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Burundi : Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix
(executive summary also available in English)


 PDF version of Burundi : Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix<br>
(executive summary also available in English) Click here to view the full report as a PDF file in A4 format.
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SYNTHESE ET RECOMMANDATIONS

(SCROLL DOWN FOR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY IN ENGLISH)

Le processus de paix burundais est enfin d�bloqu�. Le 23 juillet � Arusha, le choix du facilitateur Nelson Mandela de confier � Pierre Buyoya et Domitien Ndayizeye la pr�sidence et la vice-pr�sidence de la premi�re moiti� de la transition, a �t� ent�rin� par les chefs d�Etat de la r�gion. Les deux hommes se sont �galement engag�s � remplir onze conditions garantissant l�application pleine et enti�re de l�Accord d�Arusha du 28 ao�t 2000. La transition, qui durera au total trois ans, doit commencer le 1er novembre 2001. En l�absence de cessez-le-feu, l�application de l�Accord d�Arusha ne pourra pas b�n�ficier de la pr�sence d�une force internationale de maintien de la paix. Mais pour permettre le retour des leaders politiques exil�s, une force sp�ciale burundaise de protection des institutions est pr�vue. Elle sera compos�e pour moiti� de membres des forces arm�es burundaises, et pour moiti� de soldats et policiers choisis par les partis repr�sentants les int�r�ts de la population hutu.

L�accord politique ent�rin� � Arusha est le fruit d�un changement d�approche de la facilitation Mandela. Cette fois, priorit� a �t� donn�e aux n�gociations entre l�Union pour le progr�s national (UPRONA) de Pierre Buyoya et le Front pour la d�mocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) de Jean Minani, qui doivent devenir les locomotives du processus de paix. Le cycle d�Arusha reposant sur la fiction de n�gociations � dix-neuf partenaires �gaux est enfin clos, et les deux principaux partenaires de la transition, l�UPRONA et le FRODEBU, sont mis en demeure de prendre leurs responsabilit�s. Le succ�s de la transition d�pendra de la qualit� de leur coop�ration. La question du leadership de transition �tant r�gl�e, les parties au conflit vont �galement pouvoir se pencher sur l�enjeu central du processus de paix: la r�forme des forces de s�curit�.

Cependant, jusqu�� aujourd�hui, malgr� la mobilisation internationale et r�gionale sur la question du cessez-le-feu, les groupes arm�s n'ont donn� aucun signe tangible de leur volont� de n�gociation dans le cadre d�Arusha. Les derni�res consultations sur le cessez-le-feu, tenue � Pretoria le 25 et 26 juillet entre la d�l�gation du Conseil national pour la d�fense de la d�mocratie-Forces de d�fense de la d�mocratie (CNDD-FDD) et celle du gouvernement se sont sold�es par un �chec. Le CNDD-FDD rejette l�accord d�Arusha, conteste l�impartialit� de la m�diation sud-africaine, et exige la nomination d�un co-m�diateur francophone. L�application de l�accord d�Arusha ne semble pas non plus concerner le Parti pour la lib�ration du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de lib�ration (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), qui ne fait que r�it�rer ses propres conditions de n�gociation.

Mais, d�sormais les n�gociations sur le cessez-le-feu sont �galement la responsabilit� du FRODEBU. La cr�dibilit� de son leadership sur la famille politique hutu et sa capacit� � mener � bien la transition en d�pendent. Toute la responsabilit� de l�obtention d�un cessez-le-feu ne peut cependant reposer sur le seul FRODEBU. Il est ainsi grand temps de chercher une formule plus adapt�e et plus productive pour ces n�gociations. Leur �chec fait peser trop de risques sur l�avenir de la transition. La tentative de coup d�Etat du 22 juillet, la deuxi�me en un peu plus de trois mois, �tait un avertissement clair au pr�sident Buyoya : alors que le pays est en guerre, les choix politiques faits � Arusha sont contest�s par une partie de l�arm�e et font peur � la communaut� tutsi en g�n�ral, dont certains membres sont pr�ts � stopper net la relance du processus de paix.

Les cent jours qui s�parent le 23 juillet du 1er novembre 2001 sont donc un moment charni�re pour le processus de paix burundais. Ces cent jours vont forger la cr�dibilit� politique de la future transition. Ils doivent permettre de rassurer et de recr�er une confiance minimale, permettant de vaincre les peurs et les r�actions de rejet. A ce stade, il est essentiel que tous les acteurs politiques, nationaux, r�gionaux et internationaux, manifestent, sans ambigu�t�, leur soutien � cette relance du processus de paix. Les tentations putschistes doivent �tre d�courag�es et les pressions n�cessaires doivent �tre appliqu�es pour que la r�bellion rejoigne la table des n�gociations. Les bailleurs de fonds du Burundi doivent par ailleurs tenir leurs promesses quant au soutien financier annonc� lors de la conf�rence de Paris, en d�cembre 2000. Au premier novembre 2001, l�ensemble de la population burundaise doit pouvoir retrouver l�espoir de la paix, et commencer � sentir les b�n�fices �conomiques et sociaux qu�elle pourra tirer de l�application de l�Accord d�Arusha. Tous les efforts doivent �tre mis en �uvre pour qu�au terme de ces cent jours, un horizon meilleur se dessine pour le Burundi.

RECOMMANDATIONS

AU CONSEIL DE SECURITE DES NATIONS UNIES

1. Condamner vigoureusement les tentatives de coup d��tat et faire savoir clairement que des sanctions seront prises en cas de r�cidive, ou de r�glements de compte et d�assassinats politiques. Qualifier de criminels de guerre ceux qui tenteront un coup d��tat, lancer des proc�dures judiciaires � leur encontre et geler leurs avoirs financiers � l��tranger.

2. Soutenir la formation d�une force de maintien de la paix pr�te � intervenir imm�diatement le jour o� un cessez-le-feu est d�clar�. Engager d�ors et d�j� la pr�paration administrative et op�rationnelle de cette force, en �tablissant les diff�rentes possibilit�s de concept d�op�ration, les d�tails de sa mission, et les modalit�s et lieux de son d�ploiement (notamment sur fronti�re tanzanienne, le lac Tanganyika, et dans la plaine de la Rusizi).

3. Continuer la pression sur la R�publique D�mocratique du Congo et le dialogue critique avec la Tanzanie, pour que cesse tout soutien ext�rieur aux groupes arm�s.

AUX BAILLEURS DE FONDS DU BURUNDI.

4. Urgemment d�bloquer 100 millions de dollars sur les 440 millions promis en d�cembre 2000 � la conf�rence de Paris pour cr�er un fonds de soutien � l�application de l�accord de paix et donner un �tat de gr�ce au gouvernement de transition. Ces fonds doivent permettre la r�union rapide des commissions techniques pr�vues par l�accord pour le rapatriement des r�fugi�s et la r�installation des sinistr�s, soutenir l�activit� productive et faciliter l�acc�s aux devises, de sorte � provoquer une baisse rapide des prix sur les biens de premi�re n�cessit�, de grande consommation et les denr�es alimentaires.

5. Financer g�n�reusement la mise en place d�une unit� de protection des institutions de transition et des leaders politiques en exil, pour en faire l�exemple de ce que deviendra le futur soutien au plan de r�formes des services de s�curit�. Au besoin, offrir un compl�ment de formation acc�l�r�e aux officiers hutu qui participeraient au commandement conjoint.

AUX PAYS DE LA REGION MEMBRES DE L�INITIATIVE REGIONALE SUR LE BURUNDI (OUGANDA, RWANDA, REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO, REPUBLIQUE UNIE DE TANZANIE NOTAMMENT).

6. R�affirmer sans ambigu�t� leur soutien � l�application pleine et enti�re de l�accord d�Arusha, aux r�sultats du sommet du 23 juillet, et leur engagement � faire front contre la r�bellion si des pourparlers significatifs pour l�obtention d�un cessez-le-feu n�ont pas �t� ouverts au 1er novembre. De m�me, signifier clairement aux opposants tutsi des accords d�Arusha et de Pretoria, qu�aucune d�rive putschiste ne sera tol�r�e. A NELSON MANDELA ET A L�EQUIPE DE LA FACILITATION 7. Ouvrir un bureau � Bujumbura et lancer une grande campagne d�explication de l�accord de paix pour �viter les sp�culations et les manipulations d�opinion. La diffusion par �crit de l�accord n�est pas suffisante. Il faut l�expliquer oralement par des tourn�es dans tout le pays et la diffusion r�guli�re de programmes radiodiffus�s en langues vernaculaires.

8. Ouvrir des canaux discrets de contacts avec la r�bellion, y compris sur le terrain.

9. Nommer une �quipe de m�diateurs professionnels � plein temps sur la question du cessez-le-feu qui puissent oeuvrer discr�tement � la construction de la confiance avec les groupes rebelles

10. Donner des garanties de confidentialit�, discr�tion et immunit� � ceux qui n�gocient du c�t� de la r�bellion.

11. Ne pas inviter les FDD et les FNL � n�gocier s�par�ment.

12. Demander � la r�bellion une tr�ve, qui donnerait au gouvernement de transition les moyens de faire accepter des r�formes aux extr�mistes

AUX MEMBRES DU FUTUR GOUVERNEMENT DE TRANSITION

13. Eviter les d�clarations hostiles et travailler � construire la confiance mutuelle. Disqualifier du gouvernement de transition tout dirigeant de parti politique coupable de diffamation ou d�incitation � la haine ethnique.

14. Tout mettre en oeuvre pour s�curiser les dirigeants en exil et les inviter � rentrer

15. Ouvrir une structure d�accueil pour les combattants d�sireux de d�poser les armes et proposer des programmes de formation et de r�insertion professionnelle. Faire une campagne de communication active dans le pays proposant l�int�gration dans l�arm�e et la formation d�officiers aux combattants hutu.

Arusha/Bujumbura/Nairobi/Bruxelles,14 ao�t 2001

**********************************************************

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BURUNDI :

ONE HUNDRED DAYS TO PUT THE PEACE PROCESS BACK ON TRACK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The deadlock in the Burundi peace process has finally been broken. On 23 July in Arusha, Nelson Mandela�s choice of Pierre Buyoya and Domitien Ndayizeye as president and vice-president of Burundi for the first phase of transition was endorsed at a summit of regional heads of state. Buyoya and Ndayizeye also agreed to fulfil eleven conditions guaranteeing the full implementation of the Arusha agreement of 28 August 2000. The three-year transition period will start on 1 November 2001.

In the absence of a ceasefire, the implementation of the Arusha agreement will not be backed up by a UN peacekeeping force. However a special Burundian protection force is foreseen to facilitate the return of exiled political leaders. Half of the force will be picked from members of the Tutsi-dominated army; the parties representing Hutu interests will choose the other half.

The political compromise endorsed in Arusha is the result of a change in approach by the Mandela facilitation team. This time priority was given to the negotiations between Pierre Buyoya�s Union pour le progr�s national (Union for national progress, UPRONA) and Jean Minani�s Front pour la d�mocratie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in Burundi, FRODEBU), which must now become the driving forces of the peace process. The previous cycle of negotiations, based on the fiction of discussions between nineteen equal parties, is finally over. The key transition partners, UPRONA and FRODEBU, must face their responsibilities. The success of the transition will depend on their cooperation. And with the issue of the transitional leadership finally sorted out, the negotiators will have no choice but to focus on the central issue of the peace process: the reform of the armed forces.

Up to now, despite regional and international mobilisation on the issue of a ceasefire, the armed groups have given no tangible sign of willingness to negotiate within the Arusha framework. The latest ceasefire negotiations, which took place in Pretoria on 25 and 26 July between the government and the Conseil national pour la d�fense de la d�mocratie-Forces de d�fense de la d�mocratie (CNDD-FDD), were a failure. The CNDD-FDD rejected the Arusha agreement, criticised the South African facilitation team for being biased, and demanded the appointment of a French-speaking co-mediator. The Parti pour la liberation du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de lib�ration (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) also seems uninterested in the implementation of the Arusha agreement, simply reiterating its own negotiating conditions.

The ceasefire negotiations are also FRODEBU�s responsibility. The credibility of its leadership of the Hutu political family and its capacity to lead the transition successfully are dependent on it. But the burden of obtaining a ceasefire cannot rest on FRODEBU alone. It is high time to seek a more suitable and productive formula for the negotiations. Failure carries too many risks for the future of the transition. The coup attempt of 22 July, (the second in just over three months), is a clear warning to Pierre Buyoya: in the absence of ceasefire, the political choices made in Arusha frighten the army and the Tutsi community in general. Some of its members are ready to stop the peace process dead.

The hundred days from 23 July to 1 November are therefore pivotal for the Burundi peace process. These hundred days will lay the foundations of the coming transition period. They must produce sufficient confidence in the peace process to ease fears and reduce hostility. At this point, it is crucial that all political actors, national, regional and international, show unambiguous support for putting the peace process back on track. The coup-plotters must be strongly discouraged, and the necessary pressures must be applied to bring the rebels back to the negotiating table.

Burundi�s donors must also keep the promises of financial support made at the Paris conference of December 2000. By 1 November 2001, Burundi�s population must have regained hope that peace is possible, and begin to feel the economic and social benefits to be gained from the implementation of the Arusha agreement. All these efforts must get underway now, so that at the end of the hundred days, a brighter future is in sight for Burundi.

Recommendations

TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Vigorously condemn any coup attempts and warn that sanctions will be applied to future coup plotters or those who attempt political assassination. Treat the culprits as international criminals, begin legal proceedings against them and freeze their financial assets overseas.

2. Support the creation of a peacekeeping force, ready to intervene as soon as a ceasefire has been declared. Prepare its administrative and operational set-up, develop different options for its concept of operations, the details of its mission, and the terms and location of deployments (especially on the Tanzanian border, Lake Tanganyika, and on the Rusizi plain).

3. Maintain pressure on the Democratic Republic of Congo, and discussions with Tanzania, to end all external support for armed groups.

TO BURUNDI�S DONORS

4. Make available immediately U.S.$100 million of the U.S.$440 million promised at the Paris conference of December 2000 for the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and give the transition government a period of grace. These funds must support the rapid creation of various technical commissions for the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons. They should also support economic production, and ease access to foreign currency to promote rapid reductions in the cost of food and basic goods.

5. Generously support the creation of a special Burundian force to protect the institutions of transition and political leaders returned from exile, making the force an example of what to expect from future reform of the security services. If necessary, offer complementary accelerated training programs to Hutu officers who participate in the joint command structure.

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL INITIATIVE FOR BURUNDI (UGANDA, RWANDA, TANZANIA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AMONG OTHERS).

6. Give unambiguous support to the full implementation of the Arusha agreement if August 2000 and the results of the 23 July 2001 summit, and support the creation of a united front against the rebels if by 1 November significant ceasefire negotiations have not begun. Equally, warn Tutsi opponents of the Arusha and Pretoria agreements that no support for coup attempts will be tolerated.

TO NELSON MANDELA AND THE FACILITATION TEAM.

7. Open an office in Bujumbura and launch a major information campaign to explain the peace agreement, in order to avoid speculation and prevent manipulation of public opinion. The distribution of the written agreement is not enough. Members of the facilitation team must tour the country to explain the agreement orally, and arrange regular radio broadcasts about the agreement in local languages.

8. Open discreet channels of communication with the rebels, including in the field.

9. Appoint a permanent team of professional negotiators devoted to the ceasefire negotiations, which can work to build confidence with the rebel groups.

10. Give guarantees of confidentiality, discretion and amnesty to rebels who are prepared to negotiate.

11. Do not deal separately with the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.

12. Ask the rebels to declare a truce to give the transition government a chance to impose significant reforms on the Tutsi extremists.

TO THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF TRANSITION

13. Avoid hostile statements and work towards building mutual trust. Disqualify any party leader guilty of defamation or incitement to ethnic hatred from joining the transition government.

14. Provide all means necessary to guarantee the security and encourage the return of exiled political leaders.

15. Establish a system to receive fighters who are willing to put down their weapons and offer training and professional reintegration programmes. Launch a national information campaign offering integration into the army and training to Hutu fighters.

Arusha/Bujumbura/Nairobi/Brussels 14 August 2001

 PDF version of Burundi : Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix<br>
(executive summary also available in English) Click here to view the full report as a PDF file in A4 format.
For more information about viewing PDF documents, please click here. If you have problems downloading the report, please let us know.

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