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Burundi: One Hundred Days to put the Peace Process Back on Track (English version)

 PDF version of Burundi: One Hundred Days to put the Peace Process Back on Track (English version) Click here to view the full report as a PDF file in A4 format.
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The deadlock in the Burundi peace process has finally been broken. On 23 July in Arusha, Nelson Mandela�s choice of Pierre Buyoya and Domitien Ndayizeye as president and vice-president of Burundi for the first phase of transition was endorsed at a summit of regional heads of state. Buyoya and Ndayizeye also agreed to fulfil eleven conditions guaranteeing the full implementation of the Arusha agreement of 28 August 2000. The three-year transition period will start on 1 November 2001. In the absence of a ceasefire, the implementation of the Arusha agreement will not be backed up by a UN peacekeeping force. However a special Burundian protection force is foreseen to facilitate the return of exiled political leaders. Half of the force will be picked from members of the Tutsi-dominated army; the parties representing Hutu interests will choose the other half.

The political compromise endorsed in Arusha is the result of a change in approach by the Mandela facilitation team. This time priority was given to the negotiations between Pierre Buyoya�s Union pour le progr�s national (Union for national progress, UPRONA) and Jean Minani�s Front pour la d�mocratie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in Burundi, FRODEBU), which must now become the driving forces of the peace process. The previous cycle of negotiations, based on the fiction of discussions between nineteen equal parties, is finally over. The key transition partners, UPRONA and FRODEBU, must face their responsibilities. The success of the transition will depend on their cooperation. And with the issue of the transitional leadership finally sorted out, the negotiators will have no choice but to focus on the central issue of the peace process: the reform of the armed forces.

Up to now, despite regional and international mobilisation on the issue of a ceasefire, the armed groups have given no tangible sign of willingness to negotiate within the Arusha framework. The latest ceasefire negotiations, which took place in Pretoria on 25 and 26 July between the government and the Conseil national pour la d�fense de la d�mocratie-Forces de d�fense de la d�mocratie (CNDD-FDD), were a failure. The CNDD-FDD rejected the Arusha agreement, criticised the South African facilitation team for being biased, and demanded the appointment of a French-speaking co-mediator. The Parti pour la lib�ration du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de lib�ration (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) also seems uninterested in the implementation of the Arusha agreement, simply reiterating its own negotiating conditions.

The ceasefire negotiations are also FRODEBU�s responsibility. The credibility of its leadership of the Hutu political family and its capacity to lead the transition successfully are dependent on it. But the burden of obtaining a ceasefire cannot rest on FRODEBU alone. It is high time to seek a more suitable and productive formula for the negotiations. Failure carries too many risks for the future of the transition. The coup attempt of 22 July, (the second in just over three months), is a clear warning to Pierre Buyoya: in the absence of ceasefire, the political choices made in Arusha frighten the army and the Tutsi community in general. Some of its members are ready to stop the peace process dead.

The hundred days from 23 July to 1 November are therefore pivotal for the Burundi peace process. These hundred days will lay the foundations of the coming transition period. They must produce sufficient confidence in the peace process to ease fears and reduce hostility. At this point, it is crucial that all political actors, national, regional and international, show unambiguous support for putting the peace process back on track. The coup-plotters must be strongly discouraged, and the necessary pressures must be applied to bring the rebels back to the negotiating table. Burundi�s donors must also keep the promises of financial support made at the Paris conference of December 2000. By 1 November 2001, Burundi�s population must have regained hope that peace is possible, and begin to feel the economic and social benefits to be gained from the implementation of the Arusha agreement. All these efforts must get underway now, so that at the end of the hundred days, a brighter future is in sight for Burundi.



1. Vigorously condemn any coup attempts and warn that sanctions will be applied to future coup plotters or those who attempt political assassination. Treat the culprits as international criminals, begin legal proceedings against them and freeze their financial assets overseas.

2. Support the creation of a peacekeeping force, ready to intervene as soon as a ceasefire has been declared. Prepare its administrative and operational set-up, develop different options for its concept of operations, the details of its mission, and the terms and location of deployments (especially on the Tanzanian border, Lake Tanganyika, and on the Rusizi plain).

3. Maintain pressure on the Democratic Republic of Congo, and discussions with Tanzania, to end all external support for armed groups.


4. Make available immediately U.S.$100 million of the U.S.$440 million promised at the Paris conference of December 2000 for the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and give the transition government a period of grace. These funds must support the rapid creation of various technical commissions for the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons. They should also support economic production, and ease access to foreign currency to promote rapid reductions in the cost of food and basic goods.

5. Generously support the creation of a special Burundian force to protect the institutions of transition and political leaders returned from exile, making the force an example of what to expect from future reform of the security services. If necessary, offer complementary accelerated training programs to Hutu officers who participate in the joint command structure.


6. Give unambiguous support to the full implementation of the Arusha agreement if August 2000 and the results of the 23 July 2001 summit, and support the creation of a united front against the rebels if by 1 November significant ceasefire negotiations have not begun. Equally, warn Tutsi opponents of the Arusha and Pretoria agreements that no support for coup attempts will be tolerated.


7. Open an office in Bujumbura and launch a major information campaign to explain the peace agreement, in order to avoid speculation and prevent manipulation of public opinion. The distribution of the written agreement is not enough. Members of the facilitation team must tour the country to explain the agreement orally, and arrange regular radio broadcasts about the agreement in local languages.

8. Open discreet channels of communication with the rebels, including in the field.

9. Appoint a permanent team of professional negotiators devoted to the ceasefire negotiations, which can work to build confidence with the rebel groups.

10. Give guarantees of confidentiality, discretion and amnesty to rebels who are prepared to negotiate.

11. Do not deal separately with the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.

12. Ask the rebels to declare a truce to give the transition government a chance to impose significant reforms on the Tutsi extremists.


13. Avoid hostile statements and work towards building mutual trust. Disqualify any party leader guilty of defamation or incitement to ethnic hatred from joining the transition government.

14. Provide all means necessary to guarantee the security and encourage the return of exiled political leaders.

15. Establish a system to receive fighters who are willing to put down their weapons and offer training and professional reintegration programmes. Launch a national information campaign offering integration into the army and training to Hutu fighters.

Arusha/Bujumbura/Nairobi/Brussels, 14 August 2001

 PDF version of Burundi: One Hundred Days to put the Peace Process Back on Track (English version) Click here to view the full report as a PDF file in A4 format.
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