OVERVIEW
This background report reviews the mechanics of Saddam
Hussein’s rule, looks at the political dynamics that govern relations between
religious and ethnic entities, and describes the various opposition groups and
their potential role. It does not seek to predict the course of events in Iraq
or to argue for any particular course of action. This is the first in a series
of reports and briefing papers that ICG intends to issue on the challenges
posed by Iraq, including the state of the country more than a decade after the
Gulf War; regional attitudes toward a possible U.S. military offensive; the
status of Iraqi Kurdistan; and Iran’s posture toward a U.S.-led war and Iraq
after Saddam Hussein.
While much public attention has been focused on the
prospects of a war and how it might unfold, far less has been devoted to the
question of Iraq’s future – with or without a military confrontation. Yet the
challenges of building a new political order may be no less than those of
tearing an old one down – particularly in the case of a country emerging from a
long period of authoritarian rule. Understanding the nature of the challenges
that might emerge in the future requires understanding the nature of the
current regime and of the underlying tensions and fault-lines within Iraqi
society at large. From commentators and policy-watchers several very different
scenarios emerge:
Another focuses more on the tensions between Kurds and
Arabs, between Shiites and Sunnis and between tribes; on the prospects for
bloodletting and score-settling by Iraqis who have suffered long years of
dictatorship; and on the risks of meddling by Iran, Turkey or Syria, and paints
a far more worrisome picture of civil war and chaos.
In many respects, the 1991 Gulf War was far from a finishing
chapter in the Iraqi saga. While Iraq’s armed forces were forced to leave
neighbouring Kuwait, the Iraqi regime has continued to thwart the will of the
international community and to perpetuate its hold on power. Evidence suggests
that the regime is deeply unpopular at home, but it has continued to rule
through a combination of fear, a sophisticated security network and various
measures of political and economic cooptation. It also has either debilitated
potential alternative centres of power or ensured that they are constituted
along narrow lines to make any alliance among them unlikely. While the
internationally imposed sanctions undeniably have limited the resources available to it, the regime has
been able to establish increasingly sophisticated mechanisms of contraband
trade to circumvent them. Paradoxically, the sanctions also have deepened the
population’s dependence on the regime that they were designed to weaken.
The regime’s ability to survive derives as well from structural
tensions within Iraqi society, some of which pre-date Saddam Hussein’s rule,
most of which he has endeavoured to deepen since the 1991 Gulf War, and many of
which are likely to outlive his tenure. These include important ethnic and
religious fault-lines. Iraqi Kurds have a long history of repression at the
hands of the central government and have suffered enormously under the current
regime, which has successfully manipulated Arab-Kurdish as well as recurring
intra-Kurdish tensions. Any attempt to build a stable Iraq and preserve its
territorial integrity will need to address the Kurds’ legitimate grievances.
Much of the Kurdish population has come to enjoy considerable political
autonomy from Baghdad as a result of the direct flow of revenue from the UN
Oil-for-Food Program, and they are not about to accept a rollback of their new
status. Fear of losing this status coupled with Washington's historically
inconsistent record of support for the Kurds explains why many of them, though
deeply hostile to the regime, also are wary of the impact of a U.S.-led regime
change. An internationally-backed formula for power-sharing, for example under
some kind of federal structure, may go some way to ensuring internal Iraqi
stability and minimising third party intervention (e.g., from Turkey or Iran)
prompted by the Kurdish question.
Shiites, who constitute a majority of the Iraqi population,
are increasingly assertive in rejecting their traditional marginal status
within society. Rifts between Shiites and Sunnis, therefore, will need to be
mended as part of an effort at national reconciliation that must include an end
to any form of discrimination and intensified endeavours to rebuild the
predominantly Shiite south. At the same time, there is far less to this division
than generally assumed. Shiites are present at all levels of the Iraqi
government, including Saddam Hussein’s inner circle and the ruling Baath Party.
While they undeniably suffer from social and political discrimination, it is
difficult to speak of a strict Sunni or Shiite identity in Iraq. Among Shiites
in particular a wide variety of views about politics and religion, contradicts
the stereotypical image of a monolithic, radical and pro-Iranian community.
Playing up Shiite discontent with the regime and encouraging a separate Shiite
identity in the hope of undermining Saddam Hussein runs the risk of
exacerbating religious tensions that, so far, have been kept relatively in
check.
Other, less visible divisions are of equal importance.
Tribalism in particular is a significant but often neglected feature of the
political landscape. Even while Saddam Hussein has denounced it, his power
structure relies heavily on affiliations to his own clan and on a network of
Sunni tribes that constitute the core of the Republican and Special Republican
Guards.
Religious, ethnic, tribal but also class-based and
ideological splits will complicate attempts to rebuild Iraq. Already, they have
seriously complicated attempts to build the Iraqi opposition. Having fled as a
result of regime repression, and therefore unable to function inside the
country, most opposition groups have had a hard time maintaining close links
with the Iraqi people. Moreover, the opposition has been hobbled by divisions
along the fault-lines mentioned above. In some instances, opposition groups
have served as little more than vehicles for personal ambition. This situation,
in turn, has made it easier for the regime to keep dissent at bay.
The debilitated state of Iraq’s political and civil society
combined with the ineffectiveness and divisiveness of the opposition have led
some to bank on a military coup to oust the regime. Iraq’s military, to be
sure, has a history of intrusive intervention in politics and is viewed by many
Sunnis as a potential bulwark against future Shiite predominance. But a
successful coup remains highly improbable in Saddam Hussein’s tightly
controlled regime, particularly absent the impetus of external military action.
A concerted U.S. attack aimed at unseating the regime, or a credible threat
thereto, may make it more likely that officers in Saddam Hussein’s inner circle
will cross the barrier of fear that his police state has carefully constructed
over the years and seek to overthrow the regime. Yet even a successful military
coup may well lead to a narrowly-based regime governing along tribal lines,
with resultant political instability.
The task of building a stable and pluralistic Iraq is
enormous. The country does not divide up as neatly as people often assume, with
a Shiite south, a Sunni centre and a Kurdish north, and the Iraqi people do not
necessarily feel represented by the ethnically or religiously-based
organisations that seek to speak on their behalf. Instead, there are tribal,
ideological, and class rivalries that – given Iraq’s lack of familiarity with
genuine democracy and its surplus of experience with force as a means of
effectuating political change – could produce violent confrontations and a
continued militarisation of politics. Finding acceptable and representative
leaders will in all likelihood be complicated, not a matter simply of importing
the exiled opposition. As a result, the distribution of power and resources
will be difficult and the risks of chaos, instability, and extra-judicial
score-settling high.
The international community is only beginning to come to
terms with this task. A future government eventually will have to address
critical challenges – attending to the structural problems that have plagued
Iraq for decades, establishing a functioning democratic system, redressing and
restructuring the economy, addressing the Kurdish question, dealing with the
difficult matter of Iraq’s borders, and
promoting national reconciliation. Even in the event of an outside intervention,
and whatever regime succeeds Saddam Hussein’s in the short run, ultimately
Iraqi political forces, both inside and outside the country, will help answer
those questions and shape the character of the regime. It would be far better
to think about these issues carefully now than to react hurriedly later, forced
by swiftly moving events.
To a degree that knows few precedents in modern history, the
future of Iraq is likely to be an interactive process between, on the one hand,
Iraq and its citizens and, on the other hand, many outside actors, including
its immediate neighbours, the Arab world, Western powers and the United
Nations. Giving the great numbers within Iraq who have been effectively
disenfranchised by the current regime a say in their own economic and political
future will be one of the most fundamental and difficult challenges of all.
Amman/Brussels, 1 October 2002