Far greater international involvement is needed in resolving the
Congo conflict. Disarmament of the Hutu armed groups – the focus
of this report - is just part of the solution. The Democratic
Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe must be pressured to stop
supporting the Hutu militias which they fund as a proxy DRC army
against Rwandan and Ugandan forces. A political agreement must
also be found on the withdrawal of foreign forces, most
critically those of Rwanda in the eastern Congo. ICG calls on
the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to take a
personal, ongoing role as mediator between Rwanda and the DRC.
His ultimate objective should be a non-aggression pact between
the two countries and complete withdrawal of foreign forces.
The signing of the Framework Agreement at Ohrid in August was a
notable success, but Macedonia is not out of danger. The
conflict with Albanians and the Ohrid agreement have undermined
Macedonia’s fragile sense of national identity. Unless this
anxiety is addressed, the Framework Agreement may buckle and the
country slide back into conflict. The most acute identity issue
– and the one that, if resolved, would have most positive impact
– is the long-running name dispute with Greece. Since 1992, at
Greek insistence, Macedonia has been internationally known under
the provisional name ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, or
FYROM. ICG argues that there are now compelling strategic
reasons for the international community to acknowledge the
country’s constitutional name, ‘Republika Makedonija’, while
accepting and defending Greece’s legitimate concerns.
This report analyses key influences on the country’s military
rulers – the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Most
outside pressure has failed completely to push the regime
towards democracy or economic reforms but better understanding
of the generals’ world view may improve international leverage.
The regime is obsessed with self-reliance and national
sovereignty, making it suspicious of foreign relations, however
well intentioned. But the generals are also keen to improve
Myanmar’s desperate economic situation, and there is a tension
between the desire to maintain traditional values and current
needs. ICG believes that it is vital to work for the restoration
of democracy in Myanmar, but it may be most practical in the
short term to focus on immediate goals – transforming
relationships and gradually loosening military control over
political and economic activity. Slower incremental steps may
defuse the paranoia and win more influence than demands for
rapid change that have repeatedly been rebuffed.
This report examines the extent to which organisations
independent of government can influence Myanmar’s two key
political struggles: the restoration of democracy and the
resolution of ethnic minority rights. The findings are gloomy.
The military regime has worked systematically to prevent civil
society groups from emerging, and those that it tolerates are
tightly controlled, repressed or coopted. Independent groups
hold little prospect of playing a big role in fostering eventual
democratisation. At the same time few independents in the centre
of Myanmar have thought seriously about the demands of ethnic
minorities, even though they make up 30 per cent of the
population and many groups have been waging armed struggles for
autonomy or independence for the best part of 40 years. Low
levels of education and decades of military rule also mean that
even independent organisations tend to replicate the
hierarchical structures and lack of tolerance for dissent which
characterise the regime. Despite this discouraging picture, more
can and should be done to support the expansion of civil
society.
The international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is beset
by five main problems: absence of a shared vision and effective
structures; lack of leadership and coordination; duplication and
non-cooperation; personality clashes and turf wars; and
ineffectual management of economic reform. These problems – made
more urgent by budget cuts – are universally acknowledged, and a
number of proposals to overhaul the international presence are
now under debate. The international community should adopt a
comprehensive reform plan at the Peace Implementation Council
(PIC) meeting in Brussels on 6 December, and then quickly
implement it. A model discussed in detail in the report suggests
a ‘pillar’ system, built around four core functions: institution
building; the rule of law; economic reform; and refugee return.
Bosnia has also been saddled with constitutional machinery that
is unworkable and self-defeating. If it cannot be put on its
feet by evolution, nudged along by the High Representative, or
by some negotiated constitutional settlement, then the
international community must be ready to impose a more workable
and democratic model than Dayton envisaged.
As the conflict enters a decisive phase in Afghanistan it must
be recognised that the war there did not start with the Taliban,
and will not necessarily end with their removal. If stability
and security, let alone any measure of prosperity are to take
hold in Afghanistan, a massive and sustained diplomatic and aid
effort is required. This report sets out a clear blueprint for
donor countries and aid agencies, emphasising the need for
rapid, grassroots action and a long-term commitment across the
entire Central Asian region. In the absence of any strong
central administration it is vital that donors and aid agencies
concentrate on building relationships with local powers,
establishing work programs to demobilise soldiers and supporting
those who can act peacefully and resolve disputes without
resorting to weapons. Education and health programs, especially
for women and girls, are essential to promoting rapid
improvements in the lives of Afghans. Efforts to rapidly improve
irrigation systems and demine arable land will also be key to
improving the dismal economic situation in Afghanistan.
Conventional donor programs are unlikely to provide the
flexibility and speed that the region urgently needs. ICG
therefore recommends the establishment of a co-ordinated set of
trust funds, managed by the World Bank, that will allow rapid
disbursements for regional development, mine clearance, refugee
returns, education and media, and a regional drugs program.