To access this report in
Macedonian, please click here.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Corruption in Macedonia, especially at high levels of
government, is endemic. It has evolved from passive exploitation to active
coercion and acquired the capacity not only to retard economic progress but
also to feed organised crime and, in turn, political and communal instability.
In effect, the state has come to function in important respects as a “racket”,
while the racketeers thrive in a culture of impunity.
The disease has infected the banking system as well as the
structures of government, making Macedonia both a source and a transit point
for contraband and criminality. The system encourages autocratic administration
while coexisting comfortably with inefficiency and politicisation of the
judiciary. It saps Macedonian morale, leaving civil society enervated and the
population at large cynical.
The Framework Agreement concluded at Ohrid in August 2001
cut short a rapidly evolving civil war but the agreement depends for its
viability on the development of democratic institutions and a market economy.
The corruption that eats away at the country is in many ways a cross-community,
shared enterprise. At a minimum, it is highly damaging to the economy and
increases the scope for social instability. However, it also invites outright
collusion between ethnic leaders to heighten tensions and plays a substantial
role in making the country ripe for conflict. Left to fester and spread, it
will continue to erode Macedonia’s tenuous unity and send dangerous ripple
effects throughout the Western Balkans.
Unfortunately, the international community gives few
indications that it recognises how powerfully corruption works against its
fundamental objectives in Macedonia. Officials typically excuse Macedonia with
the empty phrase “corruption is a problem in all transition countries”.
Occasionally, senior international officials issue high-minded demands for
Macedonia to clean up its act, but these have never been seriously followed
through. Opportunistic foreign investors sometimes exacerbate the problem.
The too frail international strategy emphasises “process”
and “capacity building” – the passing of laws and the training of officials to,
as one official says, “reduce the opportunities for corruption”. In the
meantime, there is little effort to analyse why this approach has not produced
meaningful results, why, for example, prosecutors do not act on ample evidence of
corruption or precisely where criminal procedure loopholes allow corrupt
officials to run free and keep their ill-gotten gains.
The international community insists that Macedonians take
“ownership” of the problem, yet it is the “owners” themselves – those in
powerful government positions – who continue to dominate, exploit and subvert
its institutions. In current circumstances, it is both naïve and negligent to
rely on weak indigenous watchdogs like the Ombudsman, the forthcoming
Anti-Corruption Commission, or the media and civil society, to stand up alone
to the corrupt elite. By pouring money into Macedonia without insisting on a
serious anti-corruption effort, the international community is merely filling
sink-holes in the budget and inadvertently acting as one of the system’s
enablers.
The argument is often made that “if we push them on
corruption, the government won’t cooperate on implementing Ohrid”. But failure
to do so undermines the very agreement on which diplomats have concentrated
their energies.
A dramatically different mind-set is needed. Macedonia is
not “just another transition country” but an inherently weak state with
external and internal challenges to its very existence. This means that
corruption inflicts special damage and that, in effect, Macedonia can have
either great corruption or stability but not both. Unconventional prescriptions
are needed. To complement existing “capacity building” programs, the
international community must incorporate fundamental changes in its approach.
It must play the role of catalyst rather than simple adviser, unabashedly
demanding reform if its financial assistance is to continue, and it must adopt
a retrospective and punitive, not merely prospective and instructive, focus in
its anti-corruption efforts.
Although this report contains specific examples, it has been
written with care to respect the rights of individuals. ICG is prepared,
however, to discuss a number of these matters in greater detail if requested to
do so by appropriate, duly authorised governmental and legislative bodies.
Also, while this report deals with the present and recent
past and so may seem to concentrate on the parties now in power, corruption is
an aspect of the country’s political culture, not the exclusive preserve of any
particular group. For an attack on it to be effective, all political parties
need to join in the effort, along with civil society and the international
donor community. Corruption is emphatically not an issue that belongs to or
should be misused for partisan political purposes, and it would be a major
mistake to believe that a change of government after the September 2002
elections will automatically sweep away the problem.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Macedonian government and political parties:
1. Commit to fighting corruption as a major priority that
extends beyond the life of the present government and the September 2002
elections and give concrete form to that commitment by accepting international
proposals and strategies including those recommended below and those presented
by civil society.
To the major international donors, including the European
Union and its member states and the U.S., and international financial
institutions:
2. Recognise the role of corruption in perpetuating instability
in Macedonia and accept the need to play a leadership role in fighting it.
3. Develop programs and
policy positions that deal with past corruption, not only preventing future
episodes.
4. Identify as priority
areas for corrective action those sectors that are especially susceptible to
corruption because of the lucrative opportunities they offer or sensitive for
the punishment and deterrence of corruption; in particular, urge the Macedonian
government to agree to the appointment of international “watchdogs” to work
inside the Health Insurance Fund, the Customs Service, the Prosecutor’s Office
and the Judiciary.
5. Condition financial aid to the government, in particular all
balance of payments and budget support, on serious anti-corruption reform, and
work with the government to develop realistic benchmarks to assess both good
faith and effectiveness.
6. Make convictions and
confiscations the express goals of a results-oriented anti-corruption strategy,
as a complement to the existing approach that emphasises improving the
“capacity” of Macedonian institutions and strengthening the legal framework.
7. Incorporate specific
“follow-up” elements in all anti-corruption training programs.
8. Provide financial support for the newly formed governmental
Anti-Corruption Commission so it can operate effectively as soon as it is
launched in October 2002, and to Transparency International Macedonia’s civil
society effort to develop an anti-corruption strategy and build an
“anti-corruption coalition”.
9. Urge passage of legislation to limit the scope of parties
when in power to make appointments on the basis of political patronage rather
than competence.
10. Engage Albanian political parties and civil society more
actively in the anti-corruption effort.
To the European Union (EU):
11. Appoint an EU Anti-Corruption Adviser in Macedonia to
complement the work of the EU Special Envoy.
To the International Monetary Fund (IMF):
12. Relax restrictions on hiring additional personnel in the
State Auditor’s Office and related agencies.
13. Set targets of increased revenue for ministries where
corruption is depleting revenue.
Skopje/Brussels, 14 August 2002
