OVERVIEW
Prospects are still weak for a ceasefire agreement in
Burundi that includes all rebel factions. Despite the Arusha agreement in
August 2000 and installation of a transition government on 1 November 2001, the
warring parties, the Burundi army and the various factions of the Party for the
Liberation of the Hutu People/National Liberation Forces (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) and
of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy/Defense Forces of
Democracy (CNDD-FDD), are still fighting. Neither side has been able to gain a
decisive military advantage, although the army recently claimed several
important victories.
A ceasefire – the missing element in the Arusha framework –
has been elusive despite on-going activity by the South African facilitation
team to initiate joint and separate talks with the rebels. In February 2002,
the transition government and the facilitation team requested Tanzania’s help
to bring the rebels to the table. Since 28 July 2002, the CNDD-FDD factions
have been holding internal consultations in Dar-es-Salaam that should lead to
direct negotiations with the transition government. Global negotiations are to
start in Tanzania on 6 August. A subsequent regional summit should evaluate the
achievements of those talks. Its unspoken principles will be to decide whether
sanctions should be applied to those who remain outside the process. So far
both factions of the CNDD-FDD have shown signs of commitment to the talks but
the PALIPEHUTU-FNL is perceived as a stumbling block and a likely target for
sanctions.
Arusha provided that the presidency would be transferred
after eighteen months from Pierre Buyoya to the current vice-president,
FRODEBU’s Domitien Ndayizeye, but there is a risk this will not happen if a
ceasefire is not agreed soon. This would almost certainly collapse the entire
Arusha framework. FRODEBU – Buyoya’s transition partner and the main Hutu
political party – would have to concede the Hutu rebels’ chief criticism, that
it could not deliver on the political promises it made in signing Arusha. The
fractious coalition would appear a toothless partner in a flawed power-sharing
deal with a government that had no intention of reforming. All this would
likely lead to escalation rather than an end to fighting.
This
briefing paper provides information about and a context for understanding the
rebel factions, whose history, objectives and internal politics are little
known outside Burundi. It analyses their dynamics, operational situations and
negotiating positions and is a product of extensive field research conducted in
Tanzania and in Burundi, including meetings with key front-line rebel leaders.
Nairobi/Brussels, 6 August 2002
