God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan

The International Crisis Group (ICG) works to prevent and contain deadly
conflict through a unique combination of field-based analysis, policy
prescription and high-level advocacy. Few countries are more deserving of
such attention than Sudan, where the scale of human suffering has been
mind numbing, and where the ongoing civil war continues to severely
disrupt regional stability and desperately inhibit development. ICG launched
a Sudan project in 2001 because we felt the country was at a crossroads, and
that now was the time when concentrated attention by the international
community could make a decisive difference.

As this report shows, a small window for peace has opened. The reasons for
this include the shock effect of the 11 September terror attacks in the
United States (U.S.) and their aftermath on policy debates within the
Khartoum government; the military calculations of the government and its
main opposition, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) insurgency; a
difficult economic situation; and the increasing desire of the Khartoum
authorities to escape international isolation and enjoy their new oil wealth.
Importantly also, the U.S. government, by appointing distinguished former
Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy, is showing some willingness to
become more engaged.

Progress, nonetheless, will not be easy. This report makes clear that the
Sudan situation is far more complex than normally port rayed in the
media, or by advocates of particular causes. It is a struggle, to be sure,
between a northern government that is largely Arab and Muslim and a
southern insurgency that is largely black and significantly Christian , but it
is also increasingly a contest between a non-democratic centre and
hitherto peripheral groups from all parts of the country. It is a contest
over oil and other natural resources , but also one about ideologies,
including the degree to which a government's radical Islamist agenda can
be moderated and a rebel movement's authoritarianism can embrace
civilian democracy.

The Sudanese government faces stark choices, brought into sharp re l i e f
since 11 September. It can build on the progress that has been made on
counter - terrorism and commit itself to negotiate peace seriously. Or it can
try to pocket the goodwill it has gained and intensify the war while
remaining shackled to the ideology that was the inspiration of its 1989
c o u p .

The Sudanese opposition faces difficult choices and challenges of its
own . The SPLA can remain a relatively limited rebel group, with a
restricted geographic base and a low - risk minimalist partnership with its
allies in the National Democratic Alliance, including a number of northern
political parties . Or it can deepen its commitment to a hearts and minds
campaign in the south and its cooperation with National Democratic
Alliance partners around a credible peace agenda .


Among the main conclusions we reach, and recommendations we
advance , are these:

1. A comprehensive peace may be possible but only if the international
community for the first time makes its achievement a significant
objective, and commits the necessary political and diplomatic
resources;

2. There will be no success if the parties can continue to play one
initiative off against another, which means the major existing efforts -the
Egyptian - Libyan Joint Initiative , and that led by Kenya in the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - must either be
unified or a single new peace process created;

3. A unified peace process should be built around the vital element of
IGAD's Declaration of Principles, namely self-determination,
recognising all the room this leaves for creative negotiation on
context, detail and timing;

4. A unified peace process needs to be energised from outside: the ideal team
to coordinate both incentives and pressures for the parties to negotiate
seriously would include the U. S ., indispensably, and key Europeans —
ideally the UK re p resenting the European Union (EU) joined by Norway —
with a meaningful degree of buy-in from key neighbours and other
concerned states such as China, Malaysia and Canada;

5. Concerned members of the international community should pursue
vigorously and concurrently four major interests in Sudan: stopping the
war, laying the ground - work for democracy, protecting human rights
and winning cooperation in the fight against terrorism; and,

6. The top priority should be a comprehensive peace, grounded in the
restoration of democracy, which is the circumstance most likely to
bring both fundamental human rights improvements and guarantees
against backsliding on terrorism .

ICG developed this report , as always, through extensive fieldwork .The
primary author, Africa Program Co-Director John Prendergast, made three
trips between June and November 2001 and conducted many scores of
interviews in Sudan - both Khartoum and wa r - t orn areas of the south - as
well as in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Europe and North America .
Many others on the ICG team helped with writing and production,
including Mirna Galic, Regina Dubey, Philip Roessler, and Macgregor
Duncan. ICG Senior Adviser John Norris played a major role in the editing
process, supported by ICG Vice President (Programs) Jon Greenwald and,
at the production stage , by Research Analyst Theodora Adekunle and
Francesca Lawe-Davies. I thank them all for invaluable contributions.
This book-length report is not the ICG's last word on Sudan. It will be
followed by a series of further, shorter, field-based reports as we stay
engaged with future developments . We hope very much that an end to
Sudan's agony is near, and that this report will help the international
Policy community to accelerate that process.

Gareth Evans
President
Brussels , 10 January 2002