Between Death Threats And Censorship

31 March, 1998 (Part 1)

Contents

[En Francais]

• Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. Working As A Journalist In Algeria
   1. From threats to action
   2. Who is killing journalists?
   3. Journalism under maximum protection

3. The Legislative Arsenal
   1. The law on information
   2. The state of emergency
   3. "Terrorism and subversion"
   4. "Information relating to national security"
   5. The censorships committees

4. The Three State Monopolies
   1. Printing presses
   2. Paper supplies
   3. Advertising

5. The Private Press
   1. The birth
   2. Profile
   3. The editorial line
   4. Independence of the newspapers and their role in society
   5. Harassement, Censorship, Suspensions

6. The Audio-Visual Media
   1. National Television and Radio and Satellite Communications
   2. The Art of Manipulation
   3. Signs of Changes

7. Electronic Media

8. The Foreign Press

9. Future Prospects

10. Conclusion

11. Recommendations

Their development depends mainly on the following four actors.

• The National Assembly, where all political opinions within Algerian society are represented (with the exception of the Front Islamic du Salut, or FIS) and where the major differences dividing that society are expressed and debated: between support for Islam or for a secular society; for an authoritarian regime or a democracy; for Arab, Berber or French culture; in favour of confrontation or dialogue with the FIS, etc.
• The justice system, which is far from independent of the government; if "terrorists" are put on trial in Algeria, there are insufficient guarantees that justice will prevail.
• Civil society represented by thousands of citizen-based organisations that have started up since the beginning of the 90s. However, their development is hampered by inappropriate legislation, financial difficulties and practices inherited from the single party system.
• The private press, which is the subject of this report.

It is these private newspapers that have held out against official versions of the events of past months and revealed to the world the large-scale massacres that have taken place and the tragic fate of their victims. The private press often constitutes the main, or indeed the only source of credible information on these events; without it, the Algerian tragedy would largely have remained hidden.

Algerian journalists have paid a high price for their search for freedom. Sixty of them have been killed since 1993 and Islamist groups have directly or indirectly claimed responsibility for most of these assassinations. The last one was carried out in summer 1996, implying that these armed groups have now changed their strategy.

In theory, Algeria's press is free: the Information Law of 1990 ended state monopoly of the press. However, the State of Emergency declared in 1992 and measures in regard to information 'relating to national security', as well as the use of various forms of censorship, have placed serious limits on press freedom. In addition, the State has retained a monopoly of both paper supplies and the printing industry, as well as a near-monopoly of advertising through its ownership of public advertising companies. Press freedom is further limited by the necessity for press chiefs to live under the protection of the security forces.

Overall, despite these constraints the press displays a great degree of independence in regard to the authorities and a great deal of freedom of expression, notably in its editorials. This is demonstrated by press coverage of recent events such as local elections and the criticism of political leaders, and even in the handling of information relating to national security. On the other hand, human rights violations committed by the State are still not sufficiently covered by the press. This is the main problem.

Although representative of different political and economic opinions, the six independent newspapers with the largest distributions (El Khabar, El Watan, Libert�, Le Soir d'Alg�rie, La Tribune and Le Matin) have all tried to promote a political model based on the separation of state and religion, and reject any attempt at dialogue with the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, or FIS).

The private press has survived the attempts by Islamic fundamentalists' to destroy it and has resisted pressures by the government to reduce its independence. Indeed, it acts as an indicator of the degree of political openness in Algeria. The press is currently engaged in a battle for economic independence, as well as for access to information on the conflict and the violence.

To a greater extent than the work of the parliamentary assemblies that are accused of not being genuinely representative, especially the Senate, and which are controlled by President Zeroual's party, the autonomy and freedom granted to the Algerian press constitute a barometer of the political will for democratisation, which the Algerian authorities claim to pursue. The extent to which newspapers are able to cover information relating to national security and to criticise extortion and human rights violations by the security forces, will be important tests for the future.

Finally, this independent press, born in 1990 in a country without a democratic tradition, is already probably the freest press in the Arab world.

However, television and radio, which play a fundamental role in a country with a strong oral tradition, remain entirely in the hands of the State, although this monopoly is offset to a certain extent by the proliferation of satellite dishes that allow people to receive foreign channels, particularly French ones.

Recommendations

1. To support the existence and development of the private press, protesting against all censorship or attempts at intimidation. Furthermore, any co-operation agreement with Algeria should be dependent on the ending of the state monopoly of paper and printing companies.
2. To promote the education of Algerian journalists and encourage contacts with journalists from democratic countries.
3. To request that Algeria open up the audio-visual sector and lift all restrictions on the freedom of movement of both Algerian and foreign journalists in Algeria.
4. To support those civilian-based organisations that are independent of both the State and the Islamic parties. These organisations are often totally impoverished, but are indispensable in consolidating the opening up to democracy.

Despite the various elections that have been held since 1995 (presidential, legislative and municipal), the majority of which were tainted by fraud, Algeria is largely bereft of the institutions and organisations that characterise a democracy: an independent justice system, fundamental guarantees in respect to individual rights and freedoms, independent unions, etc. However, Algeria does possess a private press born in 1990 under the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid during the rush to bring in democracy. And in the midst of extreme difficulties - death threats from Islamic fundamentalists, violence, economic asphyxia, state censorship and banning orders - this press has survived. Despite its limitations, it constitutes the most tangible sign of the opening up to the democratisation process. These newspapers, which attract hundreds of thousands of readers every day, constitute a real scope for freedom and expression within Algerian civil society, which certain elements would rather see silenced while others would prefer them to be governed exclusively by Islamic law.

This first report on Algeria by the International Crisis Group (ICG) analyses the situation of the private press that coexists alongside the official press and examines:

• the conditions under which journalists work;
• the legislation governing the press;
• the attitude of Islamic fundamentalist towards the press;
• the State's attitude towards the press;
• the political position and editorial lines taken by the press;
• the independence of the press and its margin of manoeuvre with regard to the authorities.

The audio-visual sector, currently a State monopoly, is also discussed briefly.

It may be asked why the private press was chosen as the theme for a first ICG report on Algeria. First of all, because today the press is evidence, to an even greater extent than the National Assembly (elected during contested elections in 1996), of a political opening up that needs to be encouraged. Secondly, because the existence and independence of this press remains under constant threat and the international community, in particular the European Union and the United States, can contribute towards guaranteeing its survival and development. Finally, as the Algerian authorities restrict access to information for international organisations and journalists, ICG has not yet been able to make a general analysis of the political situation, particularly the violence, on the basis of a long-term and permanent presence in the field, although this is our primary objective.

This report is based on a series of interviews that took place in Algeria during a series of four visits between January and March 1998, totalling 28 days in the field, as well as the analysis of six private newspapers between November 1995 and March 1998. The newspapers were: El Khabar, Libert�, El Watan, Le Matin, La Tribune and Le Soir d'Alg�rie. This work was carried out under difficult conditions.

If free access to Algerian territory can be obtained, ICG will continue to monitor the situation and propose concrete recommendations aimed at helping the country to finally emerge from the extreme violence which characterises it today.

Algerian journalists claim that they must regularly fight against two redoubtable enemies: "those that want to kill them - the Islamic fundamentalists- and those that want to silence them - the authorities". Even if journalists recognise that they are threatened from two sides, the vast majority amongst them still refuse to unite to deal with both their adversaries at the same time.

Lazari Labten, representative of the Centre for Solidarity with the Media in Algeria ¹, explains: "a journalist can always be returned from prison, but nobody can bring a murdered journalist back to life. That is what makes the difference between those who want to gag the press and those who want to slit the throats of the journalists."

Threats of this type have been sent to Algerian journalists since the beginning of 1993. Indiscriminately, these letters accused journalists of being "ungodly", "Francophiles", "supporters of the State" or "enemies of Islam" and announce that they will be "executed to save Algeria".

These threats were confirmed, for the first time, on 26 May 1993, when the journalist and writer Tahar Djaout² was shot twice in the head while getting into his car. A few days earlier, on 17 May 1993, Omar Belhouchet, the editor of the daily newspaper "El Watan" escaped a similar attempt when two men tried to shoot him as he dropped his children at their school³ . From that moment on, media professionals understood that they had become the direct targets of these armed groups.

It is probably because national television represented a symbol of power for the armed groups that the second victim was an ENTV journalist⁴ , Rabah Zenati, who was killed on 4 August 1993.

The spiral of murder was underway: on 14 of October 1993, Mustapha Abada, the former general director of Algerian national television, was shot in the back of the neck in broad daylight in the suburbs of Algiers.

The journalists living in the working class neighbourhoods were the easiest targets. On 30 November 1994, Ahmed Isaad (also a television journalist) and Nassereddine Lekhal (reporter for the daily Arabic newspaper "El Massa") were shot and then beheaded.

On 3 December 1994, Said Mekbel, editorial director of the French newspaper "Le Matin", was shot twice in the head while in a restaurant with a colleague. Although he had already escaped two attempted murders, Said Mekbel had refused to leave Algeria.

By targeting Journalists, the objective of the killers is to silence the press, accused of being "on the State's pay role". By the same token, the aim was to reduce the ability of the press to investigate effectively.

The strategy of the armed groups was to focus on crimes that would reach the media and have the maximum impact in the international scene while terrorising the profession. This doubtless why, in addition to the actual assassination, their actions are particularly cruel. On 3 December 1995, Hamid Mahiout from the newspaper "Libert�" and his driver had their throats cut. Their heads were mounted on the gates of the cultural centre of the city in which Hamid Mahiout had lived.

On 11 February 1996, a new development took place: a car bomb, containing 300 kg of explosives, was parked against a wall on the "Maison de la Presse"⁵ . The explosion completely destroyed the premises of the "Soir d'Alg�rie" and damaged the headquarters of the newspapers "Le Matin" and "L'Opinion". The Chief Editor, Alloua Ait Meberek, and two journalists from "Soir d'Alg�rie" were killed⁶ .

Last in a long list is Boussaad Abdiche, from the pro-government newspaper "El Moudjahid", killed on 27 December 1996 .⁷

From 1993 to the present day, the Algerian press has paid heavily: 60 journalists and 13 employees⁸ have paid with their lives for exercising their profession.

In August 1994, Brahim Touchichet, editor of the magazine "Horoscope/Myst�res" was kidnapped and brought before an Islamic court. Without proof of any "involvement in the press campaign against the moudjahidin", he was released. The Islamic Salvation Army (Arm�e Islamique du Salut or AIS), the armed faction of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut or FIS)¹¹ , give him a message for journalists: "no excuse will be acceptable after this last warning: repent or you will only have yourselves to blame".

At the end of 1994, the AIS admitted to the murders of the media professionals in "Al Wassat", the weekly Saudi newspaper published in London¹² . The AIS justified these murders by stating: "Yes, we have killed some journalists because they had accused us, they were spreading lies about us and used the government media to harm us (...) Many murders are committed by groups controlled by the government, in order to harm our campaign (...)"

In January 1995, in a statement now made famous, the Islamic Armed Faction (le Groupe Islamique Arm� or GIA) claimed that it would continue to attack journalists that did not obey their orders: "The Moudjahidin consider that every reporter and journalist working for radio and televisions is nothing but a renegade (...). The GIA calls on all journalists to stop working immediately. The group will continue to attack those who do not obey (...). Those that fight us with words will die by the sword".

On 16 February 1996, "Al Ansar", the GIA newsletter published in Stockholm, claimed responsibility for the attack against the "Maison de la Presse". According to "Le Soir d'Alg�ri�", it was the work of two GIA leaders killed some months later by the security services¹³ .

According to the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ)¹⁴ , the Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria claimed responsibility for most of journalists murdered since 1993. Nevertheless, the circumstances that surround some murders remain unclear. The ambiguity is even greater because one woman reporter among journalists that have managed to escape assassination attempts said that she recognised two agents of the security forces amongst her attackers.

In October 1995, during an interview given to two French television channels, TF1 and Canal +, Omar Belhouchet, the editor of the daily newspaper "El Watan" declared: "There are journalists that embarrass the authorities. I would not be surprised if tomorrow I found out that some of my colleagues were murdered by men in power"¹⁵ . This statement resulted in his prosecution for "insulting organs of the State" and he was sentenced to one year's imprisonment. Omar Belhouchet has appealed and awaits the court's decision.

In December 1996, the AIS stated that "The Islamic Salvation Army disowns all murders those who carry the free pen, which is put to the service to the principles of our Algerian and Muslim people, be they in the media or other" ¹⁶.

Whether or not by coincidence, after that statement, no other journalist has been killed. According to International Federation of Journalists¹⁷ , 40 journalists were killed throughout the world during 1997. For the first time since the first killing in 1993, Algeria was spared and not one journalists was hurt. This does not, of course, mean that the threat and danger have completely disappeared.

Those that chose to remain in Algeria have had to adapt their way of life. Most press editors live in the "Club des Pins", twenty kilometres from Algiers, in a protected compound, where high ranking officials of the political regime have their villas.

Several hundreds journalists live in hotel rooms, put at their disposal by the authorities. These hotels are protected by security services.

Others, fewer in number, have continued to live in their homes, making sure they hide the nature of their profession. The physical dangers have forced some to live a semi-clandestine life: often moving from house to house, squatting in friends' apartments. Wigs and other means of disguise are part of the wardrobe of certain women journalists. During the black period, from 1993 to the end of 1996, they all lived in fear, jumping in alarm at the slightest noise.

Since then many journalists have returned to their old neighbourhoods, but vigilance is necessary and most still refuse to sign their articles. Countless articles are acknowledged by initials and pseudonyms. Only some dare sign their real names in the pages of the newspapers.

Photos of editors and reporters have also disappeared from their columns, apart from one of the "Libert�" reporter where part of his face is hidden by a scarf so as not to be recognised¹⁸ .

However, all agree that they do not feel directly targeted any longer. It seems that the armed groups have now changed their strategy¹⁹ and it is the Algerian population which is targeted.

Article 14 states that "the publication of all regular publications is free" once a simple declaration has been made to a tribunal.

Article 9 states that "the government programmes and broadcasts to the public, at any time, declarations and written statements, spoken or televised, that it considers necessary". However, "this right cannot, in any case, constitute a limit to the freedom of expression of the editorial committees and the organs concerned".

The arrest of journalists is covered by article 86: "Whoever publishes or deliberately spreads information that is erroneous or tendentious, of a nature to undermine state security and national unity may be punished by a term of imprisonment of 5 to 10 years".

Article 87: "Incitement, by any form of information, to crimes and offences against state security and national unity, when acted upon, renders the director of the publication and the writer of the article in the case liable to prosecution as accomplices to the crimes and offences provoked". The penalty is "imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of 10.000 to 100.000 DA²⁰ , or one of the two punishments only".

Article 97: "Whosoever deliberately offends (...) the head of state in office may be punished by imprisonment for at least one year and a fine of 3.000 to 30.000 DA, or one of the two punishments only".

In theory, article 78 protects journalists: "Whosoever offends by gestures, remarks or menaces a professional journalist during the exercise of his profession is liable to a term of imprisonment lasting 10 days to 2 months and a fine of 1.000 to 5.000 DA, or one of the two punishments only".

Article 56 does not explicitly refer to the state monopoly of radio and television. However, it does state that the distribution of radio or television programmes by cable, as well as the use of radio and television frequencies, must be receive authorisation. In essence, this means that, contrary to the situation regarding the written media, the State does not allow the creation of private television and radio chanels.

"Considering the grave and repeated acts against public order carried out over the last few days at several points across national territory, and the threats against institutional stability, and the grave and repeated attacks on the security of the population and the civil peace (...), a state of emergency is declared for a duration of twelve months".

Six years later, the state of emergency is still in place and constitutes a sword of Damocles hanging over press freedom.

In other words, this decree allows for the arrest of journalists and/or the suspension of newspapers.

A year and a half later, the measure took shape. The inter-ministerial decree of 7 June 1994 legalised censorship. However, the decree was never published. Instead, it was classified 'confidential' and was sent to the media by the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Communications.

The document specifies that from now on "with regard to information linked to acts of terrorism and subversion, all types of media must transmit only official statements". These will reach them "exclusively by means of APS (the official Algerian Press Agency)" or directly via the "communications unit" of the Ministry of the Interior.

Falling within the scope of 'information relating to national security' are attempted murder, police operations against armed groups, numbers of victims. In particular, it is strictly forbidden to report on the human losses sustained by the security forces or the army.

In parallel with this, the Ministry of the Interior addressed a series of 'recommendations' to those responsible for the press on how to treat this type of information, in order to "reduce the psychological impact anticipated by the masterminds of terrorism". Furthermore, it advised them to avoid "terminology that favours the ideology and propaganda of the enemy" and to deal with the issue of "information relating to national security in inside pages or in small print". On the other hand, those responsible for the press are invited to "publicise atrocities committed by the Islamists", as well as "the tricks and fraud of those who, in the name of religion (...), undertake criminal acts".

In order to ensure respect for this "phantom" law, 'reading committees' were set up inside printing firms. The civil servants responsible for censorship were also put in charge of reading the proofs before the paper is printed. Certain articles were to disappear as well as the proofs, or the whole newspaper would simply be suspended.

The first version of the 'reading committee' was rapidly shelved for more than two years.

As from 1992, having eliminated the newspapers close to FIS, the authorities attempted to control the private press. Their objective was clear: to enforce silence regarding attacks carried out by armed groups so that the authorities could continue to state, as did the politicians, that the "situation is under control and terrorism is no more than a residual phenomenon"²¹ .

However, as we shall see in Chapter 5 on "The Private Press", the journalists succeeded in winning the battle against the 'reading committees', which were abolished on 30 December 1997.

Continue...