Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 of 3)
ICG Bosnia Project, 22 September, 1996
INTRODUCTION
On 13 August the International Crisis Group monitoring the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) issued a report calling for the postponement of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the grounds that the minimum conditions for a free and fair poll did not exist. Although this call was partly answered by the decision of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to postpone municipal elections because of the blatant manipulation of the registration of refugee voters in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, the OSCE did not regard this as sufficient reason for postponing the general elections. On 14 September the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted in multi-party elections for the first time since 1990. However, the Parties to the DPA (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its two constituent entities - the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) had not created the minimum conditions for elections: repatriation and reintegration of refugees had not begun; indicted war criminals continued to exert influence behind the scenes; and freedom of movement and expression remained severely restricted. Under such handicaps the elections were bound to confirm the effective division of the country on ethnic lines and that proved to be so.
Events on the day showed that many thousands of voters were prevented from casting their ballot. Some were disenfranchised beforehand because of technical errors in the registration process; others were disenfranchised on the day through errors in the voter lists; yet others failed to cross the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) to vote because of fears for their security, confusion over transport arrangements and restrictions on seeing their former homes; and some did not see any reason to cross the IEBL because the municipal elections had been cancelled. By contrast, tens of thousands of Serb refugees were bussed into Republika Srpska from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to vote where instructed or lose their refugee status and benefits.
Analysis of the preliminary results from the elections suggests that there was a serious discrepancy between the overall voter population and the number of ballots cast. It would seem that there was a turn-out of over 100%. This calls in question the validity of the results.
On the basis of this failure to achieve the required conditions for holding the elections, disenfranchisement, electoral engineering, and the preliminary vote count results, the 14 September elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be considered free and fair as required by the DPA.
This report describes the recent historical context and analyses the campaign, the conduct and the outcome of the elections.
BACKGROUND
General
- Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia
Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most ethnically mixed of the six republics making up the Yugoslav state that emerged from the Second World War. While every republic contained more than one ethnic group, a single nation formed an absolute majority in each of the other five, and minorities tended to be concentrated in specific regions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, no nation formed an absolute majority and all three constituent nations were intermingled throughout the republic.
According to the last census, carried out in April 1991, 43.5 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina's 4,377,033 citizens declared themselves Muslim (Bosniac), 31.2 per cent Serb, 17.4 per cent Croat and 5.5 per cent Yugoslav (usually the offspring of mixed marriages). Another 2.4 per cent of the population did not belong to any of these categories. 1 Of 109 municipalities 37 had an absolute Muslim (Bosniac) majority, 32 an absolute Serb majority and 13 an absolute Croat majority.
- Bosnian Election of 1990
Bosnians went to the polls for two rounds of voting in November and December 1990. The Bosnian vote followed elections in Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia's two northern-most republics, in April that year.
As communism disintegrated and nationalists rose to power in neighbouring republics, Bosnians sought security within their own ethnic group to such an extent that the election results resembled those of an ethnic census. Of those who voted, 75 per cent opted for nationalist parties, the Bosniac Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije or SDA), Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka or SDS) and Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica or HDZ). The SDA won 86 seats, the SDS 72, and the HDZ 44 -- a combined total of 202 out of 240 seats in the Bosnian Parliament. 2
Although citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina elected nationalists to power, they did not expect their vote to result in the wholesale destruction of their homeland. At that time, the nationalist parties were broad coalitions, and local candidates reflected the very different concerns of communities spread throughout the republic. Moreover, after the vote, all three parties joined together in a coalition government in which the President of the SDA party Alija Izetbegovic became the first President of what was supposed to be a collective, rotational Presidency.
- War and Demographic Changes
Bosnia and Herzegovina's first elections in 1990 exacerbated national tensions that had already been strained by the rise of nationalist leaders in neighbouring republics. During the nearly four years of war that followed, relations between the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina disintegrated further, and people naturally rallied around their respective flags. Since the formal end to hostilities last December, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been hovering somewhere between a cease-fire and genuine peace, but psychologically Bosnians remain at war.
The Bosnian war began in April 1992. The initial Serb offensive conquered two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina within three months and set in train a massive flight of population. In its wake, the phrase etnicko ciscenje (ethnic cleansing) passed from Bosnian into the international lexicon. It encapsulates the brutality of a conflict aimed at expelling members of the "other" ethnic groups and eradicating all traces of alien culture. When a new round of fighting erupted in 1993 between Bosniacs and Croats, more of Bosnia and Herzegovina was "cleansed." And last year, when Croats and Bosniacs counter-attacked against Serbs in a joint offensive following massive NATO bombing of Serb positions, yet another wave of refugees�this time Serb�was created. Finally, when the Sarajevo suburbs were transferred in February and March of this year to Federation authorities, a new sort of bloodless "cleansing" displaced more Serbs.
The conflict and the cleansing have altered the country's pre-war demographic map beyond recognition. Estimates of war-time casualty figures vary. While some western officials have placed the death toll near 100,000, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Bureau for Health Protection reports that 278,800 people, or 6.3 per cent of the pre-war population, were killed, died or went missing in the war. Of these, 140,800 were Bosniacs, 97,300 Bosnian Serbs, 28,400 Bosnian Croats and 12,300 others. The Bosnian Serbs have never released a comprehensive report on their losses. 3 According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the war also caused 60 per cent of the population to flee their homes. Of these, 1,282,257, or 29.4 per cent of the population, sought refuge within Bosnia and Herzegovina; and a further 1,329,333, or 30.5 per cent of the population, were dispersed throughout the world in 63 countries. 4
Dayton Peace Agreement and Elections
- The Dayton Peace Agreement and the OSCE
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its two constituent entities the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska (the "Parties") agreed in the Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement or DPA), signed on 14 December 1996, to ensure that conditions exist throughout the country for the organisation of free and fair elections, and they requested that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assist the Parties to create such conditions. Also, the Parties requested that the OSCE organise the elections within nine months of signing the DPA, supervise the preparations and conduct of the elections, 5 and take on two additional tasks: monitoring and promoting human rights, and promoting confidence and security building measures and arms control. OSCE was mindful that assisting the Parties in their creation of the electoral preconditions and monitoring as well as promoting human rights were closely linked�even mutually dependent�mandates.
The OSCE set up its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1996 with U.S. diplomat Robert Frowick as the Head of Mission and created the Provisional Election Commission (PEC), the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), and the Media Experts Commission (MEC). In addition, the OSCE deployed some 40 human rights monitors in a central office in Sarajevo, in five regional monitoring centres, and in 26 field offices.
The OSCE grew out of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki in 1975. For the first 17 years it functioned as an inter-governmental conference with minimal staff. It served as a forum for Cold War dialogue and its personnel drafted human rights, security and disarmament standards. Since the collapse of communism in eastern and central Europe its name was changed to OSCE, and the organisation has taken on a more prominent and operational role in conflict resolution. Organising the Bosnian elections has been the most difficult task the organisation has ever undertaken, especially given the tight time frame mandated by the DPA.
- Criteria for Free and Fair Elections
The criteria for measuring the conduct and results of the 14 September elections are outlined in the following agreements and instruments:
1) International human rights instruments contain the fundamental criteria for judging elections around the world and determining whether they were "free, fair and democratic." These instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, were incorporated in the DPA and agreed to by its signatories.
2) The Dayton Peace Agreement required the Parties to ensure the right to vote in secret and without fear or intimidation; freedom of expression and the media; freedom of association; freedom of movement; and the existence of a politically neutral environment during the period leading to election day. 6 This last prerequisite bound the Parties to creating a climate of security, complying with human rights provisions, and respecting the general goals of the DPA, which meant refraining from any statements that advocated secession from the unitary state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3) In his speech certifying the existence of conditions for holding the elections, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Flavio Cotti added that without the arrest and delivery of indicted war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and a credible start on the return and repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, the elections would produce results opposite to those intended. 7
4) In an annex to the DPA the Parties also pledged full compliance with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document, which included provisions for universal and equal suffrage for all adult citizens; secret balloting and honest and public counting and reporting procedures; respect for the right of citizens to seek political or public office; respect for the right to establish, in full freedom, political parties or organisations, as well as legal guarantees to compete in the elections on an equal basis; a fair and free campaign atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation barred the parties or candidates from freely presenting their views and qualifications, deterred citizens from learning and discussing them, or stopped voters from casting their ballot free of fear of retribution; unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political participants; and, finally, free access for international monitors of the electoral process. 8
5) The OSCE Provisional Electoral Commission (PEC) Rules and Regulations (issued 16 July 1996) reiterate some of the requirements for free and fair elections identified in the DPA and the Copenhagen Document, and in addition promulgate the comprehensive and detailed requirements for the conduct of the electoral proceedings, outlining the rules for campaigning, registration of voters, conduct of the media, conduct of the governments, voting day events, counting procedures, announcement of final results, and PEC certification.
- OSCE's Supervisory and Monitoring Bodies
- Provisional Election Commission
The Parties to the DPA asked the OSCE to establish a Provisional Election Commission (PEC) and mandated it to adopt rules and regulations regarding: the registration of political parties and independent candidates; the eligibility of candidates and voters; the role of domestic and international election observers; the ensuring of an open and fair electoral campaign; and the establishment, publication, and certification of definitive election results. The PEC was also mandated to supervise all aspects of the electoral process, to elaborate a voter registration procedure, to ensure compliance with the electoral rules and regulations, and to ensure that appropriate action was taken to remedy any violation of DPA or the rules and regulations. 9
The PEC, which was comprised of four international and three Bosnian members, was nominated in January and held its first meeting on 1 February under the chairmanship of Robert Frowick, Head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia.
Under the supervision of the PEC, Local Election Commissions (LEC) were established to organise the elections at the local level. This included arranging voter registration and securing facilities and staff to man polling stations and counting votes. The LEC members were nominated by authorities in each entity and approved by the PEC.
- Election Appeals Sub-Commission
10
The OSCE's Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC) consisted of four Judges. Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska, each supplied a judge, and one senior international jurist served as the Chief Judge. The Judges were appointed by Ambassador Frowick.
The EASC was mandated to ensure compliance to the PEC Rules and Regulations and to adjudicate complaints about the electoral process. It had the power to impose penalties on any individual, candidate, party, or other body in violation of the PEC Rules and regulations or of the DPA. This could include fining parties or striking candidates' names from the electoral lists.
- Media Experts Commission
11
The Media Experts Commission (MEC) was established to investigate media-related complaints. The MEC was mandated to monitor the security of journalists, to gauge whether the access provided to political parties and candidates was equitable, to observe erroneous news reporting, and to ensure that the media observed the PEC "Standards of Professional Conduct." The MEC was chaired by the OSCE Senior advisor for Media Development, and included representatives of the Parties, media specialists appointed by each of the Parties, representatives of the Ministries of the Interior of both entities, a representative of the High Representative, and a human rights officer of the OSCE. In each of the OSCE regional centres, Media Expert Sub-Commissions were also constituted.
In essence, however, the MEC had no real powers. It could only report serious violations to the PEC which had the power to impose fines or other appropriate penalties.
- OSCE Election Supervisors
By early September, some 1,200 OSCE Election Supervisors had arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide technical assistance in the organisation of the elections, and to solve technical problems before and during election day. The Supervisors were OSCE employees recruited by member states of the organisation. They reported to Ambassador Frowick.
- Co-ordinator for International Monitoring
In January 1996, an International Expert Meeting on Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina held in Stockholm concluded that a conflict of interest existed between the two roles assigned to OSCE - supervising the preparations and conduct of the elections through the PEC, and organising the independent monitoring of the elections. To resolve this potential conflict, the experts suggested that a separate electoral observation unit be established within the OSCE to prepare and co-ordinate the international observation of the elections. 12 Accordingly, the office of the Co-ordinator for International Monitoring (CIM) was set up within the OSCE in early March, and OSCE Chairman-in-Office Flavio Cotti appointed Ed van Thijn as the head of CIM. While CIM receives administrative support from the OSCE Mission in Bosnia, it was set up to operate independently of the Mission and has reported directly to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in order to ensure neutrality and objectivity. On 22 May 1996, the PEC adopted the Rules and Regulations for international observers, authorising the CIM to invite, accredit and co-ordinate the work of international observers.
Under the authority of Co-ordinator van Thijn, CIM was tasked to observe the whole electoral cycle from registration to the announcement of the results�this included monitoring the out-of-country and in-country absentee voting, sorting and distribution of ballots; following complaints and appeals to the Election Appeals Sub-Commission; hearing the electoral concerns of political parties and NGOs; evaluating observations and complaints about the electoral process; preparing and co-ordinating the activities of short-term observers; and, on the basis of these observations and reports, preparing a report for the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. 13
By mid-July, the CIM had deployed some 25 long-term observers in all regions to observe the election campaign and to prepare the ground for the deployment of short-term observers. By election day, some 850 short-term international observers (including 150 recruited by the International Crisis Group from non-governmental organisations in the country) had been deployed to monitor election day events at more than 4,400 polling stations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and the counting of votes.
- Certification of the Conduct and Results of the Elections
- Pre-Election Certification
In DPA the Parties requested the "OSCE to certify whether elections can be effective under current social conditions in both Entities and, if necessary, to provide assistance to the Parties in creating these conditions." 14
The architects of the DPA intended this pre-election certification to serve as an effective tool to push the Parties into compliance in creating the conditions necessary to hold "free and fair" elections. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office Flavio Cotti was to announce the pre-election certification and set the date.
- Post-Election Certification
In accordance with the DPA, the PEC adopted regulations on the publication and certification of definitive election results 15 �decreeing that the PEC itself would announce the election results at all levels, verify that the elections were valid and certify the results. The Chairman of the PEC, Ambassador Frowick, would officially publish the results, followed by a complete publication of all figures in the Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation and the Republika Srpska. 16
Independent of the PEC and in accordance with the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the CIM would certify independently whether the conduct of the elections was "free and fair" and report his finding directly to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office.
This two-track certification of the conduct and results of the elections would be sequenced as follows: 17
1) The CIM would issue a preliminary statement within 48 hours of the close of polling stations. This would include an objective statistical analysis of short-term observers' checklists completed on election day;
2) The CIM would issue a second preliminary statement when the vote count was completed by the PEC. This would include an objective statistical analysis of the observers' second checklist completed at the vote count proceedings;
3) The PEC would announce the preliminary result of elections when the vote count was completed, but without any assessment of their "validity;"
4) The CIM would issue its final report after the vote count results were announced by the PEC and would determine the extent to which the conduct of the elections was "free, fair, and democratic" in accordance with the DPA. The final report would be addressed to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and would be based on a more thorough evaluation of the short-term monitors' reports and an assessment of the long-term monitors' observations during the entire electoral process.
5) The PEC would issue its final report after the Election Appeals Sub-Commission had ruled on all appeals, and after the CIM final report had been published. This report will "follow the conclusions" of the CIM final report and determine whether the conduct of the elections was "valid" and certify the results accordingly;
6) The OSCE Chairman-in-Office would forward the PEC final report and presumably the CIM final report to the Parties and the High Representative.
7) The High Representative would then report to the UN Security Council through the Secretary General on the conduct and results of the elections. The UN Security Council would then automatically lift the sanctions on Republika Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if the elections were determined "free and fair". (A new imposition of sanctions would require the unanimous vote of the whole UN Security Council. Sanctions were "suspended" in November following the Parties' approval of the DPA.) 18
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