SKOPJE/BRUSSELS, 27 July 2001: As ethnic Macedonian and Albanian leaders prepare to resume political talks on the basis of a shaky truce, the international community must ask itself quickly - and answer - whether the continuing risk of full blown civil war does not justify dispatching a serious NATO force to Macedonia, even without a political settlement in place.

In a briefing paper released today, Macedonia: Still Sliding, the International Crisis Group (ICG) argues that Macedonia is still locked in crisis and threatened by war. Neither ethnic Macedonian nor ethnic Albanian leaders have been converted to belief in a 'civic' settlement that would strengthen democracy by improving minority conditions without weakening the integrity of the state. Nor have separatists from both sides given up their conviction that security for their communities can only be achieved by demarcating - and hence competing for - ethnically "pure" territory.

ICG President Gareth Evans said: "The international community is right to pursue a 'civic' settlement, and must resist the superficial appeal of a solution that would entrench and formalise the existing ethnic division, as the Dayton Peace Agreement did in Bosnia. Yet, it must also recognise that a 'civic' settlement will almost certainly prove impossible to achieve or implement without a much more substantial security commitment."

It appears that European and U.S. leaders now face a choice in Macedonia that is distressingly similar to the one they confronted in Bosnia in the first half of 1992. They can sit on the sidelines, urging the parties to reach a reasonable settlement by means of compromise, while “ethnic cleansing” gathers pace and the space for moderate options disappears. Alternatively, they can assume the burden of a military intervention, with no assurance of an early exit.

The latter strategy would entail the risk of being caught up in a war without obvious front lines or even clearly distinguishable opponents. On the other hand, there is great risk that without such a commitment there will be either no agreement – and thus all-out war – or the kind of agreement that has little chance to be implemented. That would probably condemn Macedonia to a long, slow slide into the kind of situation that would ultimately force a Western response in circumstances no more favourable than they were in Bosnia in 1995.