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Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan’s Peace Process

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The latest phase of the negotiations in Machakos, Kenya closed on 18 November 2002 with the signing of an important new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on power sharing and an extension of the earlier MOU on cessation of hostilities and unimpeded aid access. Significant progress was made during this phase. The Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) are slowly, painstakingly elaborating the structures of governance and wealth sharing arrangements through intense haggling - for example, what proportion of seats southerners will have in the legislative bodies and the oil revenues that will go to a Southern Reconstruction Fund.

Though the final protocol on power and wealth sharing that the mediators sought was in the end not signed, there was more movement toward a comprehensive peace agreement than the MOU reflected. Both parties wanted to retain manoeuvring room for making tradeoffs at a later stage and so held to some maximalist positions. They will continue to do so during the adjournment while trying to persuade their constituencies that they are battling extremists on the other side of the table, and wait until the negotiating endgame to explore bottom line compromises.

Major credit for achievements to date goes to the structure and the personnel of the process. The partnership between IGAD and the observer countries is solid and working. The chief mediator, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, is indispensable - an excellent negotiator with good instincts about the parties' intentions and requirements.

There are still serious obstacles, however. The next phase, scheduled to begin in early January 2003, must make substantial progress on the remaining issues or the process may collapse under the pressures of hard-line constituencies and domestic politics on both sides. The government still has difficulty envisioning a real partnership with southern Sudanese, while the SPLA is moving further toward independence-oriented positions. Both postures make a final agreement harder to reach.

Given the history of SPLA and government opposition to a provisional ceasefire and unimpeded aid access respectively, the extension of those commitments to 31 March 2003 was remarkable. Most importantly, it came at a time when Khartoum normally would be preparing to launch its annual dry season offensive. Although there are elements in the capital who are sorely tempted to use the government's new military hardware to try again to dislodge the SPLA from the Western Upper Nile oilfields, leaders on both sides appear to be giving peace a chance.

Nevertheless, the moment is not indefinite. The peace process is nearing the decisive point, and when the parties return to the table next month, it will be time for historic decisions, compromises, and political courage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the IGAD Envoys, the IGAD Secretariat and the International Observers:

1. Undertake a major, internationally coordinated public diplomacy campaign to sell the benefits of a peace agreement throughout Sudan, delivering the message that compromise is difficult but essential, and the peace dividend will be significant.

2. Create an advisory body to give a voice to political parties and civil society elements thus far excluded from the peace process, particularly the NDA and Umma Party.

3. Create as many opportunities as possible for team building, confidence building, and trust building among the warring parties, such as the workshops being held in the U.S. during December 2002 and earlier ones hosted by the UK and Germany.

To the International Observers and the European Union:

4. Support transformation of the SPLA into a political party and promotion of governance and economic development in the South, for example by encouraging a second SPLA convention as soon as possible that will provide opportunities for broader community participation and for southerners to begin to craft details for the South's system of government during the interim period following a peace settlement.

5. Provide the necessary support to those in the government firmly committed to a peaceful end to the conflict, by continuing to apply pressure on Khartoum until an agreement is reached, and by insuring that those threatened by peace are reassured about their post-conflict role, while likewise maintaining pressure on the SPLA to negotiate in good faith; publicly acknowledge progress and compromises made by either side.

6. Insist as a priority that the government of Sudan agree to reschedule quickly the meeting of the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (TCHA) that was to have been held on 16 December so that it can permanently remove all restrictions on aid access and on the geographic scope of Operation Lifeline Sudan operations.

To the U.S. government:

7. Make clear to the SPLA that no aid will be forthcoming if it is responsible for lack of progress in the negotiations.

To the Egyptian government and the Arab League:

8. Invest now in supporting successful implementation of a peace agreement by planning - in coordination with the donor consortium IGAD Partners Forum - the kind of assistance for reconstruction and reconciliation during the interim period that will help pave the way for increased southern Sudanese confidence in a united Sudan.

Nairobi/Brussels, 18 December 2002



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