OVERVIEW
On 27 October 2002, Somali political leaders gathered
in the Kenyan town of Eldoret signed a new declaration that envisages
an end to the protracted crisis in their country.
After more than a decade as the only country in the world
totally devoid of a functioning central government and no less than twenty
unsuccessful national-level peace initiatives since 1991, the Eldoret
Declaration has raised hopes that resolution of the Somali crisis may now be
within reach.
The ongoing process – under the mandate of the East African
regional organisation the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) –
represents a unique opportunity to restore governing institutions and move Somalia
towards peace. The framework for the dialogue that is still needed is sound and
comprehensive, most major political movements (with the exception of the
self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the Northwest of the country)
are represented, and key members of the
international community have been closely engaged at every step.
But ICG visits to Eldoret in November 2002 found that the
process still faces considerable difficulties. A combination of mismanagement,
regional rivalry, insufficient outside political support and financial
constraints have brought the talks to the verge of collapse. Somali delegates
are frustrated and disillusioned with the lack of progress that followed the
Declaration. Donor representatives express deep misgivings. As one
Nairobi-based diplomat dryly observed, “This process has made progress in spite
of itself.” The process is in critical condition, and the mediators have not
yet demonstrated that they possess the medicines necessary to keep the patient
alive.
Nevertheless, Eldoret can be salvaged. Most Somali delegates
seem committed to moving forward. “This process is different from all the
others,” said a senior figure in the Puntland administration (in the
Northeast). “People realize that they cannot achieve what they want through
force”. However, as the conference enters its second, main phase of
negotiations, a number of measures need to be taken urgently. Visible and
sustained international political support for the conference – including
readiness to adopt and implement targeted sanctions against recalcitrant
warlords and to enforce the international arms embargo – has yet to
materialise. Rivalries between regional powers need to be addressed and
conference management will have to improve. And the prospects for a lasting
settlement must not be compromised by the desire to meet artificial and
unworkable deadlines.
If these formidable obstacles can be overcome, then the
Eldoret process represents Somalia’s best chance for peace in many years.
Nairobi/Brussels, 9 December 2002