OVERVIEW
Multiparty parliamentary
elections are a comparatively recent
innovation in Algeria, and in each instance to date the outcome has been
overshadowed by the process that preceded or followed it. The first, held at
the end of 1991, were cancelled before the second round of voting had taken place. The parliament,
which would otherwise have been dominated by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),
never came into being and Algeria went through a period of overtly
unconstitutional rule dominated by the army commanders.
In June 1997, Algerians
elected their first multiparty National
Popular Assembly (APN) since the country’s independence in 1962. However, the parliament’s legitimacy was marred
from the outset by serious allegations
of vote-rigging and other electoral manipulation.
Algerians returned to the polls on 30 May 2002, after the
term of that parliament expired. This time the elections were marked by a high
abstention rate (over 50 per cent of the registered voters).
In short, one might be tempted to conclude that in 1991
Algerians voted but their votes were negated; in 1997 they voted but their
votes were rigged; and in 2002 they simply did not vote.
However, the 2002
elections carry a deeper significance, in terms of:
Popular attitudes, a
mixture of displeasure, apathy and, in the case of Kabylia, the largely Berber
region which is the country’s most troubled, even rage;
Re-composition of the
political space, with resurgence of the
former single party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), collapse of the
previously dominant Democratic National Rally (RND), endurance of an Islamist current in the form of Djaballah’s Movement for National
Reform, and emergence of the Workers’ Party at the head of the “secular-democratic” opposition; and
The future course of Algeria’s policy.
In many ways, Algeria is at a critical juncture:
Islamist-inspired and other forms of violence that raged throughout the 1990s
have been partially subdued, but attacks by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) still claim around 100 victims a month. Economic reforms that received
international plaudits so far have failed to improve living standards
and have cost more jobs than they have created. The return of ostensibly
democratic institutions, most notably the outgoing parliament elected in 1997,
disappointed expectations both in terms of origins, marred by allegations of
vote-rigging, and track record, marked by an almost total lack of influence
over governmental actions.
In short, Algeria has yet to recover fully from the decision
to cancel the elections in 1991-1992 and the ensuing war that has been civil in
name only. The country’s rulers must overcome a decade of continuing violence,
political fragmentation and a significant gap between themselves and their
citizens. Against this backdrop, Algeria’s leaders and political parties (in
power and in opposition alike) face the daunting task of recapturing the confidence of ordinary Algerians. This will
require, above all, a greater focus on the everyday challenges they face
and an ability to translate reform programs from theory into practice. Unless
they can achieve this, the political elites will have gained only a poisoned
chalice.
This briefing paper examines the background and results of
the elections and looks at what they might mean in terms of Algeria’s efforts
to end its ten-year crisis. It will be followed by more extensive reporting on
Algeria’s domestic situation and the situation in Kabylia.
Algiers/Brussels, 24 June 2002
