The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In late February, violence flared in Albanian-inhabited villages in northern Macedonia close to the border with Kosovo. In mid March, the violence spread to Macedonia’s second largest city, Tetovo. The rebels claimed to be defending themselves against Macedonian security forces, i.e. their own government, and to be fighting for Albanian national rights in Macedonia. The coalition government in Skopje promptly raised the alarm, blaming Kosovo Albanian elements for exporting rebellion to Macedonia, and calling for the NATO-led forces in Kosovo (KFOR) to seal the border. The rebels claimed they were local Albanians, numbering 2,000 and recruiting dozens of volunteers from the surrounding area every day.

The international community reacted unanimously with high-level affirmations of support for Macedonia and its elected government, identifying the rebels as a few hundred “terrorists”. On 21 March, the government gave the rebels a 24-hour deadline to lay down arms and/or leave the country, or face a full-scale offensive. The offensive began on 25 March. Four days later, the government announced that the military operation had successfully pushed all the terrorists back into Kosovo.

Lacking a central command structure, the rebels appear to be a cluster of loosely co-ordinated cells of experienced ethnic Albanian fighters from Macedonia, Kosovo and abroad as well as a small number of foreigners. The political demands issued by the rebels are designed to gain popular support in the Albanian community, and a hearing by the international community. Whatever the rebels’ long-term intentions may be, they clearly tapped into the frustrated local demands for basic minority rights: citizenship, ownership, education, language and representative government.

Now that the dust around Tetovo has settled, the government and parliament need to face squarely, without panicking, a large political question: Are the Macedonians and Albanians in the country committed to integrated living? Or, should they accept nationalist logic and prepare to negotiate federalisation?

A policy of half-hearted, half-reluctant ethnic cohabitation has led to the present crisis. If the government does not want federalisation, it should declare its commitment to the full and equal integration of all nationalities in the country. It will not be enough to improve the legal framework. The Slavic majority must be ready to challenge the notion that Macedonian state identity is synonymous with the Slavic population.

The government should get strong international backing to ensure that political dialogue leads to real action. The troublesome preamble of the constitution must be deleted, as well as other discriminatory references. Decentralisation measures that have languished in parliament should be adopted and implemented. A census should be prepared and conducted, with international assistance, to determine demographic reality as accurately as possible. Political ethics must be reformed, in particular by introducing and enforcing effective anti-corruption measures. Otherwise, violence may spread along the lines of ethnic cleavage. A strategy to prevent such escalation and produce credible negotiations should include the following elements:


RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The international community has reacted to the crisis in Macedonia with one voice. All countries have condemned the rebel violence. This solidarity must be maintained while supporting and lending assistance to Macedonia, and insisting on a political solution to the current crisis. However, NATO should be prepared to consider direct support for the security forces, in the event of a dramatic escalation of violence by the rebels, and if the government so requests.

2. While the rebels failed to mobilise Albanian support inside Macedonia, the sympathy for their complaints about Albanian status was obvious and widespread. This longstanding sense of grievance is dangerous. The international community should urge the government to begin parliamentary discussions on measures to improve the constitutional and legal status of minorities.

3. It may prove impossible to achieve consensus among the main political actors on a reform agenda and process without widening the governing coalition. The government should be ready to bring the principal opposition parties, the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia and the Party for Democratic Prosperity, into the coalition.

4. The forthcoming census should be postponed until late autumn. The census should be conducted so that its findings reflect demographic reality as accurately as possible, in line with internationally accepted criteria of residency. This will require international assistance, not only in processing the census results but also in preparing it and supervising its conduct.

5. The international community has contributed to an environment of mistrust and cynicism by reluctantly validating a series of elections dating from 1994 that were marred by deaths, violence, and widespread voting irregularities including ballot stuffing, proxy voting and tampering with returns. The international community must insist on the conduct of free and fair elections rather than lower acceptable standards.

6. The European Union, the United States and international organisations should facilitate a dialogue in Macedonia representatives, on improving media portrayal of all nationalities and minorities. Tensions in the country have been exacerbated by media coverage that polarises the largest ethnic groups. Macedonia’s media must be judged, and reformed, according to the same international standards that are invoked elsewhere in the region.

7. Tensions in northern Macedonia – as also in the Albanian-majority districts of southern Serbia – are fuelled by uncertainty over Kosovo’s future. This uncertainty should be removed insofar as possible. The United Nations-led mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) should set a date for elections later this year to a Kosovo assembly as a watershed on the way to real self-government, commencing the process that will eventually lead to final status negotiations.

8. The rebels are receiving logistic and financial support from inside Kosovo. Recent discussion of trimming back the Kosovo Protection Force (KPC) should be discouraged, as such steps would increase the pool of unemployed former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), so heightening the security risks to Macedonia (as well as in Kosovo itself).

9. The rebels fighting in Macedonia are financed by funds collected abroad. The international community must strongly urge an investigation of currently legal funding of rebel movements in Macedonia and adjoining countries, and crack down on illegal funding of such movements.

10. Efforts should be made to reduce the proliferation of weapons in the region. A staggering quantity of weapons has been stockpiled in the region. Approximate figures circulating in Balkan and Western ministries for the totals of weapons in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo are as follows: 280,000 Kalashnikovs, one million anti-tank missiles, 3.1 million hand-grenades, one billion rounds of ammunition, and 24 million machine guns. Although the climate may not be ripe for voluntary compliance, the international community must develop mechanisms to reduce this proliferation. As a start, means should be found to extend the United Nations’ “Weapons in Exchange for Development” project to Macedonia.


Skopje/Brussels, 5 April 2001