OVERVIEW
The policy dilemmas posed by the Iraqi crisis are much more
acute, and the issues much more finely balanced, than most of those publicly
supporting or opposing war are prepared to acknowledge. There is still broad
international agreement about the objectives to be pursued: ensuring that Iraq
does not constitute a threat, disarming it of the weapons of mass destruction
it still retains (as demanded by Security Council Resolution 1441), and
improving the condition of the Iraqi people (as demanded both by common decency
and the Iraqi people themselves). But following the inspectors' reports to the
UN Security Council on 14 February 2003 and the extraordinary scale of the worldwide anti-war
demonstrations over the following days, achieving international consensus on
how to achieve these objectives appears as difficult as ever.
This policy briefing does not offer clear conclusions and
recommendations – not least because views within the ICG Board are as sharply
divided as those within the international community. We hope, nonetheless, that
it will clarify the issues and contribute some useful ideas to this difficult
debate. The report is divided into four sections, each addressing a distinct
course of action and identifying its pros and cons:
War options: This
section analyses the three principal rationales that have been put forward to
justify a war at this point, corresponding to the three broad objectives of the
international community just stated (to meet the threat the Iraqi regime
presents to the international community; to disarm Iraq; and to meet the threat
the Iraqi regime presents to its own people). It examines in each case the
criteria that may be thought to be required to be satisfied and whether they
have been.
More time for inspections: Several nations have
argued that additional time (and means) need to be given to the inspectors
before any final decision can be made about
a possible war; some have also argued in this context that inspectors ought to
be accompanied by an armed force. This section discusses this approach and the
two rationales that have been offered: more time to establish that inspections
can actually disarm Iraq, and more time to establish that inspections can at least
contain Iraq.
The CDD-Plus alternative: stronger containment,
deterrence and diplomacy: The final section looks at an alternative to
further pursuing war as an option (assuming that there is no change in the state of evidence
regarding the nature or extent of the Iraqi threat) and explores whether a strengthened regime
of containment, deterrence and diplomacy can viably and in a sustained manner address such
threat as currently exists.
There are situations, and this may be one of them, where
there is no alternative but to resort to war to achieve legitimate
international objectives. At the same time, everyone acknowledges that war in
the current situation should be the last resort. The case for looking for an
honourable and defensible alternative to war is always strong, even more so
when the transatlantic alliance is under unprecedented stress, when the case
for war is clearly struggling to win international support in the Security
Council and elsewhere, and when the risk of wider adverse consequences from war
may well be greater than usual. What can be stated unequivocally is that the
alternative to war, if there is one, is not to do nothing. Something
substantial must be done to advance all three of the basic international
objectives identified above. And it would obviously be helpful, if at all
possible, that what is done were done in a way that maximises the chances of
reuniting rather than further dividing the international community.
Amman/Brussels, 24 February 2003
