EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The horrific bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 has focused renewed attention on the question of who, if anyone, is capable of governing Iraq in the current highly volatile environment and, in particular, on what ought to be the respective roles, during the occupation period, of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Interim Governing Council and the United Nations. This report proposes a new distribution of authority between the three – potentially acceptable to the United States, the wider international community and the majority of Iraqis – which would enable Iraq’s transitional problems, including the critical issue of security, to be much more effectively addressed.
The problem of who is to govern Iraq, and how, will persist until national, democratic elections are held and power is fully transferred to a sovereign government. But the conditions for such elections will not exist for some time, possibly as long as two years: the security situation has to stabilise, a democratic constitution has to be adopted, voters have to be registered, and – arguably – at least the beginnings of a pluralistic political culture have to visibly emerge. In the meantime it is not realistic, on all available evidence to date, to expect the CPA to be capable by itself of adequately caring for the population’s essential needs and successfully ruling Iraq. Nor is it realistic to imagine that Iraqis will view the present Interim Governing Council as a credible, legitimate and empowered institution.
The most drastic solution to this dilemma is presently unimaginable: for the occupying powers simply to walk away at this stage, leaving a fully empowered Interim Governing Council the only player on the field during the transitional period. What is more realistic to contemplate is the rebalancing of the respective roles of the CPA and the Interim Governing Council, with steps being taken to improve the latter’s representativeness, vest it with more real power, and improve its executive capacity to deliver – and in this report we argue that this should be done. But more than that is needed: in particular some broader international legitimisation of the transition process, and that means a greater role for the UN in the governance process.
The Coalition Provisional Authority. The CPA until now has retained quasi-exclusive authority, with Washington’s approach translating into an unwillingness to involve seriously either the Iraqi people or the international community. Since its early missteps, the CPA appears to have engaged in some salutary self-correction and has registered some real successes. But fundamental problems remain. Policing troubles are mounting and they have not been addressed with policing solutions. Instead, coalition troops unsuited to the task have been called in, leading to inevitable mistakes at the cost of both innocent lives and Iraqi national pride. Basic infrastructure has not been rebuilt. Iraqis lack jobs and subsistence income. The CPA lives in virtual isolation, unable to communicate effectively with the Iraqi population. It has yet to correct some of its most counterproductive decrees such as the disbanding of the entire 400,000-man army and the large-scale de-Baathification. Meanwhile, the occupation’s U.S. face has heightened suspicion and anger in Iraq and parts of the Arab and Moslem worlds where many view it as part of Washington’s agenda to reshape the region.
Opposition to the foreign occupation is becoming stronger and more violent. It comes in various shades: Baathist loyalists; nationalists; Islamists, who for the time being are predominantly Sunni; tribal members motivated by revenge or anger at the occupiers’ violation of basic cultural norms; criminal elements; Islamist and other militants from Arab and other countries. At present, the vast majority of Iraqis give no indication of supporting armed resistance; but, dissatisfied with current conditions and lacking loyalty to or trust in a central authority, many are not willing to oppose it either. Unless the situation rapidly is turned around, the distinctions between the different opposition groups could fade; resistance could become politically organised; radical Shiites could join the fray; and increasing numbers of Iraqis could relinquish their faith in institutional politics and look upon the resistance with greater – and more active – sympathy.
The Interim Governing Council. The formation of the 25-member Iraqi Interim Governing Council on 13 July 2003 was an attempt by the U.S. to develop an interim authority that would have legitimacy in Iraq and abroad, appease the population and deflect criticism of the occupation forces. Under current conditions, it is unlikely to meet those goals fully. The basic problems are the Interim Governing Council’s political legitimacy, actual power and executive capacity. While it can accurately be described as the most broadly representative body in Iraq’s modern history, selected as it was by the CPA in consultation with pre-chosen political parties and personalities, the Interim Governing Council simply lacks credibility in the eyes of many Iraqis and much of the outside world. On paper, it enjoys broad powers; in reality, few doubt the deciding vote will be cast by the U.S. A gathering of political leaders with weak popular followings, very little in common between them, no bureaucratic apparatus and a clumsy nine-person rotating presidency at its helm, it is doubtful that it can become an effective decision-making body.
The principle behind the Interim Governing Council’s composition also sets a troubling precedent. Its members were chosen so as to mirror Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic makeup; for the first time in the country’s history, the guiding assumption is that political representation must be apportioned according to such quotas. This decision reflects how the Council’s creators, not the Iraqi people, view Iraqi society and politics, but it will not be without consequence. Ethnic and religious conflict, for the most part absent from Iraq’s modern history, is likely to be exacerbated as its people increasingly organise along these divisive lines.
The United Nations. The missing ingredient in Iraq’s governance during the transitional period is the United Nations, which has so far been granted by the occupying powers only an advisory and wholly subordinate role. The UN has been a visible presence in Iraq, but its visibility – and awful vulnerability – has not been matched by any compensating responsibility. There needs now to be a three-way division of real governing responsibility between the CPA, the Interim Governing Council and the United Nations, embodied in a new UN Security Council resolution. The UN, as the institutional embodiment of international legitimacy, should be given, in addition to responsibility for the coordination of humanitarian relief, explicit authority over all aspects of the political transition process, including oversight of the Interim Governing Council and other transitional institutions; supervision of the constitutional process; and the organisation of local, regional, and national elections. It would, in addition, be given a defined role in supporting the development of civil society, rule of law institutions and a free media.
The UN would have a particular responsibility, through its newly constituted mission in Iraq, to identify as soon as possible, after consultation with the CPA and the Interim Governing Council, a realistic indicative timetable for the adoption of a constitution, the holding of local and functional elections, the holding of national elections (to be held within 24 months, and preferably sooner) and the withdrawal of foreign forces subject to a request to that effect by a newly elected sovereign government of Iraq.
Rebalancing Transitional Governance. Under this new distribution of authority, the CPA, in its capacity as the institutional representative of the occupying powers, would have the primary responsibility in all matters relating to immediate security and, through the restoration of infrastructure, ensuring satisfaction of the Iraqi people’s basic needs. The present CPA military force would be transformed into a U.S.-led Multinational Force endorsed by the UN Security Council – with member states being encouraged to contribute personnel to such forces on an urgent basis. While civil policing would remain the primary responsibility of the CPA in the first instance, the Security Council would endorse the establishment of an international police force which would take over this role as soon as possible, and prepare the ground for the ultimate full transfer of responsibility to reconstituted Iraqi services.
And the Interim Governing Council would, working through an interim cabinet reporting to it, be responsible for all other matters of day to day governance, including social services, economic reconstruction, trade and investment, and managing relations with other countries and international institutions. It would also work with the CPA in reconstituting Iraq’s police and security forces. Although its sovereign powers would be incomplete during the transition period, it would be appropriate for the Interim Governing Council – on the recommendation of the Security Council, and with the endorsement of the General Assembly – to occupy Iraq’s UN seat during that period, perhaps at the chargé level to underscore its temporary status.
Granting the UN a stronger role and devolving more power to the Interim Governing Council in the ways described would meet several crucial objectives. It would help overcome reluctance on the part of many countries to participate in efforts to stabilise Iraq, enabling the rapid dispatch of military and police forces. It would diminish the perception that the U.S. seeks to dominate Iraq, projecting instead the image of a broad-based international effort, including with the participation of Iraq’s Arab neighbours, to rebuild the country. And it would strengthen the legitimacy of the political transition process in the eyes of the Iraqi people while accelerating steps toward self-government.
Until now, the U.S. has strongly resisted giving the UN such authority and the UN itself has not vigorously pushed for it. The Secretary General’s Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello – tragically killed in the 19 August attack – was able to perform a valuable role behind the scenes (not least in the construction of the Interim Governing Council) because he gained the trust of both the U.S. and important Iraqi players. But that role was never clearly defined, and the CPA remains for all intents and purposes in charge. While it is still unclear whether the bombing will change that reality, it should. The attack is yet another reminder to the U.S. that it needs partners to ensure security in Iraq; for that it needs a UN mandate. The UN has paid a terrible price for its presence in Iraq, and it deserves to exercise real responsibility.
The more Iraq’s future can become a matter for the Iraqi people and the international community as a whole, the greater the chances of success. Many of the problems that currently exist stem directly from the initial choice not to share more widely the burdens of transitional administration. Today, the U.S. ought to agree to a more effective and rational distribution of responsibility between the occupying powers, the Iraqi people through the best interim representation that can be devised and the broader international community represented by the UN. It is a step it will have to take if it is serious about addressing Iraq’s most urgent priorities – restoring law and order, providing basic services and holding national elections that will genuinely transfer power to the Iraqi people.
To the United States, Other Coalition members and the UN Security Council:
- After consultation with the Interim Governing Council, agree to a Security Council resolution clearly allocating responsibility between the CPA, the United Nations and the Interim Governing Council as follows:
- (a) The CPA would have primary authority and responsibility for military security, civil law and order, and restoring basic infrastructure.
- (b) The UN would have primary authority and responsibility for overseeing the Interim Governing Council and other institutions; organising local and national elections; supervising the constitutional process; ensuring transitional justice; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons; and coordinating humanitarian relief; and a defined role in monitoring and supporting human rights and supporting the development of civil society, rule of law institutions and a free media.
- (c) The Interim Governing Council would have primary authority and responsibility, through its appointed interim cabinet, for all other matters of day to day governance, including budgetary management, social services, education, economic reconstruction, trade and investment, and foreign relations; and a defined role in reconstituting Iraq’s military and police forces.
- Agree to that Security Council resolution expressly requiring the newly constituted UN Mission in Iraq to identify as soon as possible, after consultation with the CPA and the Interim Governing Council, a realistic indicative timetable for the adoption of a constitution, the holding of local and functional elections, the holding of national elections (to be held within 24 months, and preferably sooner) and the withdrawal of foreign forces subject to a request by a newly elected fully sovereign government of Iraq.
- Agree to a Security Council resolution that would:
- (a) vest responsibility for military security during the transitional period in a Multinational Force led by the U.S., which would prepare the ground for ultimate transfer of responsibility to a reconstituted Iraqi defence force;
- (b) establish an international police force for Iraq, which would in due course take over primary responsibility for policing from the CPA and prepare the ground for ultimate transfer of this responsibility to reconstituted Iraqi services; and
- (c) encourage Member States to contribute to both the Multinational Force and the international police force.
- Agree, if satisfied that the composition of the Interim Governing Council is broadly representative of the Iraqi people (to the extent reasonably possible in circumstances of post-war transition), to a Security Council resolution recommending to the UN General Assembly that it occupy Iraq’s UN seat for the transition period.
To the United States and CPA:
- Ensure the Interim Governing Council has appropriate capacity, in terms of personnel and resources, to fulfil its executive tasks.
- Transfer primary responsibility for policing to the newly constituted international police force as soon as possible, and devolve, at an accelerated pace, municipal police and other local security responsibilities to reconstituted Iraqi security and police forces.
- Review existing rules of engagement for occupation forces (to be continued in operation by the Multinational Force when constituted) to sensitise them to local norms of conduct while carrying out operations.
- Promptly investigate through an impartial, independent body all reports of Iraqi civilian deaths or injuries in the course of post-war military operations; and publish the results, including actions taken by the CPA and compensation paid, in accessible form. With regard to civilian casualties during the war itself, implement the legislative provisions authorising humanitarian assistance.
- Ensure proper treatment of Iraqi detainees consistent with the applicable Geneva Convention of 1949.
- Create ombudsman offices throughout Iraq where civilians can bring their concerns without having to approach soldiers on the streets: these should, in particular, receive and handle Iraqi complaints of mistreatment and misappropriation of goods that occurred during military raids.
To the (newly constituted) United Nations Mission in Iraq:
- Working closely with the Interim Governing Council, organise nationwide elections at the local (regional and municipal) level as well as functional elections for trade unions and business and professional associations.
- In consultation with the CPA, broaden participation in the Interim Governing Council to include social and political forces that currently are not represented adequately or at all, in particular by drawing on the results of local and functional elections, and according greater weight to grass-roots forces, above all business and professional and trade associations, as well as other civil society representatives such as human rights and women’s movements.
To the Interim Governing Council:
- Cooperate with UN efforts to include currently unrepresented and under-represented social and political forces in an expanded Interim Governing Council.
- Name a cabinet as soon as possible and ensure that it is a non-partisan, technocratic one, with appointments made on the basis of competence rather than sectarian or ethnic affiliation alone.
- Ensure the early dissemination of information regarding its decisions to the Iraqi public and operate in as open and transparent a manner as possible.
To the Arab League:
- Support adoption of a UN Security Council resolution granting the UN and the Interim Governing Council appropriate powers and in that context assuming adoption, recognise the Interim Governing Council as the temporary Iraqi representative, allowing it to participate in the League’s deliberations.
- Support adoption of a UN Security Council resolution creating a U.S.-led multinational force and an international police force in Iraq, and member states contribute personnel.
Baghdad/Washington/Brussels, 25 August 2003