EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The 11 September
2001 attacks in the U.S.
and revelations that the al-Qaeda network made extensive use of charitable
institutions to raise funds for its operations, have reinforced concerns about
the relationship between Islamic social welfare activism and terrorism. The
Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which has conducted a series
of devastating armed attacks during the current conflict, particularly against
Israeli civilian targets, and which supports an extensive network of social
welfare organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
has come in for particular scrutiny.
The concern that charitable activity and political violence
are connected is legitimate and raises genuine policy dilemmas. These need to
be addressed seriously but also with careful attention to distinctions and
nuances rather than with a one-response-meets-all-contingencies approach. Eradicating
Islamic social welfare activism would be unlikely to reduce seriously Hamas
military activity, its attacks against Israeli civilians, or indeed its
proclaimed goal of eliminating the state of Israel.
Rather, it would worsen the humanitarian emergency, increasing both the
motivation for Hamas to sustain its military campaign and popular support for
it. And, without substantial evidence that welfare institutions systematically
divert funds to support terrorist activity, it would be an overbroad and
Rather than a blanket ban, the test which should be applied,
by the international community and the Palestinian Authority alike, is whether
the charitable institution in question can be shown to have transferred monies
to fund activities of paramilitary organisations, whether it helps recruit members for such
groups, or whether its educational teachings promote intolerance or violence.
Hamas activism presents a challenge to Palestinian and
international policy-makers. It is a vital support for hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians at a time when renewed conflict with Israel
has produced a growing humanitarian emergency. But at the same time it has
helped create that emergency by its escalation of indiscriminate bombing of
civilian targets – attacks that, like all those that deliberately violate the
laws of armed conflict, ICG unreservedly condemns.
The accusation that Hamas misuses Islamic charitable
activities takes several forms. First, Hamas is suspected of diverting
charitable funds to finance its military infrastructure and activities. Secondly,
Islamic social welfare institutions affiliated with Hamas are charged with
inciting violence and recruiting militants among beneficiaries of their services.
Thirdly, the existence of a network of social welfare organisations affiliated
with Hamas, and the demonstrated capacity of this network to support groups
neglected by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and international donors, are
considered central to the Islamist movement’s growing appeal and, therefore, to
its ability to sustain a campaign of violence.
Under pressure, the PA has taken some action. But too often
it has sought mainly to assuage international opinion and fend off the Hamas
threat to its own predominance rather than adopt a sound policy. It has
periodically shut down Hamas-affiliated charitable institutions only to allow
them to reopen later, while not cracking down on the movement’s armed wing. Israel,
meanwhile, has enhanced Hamas's standing in the Palestinian community by
actions that often go far beyond what security concerns could legitimately
justify and significantly worsen the humanitarian situation in the West Bank
and Gaza. Palestinian
unemployment, poverty, and malnutrition rates – soaring to levels unprecedented
since 1967 – have contributed to radicalisation of large segments of the
The international community has been both inconsistent and
inefficient. The U.S.
seeks to ban all assistance to Hamas-affiliated organisations; most of its
Western partners, however, distinguish between support for Hamas's legitimate
and illegitimate activity; and many Arab governments permit funds to be raised
on their territory for Islamic social welfare and Islamist militant organisations
without distinction. At the same time, neither the West nor the Arab world has
provided sufficient humanitarian aid or persuaded Israel to loosen its stranglehold
on the civilian population of the occupied Palestinian territories.
Any approach to the issue of Islamic charitable institutions
– whether independent or affiliated with Hamas – must start from the premise
that they are critical in Palestinian life. Hamas in particular has since its
inception invested heavily in charitable work and considers this central to its
identity and purpose. With the onset of the intifada, the ensuing devastation
of the PA and other harsh Israeli measures, in particular closures, its welfare
activity has become more vital than ever. Roughly two-thirds of Palestinians
live below the poverty line, and Islamic social welfare organisations, directly
or indirectly, provide emergency cash assistance, food and medical care as well
as educational and psychological services, to perhaps one out of six. By most
accounts, such institutions are more efficient than their secular or official
counterparts, delivering aid without distinction as to religious belief or
political affiliation. Certainly, they are perceived as such by the Palestinian public.
Over the longer run, the challenge is to steer the radical
Islamist movement – an important component of Palestinian society – away from
violence and terrorism, and toward a constructive role both in domestic
Palestinian politics and in forging peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Though success so far is elusive, the Egyptian-sponsored intra-Palestinian dialogue is a
significant attempt. For now, the PA and the international community should focus on stopping
Hamas's attacks against civilian targets and whatever fund diversion to any violent or paramilitary
activity that exists. Any decision to shut down a social welfare institution or deny it funds
should be closely based on proof that it either diverts funds for illicit purposes, is a
platform for recruitment into Hamas's military wing or incites violence.
Rather than attack Islamic social welfare, a better response
for those who seek to reduce its influence is to establish an equally effective
social welfare network. Wholesale elimination of Hamas's Islamic social welfare
sector would carry a heavy risk of backfiring, fuelling more violence and terror,
and hurting a population already in a deteriorating humanitarian emergency.
There are inherent limits to what can be done in an
environment of occupation, violence, closures and virtual PA collapse to set up
an alternative welfare network, enforce rules against money laundering, or
institute more rigorous accounting practices. Genuine reform of the charitable
sector, like much else, probably must await an end of the current confrontation.
On that, ICG has expressed its views: achieving a sustainable end to violence
requires the international community to present and energetically promote a
comprehensive endgame solution. Still, in the absence of that step and within
the boundaries of the existing situation, there are a number of measures that
can be taken, as recommended below.
To the Palestinian Authority:
1. Enforce its own laws, in particular Law N°1 on Charitable
Societies and Civic Associations (2000), and mandate, inter alia:
(a) the registration of all such organisations with the PA, and
their operation in accordance with transparent organisational and financial procedures;
(b) the annual submission of detailed and independently audited
accounts of their finances and activities; and
(c) revocation of the charitable status of organisations that
fail to operate in accordance with the law and with their own approved charters.
2. Ratify, and enforce, the draft law on zakat committees currently
before the Palestinian Legislative Council.
3. Amend its own laws by, where applicable, bringing them into line with the
recommendations on "Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations" of the intergovernmental
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), particularly with respect to financial
transparency, program verification, administration, and oversight.
4. Establish an independent expert committee that will both
assist and actively monitor social welfare organisations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
to ensure that they strictly comply with the
above legislation and are not used as platforms to advocate attacks against
civilians or recruit members of military organisations.
5. Ensure, with all the means at its disposal, the integrity of
its humanitarian operations.
6. Take active steps to delegitimise all acts of terrorist
violence against civilians, in particular suicide bombings, in the media and
other public information systems and through the criminal justice system.
7. Assign Ministry of Education inspectors to actively monitor
schools operated by Islamic social welfare organisations in order to ensure religious instruction
is not used as a platform for promoting intolerance or to incite violence.
8. Begin a process of establishing a general welfare program,
with international help.
9. Cease arbitrary closures and seizures of social welfare
organisations where no evidence of wrongdoing exists.
To the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas):
10. Cease all attacks against civilians and declare that it will
not resort to such attacks in future.
11. Cooperate with the PA in implementing Law N°1 on Charitable
Societies and Civic Associations.
To the Government of Israel:
12. Revoke, consistent with reasonable security requirements,
economically punitive measures against Palestinians, and in particular, and
consistent with the recommendations of the UN Secretary General's personal
humanitarian envoy and Israel's obligations as an occupying power:
(a) allow access by the population to basic services and needs,
including medical care, school and employment, by lifting unduly harsh closures and curfews;
(b) ensure accelerated shipment and movement of humanitarian
goods and services, whether of Palestinian or international origin, including
ambulances, water tankers and other aid supplies; and
(c) resolve the issue of purchase tax revenues withheld from the
PA, releasing all outstanding monies.
To the Donor Community and Other Governments:
13. Provide technical and material support to assist the PA in
implementing its own law regulating charitable institutions and, as a priority,
in establishing a functioning general welfare system.
14. Increase assistance to international and local humanitarian
organisations active in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
15. Provide additional urgent humanitarian and financial
assistance to the Palestinians and encourage the establishment of additional
charitable networks that are effective and credible
16. Press Israel to rescind security measures that are not required
by its legitimate interests and have contributed to the humanitarian crisis among the Palestinian
17. Harmonise policies toward charities in their own
jurisdictions that are active in the occupied Palestinian territories and in particular:
(a) agree on and implement common regulations regarding
accounting transparency, consistent with the recommendations of the
inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF);
(b) take legal action against charitable institutions found to be diverting
funds to assist violent activity or advocating or promoting attacks against civilians; and
(c) allow charitable organisations to raise and expend funds for strictly
legitimate social purposes, irrespective of any association between the organisation and Hamas.
18. Press Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, to
ensure that funds raised in their territories for charitable institutions are used strictly
for humanitarian purposes.
To Arab States, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States:
19. Cease any support for Hamas unless and until it agrees to
halt attacks against civilians and takes the necessary steps to cease such activities.
20. Enhance monitoring of charitable organisations to ensure
that funds are exclusively and verifiably allocated for humanitarian purposes.
Amman/Brussels, 2 April 2003