EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As the national elections in Pakistan draw near, President,
Chief Executive, and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf has vowed to
restore democracy and transfer power to an elected government. Musharraf’s
roadmap to democracy is in reality a blueprint for more military rule. If his
political and constitutional reforms become the law of the land, any democratic
transition will falter before it has started. The military government’s
constitutional and political reforms will radically transform Pakistan’s
parliamentary system, tilting the balance of power from elected representatives
and democratic institutions to unelected leaders and organisations.
Negating the principal of parliamentary sovereignty, a
powerful head of state will have the power to dissolve the National Assembly.
Appointed by the President, provincial governors will have the authority to
dismiss provincial legislatures. The President will appoint military chiefs,
and the armed forces’ political role will be sanctified through a National
Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the president, this military-dominated,
supra-parliamentary body will oversee the conduct of elected governments and
the functioning of representative institutions.
Having indefinitely extended his tenure as Army Chief,
President Musharraf has also given himself a five-year extension of his
presidential term. Assuming the right to dismiss parliament, Musharraf has warned
future parliamentarians of the choice before them – to either accept his
constitutional engineering or lose their jobs. Leaving little to chance, the
military government has also revised electoral procedures to neutralise
civilian threats. Newly devised rules and regulations have disqualified scores
of politicians from standing in this month’s parliamentary election.
Pre-election rigging cannot be ruled out since the same
Election Commission that oversaw Musharraf’s flawed referendum is overseeing
the electoral process. Political leaders doubt that the elections on 10 October
2002 will be free and fair. The military government can, however, be reasonably
confident that the judiciary will endorse them and the constitutional reforms.
When it validated the October 1999 coup, the Supreme Court also gave Pakistan’s
military ruler the mandate to amend the constitution, but only within the
framework of federal, parliamentary democracy. Subsequent forced resignations,
selective appointments, and inducements have, however, subordinated the
judiciary to the executive.
Almost all major Pakistani political parties, civic groups,
and media have rejected Musharraf's constitutional and political reforms as an
undemocratic means for perpetuating military rule. These parties have vowed to
reject the constitutional amendments in parliament. Hoping to control a future
parliament through divide-and-rule strategies, however, the military is using
pressure and persuasion on the politicians.
In the past, the political elite has succumbed to the
military’s tactics, tempted by the spoils of power. From 1988 to 1999,
Pakistan’s democratic transition first faltered, then stalled when elected
governments failed to deliver, their credibility undermined by
maladministration, corruption, and political vendettas. The political elite
failed to work collectively in parliament to strengthen democratic institutions
and norms. Instead, elected governments and their political opponents joined
hands with military leaders to gain or retain power. As the democratic
transition stalled, the military was given the opportunity and the pretext to
disrupt the process.
Should civilian leaders once again succumb to the military’s
pressures and incentives, Musharraf and his colleagues will retain absolute power.
The political elite can revive the democratic transition only if they reach
consensus within and outside parliament to correct the military’s political and
constitutional distortions. A consolidation of the democratic transition would
then depend on the political elite’s respect for democratic governance.
President Musharraf is not inclined to transfer power to
civilians but could be persuaded to withdraw the military to the barracks by
international pressure. Influential actors, in particular the U.S. and EU,
could persuade military leaders to abide by their pledge to restore democracy.
Musharraf and his military colleagues are hopeful, however, that the
international community will accept military rule in civilian guise. The U.S.
and its allies could indeed be tempted in misguided belief that the military is
the only institution capable of governing the fragile state, holding back
Islamic extremism, and combating regional terrorism.
It is in the international community’s interest to encourage
the military to withdraw to the barracks and restore democracy. Political
stability will elude Pakistan without representative government. Only a stable,
democratic country is a reliable bulwark against Islamic extremism and
guarantor of its own security and that of its neighbourhood.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Pakistan Government
1. Take actions to demonstrate serious intent genuinely to
restore democratic civilian government; in particular:
a) give the Election Commission full authority to check unfair
electoral practices in the pre-election phase and during the polling, including
the right to identify and to censure wrong doers;
b) provide unrestricted access to the electoral process and
security to local and international observers; and
c) withdraw the proposal to form a National Security Council
and other constitutional amendments that undermine the 1973 constitution’s
federal, parliamentary and democratic structure in order to forestall
confrontation with the political elite and, thereby, to safeguard the true
interests of the armed forces.
To the Political Parties
2. Establish a joint monitoring centre to collate data on the
electoral process, including the pre-election phase, and present a report on
the conduct of the 2002 elections to parliament.
3. Issue a joint public declaration that they will not validate
constitutional amendments in parliament that violate the structure of
government contained in the 1973 constitution.
4. Institute mechanisms for internal democracy and introduce
legislation in parliament for mandatory party internal elections.
5. Expand responsibility for appointment and promotion of
judges beyond the executive to include representatives of the Bar Associations.
To The United States, The European Union, And Other Members
Of The International Community
6. Call upon the government to remove all restrictions on
political freedoms, including those on freedom of association and speech,
during and after the October elections.
7. Give due weight to the findings of official and
non-governmental election observers, including the European Union team, in
formulating political and economic policy toward Pakistan after October 2002.
8. Make clear that it will not be acceptable internationally
for Pakistan’s military to retain power indefinitely, whether directly or
behind a democratic façade, and strongly encourage it instead to withdraw those
constitutional amendments that have the potential of stalling the democratic
transition.
Islamabad/Brussels, 3 October 2002
