EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Recent state elections in Jammu and
Kashmir, and the loss of power by the National
Conference party that has dominated politics there since independence, have
created a spark of hope that political tensions in the Kashmir
Valley could de-escalate. It was a
badly flawed election in 1987 that helped fuel a long running militant
insurrection and general uprising, and tens of thousands have died in
subsequent violence. Violence has been further amplified by historical
strategic tensions between India
and Pakistan
over Jammu and Kashmir, and
Kashmiri hopes for a political voice have often unfortunately become caught up
in this broader international rivalry.
For the first time since independence, a non-National
Conference leader is in power. Equally historic, it is the first time that the
state’s leadership is different than the ruling party in New
Delhi – a very welcome sign of political
liberalisation. While the state elections have been seen as a window of
opportunity for peace in Kashmir, it is also clear that
they only represent a first step in unravelling the long cycle of violence.
Indeed, if the Indian government chooses to act as if the elections alone were
sufficient to address a myriad of Kashmiri grievances, it will only be a matter
of time before violence again escalates – just as it did in the run-up to the
ballot itself. Indeed, violence has continued unabated after the elections and
the formation of the new government in Srinagar.
Pakistan's
support for cross border infiltration by militants has directly contributed to
the ongoing conflict in the region. But some of the violence in Srinagar
and the rest of the valley and the abiding Kashmiri disaffection with New
Delhi are the product of India’s
own actions. Indian security forces have often practised draconian means in
their efforts to combat Kashmiri militants and separatists and have relied
heavily on militia groups that have acted violently and extra-legally. Human
rights abuses abound as a plethora of anti-terrorism legislation is used to
crush Kashmiri dissent and political aspirations. Many Kashmiris also rightly
bemoan the general lack of economic and educational opportunities in the valley
and a steadily creeping rot of corruption in local institutions.
India
would be wise to view the election results less as an embrace of India
by Kashmiris than a rejection of New Delhi’s
use of military force and disrespect for human rights as well as a desire for
peace and economic security. The voter turnout in the valley– virtually
non-existent in Srinagar –
reflected Kashmiri scepticism that elections translate into meaningful
political, social and economic change. It is up to Kashmir’s
New Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed to prove them wrong.
The new Kashmir government has vowed
to meet the grievances of Kashmiris by restoring peace, restraining the
security forces, preventing human rights abuses, and reviving an economy
devastated by war. However, Chief Minister Mufti Sayeed is less inclined to
hold unconditional talks, as he had earlier pledged with Kashmiri militants and
separatist parties, preferring to leave that task with New
Delhi. In the absence of political reconciliation and
accommodation within Kashmir and the beginnings of a
serious political dialogue between India
and Pakistan,
hopes for an early end to this long running conflict will remain just that.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the government of India
1. Ratify the
First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention Against Torture.
2. Subject the
Prevention of Terrorism Act and all other anti-terror laws to annual
parliamentary review, define the specific criminal acts governed by the
measure, and bring charges against individuals through the Act using the same
criminal procedure and courts as in all other crimes.
3. Investigate
fully and impartially all reports of extra judicial killing, disappearance,
custodial death, torture and rape by security and paramilitary forces;
prosecute those responsible, including military personnel, in civilian courts,
and publish both investigations and court proceedings.
4. Disband the
Special Task Force, the Ikhwan
al-Muslimoon militia and other unofficial paramilitary groups and end the
practice of giving their members de facto
immunity.
5. Require
security forces to provide information on all detainees to family and legal
counsel from the time of detention.
6. Open Kashmir, including the Line of Control
(LOC), to international observation, including access to political prisoners.
7. Open
elections in Kashmir to official international
observers.
8. In the wake
of the recent elections, facilitate discussions between representatives of
ethnic, religious and political parties of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.
9. Impartially
investigate allegations of corruption within the state government and punish
offenders.
10. Facilitate
the return of Kashmiri Pandits to the valley by offering appropriate economic
incentives and security guarantees, while providing broader economic assistance
to the valley to revitalise local industries and support the growth of the
private sector.
To the government of Pakistan
11. Follow up
fully and firmly on commitments to prevent incursions across the Line of
Control by militants and permanently end all support for militant groups in Pakistan and Kashmir.
12. Defuse
tensions with India and facilitate a dialogue between
Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC.
To the governments of
the United States, the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, the European Union and the United Nations
13. Urge both India and Pakistan to engage in a dialogue on all
outstanding disputes including Kashmir and encourage the withdrawal of troops from
positions along the LOC with a view to a gradual demilitarisation of the entire
pre-1947 state.
14. Urge both India and Pakistan to open the Line of Control to
civilian traffic and trade.
15. Pressure Pakistan to end its support for militant
groups.
16. Pressure India to end extra judicial killings,
custodial deaths, disappearances, torture and rape perpetrated or tolerated by
its security forces.
Islamabad/Brussels, 21 November 2002
