EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Sierra Leone continues
to make remarkable progress in ending its eleven-year civil war. There is no
longer active fighting, and the army and police are fully deployed across the
country. The battlefield capacity of the insurgents, the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF), has been significantly diminished, and their political arm, the
Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF-P), fared poorly in the May 2002 elections
that saw President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah re-elected in a landslide with just over
70 per cent of the vote and his party win an overwhelming majority of seats in
parliament. Those elections were the first major test for the country following
completion of the disarmament process and the official declaration of the end of
the war in January 2002.
This was the first truly
non-violent vote in the country’s history, in large part because of the
substantial international peacekeeping presence. However, a number of concerns
are on the horizon that could threaten long term peace prospects. First, there
were many questions about the fairness of the electoral process and the level of
fraud and coercion that shrouded it.
Secondly, the returns revealed potentially dangerous
divisions between the army and President Kabbah’s ruling Sierra Leone
People’s Party (SLPP). A large majority of the security forces voted for
Kabbah’s opponents, indicating there is at least some animosity between the
executive branch and the armed forces.
Thirdly, the elections
also demonstrated that ethnic tensions between Temne in the North and Mende in
the South and in the central part of the country remain significant. These
underscore the need for a more inclusive government in Freetown. President
Kabbah’s SLPP party swept votes across the South and East while its main
rival, the All People’s Congress party (APC), maintained its stronghold in the
North. The results left Sierra Leone dangerously close to single party rule,
with an executive branch and a parliament heavily dominated by the SLPP.
Regrettably, President
Kabbah appears to have emerged from his victory with diminished commitment to
the peace process. He has done little to establish a cabinet that is broad
based, inclusive and designed to promote the goals of national reconciliation.
The international
community has expended time, effort, and approximately U.S.$2 billion in an
expensive but so far successful peacekeeping mission. This investment made the
election possible, but it is still too soon to declare victory. Many root causes
of the war, particularly the culture of “winner-take-all politics”, have not
been eliminated.
The election will only be significant if accompanied by fundamental reforms that begin to change Sierra Leone’s political landscape. The international community needs to use the post-election period to work hard at consolidating the peace process.
The newly elected
government has six months before the start of the dry season – when conflict
could resume – to tackle problems. Reform of the security forces must
continue. Aside from the divisions revealed by the vote, there are still
considerable question marks concerning the capability of the security forces to
secure the country and the capacity of local militias to challenge their
authority.
Renewed conflict in
neighbouring Liberia reinforces the need for the United Nations Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the British military and police training teams to
remain. President Charles Taylor of Liberia retains destabilising regional
ambitions and the tools to pursue them, despite his current domestic
difficulties, including elements of the RUF insurgents and Kamajor militias now
inside Liberia that he can redirect against Sierra Leone’s still fragile peace
structures.
The Kabbah administration must also tackle the corruption
that permeates all levels of government and society. The international community
has assisted in developing accountability systems, but other measures are still
needed, such as increasing the independence of the judiciary and making the
Anti-Corruption Commission more independent.
Finally, measures must
be taken to promote reconciliation among combatants and civilians. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court provide the main venues for
healing wounds. The international community, especially the United States, has
pushed hard for the creation of the Special Court, and the success of these
instruments of justice will depend on continued international support, scrutiny
and funding.
The international community’s priority has so far been to ensure “security first”, but now it has to be as rigorous in demanding better governance and
accountability from the government. It must not see these goals as mutually exclusive. Overlooking corrupt practices by the ruling SLPP would only produce
fertile ground for renewed conflict.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the United Nations Security Council:
1. Keep UNAMSIL’s mandate robust and focused on the strategic and at-risk parts of the
country while taking advantage of increased stability and the improved capacity
of Sierra Leone’s army and police to downsize over the next year.
2. Take into careful account the increased instability in
Liberia and its implications for Sierra Leone while carrying out UNAMSIL
downsizing.
3. Encourage the creation of a contact group, including Nigeria, the UK, France and the U.S., to align positions on the interlocking crises engulfing the Manu River region, and in particular to bring all stakeholders in Liberia’s civil war to
the peace table.
To the British government and the Commonwealth:
4. Continue efforts to ensure unity among the different
factions that have been newly integrated into the Republic of Sierra Leone
Armed Forces.
5. Facilitate the disbanding of the Kamajor Civil Defence
Forces and continue to ensure that security services are not polarised along
ethnic, regional or political lines.
6. Create, in cooperation with the government, an
International Police Assistance Team to develop a more robust and consistent
program of training in Sierra Leone in conjunction with opportunities for
police officers to gain experience with professional national police forces
overseas.
To International Donors:
7. Make the fight against corruption a
priority, including by pressing the new government to make the Anti-Corruption
Commission an independent body free from political interference, by
conditioning aid for reconstruction to governance reforms, by supporting civil
society groups that help in the investigation of corrupt practices, and by
strengthening the research capacity of reformers in parliament willing to
tackle corruption across all sections of government.
8. Assist the Special Court to develop
procedural rules including those covering how indictments will be brought, fair
discovery and use of evidence, and, in particular, that do not permit the
government of Sierra Leone to veto witnesses or determine who from its ranks
might be prosecuted.
9. Make greater effort to raise the
necessary operational funds for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
10. Provide
funds immediately to complete, in conjunction with efforts to aid the victims
of the war, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants –
particularly with regard to training and employment programs.
To the United States government:
11. Play a
strong leadership role in the Special Court, the chief prosecutor of which is a
U.S. citizen.
To ECOWAS leaders and other friends of Sierra Leone:
12. Make
clear to President Kabbah that his new government will only be supported if
political reforms are implemented and a more inclusive style of politics is
developed.
To the government and parliament of Sierra Leone:
13. Separate
the office of the attorney general from that of the minister of justice in
order to limit political influence in prosecutorial decisions.
Freetown/Brussels, 15 July 2002
To read the response of the Sierra Leone government to this report
To read the response of the Sierra Leone
government to this report, click here.
