The People's National Assembly: The past 18 Months

16 February, 1999

Part 1 of 3

Contents

• Executive Summary

• Introduction

• 'Legislative Power' from 1962 to 1997
  1. The period of one-party democracy
     1. 1962 - 1965: The first Assembly.
     2. 1965 - 1977: The 'revolutionary Council'
     3. 1977 - 1991: The People's National Assembly (PNA)
  2. Opening up to democracy
     1. The end of the one-party system
     2. May/June 1991: The FIS insurrection and strike.
     3. December 1991: The first multi-party legislative elections are aborted
     4. 1992 - 1997: The 'transition period'

• The June 1997 legislative elections
  1. Proportional representation
  2. A multi-party election
  3. Election Controls
  4. A controversial campaign
  5. A very tense election period
  6. Contested results
  7. Opposition grievances
  8. International observers divided

• The multi-party assembly
  1. Redrawing the political landscape
     1. The 'nationalist' movement
     2. The 'Islamist' movement
     3. The 'democratic' movement
     4. The 'independents'
  2. The 'objective' alliances
     1. The majority: the 'Islamist nationalist' bloc
     2. The divided opposition

• How The Assembly Functions
  1. Organisation chart
  2. Parliamentary immunity
  3. Law-making
     1. Government bills and private members' bills
     2. Amendments
     3. Voting procedures
  4. Power of control over the executive
     1. Approving the government's programme
     2. Oral and written questions
     3. Government summoned to answer questions ('Interpellation')
     4. Resolutions on government policy
     5. Censure motions
     6. Votes of confidence
     7. Committees of enquiry

• Assessing the Assembly's work over the past 18 months
  1. A difficult beginning
  2. The main topics of debate
  3. Signs of progress towards democracy
     1. A forum for opposition
     2. The refusal to accept electoral fraud
     3. Sensitive questions under debate
  4. Room for improvement
     1. Law-making
     2. Exercising control over the executive
     3. Bringing morality into public life

• Important issues still to be dealt with
  1. Family law code
  2. The press code
  3. Reform of the education system

• Conclusions
  1. Electoral fraud
  2. Arab-Islamic ideology

• Recommendations
  1. Set up a framework conducive to free and open elections
  2. Preventing electoral fraud
     1. National controls
     2. International controls
  3. Revision of sensitive laws
  4. Human rights
  5. Support for the democracy movement

• Annexes
  1. Annexe A : The legislative elections of 5 June 1997
  2. Annexe B : The multi-party Assembly
  3. Annexe C : Bills debate during the first year of the legislature
  4. Annexe D: The main parties represented in the PNA
  5. Annexe E : Organisation chart of the PNA
  6. Annexe E 1 : Organisation chart of the PNA
  7. Annexe F : The Assembly's preoragatives (extracts from the Constitution)
  8. Annexe G : Index of initials and abbreviations
  9. Annexe H : Bibliography

Algerians elected this, the first multi-party Assembly in the country's history, against a background of chronic violence in June 1997, six years after the previous aborted elections. Although controversy surrounded the 1997 elections, they did produce a clear political landscape in which three distinct tendencies stand out. The first of these is identified as 'nationalist' and is represented by the FLN and the RND, which are often split internally as they devise strategies for maintaining their increasingly shaky hold on power. The second force is 'Islamist', officially represented by the MSP/Hamas and Nadhda, which share the same strategic objectives as the FIS in their desire for an Islamic state based on the application of Chari'�a (Koranic law). As the third and 'democratic' trend is divided between RCD 'eradicators' and FFS and PT 'conciliators', its influence has been considerably reduced. These 'democratic' parties follow a 'modernist' path directed towards political, cultural and linguistic pluralism, respect for human rights, equal rights for men and women, rejection of the existing code of family law, and the separation of politics and religion. They have a limited influence over the passing of bills, but they speak out freely and have succeeded on several occasions in bending the government away from its rigid and authoritarian line.

During the eighteen months of its existence, the PNA has registered some progress towards democracy. It acts as a forum for the opposition and for discussion of such sensitive subjects as the security situation and the drama of the 'disappeared'. However, despite its constitutional prerogatives, the PNA has only a limited margin for manoeuvre in regard to law-making and the exercise of control over the government. To a certain extent this can be explained by its lack of experience as a functioning parliamentary body and by the reluctance of the majority of its members, who were previously connected with the machinery of the former one-party state, to accept the need for transparency.

The PNA must become an independent branch of the executive that will not act as an alibi for the government. Democratic progress in Algeria will be measured by its performance - and freedom - in dealing with dossiers on such matters as the family law code and the press code

In order to establish the legitimacy of existing institutions, and avoid the large-scale fraud associated with the June 1997 legislative elections, it is essential that there be complete openness in the holding of the April 1999 presidential elections.

The Algerian government must therefore guarantee total transparency throughout the election process and encourage political debate between the different candidates. The political parties must have free and equal access to the press and other media. The government must also ensure the security of all candidates. Finally, international organisations must be given access to the whole country before, during and after the elections.

After aborted elections in December 1991, the country was caught up in a spiral of instability and violence that resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. However, Algerian hopes were raised with the election of Liamine Z�roual to the presidency on 16 November 1995. Despite widespread electoral fraud, the new head of state succeeded in reinstating the country's legitimate institutions.

Algerians were therefore taken by surprise at President Z�roual's announcement three years later that he intended to resign in order to "ensure the changeover of power".³ This represents something new in the Algerian political tradition. He is the first elected president since independence and the first to leave office by preparing for a successor to replace him through the ballot box. The elections, planned for April 1999, have already attracted several candidates, and will represent a first test of the stability of the institutional framework set up three years ago.

The People's National Assembly (PNA), formed after the multi-party elections held on 5 June 1997, is the most reliable indicator of political evolution in Algeria and a guide to understanding the main issues and divisions in Algerian society. The Assembly's credibility and its degree of independence from the government can be gauged by evaluating how it has functioned over the past eighteen months since its inauguration.

Does the PNA play a role in building democracy? Or does it act only as an alibi for the regime? What are its prerogatives in drawing up laws? Is it able to exercise control over the government? This report attempts to answer such questions.

On 20 September 1962 the government and the political office of the Front de lib�ration nationale (FLN-National Liberation Front), the independence movement that had become the only party in power, nominated 196 members to the constituent Assembly. At the same time as the Assembly members were debating the text of a proposed basic law, Ahmed Ben Bella, chairman of the Council, proposed an alternative, which was adopted unconditionally by his supporters at a separate meeting. This text, sanctioning a one-party state, was passed by referendum on 15 September 1963 with a majority vote of 99.7%, and Ben Bella was elected president of the republic with a majority of 99.6%.

This was the beginning of an era of rigged elections and referenda for which the country is still paying a price today. The "Constituent Assembly", without any other form of election being held, simply continued under the new name of "Legislative Assembly". According to Krim Belkacem, leader of the national resistance movement and signatory of the Evian agreement⁴ , this Assembly "is not a product of the will of the people". He added that the designated Assembly was neither a constituent authority nor, even less, a legislative body for it allowed the government to legislate through a spate of orders and laws, thus disrupting the country's institutions to a greater or lesser extent.⁵

Ferhat Abbas, chairman of the Assembly, handed in his resignation declaring that: "The representatives of the people must be democratically elected by the people. I refuse to sit in an assembly appointed by the government, and I will only return if the people have the right to choose their own representatives."⁶

Mohamed Boudiaf, one of the 'historic leaders of the revolution'⁷ criticised the government and set up the Parti de la r�volution socialiste (PRS] , the first opposition party⁸. He was arrested and held in secret detention. His friend and supporter, Hocine A�t-Ahmed, another symbolic figure in the liberation struggle, protested this arrest and tried, in vain, to encourage a 'constructive opposition' within the Assembly itself. He created the FFS⁹ and then began an armed underground resistance when he was forced into hiding. Clashes with government forces resulted in 400 deaths among his fellow resistance fighters. In April 1964 he was arrested and sentenced to death, and then pardoned.

However, despite ferociously repressing any hint of opposition, the government was unable to put an end to the internal dissent and President Ben Bella was overthrown by Colonel Boum�di�ne, his Minister of Defence, on 19 June 1965.

With an intransigence rooted in Soviet-style socialism and the despotism of Islamic ideology, Boum�di�ne ruled the country with an iron fist for 12 years thanks to the unlimited power given to his formidable security force ¹⁰.

On 10 October, in order to calm the situation, President Chadli promised "significant political reforms".¹³ A referendum on 23 February 1989 led to the adoption of a new constitution¹⁴ , despite attempts to block it by intransigent supporters of the former regime. Article 40 of the new constitution recognised a multi-party system, thus putting an end to 27 years of one-party rule.

The "democratic" parties

The "Islamist" parties

The 'mini-parties'

On 12 June 1990 the first multi-party local elections were won by the FIS in the majority of Assembl�es populaires communales (APC: People's Communal Assemblies, at the level of the communes) and the Assembl�es populaires de wilaya (APW: People's Wilaya Assemblies, at the level of the wilaya, or departmental councils). Many analysts believed that the regime had encouraged an Islamist victory. By letting in the fervent fundamentalists, they hoped to discredit those who supported democracy and then present themselves as the only defence against the 'green peril'.

In a poisonous atmosphere marked by the rise of the Islamists and an underground battle between government factions grouped into "reformers"²⁰ and "conservatives"²¹ , legislative elections were scheduled for 27 June 1991.

The army intervened to remove the insurgents during the night of 4 June 1991 and arrested the two FIS leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj. The confrontations between Islamists and the security forces resulted in several deaths and hundreds of wounded. Mouloud Hamrouche handed in his government's resignation and the legislative elections were postponed indefinitely. He was replaced by Sid-Ahmed Ghozali, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who promised "clean and fair elections".²³

However, in the face of this fundamentalist flood, the army intervened a second time. On 11 January 1992 President Chadli Bendjedid was forced to resign and the electoral process was suspended. At the same time, it was discovered that the PNA had been dissolved the previous week. This meant that the chairman, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, who was close to the Islamists, could not serve an interim term of 45 days in order to organise new elections, as required under the constitution.

The HCE decreed a state of emergency on 9 February, and dissolved the FIS a month later. A 60-member Conseil consultatif national (CCN: National Consultative Council) was nominated from among leaders of non-political associations. Lacking any real legislative power, it was supposed to debate certain bills and submit its opinions to the HCE, which would legislate by edict.

In January 1994 Liamine Z�roual, Minister of Defence was nominated president of the republic by an overwhelming majority during a national conference of the smaller parties²⁸ and several civil associations. He then took his place on the HCE. A Conseil national de transition (CNT: National Council of Transition) was designated to serve as an interim parliament.

After his election to the presidency on 16 November 1995 Liamine Z�roual promised to reinstate the country's legitimate institutions and set 5 June 1997 as the date for holding elections to the legislature.

In order to win greater credibility for the elections, the Algerian government called on the United Nations, the Organisation for African Unity and the Arab League to send observers. On the day of the elections 106 observers were deployed in 40 of the 48 wilayas under UN co-ordination.

Although there were several parties in the race, a face to face confrontation developed very early on between Hamas and the RND, recalling the aborted campaign of 1991 and the polarisation between the FIS and the FLN.

Mahfoud Nahnah presented his party, Hamas, as "the only alternative" and threatened to "divulge the contents of files that would compromise the government".³⁰

For Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, head of the RND's list in the capital, his party was "the only bulwark" against the danger of fundamentalism. He warned against those who "promise paradise, but if they reach power, hell will follow."³¹

Radio and television time was reserved for the parties according to the number of candidates each put forward, and lots were drawn to decide the order in which they would be broadcast. Their speeches were recorded in advance and closely scrutinised by CNISEL. CNISEL twice censored speeches recorded by the FFS and the PT because they considered them too favourable to the FIS and hostile to the army. Television news bulletins largely favoured the activities of the RND.

During the campaign the security forces often intimidated opposition activists throughout the country. FFS militants were arrested in El Bayadh in the east of the country for possession of "subversive material". In fact, this was electoral posters and leaflets. Much more seriously, HAMAS accused the police in Medea (70 km south of Algiers) of torturing to death a supporter who had been putting up their posters.³²

On 5 June 1997, the day of the elections, 300,000 soldiers and police were deployed throughout the country. Despite these precautions, the turnout was low compared to the presidential elections of November 1995.

Opposition fears were confirmed by numerous incidents in the polling stations. The 'special polling stations' reserved for the army and security forces were completely unsupervised. The same was true for the 'mobile polling stations'. Originally foreseen for the desert nomads and populations living in isolated regions, their numbers grew, even in the coastal towns and Algiers itself. According to opposition estimates, almost two million voters out of the 15 million who registered, avoided all 'prying eyes' and increased the score for the RND.

During vote counting party representatives and candidates, with the exception of the RND, were forcibly ejected from the polling stations. All efforts to prevent the manipulation of results was left to the 'discretionary powers' of the authorities at every level.

Contested results³³

The opposition introduced almost a thousand appeals to the Constitutional Council. Although these were rejected, mainly on the basis of 'legal flaws', two seats were withdrawn from the FLN in favour of the FFS and the RND.

The FFS called for the elections to be annulled because "The results were worked out in the laboratories of power. (�) The people's voices have been used against them. This is a provocation against society."³⁴

The RCD agreed with this verdict, but responded in more measured terms: "We knew that the government wasn't going to change its habits, but it was only by participating that we could ensure a democratic presence on the political scene."³⁵ . Even the FLN, formerly the only political party allowed and still close to the government, went further and said: "The administration acted on behalf of the RND. The number of uncontrolled mobile polling stations rose to 5,200, and were even set up in the north of the country and Algiers. Despite these excesses, the FLN has decided to put national interest above party interest."³⁶

Hamas, the main victim of the fraud, did not hide its anger: "the celebration of democracy has been spoiled by the administration's excesses. The fraud that marked this election is a terrorist act just as much to be condemned as the assassinations carried out by the GIA ³⁷. We hold the proofs of a fraud that has deprived our party of victory in several constituencies."³⁸ Despite his real desire to calm things down, Mahfoud Nahnah, Hamas' leader, had to respond to the simmering discontent among his grassroots supporters. He threatened: "Watch out! The people in the streets are seething with anger!"³⁹ . During the electoral campaign his militants had been chanting: "For the presidential elections we said nothing, but this time nothing will get past us!"⁴⁰ After the results were announced, he had difficulty in restraining the fury of his rank and file who were all set to take to the streets to challenge the results. But the 'FIS syndrome' was still working in him and he knew that he would be the loser in any direct confrontation with the government. He therefore preferred to limit himself to a token protest in the belief that time was on his side.

NAHDA, the other 'moderate' Islamist party, noted "several examples of electoral excesses and fraud � In some polling stations the urns were hijacked by communal security guards before voting began and our supporters were threatened by firearms. However, we accept the election results."⁴¹

The RND was the only party satisfied with results that produced a flood of protests. For Abdelkader Bensalah: "the results of these elections are a first step towards the successful reconstruction of legitimate state institutions, and represent a collective victory for the Algerian people."⁴²

This whitewashing was tempered by the UN delegation. It appears that differences of opinion between delegation members precipitated the unexplained cancellation of a press conference. These differences of opinion were made clearer in a press release published on 8 June.⁴⁴ This stated that: "several observers considered that security measures were used as a screen in order to increase control over the delegation's activities, although others felt that they had been able to carry out their tasks without constraint." The same statement also stressed that: "the observers were impressed by the material and logistical preparations for the elections, the professionalism of those working in the polling stations and the harmonious atmosphere in which the elections took place."

While it acknowledged some success in regard to the form of the elections, the delegation had several reservations in regard to their substance. Commenting on the consolidation of results at the level of the communes and the wilayas, the delegation reported that "the majority of observers were able to follow the overall process without any major problem, although others were refused access by some electoral commissions in the wilayas. As regards the special polling stations reserved for the security forces, and the mobile polling stations, the majority of observers are agreed that the process did not provide sufficient guarantees of neutrality and transparency."

Although their numbers were restricted and the government was particularly solicitous towards them, the UN observers shared the same grievances as the opposition parties regarding the electoral process in the polling stations to which they had no access. That is to say, they agree on the extent of the fraud practised in those places where no controls were permitted.

This over-simplified division, which placed the FIS at the centre of the political field, has shown its limits over the course of time. The aspirations of the Algerian people are hidden when the political situation is reduced in this way to a confrontation between a 'military power' and an 'Islamist opposition'. The struggle for democracy appears to be no more than a decision to back one group or another. Notwithstanding the fluctuating tactical alliances, sometimes intended to lay a false scent, the political parties have not renounced their original objectives.

The FLN

The FLN, which rose out of the independence struggle and was formerly the only party permitted, has had great difficulty in adapting to the way the cards are now dealt. The party's platform, based on "national independence and national unity", remains nostalgic for an antiquated epoch, and is often out of step with the social and political realities of the country.

Divided into two main groups, the 'reformers' and the 'conservatives', the FLN changes its alliances according to the balance of power within the party and what best serves its own interests at the time. In January 1992 the FLN became a 'fellow traveller" with the FIS and found itself in opposition. However, in February 1996 the party returned to power following a 'palace revolution' among its leaders who preferred a change of tactic. However, the brief spell of virtual opposition to a government of which it was the architect has allowed the FLN to present an image of itself as being open to democracy in a way that it could not have hoped for previously.

The RND

Regarded as an FLN 'clone'⁴⁵ , the RND developed the same line of overall thinking and the same reflexes as the former single party, of which it was an extension. The leadership of the RND, created in February 1997 to support President Z�roual, is composed of members of the administration and former FLN staff.

If this fortuitous recruitment pattern relies on the RND's proximity to power and the privileges that it therefore has to offer, its position in the political field leaves the door open to all sorts of alliances, as much with the 'Islamists' as with the 'democrats'. The internal balance of power within the party is constantly fluctuating between the 'democratic nationalists' and the 'Islamic nationalists'.

Set up to provide backing for President Z�roual's policies, the RND has been going through turbulent times since the announcement of his 'resignation' on 11 September 1998, and there is a risk that it may eventually implode. This situation is caused by the lack of any new personality of calibre emerging from the ranks capable of winning the consensual support of the party. As a result, the different factions are lining up behind the presidential candidates of the other parties, particularly the FLN.

MSP/Hamas

By a policy of "one step at a time" and a gradual 'infiltration' into state institutions, the Mouvement de la soci�t� pour la paix⁴⁶ (MSP/Hamas) has achieved unexpected results. In the presidential elections of 16 November 1995, its leader, Mahfoud Nahnah gained 25% of the votes and came in second place behind Liamine Z�roual. Despite fraud during the legislative elections of 5 June 1997, the party gained second place behind the RND. The RND still describes itself as an "opposition party" even though it entered the government with 7 ministerial portfolios.

Thanks to its links with a very large number of 'charitable and humanitarian associations, Hamas has woven a veritable spider's web through Algerian society. As the main party to benefit from the dissolution of the FIS and heir to a significant number of its former voters, Hamas is developing ambiguous tactical positions, and often acts opportunistically. While it denounces terrorism in order to guard its links with the government, it is calling for a general amnesty during the election period so as to win support from the FIS grassroots.

Nahdha⁴⁷

Less widespread than Hamas, Nahdha is mainly implanted in the east of the country. The sometimes virulent speeches given by Abdellah Djaballah, its leader, are tempered by those of his associates, who are attracted by the 'participationist' strategy used by Hamas. Negotiations began with the RND and the FLN in spring 1998. However, just when it seemed that Nahdha was about to join the government, an internal crisis created a split between the radical supporters of Abdellah Djaballah and the leaders of the party's political bureau. Although negotiations were suspended on news of President Z�roual's resignation and the announcement of early presidential elections in April 1999, the crisis that shook the party is still lying latent.

The balance of power does not presently favour the 'moderate' Islamist parties. They are therefore obliged to provide reassurances and professions of good faith, but these promulgations should not be allowed to delude. Their strategic objective remains unchanged: to succeed by the ballot box where the FIS failed by armed force, and then to impose an Islamic state.

During the years of one-party dictatorship, they were happy to criticise 'the government's socialist option', and to demand a greater 'Islamisation' of society, but without ever repudiating democracy or the multi-party system without which could have no legal existence. Nonetheless, their vision of society remains stamped with the unicity of Arab-Islamic ideology: one nation, one language, one religion, one leader and one party.

When Nahdha was set up in 1990 its leader declared: "democracy and a secular state are the inventions of the Judeo-Christian west, contrary to our Arab-Islamic values. We are presently subject to a constitution, which we respect. When we reach power we will adopt an Islamic constitution based on the Chari'�a (Koranic law). Secular parties and communists, that do not conform to this constitution, that is to the principles of Islam, will not be tolerated."⁴⁸

Contrary to the Islamists, the main themes of their programmes are an extension of the ideas they fought for clandestinely during the years of one-party dictatorship; they are not the result of constraints arising from the political evolution of the past ten years. However, because they each have their own interpretation of the Islamist phenomenon, they remain divided, which considerably reduces their influence.

The RCD 'eradicators'

The RCD supported the cancellation of the legislative elections of 26 December 1991 and the subsequent interruption of the electoral process, but is opposed to any dialogue with the FIS. The RCD believes that the only way to counter the armed Islamist groups is to employ legally-sanctioned anti-terrorism measures.

Described by the Islamists as the 'Rassemblement contre Dieu'' ('Assembly Against God') because of their secular stand, the RCD has been the particular target of the FIS since well before terrorist tactics began to be used. Between 1990 and 1991 public meetings held by the RCD were disturbed time and again by FIS militants using axes and swords, and a number of people were wounded. Since 1992 armed Islamist groups have assassinated scores of RCD activists. Finally, in February 1994, the RCD felt forced to call for armed 'resistance' to the GIA, and a large number of RCD activists and sympathisers have now joined Groupes de l�gitimes d�fense⁴⁹ (legitimate defence groups), with the support of the authorities.

The FFS and PT 'conciliators'

Both these parties have taken part in the 'national reconciliation' process and share the belief that peace lies in dialogue with the FIS.

Under the sponsorship of the Catholic community of Sant'Egidio the FFS and PT, together with the FIS, Nahdha and the FLN signed a contrat national pour la paix et la r�conciliation nationale (national contract for peace and national reconciliation) in Rome on 13 January 1995. However, despite this apparent opening, the proposed political solution for ending the crisis in the country soon showed its limits. The FFS and the PT claimed that the FIS had agreed under the terms of the contract to abide by the rules of the democratic game and reject violence. But the Islamists had a different interpretation and claimed that the democrats had accepted their arguments by signing for "the primacy of the Law (la loi l�gitime) above all other laws."⁵⁰

The FFS and the PT found themselves caught in a trap. While intending to insist on the supremacy of a legal system adopted by an elected parliament, they used the same expression that translates from Arabic to mean the application of 'the Chari'�a' (Koranic law)" as opposed to any institutionally composed body of law.

Rejected by the government and by a large section of the political community, this deal was never likely to succeed. The final straw was the explosion of a booby-trapped car in the center of Algiers resulting in several civilian casualties only the day after the agreement was announced. Anouar Haddam, one of the leaders of the GIA, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of that group. Anouar Haddam, living in refuge in the US, had previously signed the peace agreement in Rome on behalf of the FIS.

This split in the 'democrats' between 'eradicators' and 'conciliators' has been sharpened by the multi-facetted manipulations of the government, which succeeded in infiltrating its agents into the highest reaches of the 'democratic' parties. The emergence of a current of democratic thought, which might have constituted a credible alternative to both the government and the Islamists, remained a pious hope.

The confrontation between an arrogant majority and a splintered opposition was turned on its head twice, resulting in surprising adjustments to the situation. The first occasion was when the opposition protested against the fraud following the local elections on 23 October 1997; the second occasion arose during the passage of a law dealing with parliamentary salaries.⁵⁵

Part 2 of 3

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