Kosovo Spring

March 20, 1998 (Part 2 of 2)

Contents

• Introduction

• Kosovo Situation
  1. Historical Background
     1. Importance Of Kosovo For Serbs
     2. Importance Of Kosovo For Kosovars
  2. Sociological Background
     1. Albanians In The Region
     2. Language And Religion
     3. Demographics
     4. Diaspora
  3. The Human Rights Situation
  4. Evolution Of The Status Of Kosovo
     1. From Autonomy To Repression 1974 - 1989
     2. Adherence To Non-Violence 1989-1997
     3. Kosovo's Status, Differing Views
  5. Parallel Institutions
     1. Government And Political Life
     2. Democratic League Of Kosovo
     3. Parliamentary Party Of Kosovo
     4. Other Parties
     5. 22 March 1998 Elections
  6. Education
     1. History Of The Conflict
     2. The Parallel Education System
     3. Education Agreement
     4. Students
  7. Health Care
  8. Economy
  9. Media
     1. Print Media
     2. Electronic Media
     3. Internet
  10. Kosovo Liberation Army, UCK

• Kosovo In Context
  1. Kosovo And Kosovo Serbs
  2. Kosovo And Belgrade Serbs
  3. Kosovo And Yugoslavia
  4. Kosovo And Albania
  5. Kosovo And The Balkans
  6. Kosovo And Europe
     1. European Union
     2. Council Of Europe
     3. Individual European Initiatives
  7. Kosovo And The US
  8. Kosovo And International Organisations
     1. OSCE
     2. Contact Group
     3. United Nations
     4. NATO
     5. Non-Governmental Organisations

• Proposed Solutions
  1. Status Quo
  2. Independence
  3. International Protectorate
  4. Administrative Reforms And Possible Partition Of Kosovo
  5. Autonomy
  6. "Third Republic"
  7. Conclusion

• ICG Recommendations
  1. Short Term Measures
     1. Military Strategy
     2. Sanctions And Other Punitive Measures
     3. Mediation Of Immediate Issues
     4. International Presence
  2. Accompanying Measures
     1. Negotiations
     2. Increased Contacts
     3. Support For Education And Health Service
     4. Civil Society
     5. Media
     6. Students

• Appendices
  1. Chronology Of Events In Kosovo 1946-1992
  2. Who Is Who

Kosovo in Context

The province's most prominent Serb politician is Momcilo Trajkovic, leader of the Serb Resistance Movement (Srpski pokret otpora or SPO). Trajkovic's position is categorical: "The question of Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija] is an internal problem of Serbia, not of Yugoslavia."¹⁰⁰ That said, he and another Serb leader, Raska-Prizren Bishop Artemije, have become increasingly vocal critics of Milosevic's Kosovo policy in recent months. In January, they wrote to him warning: "We are convinced that a solution cannot be found by taking Serbs out into the streets and by manipulating their misfortune. Such an irresponsible approach is leading us all directly to a national catastrophe."¹⁰¹ Moreover, after the Drenica clamp-down, Trajkovic stated: "Serbia should have initiated an open dialogue earlier, without waiting for pressures and threat of sanctions."¹⁰²

Already at the end of December last year Kosovo Serb leaders urged the Serbian parliament to hold a special session to focus on Serb-Kosovar relations. They formed a delegation to lobby on their behalf, which, in addition to Trajkovic, and Artemije, includes Dusan Ristic of the Serb Renewal Movement (SPO). And they accepted The Proposal for a Democratic Solution of the Kosovo-Metohija Question , (see section IV D below) which essentially entails a the division of Kosovo into two regions, Kosovo and Metohija, as a basis for future negotiations with Kosovars.

In February Trajkovic and Bishop Artemije visited both France and the US to discuss options in Kosovo. At home they have also organised a series of meetings called "the Serb-Serb dialogue on Kosovo" in an attempt to build a common Serb position towards the province. The fourth meeting took place at the Belgrade Writers' Association behind closed doors and was only attended by opposition parties. Representatives of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia and his wife's Yugoslav Left did not show up. Nevertheless, the meeting concluded that the way forward was to begin a dialogue with the Kosovars.¹⁰³

Starting such a dialogue is difficult since contact between Serbs and Kosovars is minimal. Indeed, when in 1995 the LDK organised a street clean-up with the participation of people from both ethnic groups, the event was so exceptional that it featured in a report of the Humanitarian Law Centre. Most Serbs do not speak Albanian and live in fear of their Kosovar neighbours. Moreover, Kosovar militants have begun to target Serb refugee centres, police stations, military barracks and cafes.¹⁰⁴

As Trajkovic and mainstream Kosovo Serb politicians have fallen out with Milosevic, another group of Kosovo Serbs became active again. The Bozur Association of Serbs and Montenegrins, originally founded as part of the so-called third Serb uprising in the mid-1980s, has come back to life after more than half a decade in hibernation. Bozur president Bogdan Kecman is a former high-ranking Communist and Milosevic loyalist who led the populist Serb movement in Kosovo in the second half of the 1980s. In gratitude Milosevic secured Kecman's appointment as Kosovo director of Jugopetrol, the state energy company.¹⁰⁵

In mid-January 1998, somewhere between 154 and 600 (estimates vary) Bozur activists rallied in Kosovo Polje to protest the rise in Kosovar terrorism. Speakers refused to criticise the Serbian or Yugoslav authorities, but urged Serbs to go to Srbica, the central village in the Drenica region. A Bozur delegation then went to Belgrade to inform Milosevic of the "real situation" in Kosovo and -- according to a Bozur member -- Milosevic assured the delegation that state bodies would do everything to provide energetic protection from terrorism for the Serbs in Kosovo. In retrospect, it seems that the Bozur reactivation was meant to prepare Serb opinion for the Drenica clamp-down. In response to the series of Albanian protest rallies, Pristina's Serbs too started daily demonstrations on 18 March 1998.

The gulf between Kosovar and Serb society is huge. Even when, in late 1996 and early 1997, thousands of Serbs demonstrated for three months against Milosevic's rule in the streets of Belgrade, Kosovars remained silent. Only Adem Demaci, who having spent 28 years in a Serbian prison cannot be accused of collaboration, broke ranks to send a letter of support to the demonstrators. The Serbian opposition has been equally silent in response to police brutality against Kosovars during the Drenica clamp-down.

Most Serbs know very little about Kosovar society. However, a rather exhaustive book was published two years ago in Serb which serves as a sort of primer on Kosovo. It is a collection of ten portrait-interviews with the most important Kosovar personalities. The title of the book is rather telling: "I Asked the Albanians What They Want and They Said a Republic... If Possible."¹⁰⁷

Since Kosovars boycott Serbian elections, the indifference of Serbian opposition parties to their plight should not be a surprise. A poll of Kosovar opinion carried out in October 1996 found that:

Only 2.5 percent view the Serbian opposition parties as possible coalition partners. A vast majority of the surveyed (91.9 percent) does not believe that any Serbian opposition party would work together with the Albanian representatives on the resolution of the problem of the status of Kosovo.¹⁰⁸

The same poll showed that the prospect of recognition of the republic of Kosovo within the FRY would tempt 6.3 percent of people to cast their ballots in federal and local elections. The same percentage said they would vote if the Kosovo problem was to become fully internationalised.

A handful of moderate Serbs and Albanians do, nevertheless, attempt to work together, often at great personal risk. On the Serb side, this includes the Humanitarian Law Centre, the Forum for Ethnic Relations, the Belgrade Circle, Helsinki Committee, Soros Foundation and a group of young people who call themselves "post-pessimists". Among the political parties, only Vesna Pesic's Civic Alliance is sympathetic. On the Kosovar side, this includes the likes of Veton Surroi, editor of Koha Ditore, Shkelzen Maliqi, the current director of the Open Society Institute's Pristina Office and Gazmend Pula, the head of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Kosovo. These mavericks are usually only able to meet up at internationally-organised conferences. In the course of 1997 three took place, in New York (7-9 April), Vienna (18-20 April) and Ulcin, Montenegro (23-25 June).

At the end of January 1998, Belgrade's "Appeal of the Fifty Association", a right-wing intellectual group, appealed to all Kosovar intellectuals to work together to come to a settlement in Kosovo outside regime and party channels. While the appeal has no political weight, it is an encouraging indication that some in Serbia may be looking for alternative ways of resolving the conflict.¹⁰⁹

The Drenica clamp-down was the work of Ministry of Interior (MUP) forces and of the feared SAJ - Serbia's Anti-terrorist Units. The army is not known to have taken part. Indeed, the commander of the Pristina Corps, Major-General Nebojsa Pavkovic, said on 27 February that the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) is not threatening anyone in Kosovo-Metohija and that it wants to turn the region into "an oasis of peace rather than clashes".¹¹⁰ However, the Albanian-language daily Koha Ditore reported at the end of January that two notorious Serbian paramilitary leaders, Zeljko Raznjatovic "Arkan" and Dragan Vasiljevic "Kapetan Dragan", both active at the beginning of the Croatian war in 1991, had taken up residence a hotel in Kosovska Mitrovica. There was no independent confirmation of these reports, but the rumours have caused great concern among Kosovars.

Following the Drenica clamp-down, Belgrade's state-owned media rallied around Milosevic and behind the police operation in predictable fashion. The main television news broadcasts have been filled with messages of unconditional support. Interestingly, independent media, including the newspapers Nasa Borba, Danas, Dnevni telegraf, Blic and Demokratija, reported events in an very different manner, causing the Belgrade District Attorney to move against the editors. However, with state-owned television by far the most influential medium and no mention or pictures of Kosovar victims, Serb society is again, as earlier in Croatia and Bosnia, homogenising around an uncompromising position. The only political party to take a conciliatory line was he Serbian Civil Alliance (GSS) which demanded that "The Serbian government urgently inform the public of all the circumstances of the tragic conflicts in the Drenica area of Kosovo" and "start resolving the Kosovo problem through all political means".¹¹¹

Despite the uncompromising Serbian position, attitudes elsewhere in the FRY -- in Montenegro in particular, but also in Vojvodina and the Sandzak -- are rather different and more accommodating towards Kosovars. Moreover, constitutional reform or any other changes in Kosovo will surely have an impact elsewhere in the rump federation.

Though sanctions are being considered against the whole of the FRY, Montenegro is as hostile to the strong-arm tactics which Serbian has adopted in Kosovo as the international community. New president, Milo Djukanovic, whose election Milosevic attempted to block, was in large part voted into office on the strength of non-Serb votes in last year's election and is keenly aware of this constituency. Indeed, if given the opportunity, Djukanovic may be able to play a key mediation role between the rival communities in Kosovo because of the esteem in which he is held by both Muslim Slavs and Albanians.

Clearly, a major concern for Djukanovic is Montenegro's status as an international pariah, if it remains shackled to Serbia. Already on 24 February 1998, before the recent upsurge in violence, he told Montenegrin state television that Kosovo had to be solved "by giving [the province] a certain degree of autonomy." And he warned that "without opening dialogue in Kosovo, Yugoslavia cannot return to the international community." In mid-March Djukanovic again criticised Milosevic for allowing Kosovo problem to fester.¹¹⁴ Meanwhile, he allowed Montenegrin Albanians to demonstrate in solidarity with the Kosovars with, according to Albanian sources, close to 10,000 protesters marching in the towns of Ulcinj, Rozaje and Plav.¹¹⁵ And the Montenegrin state-owned media have attempted to cover the Kosovo violence so objectively that the Belgrade daily Politika attacked them for reporting "tendentiously and giving too much space to statements by Kosovar leaders."¹¹⁶

Politicians in Vojvodina, both Serb and non-Serb, are also watching events in Kosovo closely. For before Milosevic's so-called yoghurt revolution¹¹⁷ in 1988, Vojvodina too had the status of an autonomous province. Moreover, it too contains a large non-Serb population. Indeed, according to the 1981 census, only 56.6 percent of its 1.15 million inhabitants were Serbs or Montenegrins, and the remaining 43.4 percent were a mixture of people, including Hungarians (19 percent), Croats (5.4 percent), Slovaks and Romanians. If Kosovo's status is changed, Vojvodina may seek a similar degree of autonomy. Indeed, at the end of February, Mihalj Secej, deputy president of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM), said that his party would not join the new republican government, but would support any programme to "give more powers to self-government authorities who should bear greater responsibility for all affairs including the position of national minorities."¹¹⁸ And if Vojvodina and Kosovo win enhanced autonomy, the 250,000 Muslim Slavs who form more than 80 percent of the Sandzak's population will no doubt also seek to improve their position.

Another factor in Yugoslav politics is the 150,000 Croatian Serbs who have taken refuge in the FRY since being expelled from their homes in 1995. Of these, according to UNHCR figures, some 20,000 were dispatched as settlers to Kosovo. The Croatian Serbs are reluctant settlers and a group of them recently organised a petition refusing to go to Kosovo so that the province would be "turned into a bastion of Serbdom or subject of political deals".

On 3 November 1997, Albania's president, Rexhep Mejdani, said in Geneva that the international community should react to head off clashes in Kosovo. Moreover, he urged the international community to force Yugoslavia immediately to implement the Rome Agreement on education in Kosovo because "stalemating the situation leaves room for increased tensions".¹¹⁹ Then at the end of February, Mejdani asked Kofi Annan to establish a permanent UN presence in Kosovo as a preventive measure.

After the upsurge in violence in Kosovo, Albania's defense minister Perikli Teta said that his country feared the influx of up to 200,000 Kosovar refugees as a result of the crisis.¹²⁰ And he proposed that NATO deploy a peacekeeping force to help patrol the Albanian border with Kosovo. Instead, however, NATO decided to help Albania, which already belongs to Partnership for Peace, control arms smuggling along the border with money and technical aid, and promised emergency assistance in the event of a refugee influx. A NATO official speaking to a Reuters correspondent in Brussels said: "We expect Albania to exercise restrain... to make certain that their territory is not used for any activities to support the Kosovo Liberation Army."¹²¹

Former Albanian president Sali Berisha had a sober view of the prospects for international involvement in solving the Kosovo question. In December 1997 he declared that Kosovars' "freedoms and rights will not come as a gift from anyone, and their problems will not be solved in Tirana [or] Belgrade, or in Washington, London and Paris... They are solved and will be solved in Pristina and the towns and villages of Kosovo."¹²²

Albanian prime minister Fatos Nano has been more accommodating to the Serbian position. In November last year he met up with Yugoslav president Milosevic on Crete in Greece, much to the chagrin of the Kosovars. LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova responded by saying that Albania can cooperate with all countries in the region, but "decisions on Kosovo can be made by the legitimate leadership of Kosovo only"¹²³ PPK leader Adem Demaci described the talks held there as "a serious political mistake", and Luljeta Pula-Beqiri of the Social-Democratic Party said that "the talks were premature."¹²⁴

In mid-February 1998 Nano went further and openly criticised the "establishment of parallel institutions by Kosovo Albanians" according to the Tirana daily Koha Jone.¹²⁵ He also said that: "The Albanians in and outside Albania should understand that parallel institutions are no solution; on the contrary, they only radicalise the societies that have created them" because "these tendencies stir radical actions, and as we are witnessing, even terrorist ones, actions which the Albanian government does not support, irrespective of whether Albanians or Serbs are behind them." He therefore proposed that Kosovars "give up the policy of boycott, as a policy which has not yielded them any result so far [and] incorporate in the political life of the country they live in."

The United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP), whose mission has been to patrol the Macedonian border, was supposed to come to an end in August 1998 when the peace-keepers (300 US and 400 Scandinavians) were scheduled to withdraw. During his visit to NATO headquarters in February, Macedonian prime minister Branko Crvenkovski asked the alliance to take over from the UN. In mid-March, the US State Department suggested that UNPREDEP might be enlarged,¹²⁸ while Macedonian president Gligorov called for US troops to replace the UN detachment.¹²⁹

A month before the Drenica clamp-down on Kosovars, Gligorov announced that his country was preparing to secure a corridor for refugees from Kosovo in the case of serious conflicts in Serbia's southern province. This statement annoyed both Kosovars and Macedonia's own Albanian community. In response, Arben Xhaferi, president of the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity, addressed tens of thousands of fellow Albanians in Skopje and Tetovo, many of whom chanted "UCK" and "We will give our lives but we will not give up Kosovo." And the secretary general of the Democratic Party of Albanians, said: "If there is trouble, Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and of course Albania will stand as one… we hope the US and Europe will open a dialogue, but if they don't we must look after ourselves"¹³⁰

The fall-out from ethnic conflict in Kosovo may also be damaging to the peace process in Bosnia. While fighting is extremely unlikely to break out again in the presence of 35,000 NATO troops, another ostensibly Orthodox-Muslim struggle in the region will inevitably have consequences and may hold back the reconstruction process. Even Republika Srpska's new moderate prime minister Milorad Dodik has backed the Serbian clamp-down, sending a telegram of support to Serbian Prime Minster Mirko Marjanovic on 3 March 1998.¹³¹ Serb member of Bosnia's Presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik, told the Bosnian Serb news agency Srna that: "The question of Kosovo is an internal Serbian matter, but not only a Serbian problem, because it is a symbol for the whole Serb people."¹³² And deputies in Republika Srpska's National Assembly proposed a resolution demanding that Republika Srpska secede from Bosnia and join Yugoslavia in the event of independence for Kosovo¹³³. Meanwhile, Bosniac media and politicians have indicated sympathy for the Kosovar position.

Turkey has strong historical links with Kosovars and has forged close military ties with Albania since the end of the Cold War. Following the Drenica clamp-down, Turkish president Suleyman Demirel wrote to his Yugoslav counterpart Slobodan Milosevic saying: "Leaders are persons who are invited by their people to come forward with remarkable courage and wise initiatives in the hard days of history." In an apparent allusion to the 13-years old conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurdish rebels in which 27,000 have died, he added "Turkey has a definite attitude on the subject of terrorism."¹³⁴

In mid-January 1998 Greece proposed organising a meeting between FRY president Milosevic, the Kosovar leader Rugova and Albanian prime minister Nano. Such a meeting, said the Greek minister for European affairs, Iorgos Papandreu, should focus on the problem of Kosovo. He added that Greece, like the rest of the EU does not favour independence for Kosovo. The Albanian prime minister's advisor described the Greek proposal as interesting and said that Albania believes that the will of the Kosovars and their leaders should be respected in seeking a solution to this problem.

Kosovar political leaders shrugged. An LDK vice-president announced that the Greek initiative has no great chance of success at a moment when the US and EU are vying to mediate in Kosovo. And a PPK deputy leader said that the great powers have influence and can secure the implementation of agreements in resolving the Kosovo issue. In other words: no thanks, we have better protectors.

In response to the Serbian crackdown in Drenica, EU foreign ministers met on 13 March 1998 in Edinburgh to agree the following measures:

• Renewal of the EU's demand to open an office in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo province;
• Expansion of the EU monitoring mission in Albania to observe the border with Kosovo;
• Continuing the pressure on the Belgrade government to open dialogue with the Kosovar leadership;
• Sending a message to the region stressing EU support for autonomy, but not independence in Kosovo;
• Appointing former Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez as EU mediator for negotiations between Kosovo and the Yugoslav government (Mr Gonzalez has already been designated OSCE representative in the region);
• Convening a Kosovo conference in Paris with the participation of the countries of the troubled region, as well as the US and Russia;
• Implementing sanctions against Milosevic's government agreed to by the Contact Group;¹³⁶

Earlier on 3 March 1998 the EU's Political Committee had concluded that, while the EU did not wish to internationalise Kosovo, but the question had been internationalised as a result of the violence and potential refugee exodus and was therefore no longer simply an internal matter for the FRY or Serbia.¹³⁷ And on 12 March 1998 the European Parliament¹³⁸ adopted a resolution calling on the UN, EU, OSCE, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) to prepare the dispatch of a "preventive deployment force" for the region.¹³⁹

The resolution is a typical case of good intentions and even frank outrage that the main actors of the international community express to each other in different fora. Since it is addressed to everybody and nobody in particualr it is unlikely to spur any organization into action. The only recipient that could in the real world dispatch a "preventive deploymet force" is of course NATO, but NATO has refused to do anything of the sort. On 18 March 1998, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said "We are going to work with NATO and make sure that all instruments available to us to shore up the region of this conflict are used. But the issue of further deployment of NATO forces has not arisen."¹⁴⁰

The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution on the FRY making clear to the Yugoslav authorities that the EU would only help reintegrate the country into European affairs, if it fulfilled key conditions, and in particular improved its human and minority rights record. The resolution also asked the Belgrade authorities to allow a "permanent presence of the international community in the region".¹⁴²

Following the events of late Febraury and early March 1998, the president of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, Leni Fischer, travelled to Belgrade. There he said that the reinstatement of the autonomy Kosovo had enjoyed before 1989 was no longer an option, since that status had only been viable within the framework of a Yugoslavia of six republics and two autonomous provinces. Instead, the Council of Europe proposed that the authorities [in Belgrade] should determine a certain degree of autonomy for Kosovo, and that Kosovars should be represented in administrative bodies, the police, and the health care and educational systems, in proportion to their overall numbers in the population.¹⁴³

In an interview with the German daily General Anzeiger dated 17 March 1998, Kinkel also had harsh words for the Kosovars: "It is most important to start a dialogue, even if not all demands of the Kosovo Albanians will be fulfilled.... They should not stage any militant actions, nor should they make demands for independence. There is no support for this in the international community," he said.¹⁴⁵

The two foreign ministers eventually visited Belgrade on 19 March 1998. They are believed to have offered Milosevic a package of inducements, such as readmission into the OSCE, in return for allowing the EU to open an office in Pristina, and the OSCE's observation mission to return to Kosovo (see section III, H(1) below). Kinkel also asked for the dialogue on Kosovo to be held on the Federal and not Serbian level.

As during the Bosnian war, Russia has adopted a obdurate, pro-Serbian position. In response to Western hopes that Russia might mediate, the foreign ministry's spokesman Gennady Tarasov stated that Russia considered Kosovo to be an internal Serbian matter and that therefore: "Russia is not taking on the role of intermediary in the settlement of Yugoslavia's internal conflict in Kosovo province."¹⁴⁶ After Serbian president Milan Milutinovic said that Serbia was ready to discuss "self-rule" for Kosovars, the Russian foreign ministry announced: "We welcome the measures suggested in the declaration directed at the quickest resolution of the situation in Kosovo and consider them an important step in the spirit of the Contact Group's recommendations."¹⁴⁷

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott have, in particular, been outspoken in their criticism of Serbia, and especially Milosevic, since the upsurge of violence. This is probably in large part a reaction to the timerity which characterised the international communty's response to the outbreak of fighting in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia in 1992. Mme Albright has warned Milosevic that he will pay a high price, saying: "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia."¹⁴⁸ She believes that "the one thing [Milosevic] truly understands is decisive and firm action on the part of the international community."¹⁴⁹ that "the time to stop the killings is now, before it spreads."¹⁵⁰ Talbott has gone even further, ordering Serbia to "cease its brutal repressive campaign which involves ethnic cleansing, summary executions and mass expulsions", and warning that "Belgrade will bear full responsibility for bringing the viability of their own state into jeopardy."¹⁵¹

This uncompromising US approach is not a new departure. Five years ago in Christmas 1992 at the height of the Bosnian war, then president George Bush warned Milosevic in a cable that in the event of conflict in Kosovo, the US would be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs. The cable was reported at the time by The New York Times and confirmed privately by US officials. Moreover, when asked if Bush's so-called "Christmas Warning" was still in effect, special US envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard said: "US policy has not changed... We have warned Milosevic appropriately."¹⁵²

The US also insists on maintaining an "outer wall of sanctions" against rump Yugoslavia, because it considers the country to be a threat to its national interests.¹⁵³ It therefore prevents Yugoslavia from joining the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, UN and other international organizations and institutions.

These sanctions against Yugoslavia will be kept in place until Congress has received a written explanation from the president stating that significant progress has been achieved in resolving the situation in Kosovo. "Significant progress" in Kosovo would include, as specified by this article, the right to self-rule for the people in Kosovo; the establishment of international protectorate in Kosovo; an improvement in the state of human rights; allowing the return of international observers in charge with monitoring human rights in Kosovo; and allowing Kosovo's elected government to carry out its mandate as a legitimate representative of the people in Kosovo."¹⁵⁴

Other conditions which rump Yugoslavia has to meet before the sanctions will be fully lifted are the following:

• cooperation with the Hague war crimes tribunal and the fulfillment of the other articles of the Dayton Peace Agreement;
• completion of the division of assets among the heir states of the former Yugoslavia;
• democratization in Serbia based on OSCE recommendations; and
• official recognition of the presidential elections in Montenegro.

This latter item was added in the December 1997 renewal of the "outer wall". By extending the list, however, it softens the edge of this sanction as a weapon used on behalf of Kosovo.

Ironically, many Kosovo observers accuse the US of giving Milosevic the "green light" to launch the Drenica clamp-down. On 23 February 1998 the US offered Belgrade minor cosmetic concessions which did not, however, affect the "outer wall" of sanctions as a reward to Milosevic for supporting Milorad Dodik, the new, moderate Serb prime minister in Republika Srpska. On the same day, Gelbard visited Pristina and said that the Kosovo Liberation Army UCK "is without any questions a terrorist group" and that the US "condemns very strongly terrorist activities in Kosovo." On 12 March, when questioned by lawmakers, over whether he still considered the group a terrorist organization, Gelbard said that while it has "committed terrorist acts" it has "not been classified legally by the US government as a terrorist organization."¹⁵⁵ Gelbard has, nevertheless, continued to make it clear to Kosovars that the US wants their leadership to condemn terrorism and does not support the concept of an independent Kosovo, seeking instead a settlement which leaves today's international borders intact. A diplomatic source told Reuters: "Rugova should know by now that independence is not an option and that continued violence will lessen Western support."¹⁵⁶

Though the US does not have an embassy in Belgrade, since it has not yet officially recognised the FRY, the US Information Service has a small office in Pristina. Opened in July 1996 in an Albanian neighborhood (to Serb annoyance), USIS is based in a two-storey building, filled with an impressive collection of CD-ROMS, reference materials and a library of classic books, and staffed by one US diplomat.

LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova described USIS as "a direct link with the US" and its opening as "a historic day for Kosovo". However, after a few months of euphoria -- during which time the information centre was treated as a fully-fledged embassy and the solitary diplomat as an ambassador -- Kosovars turned against USIS. This was because, on a visit to Kosovo in spring 1997, the then US special envoy to the Balkans John Kornblum bluntly told Kosovars that the US did not consider independence to be a solution. As a result, USIS began to be known merely as a "little library" and its then director was attacked in the Albanian-language press on personal grounds.

Though only of minor significance, the affair is indicative of the faith Kosovars have in the US, their desperate hope that the US will provide their salvation and their bitter disappointment when the US makes it clear that it will not. But the US still is the one and perhaps only reference for Kosovars. Starting with the 7 March 1998 demonstration of Kosovar doctors and nurses, many public protests were staged in the narrow steep streets around the USIS building, both as a sign of trust in the American willingness and possibilities and a protection against Serbian police which is less likely to attack Kosovars in full view of an American diplomat.

The Mission's tasks were as follows:

• promote dialogue between authorities and representatives of the populations and communities in the three regions [Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina];
• collect information on all aspects relevant to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and promote solutions to such problems;
• establish contact points for solving problems that might be identified;
• assist in providing information on relevant legislation on human rights, protection of minorities, free media and democratic elections.¹⁵⁷

Max Van der Stoel, the OSCE's high commissioner for minorities, traveled on 19 February 1998 to Pristina where he met with LDK leader, Ibrahim Rugova. Because Van der Stoel was refused an official visa by the Belgrade authorities, he visited Kosovo in a private capacity. Ironically, PPK chairman Adem Demaci refused to see Van der Stoel, on the grounds that Kosovars are not a "minority" in Kosovo but a nation. (see section II, E(3) Parliamentary Party of Kosovo)

At the beginning of February, a delegation of the OSCE's "Troika" Heads of Missions in Belgrade, led by Poland's Ambassador to Belgrade Slawomir Dabrowa, went to Kosovo on a fact-finding visit (2-3 February). Serbian officials in Kosovo refused the talk with the OSCE delegation, but the Troika did manage to hold talks in Belgrade with the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Serbian Parliament, and in Pristina with Rugova, PPK representatives, members of the "3+3" commission on Education, one human rights activist, one journalist, two formerly prominent politicians and Momcilo Trajkovic, the chairman of the Serb Resistance Movement.

The Troika concluded that the role of the OSCE and its position on Kosovo has been perceived in a different way by the two sides. The Serbian authorities could see no role for the OSCE until the FRY was readmitted into the organisation and repeated that Kosovo was purely an internal matter. By contrast, Kosovar leaders viewed the prospects of OSCE involvement positively, saying that Van der Stoel would be welcomed in Pristina as the OSCE Chairman-in-Office's Personal Representative, but not at all as the OSCE High commissioner on National Minorities.

After the upsurge in violence, the OSCE condemned "the excessive and indiscriminate use of force" but also stressed "the unacceptability of any terrorist action." It also decided that the two existing OSCE missions, in Tirana and in Skopje, should monitor the border with Kosovo in view of the potential for the spill over of the conflict and the possible flow of refugees. And it called on Serbia "to halt excessive use of force in Kosovo, to vigorously investigate and accept international investigation of reported summary executions and to bring to justice those found responsible."¹⁵⁸

After the upsurge in violence, the Contact Group met on 9 March 1998 and agreed (1) to support a UN Security Council resolution to impose a comprehensive arms embargo against Yugoslavia; (2) to deny visas to senior Yugoslav and Serbian officials responsible for the repression; and (3) to impose a moratorium on credit for government-financed exports. The same five countries also set Milosevic a deadline of 19 March 1998 to achieve the following:

• withdraw the special police units and call off action by the security forces against the civilian population;
• allow access to Kosovo for the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations as well as representatives of the Contact Group and other embassies;
• commit himself publicly to begin a process of dialogue with the Kosovar leadership.¹⁶⁰

A follow up Contact Group meeting to assess Milosevic's response is scheduled to take place in Bonn on 25 March 1998. The main measure to be discussed is the freezing of funds held abroad by the FRY.

The sanctions foreseen by the Contact Group raise two issues. The first is implicit US recognition of the FRY, since officially the US uses the term Serbia-Montenegro. The second, and more substantial, issue is that sanctions against the FRY will also affect Montenegro even though that republic played no part in the Kosovo clamp-down and its president Milo Djukanovic is one of Milosevic's most vociferous opponents. There may be no way to fine tune the sanctions, but Montenegro must be treated in a different manner to Serbia, even though Milosevic is officially president of the whole of the FRY. Punishing Montenegro at this stage may mean a loss of a potential ally.

The US and various human rights non-governmental organisations have also urged the UN Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague to investigate the recent violence [see section II C, Human Rights Situation) Since the Tribunal's statute empowers it to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, the Tribunal answered that: "the prosecutor is currently gathering information and evidence in relation to the Kosovo incidents and will continue to monitor any subsequent developments."¹⁶²

In the aftermath of the Serbian police's clamp-down, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement calling on all sides to reduce tension; suggesting that the implementation of the education agreement would be an important step forward; and calling "on the authorities in Belgrade and leaders of the Kosovar Albanian community to enter without preconditions into a serious dialogue in order to develop a mutually-acceptable political solution for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." The statement ended with: "NATO and the international community have a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo, inter alia because of their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern to the Alliance."¹⁶⁵

The following extract from an internal report of an international organisation working in Kosovo is typical: "Kosovo is a very sensitive issue that generates strong feelings of nationalism in the parties involved, i.e. the Serbs and the Albanians. In an environment like the Balkans, where 240,000 have been killed over the past four years due to this particularly unhealthy nationalism, it is understood that any involvement in the Kosovo issue would not be welcomed. This is equally so for any public reporting by international bodies or organisations. Thus, [our] monitoring function in Kosovo has remained a low-profile exercise. While considering [our] need for diplomacy in implementing [our] mandate, our possible involvement in Kosovo... would most efficiently be carried out if it were to draw attention to issues directly linked to [our] mandate (as a result or a consequence of the political and human rights situation)."

Since the NGOs can only operate with Belgrade's blessing and expatriates -- of whom there are fewer than two dozen permanently resident -- require visas, these groups tread warily. After the Drenica clamp-down, the director of one internationally-known aid agency complained to a Reuters reporter that he had been denied access to the area of fighting. However, he declined to identify himself or the organisation for fear of repercussions.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, NGOs have succeeded in reducing repression, especially in Pristina where they all headquartered, simply by their presence.

In the aftermath of the Drenica clamp-down, the ICRC pulled its international staff out of the province following a series of death threats. The unspecified threats came after ICRC was allowed by Serbia's authorities to assist victims of the violence. On 9 March 1998, however, the Serbian government called on ICRC to appoint an ad hoc team of neutral experts to go to Kosovo.¹⁶⁷

International envoys aiming to help facilitate a sustainable and peaceful solution face a dilemma. If the international community recognises that Kosovo is part of Serbia, then the issue is an internal Yugoslav affair and any "help" must be approved by Belgrade. Any other approach would be interpreted as recognising Kosovo's independence, with potentially deadly consequences. Whereas the Kosovar leadership regularly appeals for international mediation, Belgrade typically resents what it deems international meddling. In response to a Franco-German initiative calling for a special status for Kosovo late last year, for example, Milan Milutinovic, then foreign minister and now Serbian president, said: "Foreign mediators are an interference in the internal affairs of our country and are out of question. We do not write letters to them [the French] about, say, Corsica, where there are problems with national minorities and separatist movements too."¹⁷¹

At the end of last year, however, blanket Serbian opposition to foreign involvement appeared to crack. Milorad Vucelic, vice-president of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was reported saying: "The SPS is ready to open a dialogue on all issues with the political representatives of Kosovo Albanians. We are willing to discuss everything except the secession of Kosovo and the violation of territorial integrity of Serbia. We can speak with the citizens of Serbia of Albanian nationality without international mediation, which does not mean that outside initiatives that help the dialogue are unacceptable."¹⁷² It was the first time a member of the ruling party had proposed talks with the parallel Kosovar authorities which had hitherto not been recognised by Serbia.

Otherwise, international initiatives to help facilitate a peaceful settlement have generally been limited to conferences (see section , III, B above Kosovo and Belgrade Serbs) bringing together moderates on either side of the ethnic divide. The Bertelsmann Foundation, a German think-tank published in 1997 a document called How to Settle the Kosovo Conflict proposing a series of confidence-building measures aimed at restoring trust between Serbs and Albanians, including the creation of an international ombudsperson. The paper also examined possible ideas for a final settlement. And a Swedish-based conflict resolution group, the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research proposed United Nations administration.

Theoretically, the options for the status of Kosovo range from the province gaining total independence to maintenance of the status quo.

Independence for Kosovo would also turn the current relationship between Serbs and Albanians on its head. Instead of Albanians forming a minority in Yugoslavia, Serbs would form a minority in an independent Kosovo, that is if any Serbs chose to remain in an independent Kosovo at all. Given current strained relations between the communities and Albanian treatment at Serb hands during the past decade, the chances are that virtually no Serbs would in fact stay on in an independent Kosovo and that those who did would face a very similar oppression to that currently experienced by the Albanian community. Moreover, another Serb exodus, this time from Kosovo, would place yet more pressure on Yugoslavia's already massively over-burdened social infrastructure.

An independent Kosovo also opens up the Albanian question elsewhere in the Balkans, with ramifications both for Albania and Macedonia. Rexep Qosja, a militant member of the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Science who has long advocated "intifada"-like protests against Serbian rule, argues for union with Albania and the creation of a single state comprising all Albanians in the Balkans.¹⁷⁵ While the appeal of such a union has probably diminished since the collapse of Albania's many pyramid-saving schemes in 1997, the prospects of Macedonia's Albanians deciding to secede and join their ethnic kin in an independent Kosovo remain real. In such an event, the territorial integrity and, indeed, the very survival of Macedonia as an independent state will be in jeopardy.

An earlier proposal from Aleksandar Despic, head of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, in June 1996, went further. He suggested the partition of Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians.¹⁷⁸ And Dobrica Cosic, the writer and former President of Yugoslavia, is associated with another proposed ethnic division envisaging the formation of two entities, based on the Bosnian model, each able to form special relations with their "mother states". The obvious problem which arises is how to draw up boundaries between Serb and Albanian territory. Ironically, Kosovars have generally been more receptive to these proposals than Serbs, considering them a step towards secession.¹⁷⁹

One problem with this approach is the very term "autonomy" which has a negative connotation among the Kosovar leadership and is rejected. According to LDK vice-president Fehmi Agani: "The offer of autonomy is no offer at all. It has been outdated for a long time, and, moreover, it would not guarantee the respect of Kosovo Albanians' civic and national rights."¹⁸¹ The concepts "autonomy" and "national minority", which were both used in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which were supposed to provide basic rights to Albanians, are in large part blamed for Kosovo's current status and the on-going oppression. Autonomy has, Kosovars believe, already been tried and was found wanting because it is insufficient to ensure Albanian rights and runs the risk of unilateral and illegal revocation by Belgrade as in 1989. Serbs too feel that autonomy was tried and found wanting but for very different reasons -- the autonomy granted to Kosovo between 1974 and 1989, they feel, led not to stability but inexorably towards secession.

Kosovars appear more receptive to a similar concept under a different name. Using terms such as "special status", "special entity", "federal entity", "federal unit, "transient protectorate", interim constitutional and/or political status", rather than autonomy is generally more productive, even though it effectively means something very similar. Further, Kosovars find such a status, however it is formally called, more palatable, when considered in a Yugoslav, as opposed to a Serbian framework. The term Serbia is overwhelmingly linked to the Serb nation, while Yugoslavia, though negative and difficult to deal with, is still vaguely supranational and bearable.¹⁸²

As a third Yugoslav republic, Kosovo would have its own constitution, independent powers to legislate, its own administrative and judicial institutions and the right of veto over key issues decided at the national level. The Yugoslav state would be responsible for defence and security, foreign and monetary policy. Kosovo's borders would be guaranteed, Albanians become a constituent nation of Yugoslavia, and Albanian an official language. Meanwhile, Kosovo's Serbs would remain a constituent nation and enjoy positive discrimination.¹⁸⁴ Despite such guarantees, however, both Belgrade and local Serbs reject the approach. According to Momcilo Trajkovic, leader of the local Serbs: "We do not want to accept such compromise because this means that ultimately Kosovo would be lost [for Serbs]."¹⁸⁵ A variation of the "Third Republic" concept is Adem Demaci's project of Balkan Confederation, popularly called Balkania. This envisages the alliance of three free, secular and sovereign states, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, each with the right to secede. And it is this prospect of secession which makes the "Third Republic" unpalatable to Serbs.

Kosovars have tired of the passivity and non-violence preached by Dr Rugova and the LDK. They are also disappointed with and feel let down by the international community and in particular the US and will no longer necessarily listen to outside calls for restraint. The pent-up frustration of close to a decade of waiting without any hint of light at the end of the tunnel, and the precedents for achieving political goals by military means set by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Republika Srpska, play into the hands of hotheads who are prepared to fight for an independent Kosovo. Acts of terrorism by groups such as UCK will surely increase as Kosovars see the publicity benefits of more aggressive tactics. Moreover, the cause has acquired more than 50 martyrs just in the past month.

Clearly there is no magic solution. However, in the current circumstances the conflict will not simply disappear or work itself out of its own accord. Further, because of the likelihood that ethnic fighting could not be contained within Kosovo, the conflict has an international dimension and should not therefore be treated merely as an internal Yugoslav matter. Kosovo has to be treated as an international priority and Yugoslavia has to accept that the threat to regional stability and the potential for another exodus of refugees from its territory give the international community the right both to become involved and to mediate in this most delicate affair. A patient, determined and consistent approach to Kosovo now can help avert yet another humanitarian catastrophe in the former Yugoslavia which is in the interests of Serbs, Albanians, the wider region and the international community.

ICG proposes the following recommendations:

Once the immediate mediation aimed at stopping the violence is successfully completed, secret negotiations about the status of Kosovo should be encouraged, with no media attention, no intermediaries that would like to use the event for their own promotion. This would have to be something along the lines of the Oslo Peace Process. For the participants such a modus operandi would reduce the risk of being blamed in the event that the negotiations fail, and make it easier to present and sell concessions as part of a broader package. A non-governmental organisation or a very neutral government should prepare the logistics and some minimal procedural matters.

Direct financial assistance to the parallel Kosovo education and health systems would, however, contribute to further isolating the two communities and would reinforce the Kosovars belief that their parallel system is sustainable, which it is not. Instead, the international community should use the instrument of aid conditionality-the attachment of tough conditions to the granting of financial assistance-to create links between the two systems and benefit both. For example, funding could be used to renovate schools and health institutions on the condition that they are used by both communities.

There is a surprisingly high number of satellite dishes in Kosovo, so the audience for any satellite broadcast would be significant. To offer Kosovars world news broadcast in their language may bring them a reality check and help them realise that they need to take their fate into their own hands and come up with more realistic demands and expectations. A major international news provider, such as for CNN, could be asked to donate the right to rebroadcast news programmes on the satellite link used by Tirana TV. (Some East European countries have a CNN-translated news service and it is always a popular broadcast).

Positioned between two more extreme political alternatives (the passivity of the LDK or the violence of the UCK), the Kosovar students' movement may provide the best basis on which to build an effective, moderate opposition capable of putting forward a credible and peaceful plan of action.

Kosovar students should be encouraged to increase their contacts and take advice from students in Eastern Europe more than in the West. The modus operandi, the concrete actions undertaken by young people under totalitarian regimes are more likely to provide useful examples for the Kosovars than the more distant experiences of students in Western societies. They should also be encouraged to get in touch and collaborate with students from Belgrade. The Union of Students desperately needs help with public relations; even as the wave of protests swept through Kosovo, they failed to take the lead the way their peers did in 1968 in Paris.

1946-1963: During Tito's clash with Stalin, Albania supported the USSR and border clashes between Yugoslav and Albanian border guards ensued along the Kosovo-Albania border. The Yugoslav secret police heightened persecution of the Albanian population in Kosovo, especially in the 1950s. Serbs began to migrate from Kosovo for economic reasons and because of alleged Albanian persecution and harassment.

1963: New Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions were adopted. Both documents increased Serbia's control over the provinces by conditioning the provinces' autonomy on the will of the Serbian government. The provinces' representatives to the federal parliament were to sit as part of the Serbian delegation, not as separate provincial delegations.

1968: Demonstrations in which Albanians demanded that Kosovo be recognised as a separate republic took place. The Serbian authorities made several concessions, including the establishment of an Albanian-language university.

1968-1974: Amendments to the federal Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions further augmented the independent authority of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The provinces were allowed to promulgate their own laws, provided such laws conformed to the federal and Serbian constitutions. Kosovo and Vojvodina again were allowed to participate in the federal government as separate delegations representing their respective provinces.

1974: Yugoslavia's third constitution was adopted. The new constitution formally defined the autonomous provinces as constituent members of the federation. De facto, Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted the status of sovereign republics in almost all respects; their status differed from the other six Yugoslav republics only insofar as they were not granted the right to secede from the federation. Both Vojvodina and Kosovo were given seats in the federal parliament and the federal constitutional court.

It should be noted that the 1974 constitution regulated Kosovo's and Vojvodina's constitutional status in federal affairs; it did not explicate the authority Kosovo and Vojvodina would have within Serbia -- that was left to the Serbian government. In 1974, the new Serbian constitution incorporated the principles set forth in the amendments to the 1963 constitution, thus granting both Kosovo and Vojvodina a large degree of autonomy. (De jure, Serbia had the right to regulate the political status of the provinces within its territory, thus providing the legal justification for the revocation of the provinces' autonomy in 1990.)

March 1981: Student demonstrations calling for better living conditions and financial aid were forcibly dispersed by the local police in Kosovo.

Early and mid-1980s: A series of demonstrations took place in Kosovo in which the participants demanded higher wages, greater freedom of expression, the release of political prisoners and republican status for Kosovo. The Serbian authorities forcibly dispersed many of these demonstrations and federal police and Yugoslav army (JNA) forces were sent to Kosovo. Several people were killed and many were arrested and sentenced to prison terms ranging in duration from several months to 15 years for so-called "verbal crimes," (e.g., mentioning the words "Kosovo Republic" or making the "V" sign.) The press, schools and local government bodies were purged and a new communist party (formally called the League of Communists of Yugoslavia - LCY) leadership was installed. (Azem Vlassi was named as the new LCY chief for Kosovo.) Albanians protested the measures and resorted to sabotage, bomb explosions and destruction of Serbian property. According to Serbian sources, approximately 30,000 Serbs left Kosovo in the early 1980s.

1986: Serbs lodged complaints in the federal Assembly against what they viewed as Albanian "genocide" against Serbs in Kosovo.

1987: Milosevic ousted his mentor and then-leader of the Serbian League of Communists, Ivan Stambolic, and assumed power in Serbia.

Late 1988: Milosevic proposed several measures and constitutional amendments that would effectively revoke the autonomous status of Vojovodina and Kosovo. In response, Albanian calls for secession from Serbia increased. Peaceful demonstrations took place but Serbian authorities responded by banning all public meetings in Kosovo. Strikes spread throughout the province.

Early 1989: Albanian miners in Kosovo went on strike to protest the proposed constitutional amendments. In March, Kosovo's communist party chief, Azem Vlassi, was arrested for having met with the striking miners. Vlassi was considered to have been insufficiently loyal to the Milosevic regime and was charged and tried for "counter-revolutionary acts, destruction of brotherhood and unity, and destroying the economic base of the country." (In May 1990, charges against Vlassi were dropped as a result of international pressure against what was widely viewed as a "show trial.")

February 1989: Yugoslavia's collective presidency imposed "special measures" in Kosovo and assigned responsibility for public security in the province to the federal government. The federal militia was sent to Kosovo. Arrests and trials of approximately 50 political and business leaders and about 1,000 striking workers took place. Most were sentenced to 60 days of imprisonment.

March 1989: A meeting of Kosovo's Assembly took place to discuss the proposed amendments to the Serbian constitution. One hundred fifty of the 184 delegates were present. Because the LCY had announced that it would consider a vote against the amendments to be a "counter-revolutionary act," almost all of the Albanian delegates abstained from voting. Sixty delegates voted in favour of the amendments while 10 voted against. Despite the fact that the required two-third majority of the full Assembly was not met, the Serbian president of the Assembly declared that the amendments had passed. Six days of demonstrations and riots ensued. Estimate of the number of persons killed in the riots range from 26 to 100. Hundreds were injured and about 900 demonstrators were imprisoned for up to 60 days. Intellectuals who signed petitions opposing the amendments also were arrested and detained without charge.

Autumn 1989: Extraordinary elections were held in Kosovo and new delegates to the Kosovo Assembly were elected.

January-February 1990: Renewed violence and demonstrations took place throughout Kosovo.

April 1990: The federal Yugoslav authorities lifted the special measures in Kosovo and removed most of the federal police, leaving matters to the Serbian government and its republican security forces.

June 1990: The Serbian legislature passed a law which effectively extended the emergency period and mandated Belgrade's direct control over the administration of special measures in Kosovo.

2 July 1990: The Kosovo Assembly responded to Serbia's June law by issuing a proclamation which declared Kosovo an independent republic within the Yugoslav federation.

5 July 1990: The Serbian Assembly suspended the Kosovo Assembly and other organs of the provincial government. The Serbian authorities also took control of approximately 60 enterprises, including hospitals and energy plants. Repressive measures were taken against Albanian-language media that reported the recently dissolved Kosovo Assembly's declaration of republican status for Kosovo.

Summer 1990: Demonstrations against Serbian policy took place but were forcibly dispersed. (One such demonstration took place in August, during a visit by a delegation of the U.S. Congress, which was headed by Senator Robert Dole. The delegation witnessed the beating of peaceful demonstrators by police in front of the Hotel Grand in Pristina.) Serbian police searched entire Albanian villages for weapons; most house searches were arbitrary and were conducted without warrants. The police frequently beat and detained the inhabitants of the searched home.

3 September 1990: Albanians participated in a 24-hour general strike. The Serbian authorities responded by dismissing thousands of participants from their jobs and by fining shopkeepers who honored the strike.

7 September 1990: Delegates to the recently dissolved Kosovo Assembly met secretly in the town of Kacanik and adopted a new constitution for Kosovo, stressing its status as a sovereign republic within Yugoslavia. A clandestine government and legislature were elected. Many Albanians continue to abide by the decisions off this underground government rather than Belgrade's rule.

17 September 1990: One hundred eleven delegates of the underground Kosovo Assembly and six members of the Kosovo government were charged with "counter-revolutionary activity" for having approved the 2 July proclamation of republican status for Kosovo and the 7 September constitution. The charges were subsequently changed to 'endangering the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia." Serbian courts stripped the Assembly's delegates of their legislative immunity. Most of the delegates fled Serbia but some were arrested. Journalists who reported the 2 July proclamation or the 7 September constitution also were arrested. Most were detained for 30 to 60 days.

28 September 1990: The Serbian Assembly adopted a new constitution for all of Serbia, including Kosovo and Vojvodina. The autonomous status of both provinces was effectively revoked. The constitution vested all effective control of Kosovo's political, economic, judicial and security institutions in the hands of the Belgrade government. Only cultural and educational institutions are left in control of local Serbian authorities.

Also, by placing Vojvodina and Kosovo directly under Belgrade's control, Serbia gained two seats in the collective Yugos!av presidency, thus granting it three voices in federal affairs, while the remaining republics retained only one vote in the presidency. This action increased Serbia's relative power in the Yugoslav federation.

29 November 1990: Tile Yugoslav Presidency granted individual pardons to 124 prisoners, all of whom were released. A further 69 prisoners had their prison sentences reduced. Some of those who benefited from the pardon included ethnic Albanians who had been imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their political views.

26-30 September 1991: Kosovo Albanians held an unofficial referendum on Kosovo's independence. Although voting was open in most rural areas, voting in the cities was conducted in private homes to avoid police repression. Nevertheless, numerous seizures of voting materials and arrests by the Serbian police occurred. 27 April 1992: Following the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republics of Montenegro and Serbia (including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina) declared the formation of a new Yugoslavia. A new constitution was adopted but the status of Vojvodina and Kosovo remains unchanged in the current Yugoslav state.

24 May 1992: Albanians held elections for new members to their clandestine government. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo -- the strongest political party representing Albanians in Kosovo -- was elected president of an independent Kosovo. Delegates to the 130-member legislature also were elected.

LDK (Lidhjes Demokratike t� Kosov�s) - Democratic League of Kosovo

Ibrahim Rugova (president of LDK)
Fehmi Agani (former vice president LDK, until 26 February 1998)
Hydajet Hyseni (former vice president LDK, until 26 February 1998)

PPK (Partia Parlamentare e Kosov�s) - Parliamentary Party of Kosovo

Adem Demaci (chairman of PPK)
Bajram Kosumi (vice chairman PPK)

Other parties

Hivzi Islami (chairman Peasants' Party of Kosovo)
Mark Krasniqi (chairman Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo)
Luljeta Pula-Beqiri (chairman Social Democratic Party - wing I)
Kaqusha Jashari (chairman Social Democratic Party - wing II)
Ukshin Hotti - currently in jail (chairman Albanian Party of National Unification - UNIKOMB)

Student Activists Bujar Dugolli (chairman Students' Independent Union - Unioni Pavarur i Student�ve)
Driton Lajci (vice chairman Students' Independent Union)
Albin Kurti (international officer Students' Independent Union)

Human Rights Activists

Gazmend Pula (chairman Helsinki Committee for Human Rights)
Pajazit Nushi (chairman Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom - K�shilli)
Shaban Shala (vice-chairman K�shilli)
Binak Ulaj (vice-chairman K�shilli)
Nora Ahmetaj (Humanitarian Law Centre, Pristina office)
Vjosa Dobruna (Centre for Protection of Women and Children)

Journalists and Political Columnists

Veton Surroi (editor, Koha Ditore)
Dukagjin Gorani (deputy editor, Koha Ditore)
Baton Haxhiu (deputy editor, Koha Ditore)
Gjeraquina Tuhina (journalist, Koha Ditore)
Arber Vllahiu (journalist, Koha Ditore)
Blerim Shala (editor, Zeri)
Auni Spahiu (editor, Bujku)
Shkelzen Maliqi (director, Open Society Institute, Pristina)
Rexjep Qosja (writer)

Former Yugoslav Officials from Kosovo

Mahmut Bakalli
Azem Vlasi
Remzi Koljgeci
Kaqusha Jashari
Gani Jashari

Serbs

Ljubinko Cvetic (spokesman, Serbian Interior Ministry - MUP)
Veljko Odalovic (deputy head of Kosovo district)
Bosko Drobnjak (Kosovo information secretary)
Momcilo Trajkovic (president, Serb Resistance Movement - Srpski pokret otpora - SPO)
Aca Rakocevic (vice-president, Serb Resistance Movement)
Artemije Radosavljevic (bishop of Raska and Prizren, head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo)

NGOs present in Kosovo (all based in Pristina)

Children Aid
Catholic Relief Service
HANDICAP
International Committee of Red Cross
International Federation of Red Cross
International Rescue Committee
Medecins du Monde (Doctors of the World)
Mercy Corps International
Medecins sans Frontieres
Mother Teresa Society (SHBH Nena Tereze)
OXFAM
Pharmaciens sans Frontiers
Save the Children
UNHCR
UNICEF WHO (World Health Organisation)
(World Vision was planning to open a mission in the spring of 1998)

Most commonly used acronyms:

LDK : Lidhjes Demokratike t� Kosov�s - Democratic League of Kosovo
PPK : Partia Parlamentare e Kosov�s - Parliamentary Party of Kosovo
QIK : Qendra p�r Informim e Kosov�s - Kosovo Information Centre or KIC
MUP : Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova - Ministry of Interior Affairs of Serbia
UCK : Ushtris� Clirimtare t� Kosov�s - Kosovo Liberation Army whose acronym is KLA, KAL or also LAK) and in Serbian Oslobodilacka vojska Kosova (OVK) also KOA (Kosovska oslobodilacka armija) - UCK is pronounced "oo-che-kah"
SAJ : Specialne Antiteroristicke Jedinice - Special Anti-terrorist Units of Serbia's MUP
UPS : Unioni Pavarur i Student�ve - Students' Independent Union