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Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Prevent Further War. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Democratic Republic of Congo remains a failed state, occupied by six foreign armies, tormented by militias and unable to meet the most basic needs of its people. The war, which began in August 1998, has not yet ended.

The cease fire agreement signed at Lusaka in July 1999 is respected on the conventional front lines, but the underlying causes of conflict remain to be resolved, and people are still dying every day from fighting, hunger and disease. This report addresses in detail one of the factors critically necessary for peace – the process of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) of the armed rebel groups. There are in fact three interlocking processes that must succeed if peace is ever to be achieved.

First, is the disarmament of the non-Congolese armed groups based in the DRC, addressed in this report. The most significant of these predominantly Hutu rebel forces, the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALiR), is led by the masterminds of the Rwandan genocide who fled to the Congo in 1994. They are still supported by the government in Kinshasa because the DRC lacks an effective military force against the occupying forces of Rwanda and Uganda.

The Hutu groups, fed and armed by Kinshasa, have become proxy fighters for the DRC. DDRRR is not well advanced. There is very little contact by MONUC or other international officials with the AliR leaders, many of whom fear arrest because of their alleged role in the Rwandan genocide.

Resolving the AliR leadership’s demands for amnesty and political dialogue with the Rwandan government is further complicated because the government understandably refuses to negotiate with génocidaires. But the AliR members, most of whom were recruited after 1994, have legitimate security and political demands, and the Rwandan government is also keen for these men to disarm and return to society, or be reintegrated as soldiers in the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), so long as their leaders face justice. The second process that must be successfully completed if the country has any chance of survival is the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC.

Tutsi-dominated regime in Rwanda, afraid of renewed Hutu attacks, maintains its own occupying forces in eastern Congo, refusing to withdraw until the Hutu groups are disarmed. And for reasons of their own Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Uganda and Burundi all have forces in the Congo as well. The third factor that will be vital to peace in the Congo is the Inter-Congolese Dialogue – the only forum through which DRC can rebuild its political institutions.

But this too is stuck in a deadlock. President Joseph Kabila and his backers, Angola and Zimbabwe, refuse to consider power-sharing through the Dialogue with anti-government rebels without guarantees of Rwanda and Uganda’s full withdrawal. The rebels and their sponsors, on the other hand, refuse to consider withdrawal until a transition government is established through the Dialogue and Rwanda’s border security is guaranteed.

These external demands have to be addressed as part of Congo’s political transition. In total these challenges appear to present a near-impossible Catch-22. But they can be resolved if the international community, and especially the UN, is prepared to make a greater commitment to completing all three parts of the peace process.

There is room for cautious optimism at the moment – especially on the issue of disarmament. The United Nations Observer Mission to the Congo (MONUC) has recently taken the lead in a limited, voluntary disarmament program of AliR. In November the DRC authorised MONUC to conduct a census of about 1800 unarmed AliR combatants in the Kamina military camp in the DRC and further screening is taking place in hospitals in Lubumbashi and Kinshasa.

These small steps forward also stem from the capture of around 2000 AliR fighters by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in May/June this year. The RPA placed the captured fighters in re-education camps and appealed to the international community for assistance in their rehabilitation and reintegration. If the AliR groups in Rwanda and in DRC are properly rehabilitated, their 20,000 (or more) fellow fighters may also be persuaded to return to Rwanda.

The opportunity offered by these events must be seized quickly. Despite the limited progress described above, the war is continuing in eastern Congo between Rwandan armed forces and several DRC-backed Hutu factions. Tensions have also risen between Rwanda and its former ally Uganda, with confirmation of a build-up of armed forces of both countries in the Kivus in eastern Congo.

In this context, the DDRRR program may simply recycle demobilised Hutu rebels into a new war with new military alliances. Bilateral talks between President Kabila and President Kagame have failed to produce results, mainly because of intransigence and a lack of trust on both sides, but also because of the lack of mediation and international involvement in the Congo peace process. In order to avoid another war, it is vital that the international community persuades the DRC and its ally Zimbabwe to stop supporting the armed groups.

MONUC and the international community must assist the government in Kinshasa to build up its own army, while pressing neighbouring countries to withdraw their troops. The peace process would also be greatly assisted if President Kagame would restate his commitment to the withdrawal of his soldiers from the Kivus. This would limit the justification for DRC and Zimbabwe to rearm the rebel groups and help President Kabila maintain his disarmament policy in the face of hard-line opposition inside his own government.

Without considerable improvement in international support, the Democratic Republic of Congo may not survive. The resumption of war would probably mean the partition of the country, hundreds of thousands more dead and millions more refugees. The war and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe have already claimed 2 million lives.

Now is the time for the Lusaka signatories and the international community to start the DDRRR process to build momentum, and to take and the rest of the peace process forward. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 1. Urge a personal, ongoing mediation role for the UN Secretary General between Rwanda and the DRC with the ultimate objective of concluding a non-aggression pact between the two countries and complete withdrawal of foreign forces. 2.

Urge the Secretary General to emphasise the importance of the DDRRR process by appointing a new Special Envoy for DDRRR, or by formally including DDRRR in the mandate of the SRSG for MONUC. In either case the envoy’s task would be to negotiate a political agreement on DDRRR, local cease-fires in the Kivus and then oversee DDRRR implementation. 3. Assist and co-ordinate political processes in the region, in particular by – supporting shuttle diplomacy efforts ahead of the next meeting of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in South Africa;. – supporting a parallel dialogue and inter-community reconciliation effort in the Kivus between the Mai Mai, traditional leaders, civil society leaders and the church; and – supporting the implementation of the Arusha agreement in Burundi and the efforts of the President of Gabon and the Vice-President of South Africa to reach a cease-fire with the FDD and FNL. 4.

Establish a sanctions committee mandated to report support to the armed groups, based on UNSC Resolutions 918, 997, 1011, and 1341, and on the recommendations of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda. All UN members should be required to provide information they have about the resupply of these groups. Consider trips to the field by sanctions committee members, and provide staff experts to evaluate information provided. 5.

Support the efforts of MONUC to deploy in eastern Congo and encourage the opening of a DDRRR camp in the Bukavu area in South Kivu where AliR combatants captured and disarmed by the Mai Mai can be cantoned. 6. Desirably, while recognising the significant human, logistical and communications resources needed to carry this out, task MONUC, once deployed in eastern Congo, to monitor and report on the resupply of armed groups. 7. Consider action on the exploitation of DRC resources.

Strong consideration should be given to implementing the primary recommendation of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the DRC: a moratorium on the purchase and importation of minerals originating in areas where foreign troops are present in the DRC. 8. In this context, initiate action to review and revise all contracts signed since 1997 in the DRC to address and correct any irregularities. This should be used as leverage to accelerate DDRRR and the withdrawal of foreign forces.

TO DONOR GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AHEAD OF THE 19 DECEMBER WORLD BANK MEETING IN BRUSSELS 9. Provide urgent financial support to the DDRRR process, especially for the AliR forces that are already being screened in DRC and Rwanda. 10. Provide international observers in Rwanda to monitor the reintegration and rehabilitation of AliR ex-fighters. 11.

Help Rwanda’s local authorities and Community Development Committees to absorb and manage international funds for DDDRR, recognising that local control and management of DDRRR is vital to the successful reintegration of former fighters. 12. Provide funds for information campaigns on DDRRR aimed at AliR forces in the Congo, in particular the 1200 men based in the Nyungwe forest in Rwanda. 13. Support a Reconciliation Economic Recovery plan in eastern Congo as an incentive for a peace agreement in the Kivus. 14.

Establish an international trust fund to support the DDRRR process. The fund’s managers would work to mobilise resources and work with the Rwandan government to ensure transparency in the reintegration process. TO THE WORLD BANK 15.

Clearly distinguish between the existing RPA demobilisation program and the proposed DDRRR programs for AliR, and give priority to DDRRR. TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT 16. Create conditions that will encourage the return of ex-combatants, providing amnesties where appropriate, ensuring strict adherence to the rule of law, and total transparency of the reintegration proces17.

Further and more fundamentally, show commitment to reconciliation and political liberalisation by accepting opposition voices in internal debate, and freeing political activity from interference, recognising that persuading Hutus to return will be difficult if political freedoms continue to be restricted. 18. Accept the demilitarisation of Kisangani and MONUC’s deployment in eastern Congo, as required by UNSC Resolution 1376. 19. Reiterate commitment to a full withdrawal of RPA forces from eastern Congo.

TO THE DRC GOVERNMENT AND ITS ALLIES 20. End support for the armed groups immediately, more specifically AliR, now considered by the US government as a terrorist organisation. 21. Arrest and transfer to Arusha all genocide suspects indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Nairobi/Brussels, 14 December 2001 Any comments about this publication? Click here – – Democratic Republic of Congo Menu – – – – – – about pages Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Prevent Further War Report 14 December 2001 Le dialogue intercongolais: Poker menteur ou négociation politique? Report 16 November 2001 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game of Bluff? Report 16 November 2001 Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention Briefing 12 June 2001 From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo Report 16 March 2001

Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Since coming to power in 1988, the most recent military rulers of Burma/Myanmar have effectively resisted external demands to turn over power to a democratic government. Most of the outside pressure has failed to take into account how this government sees and responds to the world beyond its borders.

This paper examines the military’s perspective on foreign relations and explains why many current international strategies have failed to push it towards democracy or economic reforms. The modern state of Myanmar was forged under colonialism and born in the aftermath of World War II. Since independence in 1947, continuous domestic conflict and the failure of successive governments to forge a stable and prosperous nation have sustained fears of foreign intervention and reinforced a mindset that foreigners are to blame for the country’s many problems.

During four decades of military rule, Myanmar’s leaders have grown increasingly inward-looking and alienated. They are driven by an obsession with national sovereignty to seek almost total autonomy from international influences. The hallmark of a foreign policy driven by insecurity has been self-reliance.

Since 1962, military leaders have insisted that Myanmar, as much as possible, do things its own way and rely on its own resources. They perceive their country and its problems to be not only unique, but also essentially unfathomable to outsiders. They also exhibit a clear lack of understanding of international affairs and the motivations, and values of other nations.

The current military regime in principle has reversed 26 years of self-imposed isolation in an attempt to revitalise the ailing economy and ward off popular pressure for political reform. However, while it has relaxed the long-cherished notion of territorial sanctity, the ideal of absolute sovereignty and perceived need to insulate Myanmar from foreign influence remains. Each opening is accompanied by control mechanisms to limit the negative impact of allowing in more foreigners.

Myanmar’s foreign relations are shaped in this tension between traditional values and current needs. Many outside observers have bought into a kind of conspiracy thinking, which sees the regime to be cooperating with regional governments to undermine the pro-democratic forces. This has given rise to a clash-of-civilisations image that posits the forces of good (i.e. Western democracy) confronting the forces of evil (i.e. Asian authoritarianism).

The reality is much more complex and ambiguous. Some highly practical considerations also shape the approaches taken by the SPDC leadership. One relates to how their commercial interests tie in with national economic development and the drug trade.

The regime has obtained vital revenue from reinvestment of narcotics profits. No reform package that does not address personal and institutional economic interests is practical. Another relates to personal security.

The military leaders fear what will happen to them if the political order is overturned. They will continue to frame policies influenced by personal security and will not surrender power without guarantees for themselves and families. While the military government is locked in a adversarial relationship with Western governments and organisations over democracy and human rights, its leaders harbour a deep-seated wish to be accepted as equals by the developed countries.

They are also keenly aware of the importance of attracting Western capital and technology to support military and national development. Conversely, the junta’s relations with its neighbours, though superficially close, continue to be hampered by historic prejudices and the generals’ insistence on doing it ‘their way or no way at all’. Countries like Japan, China, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, which have provided varying degrees of support for Yangon, have been frustrated in attempts to achieve cooperation from the regime on issues of concern to them.

Myanmar’s participation in ASEAN has also been half-hearted at best. The military regime stands largely alone in the world by choice as much as necessity. International actors, who aim to induce the SPDC to liberalise or in other ways work to improve the welfare of Myanmar’s people, face major obstacles: – Myanmar’s rulers are determined not to bow to outside pressure.

They refuse to accept significant foreign mediation or any other form of ‘intrusive’ international participation in the solution of its political problems. They have shown little will to learn from the experience of other countries or take foreign advice, even on technical matters. – The sense of outside threat creates a barrier of suspicion, which greatly affects the junta’s interpretation of international policies and hampers the work of foreign agencies, organisations, and companies in Myanmar. – The military leaders remain proudly aloof, partly blind to the possibilities presented by cooperating with the outside world. They continue to believe that Myanmar both can, and might be better off to, uphold the traditional emphasis on self-reliance. – The strong disposition to look inwards for solutions, compounded by fear of subversive ideas, creates an almost insurmountable barrier to import of knowledge.

Myanmar has been little influenced by foreign intellectual trends, including on human rights, economic development processes, and so forth. – Few, if any, governments or organisations have the access and goodwill necessary to influence Myanmar’s leaders. The few foreigners who have established positive rapport have done so as individuals and are inevitably sworn to secrecy. There is no doubt that foreign governments and organisations have a critical role to play in Myanmar, which has immense capital, technology, and knowledge needs.

However, in the highly nationalistic environment, they are destined to operate at the political margin for the foreseeable future. Given this situation, and while it remains vital to work for restoration of democracy, it may be more practical to focus as an immediate goal on facilitating a gradual loosening of military control over political and economic activity. This approach would aim to transform relationships first – among members of the regime, between the regime, state, political parties, and population, and among people in general – and institutions only secondly.

It would include immediate action to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, which over the last few years has caused more and more people to sink into despair, diminishing the prospects for positive change. Tackling a closed regime so hostile to outside ideas presents enormous policy challenges and there are no quick fixes. But slower incremental steps may defuse the paranoia and win more influence than demands for rapid change that have repeatedly been rebuffed.

More can be done to expand contacts and so prepare the ground for later political reforms. RECOMMENDATIONS To Donor Governments, Intergovernmental and International Non-Governmental Organisations 1. Provide education and training opportunities for government workers both in Myanmar and in the wider context of ASEAN and regional programs that could build greater knowledge of the outside world and international norms in areas like human rights. 2 Expand media activities and educational broadcasts by the BBC and VOA to improve the flow of information into the country. 3 Encourage more ties in sciences, arts and technology. 4 Expand existing humanitarian programs run by the United Nations and international NGOs with an emphasis on training local workers to run health and education programs. 5 Encourage a debate with all political groups on how the country might improve its economy without exposing itself to the feared side-effects of globalisation. 6 Increase training for the diaspora community in government, management, conflict prevention, negotiations skills and foreign policy. 7 Expand funds for diaspora graduate students to study history, politics and society to ensure a range of intellectual views on the country. 8 Improve availability in Burmese and minority languages of texts that might assist in developing a diverse, tolerant society and a democratic political system and improve understanding of international systems.

Bangkok/Brussels, 7 December 2001 Any comments about this publication? Click here – – Burma/Myanmar Menu – – – – – – about pages Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World Report 7 December 2001 Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society Report 6 December 2001 Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime? Report 21 December 2000

Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Around the world, much hope has been placed in the prospect that civil society – the loose groupings of non-government actors in political processes – would act as a major force to change or remove undemocratic governments. This has particularly been the case in Myanmar where there has been an expectation that students or monks might force the military government from power.

This has not been realised; indeed civil society is at its weakest state in decades. When Burma was under democratic government from 1948 to 1962, a vibrant civil society existed in urban areas although paramilitary organisations and local politicians tended to repress dissenting views and independent organisations in rural areas. Since General Ne Win’s military coup in 1962, however, successive regimes have sought to stamp out civil society and permit only state-controlled organisations that further the regime’s interests.

Civil society re-emerged during the nation-wide pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988, with an explosion of student organisations, political parties, and independent media. After the military retook control in September of that year, however, it clamped down on most independent organisations, although it allowed political parties to form. Following the 1990 election, the results of which it did not honour, the regime declared most political parties illegal.

Nevertheless, the National League for Democracy (NLD), under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, and some ethnic minority political parties have struggled to restore democracy. The military regime continues to restrain civil society in Myanmar severely today. Because the generals rule by decree and judges are under the influence of the authorities, legal challenges are virtually impossible.

While individuals can complain about economic woes, they cannot publicly criticise the military, suggest that the NLD should be in power, or advocate federalism. The generals maintain tight control over the media and are extremely reluctant to expand access to communication technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet, because of their potential use in anti-government activities. The regime seeks to isolate and demoralise those who would speak out for political change by extending its intelligence network into all the institutions where frustrated individuals could organise and by imposing long prison sentences for even minor actions.

Certain students, monks, and writers have taken great personal risks to promote the restoration of democracy, but they have not been able to galvanise a mass movement since 1988. International NGOs and some local organisations have worked to start small-scale projects addressing local problems, but they must stay clear of politics. Many educated people have left the country rather than live under such constraints.

Today Myanmar is entangled in two political struggles: the restoration of democracy and the resolution of ethnic minority rights. To what extent can civil society play a role in solving these conflicts? Aung San Suu Kyi strongly promotes the idea that everyone must take part in the democracy struggle, but because of the harsh repression, most people leave it to the NLD leadership to resolve the political crisis itself.

Yet because civil society is weak, and so many members have resigned under pressure, the NLD’s bargaining power is reduced. At the same time, few independents in central Myanmar have thought seriously about ethnic minority political demands and how a process of understanding and cooperation between majority Burmans and minority groups can be achieved. While the NLD has reached out to the ethnic minority political parties, the regime has sought to limit such contact by imprisoning elected MPs from those parties and the NLD.

Because Myanmar has been under military rule for so long, few people today understand the role that civil society is meant to play in a democracy or that a healthy democracy requires broad-mindedness and a dispersion of power. Thus, even organisations outside the regime’s direct control tend to replicate the hierarchical organisational structures and lack of tolerance for dissent which characterise state-controlled organisations. Low levels of education and cultural factors mean many ordinary people in Myanmar lack confidence in their ability to effect change.

For all these reasons, civil society has had an extremely limited share in the political process in Myanmar in recent years. That said, independent organisations would surely proliferate if the space emerged for them to do so. With more openness, organisations would also be likely to expand the scope of their activities and develop more dynamic organisational structures.

Foreign radio broadcasts are currently one of the few sources of uncensored information but the domestic media would be likely to play a particularly significant role in a political transition. Independent journalism has a long tradition in Myanmar, and journalists and writers could serve both as watchdogs and educators while citizens come to terms with an altered political arena. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that a sensationalist media and organisations promoting narrow nationalism could emerge to disrupt the difficult process of resolving the country’s deep political crises.

The military regime’s resistance to devolution of power to the ethnic states and its determination to unify the country’s diverse population through cultural and religious assimilation have deepened the mistrust between many minority groups and Burmans. Turning Myanmar into a pluralist society in which power is decentralised and differences are respected is a challenging and long-term process. However, more could be done to support this process and to develop the key civil society organisations that will be essential if any negotiated political transition is to be durable.

With this in mind, expanded external support is needed to promote civil society in Myanmar, including in the areas controlled by ethnic opposition groups. New entry points for such international support do exist, especially in cooperation with Myanmar’s Asian neighbours. Should the SPDC and the NLD reach an agreement on future political structures, they will both need to reassure their supporters about this deal.

The SPDC will have to get the full backing of the military, which will be fearful that a deal could result in instability. The NLD will have to prepare its supporters for the compromise over the military’s political involvement that will be necessary for a deal. Civil society organisations will be important in creating the backing for any solution, and in consolidating the democratisation process once it begins, but are not likely to be crucial players in achieving a momentum for change.

Bangkok/Brussels 6 December 2001 Any comments about this publication? Click here – – Burma/Myanmar Menu – – – – – – about pages Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World Report 7 December 2001 Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society Report 6 December 2001 Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime? Report 21 December 2000

Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS After six years and billions of dollars spent, peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains far from complete. Reshaping (‘recalibrating’, in local jargon) the international community (IC) presence is vital if the peace process is to have a successful outcome.

This presence is the result of ad hoc expansion since the Dayton Agreement was signed in December 1995. It is beset by five main problems: lack of a shared strategic vision; uncoordinated leadership; duplication and lack of communication; personality clashes and cross-cutting institutional interests; and ineffectual management of economic reform. Based on interviews with scores of international and local officials at many levels in Bosnia, this report analyses and assesses the current exercise in IC reform.

It urges those involved to agree on a comprehensive proposal – based on the Kosovo ‘pillar model’ – that can not only be endorsed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Political Directors at the next Steering Board meeting in Brussels on 6 December 2001, but which will mark a break with the muddle, inconsistency and half-measures of the past. Reform must amount to more than just downsizing, or changing the seating plan at the international top table in Sarajevo. It must reflect a coherent strategy, finally, to make Bosnia a stable, viable state with a robust rule of law and enduring central institutions, capable of making its way towards membership in the European Union (EU).

This requires a plan to complete the implementation of the Dayton Agreement by equipping Bosnia with the institutions it needs to fulfil the strategy. Once declared complete, Dayton implementation can yield to the technical imperatives of European integration. Above all, however, the reform must acknowledge that if Bosnia cannot be put on its feet by evolution, nudged along by the High Representative, or by some negotiated constitutional settlement, then the IC must be ready to impose a more workable and democratic model than Dayton envisaged.

This could involve creating a strong but fully representative central government, clearing away the counterproductive entity and cantonal structures, devolving substantial powers to the municipalities, and designing largely depoliticised structures for regional administration. It is not too soon for the PIC Steering Board to start consultations on post-Dayton structures. Time is now of the essence.

The IC should take advantage of the current Bosnian leadership’s commitment to partnership in effecting positive change, and give Bosnians something positive to vote for in next year’s elections, rather than find itself starting again with less amenable politicians in 2003. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The international community requires much better mechanisms for policy-making and coordination in Bosnia.

There should be regular information-exchange meetings of all international parties involved in Bosnia, including bilateral and multilateral organisations, embassies, and think tanks. 2. The international community presence should be reconfigured according to function. A ‘pillar’ structure – built around the four core functions of institution building, the rule of law, economic reform and refugee return – would work far better than the currently loose and overlapping arrangement.

One organisation should bear general responsibility for each core function, and in some instances an interagency coordinating body should be established. 3. The OHR’s role is to coordinate and facilitate. It should be the pediment on this pillar structure.

The High Representative should be double-hatted as a European Union (EU) envoy, to strengthen the ‘Dayton to Europe’ transition. 4. OHR should also (a) intensify its efforts to endow the state with as many functioning central institutions as can be justified and funded under Dayton’s dispensation, (b) maintain and probably enhance its capacity in economic analysis and monitoring, and (c) work more closely with the international financial institutions (IFIs). 5. Through the European Commission office in Sarajevo, the EU should increase its visibility and amplify its message about Europe.

It should also become increasingly involved in the institution-building process and in economic reform. 6. A tangible sign of the IC’s acceptance of the centrality of economic reform to everything it does in Bosnia would be to include the IFIs in the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). 7. Civilian implementation continues to require a secure environment and an effective enforcement mechanism.

The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) should stay – complete with an American contribution – until Bosnia’s governing institutions, including its security institutions, are fully viable and self-sustaining. Sarajevo/Brussels, 29 November 2001 Any comments about this publication? Click here – – Bosnia Menu – – – – – – about pages Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery Report 29 November 2001 The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska Report 8 October 2001 The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (Verzija na Lokalnom Jeziku) Report 8 October 2001 Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still not Open for Business Report 7 August 2001 Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still not Open for Business (Verzija na Lokalnom Jeziku) Report 7 August 2001

Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction and Development. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS It is widely recognised that Afghanistan cannot be left as a failed state that might again shelter terrorists and breed instability across the region. Rebuilding the country will require an immense commitment of resources and attention by the international community for some time to come.

Terrorism triggered the intervention in Afghanistan but donor countries are going to have to tackle a much wider array of issues to bring long-term stability. The immediate tasks are threefold – putting in place a new government that represents as wide a cross section of Afghans as possible; rebuilding an administration, capable in the first instance of handling increased levels of humanitarian aid; and ensuring security on the ground, probably provided by an international force made up mostly of soldiers from Islamic countries. Substantial reconstruction efforts will not begin until these processes are advanced but planners need to begin considering how to stabilise and develop Afghanistan and the surrounding countries.

Donors will have to find considerable sums of money if past programs of post-conflict redevelopment are considered. Current estimates of the costs of helping Afghanistan range from about U.S.$5-6 billion over five years to U.S.$25 billion over a decade. Making a significant difference to living standards and stability in the wider region would likely double the bill.

To win support for these efforts and to undercut the message of extremists, this money must benefit people and not end up in the pockets of Afghanistan’s warlords. To this end communities need to have a major stake in projects, donors need to fund more projects outside Kabul, women will need to have a key place in development efforts and fighters will have to be induced to do something other than fight. Afghanistan has not had a strong central government for decades and one is not likely to emerge now.

Recognising this, efforts must be made to build up existing local political structures and support those that can act peacefully and learn to resolve disputes without resorting to weapons. Identifying local powers such as shuras (local councils) and other possible partners for development work should be a key priority although this is a complex task given the changing security situation. The challenges in Afghanistan include rebuilding shattered infrastructure and clearing the mines from homes, fields and irrigation systems.

Even returning Afghanistan to its pre-war state will not be enough as the population has grown by 10 million people since 1978 – from around 15 to 25 million including refugees. Much of the country will need to be built from the ground up. Vastly improved health and education are essential to promote rapid improvements in the lives of Afghans.

To work together in broad-based government, all ethnic groups will need to feel more secure economically, politically and culturally, and so a focus on information and education is vital. The hard-line madrasas that educated the Taliban and promote Islamist extremism need to be put out of business, not through the sort of repressive measures seen in Central Asia but by offering a better alternative to parents who wish to see their children educated. Redeveloping this country will not ease all the problems in what has in reality been a regional conflict.

Donors will have to focus more attention on Central Asia’s failing economies and unresponsive governments if that region is not to become more unstable. Central Asia is already a combustible mix of corruption, ethnic divisions, poverty, authoritarianism and emerging Islamist extremism. The two neighbouring powers – Pakistan and Iran – will have to be induced to play a more positive role in Afghanistan.

This will require financial and political incentives but stability will only come if the security interests of these nations are tackled. Iran wants to see an end to drug production as well as protection and a political voice for Shia Muslims. This crisis may present an opportunity for the West to build a new constructive relationship with Tehran.

Pakistan will need to be reassured that a future government in Kabul will be friendly – most of Afghanistan’s governments have not been. Both these countries need more assistance in tackling their drugs problems and Pakistan will need help rebuilding its tax and education systems and civic institutions. The neighbouring countries all need to reduce their influence in Afghanistan and all will require efforts to stabilise their economies and societies.

This present serious problems for the West as all these countries are run by often unresponsive, authoritarian and unpopular governments. Blindly assisting these governments without pushing for deep changes in their political and economic situation will only store up problems for the future. Aid to the region must build momentum for reform.

To respond to the problems facing Afghanistan and its neighbours and to diminish the risks of extremism and conflict, donors will have to establish fast moving management structures for aid, apply concerted pressure on those nations that obstruct efforts and focus their energies on improving the lives of all people across the region. RECOMMENDATIONS GENERAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: 1. Donors should adopt a regional approach, tackling development, drugs and security problems not just in Afghanistan but in the neighbouring countries as well. 2.

Donors should establish a coordinated set of trust funds that will allow rapid disbursement of money in these areas: q Regional development q Demining q Return of Afghan refugees q Education and media q Regional drugs program 3. The World Bank should coordinate management of the funds and the establishment of an Afghan Reconstruction Agency focussing on speed and flexibility of disbursement and implementation. 4. Donors should make long-term funding commitments that are likely to be in the area of U.S.$25 billion over ten years for Afghanistan and a similar amount for the wider region. 5.

Donors should ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian to reconstruction aid in the coming years by putting funding and planning mechanisms in place as soon as possible. PRIORITIES FOR AFGHANISTAN 6. In the absence of a coherent central government in Kabul, the funds should adopt a decentralised approach, working with local powers ranging from regional commanders to village shuras. 7.

To provide rapid benefits to Afghans and reduce tensions, aid should be targeted at: q Job creation in linked programs of infrastructure repair and demining. q Education, beginning with provision of materials and efforts to get girls back to school. q Healthcare, beginning with aid to hospitals and efforts to expand immunisation and TB treatment. q Media and communications to expand awareness of political activities and spread information to the wide population. q Human rights monitoring, education and gathering evidence for future accounting of abuses. q Drug control through a coordinated regional plan of crop substitution, rural development and harm reduction with a strong focus on HIV. PRIORITIES FOR CENTRAL ASIA 8. Donors should directly address the failures of reform and the worsening human rights situation in Central Asia, applying concerted pressure for economic and political change while offering increased long-term support for reforms 9.

Donors should end the bias towards channelling aid to capitals and target resources at the most vulnerable and tense areas, including: q Ferghana Valley q Karakalpakstan q Surkhan-Darya q Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast 10. Donors should expand assistance significantly beyond its present levels across Central Asia in the areas of: q Poverty alleviation q Legal reform and development q Access to media and information q Education q Health and environmental projects 11. Donors should develop projects that promote regional cooperation and trade in Central Asia by: q Improving transport and communications, particularly local radio and Internet links. q Promoting open but secure borders. q Promoting joint emergency and environmental planning and action. q Promoting regional initiatives on energy, water and the environment.

PRIORITIES FOR PAKISTAN 12. Donors should work to overhaul Pakistan’s taxation system so that the system can underpin currently weak institutions. 13. Donors should fund efforts to develop the education and health systems to reduce the influence of extremist madrasas and improve living standards.

PRIORITIES FOR IRAN 14. Western countries, particularly the United States, should take the opportunity to build better relations with Iran by following up on proposals for dialogue. 15. Donors should provide Iran with assistance to deal with refugees and drugs.

Osh/Brussels, 27 November 2001 Any comments about this publication? Click here – – Central Asia Menu – – – – – – about pages Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction and Development Report 27 November 2001 Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict Report 26 November 2001 Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the Afghan Crisis Briefing 28 September 2001 Le 11 septembre et la crise afghane vus de l’asie centrale Briefing 28 September 2001 Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the “Island of Democracy” Report 28 August 2001

Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS On 16 November 2001, Macedonia’s parliament passed a set of constitutional amendments that were agreed in August, when Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Later that day, President Trajkovski clarified the terms of an amnesty for Albanian rebels, in line with international requests.

These positive moves have breathed new life into the Framework Agreement. But they do not put it beyond risk, or take Macedonia itself out of danger. A powerful faction in government still opposes the agreed reforms, and will resist their implementation.

Ordinary Macedonians deeply resent the way the Framework Agreement was reached and remain suspicious of the international community’s entire role. This provides a serious obstacle to the reform process, and a valid grievance for the anti-reform camp to exploit. So far as Macedonians are concerned, the Agreement contains a double weakness.

First, it redresses long-standing minority grievances mainly by reducing the privileges of the majority. Secondly, its purpose of turning Macedonia into a ‘civic state’ – while admirable and necessary – makes Macedonia an anomaly in a region of emphatically ‘ethnic’ states, three of which uphold fundamental challenges to the Macedonian identity. Greece vetoes international acceptance of Macedonia’s name, Serbia denies the autonomy of its church, and Bulgaria (while accepting Macedonia as a state) denies the existence of a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.

Following its success at Ohrid, the international community has tended to underestimate the profound challenge that the Framework Agreement poses to Macedonia’s already fragile sense of identity, and how this erodes the country’s capacity to implement the agreed reforms. This in turn has led to a loss of influence. The NATO and OSCE missions have let themselves be outflanked by the anti-reformists.

Parliamentary elections – due next April – are no guarantee that more amenable leaders will come to power. The conflict with part of the Albanian minority has pushed Skopje to seek security help (both weapons and political support) from the very neighbours who challenge Macedonian identity. There is a real risk that the anti-reform camp in Skopje will be tempted by a military solution, even at the risk of national partition – a move that would be welcomed by Albanian extremists.

In sum, the conflict with Albanians and the perceived shortcomings of the Framework Agreement have abruptly increased the importance of Macedonia’s identity crisis. The international community needs to reassure Macedonians on this issue in order to re-establish a more promising political environment for good faith implementation and constructive cooperation. The most acute identity issue – and the one that if resolved would have most positive impact – is the long-running name dispute with Greece.

While both countries claim the name and heritage, the Macedonian claim is not exclusive. However, only the Macedonians depend on the name ‘Macedonia’ as the designation of both their state and their people. Greece has a more direct interest than other European Union members in stabilising Macedonia, but is extremely unlikely to amend its position without a clear message from its partners that they sympathise with and will be helpful to its basic concerns.

Greek statesmanship is crucial. The Greek offer of financial and security assistance, while helpful, cannot substitute for the need to secure the Macedonian identity. Bilateral talks to resolve the dispute at the United Nations have not yielded a solution, nor – given the nature of the issue and the regional record on bilateral negotiations – are they likely to do so.

The international community has a compelling strategic reason to acknowledge Macedonia’s constitutional name as a matter of regional stability, and this can be done in a way that meets Greece’s legitimate concerns. ICG proposes a triangular solution with the following three elements coming into effect simultaneously: – A bilateral treaty would be concluded between Skopje and Athens in which Macedonia would make important concessions, including declarations on treatment of the Greek cultural heritage in the Macedonian educational curriculum, agreement that Greece could use its own name for the state of Macedonia, and strict protection against any Macedonian exploitation of its constitutional name to disadvantage Greece commercially or legally. – The member states of NATO and the European Union and others would formally welcome this bilateral treaty through exchange of diplomatic notes with the two parties, in which they would both acknowledge Macedonia’s name as ‘Republika Makedonija’ and promise Greece that they would consult with it about appropriate measures if the assurances contained in the treaty were violated. – The United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations would adopt and use for all working purposes the Macedonian-language name ‘Republika Makedonija’. Before formally acknowledging the name ‘Republika Makedonija’ bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, it would be reasonable for the international community to require at least two up-front concessions by Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms, namely: – An invitation for NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002; and – An invitation for OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations.

The most crucial benefit of this package is that it would consolidate the achievement at Ohrid by boosting the Macedonian sense of security and confidence in the international community. International recognition of the country by its own preferred name would supply the critical missing ingredient in the present situation – reassurance about Macedonian national identity. The proposed package would also address critical Greek demands: that Macedonia’s name should be changed, and that it should not monopolise the single name ‘Macedonia’.

Greece would retain the right in the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations to use its own preferred name for Macedonia (such as ‘Upper Macedonia’). There would be no bar on commercial use of the name ‘Macedonia’, or any variant of it, with respect to products or services from either Greece’s province of Makedonia or Republika Makedonija. Also to Greece’s advantage would be the explicit reference to the proposed bilateral Athens-Skopje treaty in the proposed diplomatic notes acknowledging Macedonia’s name.

For the first time, Greece would not have to depend on Macedonian promises, but would be backed by leading powers that would make clear their endorsement of the total package. This proposal is not a cure-all and it requires the international community to break with the habit of a decade. It will be difficult to negotiate, but – in ICG’s judgement, after canvassing the proposal at length in Skopje, Athens and among some of the major international players – not impossible.

The alternative – letting the name dispute fester – signals to Macedonians that the international community may not be fully committed to the Ohrid reforms, or to preserving Macedonia as an integral state. This is a message with dangerous implications. RECOMMENDATIONS 1.

In order to establish the psychological basis for achieving the crucial next steps toward securing sustainable peace in Macedonia, a major effort should now be made – led by European Union members and the United States – to resolve the dispute over Macedonia’s name in a way that provides Macedonia vital reassurance about its own national identity but at the same time meets Greece’s legitimate concerns. 2. The best prospects for agreement lie in a triangular solution with the following three elements coming into effect simultaneously: – a bilateral treaty between Skopje and Athens involving Macedonian concessions to Greek concerns, including allowing Greece to have its own name for Macedonia, and assurances as to future behaviour; – diplomatic notes from EU and NATO member states and others acknowledging Macedonia’s name as ‘Republika Makedonija’ and the terms of the bilateral treaty, while promising to consult with Greece on appropriate measures if the treaty is broken; and – adoption and use for working purposes by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations of the Macedonian-language name ‘Republika Makedonija’. 3. Before formally acknowledging the name ‘Republika Makedonija’ bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, at least two up-front concessions should be required of Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms: – to invite NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002; and – to invite OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations.

Skopje/Brussels, 10 December 2001 Any comments about this publication? Click here – – Macedonia Menu – – – – – – about pages Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It Report 10 December 2001 Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It (Local Language Version) Report 10 December 2001 Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum Briefing 8 September 2001 “Making a Real Peace in Macedonia” Comment by Edward Joseph, published in the New York Times on 31 August 2001 Comment 31 August 2001 “NATO Must Do More in Macedonia” Comment by Gareth Evans, published in the Wall Street Jounral, U.S. edition Comment 22 August 2001