Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares For Life After Kosovo (28 June 1999)

Contents

• Executive Summary

• Introduction: 610 Years of Kosovo Polje

• Background

• In the Hands of an Indicted War Criminal

• The Political Elements

• The Russians Build a New Berlin Wall?

• "In the Hands of all Yugoslav Citizens"

• The Conjugal Dictatorship

• Contrasting Views

• Back to the Future

• More Questions

• Recommendations
  1. Support Democratic Alternatives In The Milosevic Regime
  2. Promote Alternative Media
  3. Resist Russian Pressure To Carve Out A De Facto Zone Of Occupation
  4. Support & Defend Djukanovic Government In Montenegro

• Annex 1: Excerpts from the Diaries

• Annex 2: Images

Milosevic managed to survive the recent NATO onslaught in part by parlaying resentment against NATO into a wave of public support for his dictatorship. Adept at manipulating popular culture, the regime used such fortuitous events as the timing of the NATO action, coming only weeks before the anniversary of the Nazi bombing of Belgrade in the Second World War, to link the Western alliance with fascism in the public mind. Television programming gave prominence to heroic tales of WW2 partisan fighters, suggesting to the public how they might interpret NATO action. Any Western popular culture, from film to music to television, that degraded Western values or painted the West in a negative light also received wide play, and was clearly aimed at showing the decadence of the Alliance.

Now with the war over, Milosevic continues to use the media to his advantage. While the rest of the world learns about the appalling atrocities committed in Kosovo against ethnic Albanians and recoils at images of torture dungeons and mass graves, the Serbian media continue to play up stories claiming that the Serbs were the real victims, brutalised as they were by both NATO aggression and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) terrorism.

The Yugoslav leader uses the media not simply to promote his spin on the Kosovo war, but also to splinter public support for potential right-wing rivals. To keep the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party and its leader, Vojislav Seselj from sweeping the right, that segment of the electorate is now being urged to consider the alternative - Vojislav Kostunica and his Democratic Party of Serbia. Western observers ought not to be surprised if upcoming elections give the DSS a marked boost.

Milosevic's "divide and conquer" technique and his skillful manipulation of the media are directed toward entrenching himself in a permanent position of power in Belgrade. While he may formally leave office when his current presidential term is up as the FRY constitution prescribes, he clearly intends to remain a player, perhaps as an elder statesman and power behind the throne.

Milosevic's clear intention to retain his grip on the FRY, in or out of office, guarantees the continuation of a highly destabilizing, siege atmosphere in Belgrade, with or without the officially declared "state of war." He has already signaled that he may turn against the democratically elected Montenegrin government of President Milo Djukanovic. Further crises, confrontations, and possible conflict lie ahead. Given all of the aforementioned, ICG recommends the following:

1. That the international community continue to offer unmitigated support for the democratic opposition now led by Milo Djukanovic and Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic;

2. That the international community grasp the opportunity to make use of the windfall of NATO's presence in Kosovo. With the Kosovo Force (KFOR) firmly on the ground and in principle committed to providing security for the inhabitants of Kosovo, directed efforts must be made to bring in or support the recreation of surrogate media there which could also be aimed at the Serbian market. Broadcasting should not simply take the form of news and informational programming, which would be seized upon by Milosevic's state-run media and discredited as transparent Western propaganda. Instead, Milosevic's control of the collective public consciousness through his manipulation of popular culture must be fought on equal terms, with an entertaining media campaign aimed at the tastes of the population which could evolve into a forum where objective news and information might be introduced;

3. Milosevic's moves must be carefully tracked. As long as he remains in office or in power, he may undertake a variety of means for upsetting regional security. He may use his own paramilitaries and interior ministry forces not only, as argued in this paper, to spearhead a campaign in Montenegro, but also to undermine the precarious peace in Kosovo. He may also rely on allies and confidantes in Moscow or Beijing to offer up diplomatic and political stumbling blocks as the international community goes about creating the conditions for a lasting peace.

Belgrade-Podgorica, 28 June 1999

The 10th anniversary of Milosevic's infamous speech at Kosovo Polje is 28 June 1999, a date that coincides with the 610th anniversary of the historic battle there. Milosevic may use this occasion to pander to Serbian xenophobia. He already seems to be rehearsing. His peacetime rhetoric has recently centred around the rebuilding of Serbia's infrastructure, notably, in a campaign-style speech about bridge reconstruction and national renovation that was replete with references to growth into the new millennium.¹ Far from appearing flat-footed, the Yugoslavia leader's recent appearances in the media recall the thrusting, confident Milosevic of ten years ago², when he first led Serbia into nationalist isolation.

At first, there was a flood of speculation in the international community that the indictments would derail political initiatives aimed at bringing peace. One source suggested "the decision to indict Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes appears to have driven a dagger into the heart of diplomatic negotiations."⁴ But for his part, Milosevic did not seem fazed by the news of his own indictment. Instead, he continued to signal his preparedness to negotiate. If anyone in the West had qualms about dealing with people indicted for war crimes, it was made clear that the indictees themselves had no apprehensions. The Yugoslav United Left (JUL), headed by Milosevic's wife Mirjana Markovic, kept up the line that a resolution to the Kosovo crisis could "only be achieved" through "political agreement."⁵ For his part, Vojislav Seselj, leader of the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Serbia's deputy premier, signalled in the most unambiguous terms that the regime had reached the point of being willing to compromise with, but not necessarily capitulate to, NATO's conditions. "We are aware fully of certain risks because our stand is no foreign troops on our sovereign territory. But if that is the price to be paid for ending the war, we can make concessions."⁶

On 3 June 1999 an accord with the Belgrade authorities had at last been reached. Finnish President and European Union envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, received extensive coverage in the international media as news of a breakthrough began to be publicised widely. On 4 June 1999 headlines in Belgrade papers heralded the news that peace was imminent.⁷ All that remained to emerge over the next days, perhaps weeks, were the details.

At a 5 June 1999 press briefing, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea remarked that it would be "very interesting" to see how Belgrade would justify to its population having endured just over two months of NATO bombing to secure a peace deal "that you could have had in Rambouillet for nothing."⁹ In fact, Belgrade's political Houdini had launched the process of spinning the deal well before Shea posed the question. On 4 June 1999 headlines proclaimed that the deal recognises FRY's "territorial integrity."¹⁰ A day later, Belgrade dailies quoted political analysts seconded to the task of defending the peace accord. Ognjen Pribicevic, from the Institute of Social Sciences, suggested that the deal was a victory for the FRY, as "Rambouillet talked about the arrival of NATO troops to Kosovo, and three months later NATO is coming as a part of international forces under the UN [umbrella]". He also noted that the current accord "does not talk about a referendum which in the Rambouillet [agreement] meant the peeling off of Kosovo" and also calls for "the disarming of the KLA."¹¹

What the Belgrade regime may yet do is claim victory by suggesting that its version of the peace document at the Paris talks in March had been tacitly approved. At that time, rather than sign the Rambouillet accord, the Belgrade delegation opted for another path, unilaterally adopting and endorsing a self-styled proposal called "Agreement for Self-Government in Kosovo-Metohija."¹² That piece of paper, while not mentioning international forces, did state that Belgrade was prepared to acknowledge a presence for the international community under a United Nations banner. According to Article II of that draft's Framework: "The Signatories shall cooperate fully with all efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international and non-governmental organisations acting under the auspices of the UNHCR concerning the repatriation and return of persons, including those organisations' monitoring of the treatment Access for International Assistance�.All staff, whether national or international, working with international or non-governmental organisations including with the Yugoslav Red Cross, shall be allowed unrestricted access to the Kosmet population for purposes of international assistance. All the persons in Kosmet shall similarly have safe, unhindered, and direct access to the staff of such organisations". The document also contained the phrase, in Chapter 1, Article 1: "Respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the republic of Serbia, substantial self-government in Kosmet shall be based on broadest powers and rights of Kosmet organs and national communities in Kosmet."¹³

But is Slobodan Milosevic, now an internationally wanted war criminal and stage manager of the ongoing media blitz, in fact telling his population that FRY's victory over NATO was resounding? Contrary to some expectations, dailies are providing a forum to those willing to go on record saying the latest peace agreement is, if not a surrender or total capitulation, far short of anything that might be dubbed a victory. Dusan Nikolis, of Belgrade's Institute for International Politics and Economics [Proizvod], has already remarked that the peace amounts to "a loss of sovereignty�because US-NATO aggressors are militarily and administratively coming to Kosovo, while the FRY is withdrawing�" Nikolis added that Kosovo is being "divided into administrative zones" and that "this is a new Berlin Wall in Europe, because of the similarity [of the situation] to Germany and Berlin after the capitulation of Germany in the Second World War, and the borders of the FRY are called into question."¹⁴

Milosevic may be permitting such voices to be heard so as to exploit to the fullest the popular anti- Western, anti-NATO sentiment in the wake of 10 weeks of bombing and the effective occupation of Kosovo. Certainly, the rhetoric of victory would not lend itself as readily to an attempt by the regime to prepare the public for an eventual partition of Kosovo. In addition, Nikolis's statement may have presaged a deal Milosevic had quietly struck with the Russians with regard to their controlling a Serb-inhabited portion of Kosovo, which shall be further explored below.

Such an account was likely floated to give the regime some justification for coming to terms with NATO. The thought of the Finnish dignitary, a representative of a nation not known for its warlike approach to international problem-solving, delivering such an ultimatum will strike most as ludicrous. But the account was not without value as a piece of propaganda to be used for domestic consumption.

In fact, a Swedish investment banker named Peter Castenfelt met with Milosevic on 29 May 1999, ostensibly to soften up the dictator and prepare him psychologically to accept the deal. It is unclear whether Castenfelt convinced Milosevic that Russian support was not forthcoming for the Yugoslav cause, but he did allegedly make the case that the agreement was good for Belgrade, allowing it to assert jurisdiction over Kosovo.¹⁶

On 4 June, as dailies and electronic media trumpeted the acceptance of the deal, editors were careful to avoid mention of surrender or capitulation. Instead, reports were couched in references to Belgrade adopting a peaceful course of action. Under headlines such as "'YES' to Peace in Yugoslavia," citizens were told, "With this document the territorial sovereignty of our land is confirmed."¹⁸ While few reports have gone so far as to stress an interpretation of a NATO defeat, recent accounts have alleged that "NATO is the biggest loser." This story, from an interview with FRY Premier Momir Bulatovic, quoted the former Montenegrin president as observing that, "in the interests of peace, our country had to make many painful compromises, but even the aggressor had to make compromises�. The territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia has been secured, which undermines every [form] of separatism and terrorism." ¹⁹

At last Milosevic himself emerged to deliver the message personally in a 10 June address:

"Dear citizens, the aggression is over. Peace has overcome violence. �At this moment, our first thoughts should go to the heroes who gave their lives in the defense of the fatherland, in the struggle for the freedom and dignity of their people. All their names will be made known, but now I want to inform you that 462 members of the Yugoslav Army and 114 members of the police force of the Republic of Serbia were killed in the war that lasted exactly 11 weeks, from March 24 until today. We will never be able to pay our debt to them. We must do what we can, that which it is our duty to do � and that is to look after their families and always be prepared to defend the freedom, dignity and independence of this country, for which they laid down their lives. Our entire nation has taken part in this war � from babies in maternity wards to patients in intensive care to soldiers in air-defense trenches and patrolmen on the borders. No one can forget the heroism of the defenders of the bridges, of the citizens who defended factories, squares, their cities, their jobs, their country, their people�.Early this year there were many rallies throughout our country. One slogan could have been heard there: we won't give up Kosovo. We have not given up Kosovo. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country is guaranteed by the Group of Eight major industrial powers [sic] and the UN. That guarantee is also contained in the Draft Resolution. The outstanding issue of Kosovo's possible independence raised during the period preceding the aggression was settled and closed by the Belgrade Accords. The territorial integrity of our country cannot be questioned. We have held out. We have defended our country, presenting our entire problem at the pinnacle of world authority, the UN, to be resolved under UN auspices and in accordance with the UN Charter. The international forces to deploy in Kosovo will act under UN auspices, with the task of helping all citizens. A political process based on principles arising from previous debates and on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country will also be taking place under UN auspices. That means that this political process can only have to do with autonomy and with nothing other than autonomy. Not only did we defend our country by taking our case before the UN but we also placed the UN � which had not functioned for eighty days, since before the aggression began - back onto the world stage. That is our contribution to the efforts of the entire freedom-loving world; that is our contribution to the efforts to create a multipolar world and not to accept the creation of a world run by dictate of force from a single center. I believe that this will be a huge contribution to history and that the heroism of our people in their resistance to a far more powerful enemy will mark the end of the 20th century. I am convinced of that."²⁰

Just as everything began to seem as though it were falling into a routine, with NATO countries focussing on an interpretation of events in such a way as to stress Belgrade's capitulation, the Russians entered the scene. On 11 June a Russian contingent of 200 Bosnia-based troops raced into Pristina, the Kosovan capital, and occupied the local airport, refusing to allow NATO access until political negotiations between Washington and Moscow had produced an outcome acceptable to the Russians regarding their role in the peace-keeping mission.

Evidence that continues to dribble out suggests the Russian venture had been planned well in advance, possibly with roots as far back as late May. According to Western accounts now beginning to emerge, Peter Castenfelt, the investment banker, reportedly explained to Milosevic during his seven-day visit to Belgrade beginning 29 May 1999 "that the international force sent to Kosovo was under a United Nations mandate, something Milosevic had demanded".²⁵ At about the same time, according to Michael Steiner, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's foreign policy adviser, Moscow "signalled very clearly that (Milosevic) could not count on military or political support." But the real question remains just how firm those signals from Moscow were.

Milosevic, whose brother is the FRY's ambassador to Moscow, was undoubtedly thoroughly briefed on the court intrigue currently plaguing the Russian government. On 5 June 1999, dovetailing with the end of Castenfelt's Belgrade mission, FRY dailies began to report on wide rifts between Russian diplomats and their military counterparts. In addition, those profound differences were well known within diplomatic and military circles. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reportedly said the gulf was wide, with the military establishment interpreting the peace deal in a negative light. For his part, Russian Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Defense Ministry's department of international relations, held the view that the peace deal ran contra to Moscow's and Belgrade's interests, and as a result he and his backers were "categorically opposed to the accord arrived at in Bonn."²⁷

Western leaders' belated awareness of the Russian troops' stealth approach to Kosovo prompted frantic concern that thousands more Russian soldiers would follow, thereby establishing facts on the ground - in this case, a Russian-controlled area that could ultimately evolve into a de facto partition - before NATO had even deployed. Despite high-level Russian assurances that the troops would stop at the Kosovo border²⁸, Belgrade headlines on 12 June announced, "Russian soldiers enter Kosovo."²⁹ Already on 11 June Ivashov spelled out Moscow's intent: if Russia could not reach accord with NATO on a peacekeeping role, "Russia had the same right as NATO. We will, in such a case, declare [our own] sector [of occupation], and that with the consent of the Yugoslav side."³⁰ For nearly a week, Belgrade news focussed on the demand of Russian public diplomacy, namely, that "Yeltsin is Categorical: Russia Must Get Its Own Sector."

Ivanov initially expressed his dismay, claiming he had no knowledge of the plan to seize the Pristina airport. Yeltsin at first reacted similarly, but since has been shown to have played a key role in the planning of the operation, and has promoted the Russian officer-in-charge of the 200-strong force for his efforts. In fact, the FRY media reports from at least 5 June 1999 make clear that most if not all Russian officials knew of the deep rifts dividing the foreign and defence ministries. While perhaps some ministers took no active part in the planning of the operation, it is inconceivable that they knew nothing about it. As for the men on the ground, they appear to be fond of airports, and their corps has a history of basing itself in such facilities. Soldiers from the 103rd Russian Army division in 1968 took over Prague airport during the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in 1979 this "elite of the [Russian military] elite" took over Kabul airport during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.³²

For the time being, the tensions between Russia and the West over Kosovo appear to have subsided.³³ Following talks between Russian and US officials, Moscow agreed on a troop deployment within existing NATO zones.³⁴ Reports in the FRY media stressed that about 3,000 Russian soldiers would be based in three zones, with about 1,500 men "stationed in the zone of American control," the remainder to be divided between the French and German areas, with "a smaller" troop contingent to be "based at Pristina airport."³⁵ In a related development, Yugoslav troops required to withdraw from Kosovo beat their 20 June 1999 deadline by roughly eleven hours³⁶, triggering the NATO announcement that the air campaign against the FRY had come officially to an end. What remains an open question is whether or not the Russian race to Pristina will represent the norm or exception to Moscow's dealings with the NATO allies during the tenure of the KFOR mission.

As interesting as what Seselj said was what he omitted. He made no personal attacks on Milosevic, nor did he pledge to use the political process to overturn the legislature's acceptance of an accord. In fact, he pledged to uphold the authority of all those duly elected to office and pormised not to help organise anti-government rallies. "With respect to the question of whether or not Slobodan Milosevic should stay on as the FRY president, Seselj answered that the question of the government was in the hands of all Yugoslav citizens and that no outsider should be permitted to interfere with our electoral process."⁴² Shortly after the SRS leader made his comments, other party officials, seemingly underscoring his commitment, repeated the message, observing that under no circumstances would the Radicals "undermine peace, invite unrest, or raise political tensions in the republic." A deal that represented "the will of the majority of the representatives in the legislature" would be "honoured."⁴³ On 14 June Seselj and all the ministers of his party voted unanimously to leave government ranks,⁴⁴ but on 17 June the SRS leader made an about-face. Citing Serbian President Milan Milutinovic's refusal to accept the offered resignations, Seselj said 15 party members would remain in the Serbian government "until the election of new ministers who will conscientiously perform their duties." Seselj also stressed that, "We will have technical cooperation with the coalition partners, but there will be no more intentional co-operation."⁴⁵ Since, he has said that Milosevic and Mira Markovic very much want the SRS to remain in government.⁴⁶

Seselj's fellow paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznatovic, alias Arkan, himself an indicted war criminal, found it impossible to keep tight-lipped. As soon as news of a peace deal leaked out, he began repeating his familiar rhetoric of defiance. If it came to it, said Arkan, even "my wife [will] shoot at British soldiers."⁴⁷ As to how the peace-keeping would go, Arkan remarked there was a tremendous upside and business opportunity: "I'll sell plastic [body] bags, because you'll need a lot of body bags for your soldiers. That's good business."⁴⁸

Even less flamboyant politicians, such as Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), held steadfast to his ultra-nationalist, defiant posturing.⁴⁹ For many years, Kostunica cultivated the image of a moderate standing in contrast to the extremist policies cluttering the political landscape. In truth, Kostunica's long-held views about the possibility of co-operating with ultra-nationalists and including them in governing coalitions betrayed his underlying extremism, although his dirth of charisma actually masks the excesses of his ideology, lulling some observers into the belief that he may be a genuine democratic alternative⁵⁰. While his phrases were far less antagonistic than Arkan's and even a shade more subdued than Seselj's, Kostunica made it clear on the eve of the peace breakthrough that his sympathies lay with the regime. According to the DSS, it was Washington that was aiming to destabilise the peace process, and it was "America that was against peace."⁵¹ He claimed that the indictment of members of the FRY and Serbia's top leadership was an effort to derail a negotiated settlement to the Kosovo crisis and that "The Hague tribunal is a political, and not legal instrument�" ⁵²

With the newfound media attention gracing the DSS and Kostunica, it is tempting to speculate that Milosevic may have plans for the nationalist leader. In the past, Democratic party (DS) head Zoran Djindjic, regarded an advocate of the nationalist cause, received favour in the state-run press. This, hindsight now suggests, was the tactic for splitting the nationalist vote, allowing the SPS to emerge the strongest single party and being able to play the others off against each other. Since casting his lot with reformist Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic and becoming himself an advocate of Western-style reforms, Djindjic can no longer serve the purpose of braking Seselj's moves to unite the extremist electorate. For now, Djindjic remains vilified in the state-run media. He has been dubbed a traitor for backing reform, and on 17 June 1999, following meetings with U.S. Balkans envoy Robert Gelbard, the media tarred the DS leader a threat to national security. It was alleged that Djindjic and Vladan Batic, head of the Christian Democrat Party of Serbia (DHSS) and another key figure in the Alliance for Change coalition, met with the US envoy in the Montenegrin town of Herceg Novi to plot the violent overthrow of the Milosevic regime and to collect the millions of dollars needed to accomplish the task.⁵³ Djindjic, who dismissed the allegations as nonsense, expressed fears that the average man-in-the-street might succumb to government propaganda.⁵⁴ "If�elections were to take place in an environment where a government news agency publishes that we got $9 million from the Americans to topple Milosevic - which is probably the main news in Belgrade today - you could imagine who would win."⁵⁵

As for Kostunica, he does appear to be preparing for the campaign trail, and with the regime's blessing. While denying that the timing is off for elections in the near future, he is pressing home his message that Belgrade's ability to assert jurisdiction over Kosovo will be lost "if we allow ourselves to be led by those who maintain that the politics of our government must be pro-American."⁵⁶

Nevertheless, Milosevic does not appear bent on retaining political power only by rigging ballot box returns. His behaviour during the past year suggests at least one other approach he may be contemplating, which entails consolidating a regime based on military rule. This process actually began towards the end of 1998, with the ouster of Head of the Army Gen. Momcilo Perisic.⁵⁸ Now the FRY dictator is making noise about reorganising the army (VJ). Citing budgetary constraints, Belgrade is now on record saying that recruits are too expensive and that "the Yugoslav state leadership could re-organise the VJ and try to transform it into a professional army. Since the budget does not have enough money, part of the Serbian police, who are professionals and are paid out of the Serbian budget, could be transferred to the VJ."⁵⁹ In addition to making financial sense, the move would certainly discourage any possible coup attempts, as "the professionalisation of the VJ�would neutralise possible discontent and frustration among VJ officers."⁶⁰

Contrary to many Western expectations, Milosevic's Kosovo debacle appears not to have cost him much public support, at least so far. According to a 9-14 June 1999 poll commissioned by Medium research agency, a relatively independent polling and research firm,⁶¹ Milosevic is regarded by a plurality of the 800 respondents as the most trustworthy man in Yugoslavia with 15.6% of respondents avowing their faith in him.⁶² While the statistics do indicate a decrease in his popular standing,⁶³ a remarkable 21% of respondents do not hold him accountable or responsible for the national crises affecting the FRY over the past year. If an election were held today, 21.9% of respondents said they would vote for the SPS, while Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) came in second, with 14.7% support.⁶⁴ Finally, Milo Djukanovic came in fourth on the list of most trusted of political leaders, receiving the nod from five percent of respondents.

Part 2 of 2