Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement
28 October 1999
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Executive Summary
Introduction: Dayton's Goals
Purpose
Annex by annex
Annex 1-A: Cease Fire and Mujahedeen
Cessation of Hostilities
Armed Civilian Groups: Militia and Paramilitary
Foreign Troops: the Osama Bin Laden Connection
Who Pays the Rent?
War Criminals
The Fear of Body Bags: Why Dayton Isn't Working
Annex 1-B: Regional Stabilization
Purpose
Confidence and Security Building Measures
Implementation
The Standing Committee on Military Matters
The Federation Armies: HVO and ABIH
Funding an Arms Race?
Sub-Regional Arms Control
Agreement on Regional Arms Control
Annex 2: Boundaries and Brcko
Boundaries
Brcko: A United District?
Annex 3: Elections
The Failure of "Democratic" Elections
The Fraudulent 1996 Elections: D�j� vu from 1990
The 1997 Elections: Gerrymandering Dayton to Death
OSCE Intervention
The 1998 Election: Poplasen Wins
The Potemkin Village of Multi-ethnic Administration
Boycotts and Threats of Violence
The PEC and the Draft Permanent Election Law
Whither Elections?
Annex 4: The Constitution
The House of Cards
Why is it Not Implemented?
Three Peoples, Two Entities, One Republic
Constituent Peoples: Us vs. Them vs. Them
Denial of Individual Human Rights
Dayton's Glue: The Weakness of the Joint Institutions
The Parliamentary Assembly
The House of ["Constituent"] Peoples: Institutionalised Discrimination
Legislative Ineffectiveness
The Presidency
Co-presiding: The Council of Ministers
The Constitutional Court of BIH
The Failure of Central Institutions
Annex 5: Arbitration
Annex 6: Human Rights
The Human Rights Chamber
Speed and Case Load
Ombudsperson
Why is the Commission Ineffective?
The Confusion of Bureaucracy
Human Rights Soldiers
Human Rights - What They Could Be
Whither Human Rights
Annex 7: Refugee Return - The Key to Dayton
How Many Have Actually "Returned?"
Republika Srpska: The Ethnic Cleansers Win
Federation: Croat Obstruction, Bosniak Semi-Obstruction
1999 Returns
The Escape Clause: Chapter 1
The Ill-Fated Commission
Results
The Property Fund
Refugee Return And Security Issues
Minority Return Minimalism
Refugee Return Opportunities
Refugee Return Strategies
The High Representative Acts
The Fear Of What May Develop
Annex 8: Preserving National Monuments
The List And The Law
The Need For Protection: Radimlja Necropolis And The "Bogomil" Stecci
Non-Compliance And Extinction
Annex 9: Public Corporations
Commission On Public Corporations
Transportation Commission And Railway Corporation
The Electric Company And Other Non-Existent Corporations
Annex 10: The Office of the High Representative
What Is It?
Authority + No Power = Non-Implementation
Annex 11: International Police Task Force (IPTF)
The Purpose Of Annex 11
Republika Srpska: Defiance And Reluctance
The Federation: A House Divided�
Un-Federated Federation: Stolac And Croat Separatism
Training
IPTF Limitations: Weak Enforcement Mechanisms
Problems In Practice And Public Perception
And Finally...The Courts
Whither IPTF?
Conclusion
The International Community's Uphill Struggle
Why Isn't It Working?
Policy Options
Option 1) Pull Out Immediately
Option 2) Continue Present Strategies
Option 3) Rewrite DPA
Option 4) Enforce DPA More Robustly
Option 5) Create An International Protectorate
Whither Bosnia And Herzegovina?
Glossary of Abbreviations