MINORITY RETURN OR MASS RELOCATION? 14 May 1998

<script language="JavaScript">  </script> <body bgcolor="#ffffff"> <table width="520" border="0"> <tr> <td colspan="2"> <table cellpadding="0" border="0" cellspacing="0"> <tr> <td valign="top"> <img src="../../../images/t_bosnia.gif" width="292" height="74" alt border="0"></td> <td valign="top"><img src="../../../images/tnav.gif" width="226" height="74" alt border="0" usemap="#tnav"></td> <map name="tnav"> <area shape="rect" coords="6,14,115,28" href="../../../projects/bosnia/Default.html" target="main"> <area shape="rect" coords="7,29,97,43" href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports.html" target="main"> <area shape="rect" coords="8,47,57,57" href="../../../projects/bosnia/map.html" target="main"> <area shape="default" nohref> </map> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> <tr> <td align="left" rowspan="3"><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="10" height="1" border="0"></td> <td align="left" valign="top"> <h1><a name="top">MINORITY RETURN OR MASS RELOCATION?</a></h1> <p class="small">May 14, 1998 (Part 1 of 4)</p> <p> <br> <h2>Contents</h2> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#exec">Executive Summary</a> <p> <ol class="normal" type="i"> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#1">Introduction</a> <ol type="a" class="small"> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#1a">RETURNS DURING 1996-97: ETHNIC CONSOLIDATION</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#1b">POLICY SHIFT IN 1997: ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR MINORITY RETURNS</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#1c">THE RETURN SCORECARD</a> </ol> <p> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#2">THE SPECTRE OF MASS RELOCATION</a> <ol type="a" class="small"> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#2a">ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELOCATION</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#2b">RELOCATION AS A POLITICAL PROGRAMME OF THE NATIONALIST PARTIES</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#2c">THE TRAP OF RECIPROCITY</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep1.html#2d">REFUGEE REPATRIATION FROM GERMANY AND RELOCATION</a> </ol> <p> <li><a href="/#3">MINORITY RETURNS: WHAT HAS BEEN TRIED SO FAR?</a> <ol type="a" class="small"> <li><a href="/#3a">OPEN CITIES INITIATIVE: THE KONJIC MODEL</a> <ol type="1" class="small"> <li><a href="/#3a1">Open Cities in 1997: a Disappointing Record</a> <li><a href="/#3a2">Konjic - a "Model Open City"?</a> <li><a href="/#3a3">Other Open Cities</a> <li><a href="/#3a4">Weaknesses of the Open Cities Initiative</a> </ol> <li><a href="/#3b">DRAFTING RETURN PLANS - THE CENTRAL BOSNIA MODEL</a> <ol type="1" class="small"> <li><a href="/#3b1">A Multiplicity of Structures and Plans</a> <li><a href="/#3b2">The Central Bosnia Experience</a> </ol> <li><a href="/#3c">RETURNS DRIVEN BY DISPLACED PERSONS - THE DRVAR MODEL</a> <ol type="1" class="small"> <li><a href="/#3c1">Why Returns Driven by Displaced Persons Are Crucial</a> <li><a href="/#3c2">Returns to Drvar</a> <li><a href="/#3c3">Organised Violence and the International Community's Inadequate Response</a> </ol> <li><a href="/#3d">RETURN CONFERENCES - THE SARAJEVO MODEL</a> <ol type="1" class="small"> <li><a href="/#3d1">Achievements of the Sarajevo Return Conference</a> <li><a href="/#3d2">Unresolved Issues</a> <li><a href="/#3d3">Banja Luka Returns Conference</a> </ol> <li><a href="/#3e">INTERNATIONALLY REGULATED RETURNS - THE BRCKO MODEL</a> </ol> <p> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4">CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR MINORITY RETURNS</a> <ol type="a" class="small"> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4a">DISPLACED PERSONS: THE INDISPENSABLE ACTORS</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4b">FOCUSED POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS: THE NORTH-WEST RRTF EXAMPLE </a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4c">CREATING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR RETURNS</a> <ol type="1" class="small"> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4c1">Preventive Measures</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4c2">Responses to Crises</a> </ol> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4d">FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS</a> <ol type="1" class="small"> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4d1">Flexible Funding</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep3.html#4d1">The Special Case of the European commission</a> </ol> </ol> <p> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#5">RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGIC BREAKTHROUGHS IN 1998</a> <ol type="1" class="small"> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#5a">OPENING REPUBLIKA SRPSKA</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#5b">OPENING "HERZEG-BOSNA"</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#5c">OPENING CROATIA</a> </ol> <p> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#6">CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS</a> <ol type="1" class="small"> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#6a">OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE MINORITY RETURNS</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#6b">DISPLACED PERSONS ORGANISATIONS</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#6c">SECURITY FOR MINORITY RETURNEES</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#6d">POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS</a> <li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh33rep4.html#6e">RELOCATION AND RETURN OF REFUGEES</a> </ol> </ol> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="exec"><h2>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</h2></a> International organisations working to help displaced Bosnians return to their pre-war homes -- arguably the most important element of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) -- have declared 1998 the "year of minority returns". Four months into the year, however, there is the distinct possibility that 1998 may instead prove to be the "year of mass relocation". This need not be the case. The political climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) has shifted in recent months and, despite major set-backs, including in Drvar, minority return success stories are already beginning to emerge. In order to turn the current trickle of minority returns into a steady flow, the lessons of past failures and successes have to be learned. <p> The ethnic cleansing which characterised the wars of Yugoslav dissolution did not end with the final cease-fire. Instead, hard-line Serb and Croat leaders continued their campaigns of ethnic separation and consolidation after the DPA came into force - terrorising "their" people into leaving areas outside the control of "their" armies and offering incentives for resettlement in strategic areas. This was especially evident in Sarajevo where over 60,000 Serbs abandoned their homes in suburbs which were surrendered to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in February and March of 1996. This is also the policy of the Bosnian Croat HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica), which organises violence against minority returnees and promotes strategic resettlements of displaced Croats in non-Croat houses. <p> Early in the peace process, return and return-related reconstruction was entrusted to agencies with non-political mandates, in particular the Office of the United Nations High commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Bank. They and their implementing partners focused on the easiest tasks -- helping displaced persons to return to areas in which they belonged to the majority ethnic group -- and worked closely together with local authorities, themselves often the greatest obstacle to minority return. This policy shifted in the course of 1997. Led by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), international agencies abandoned the deferential approach to Bosnia's nationalist leaders and are, instead, taking them on. This new policy has already borne fruit and, among other advances, led to the appointment of Milorad Dodik, a moderate Prime Minister in Republika Srpska. <p> Of the over 1.3 million refugees at the end of hostilities, some 208,000 had, according to the UNHCR, returned to Bosnia by the end of 1997, though often not to their own homes. Another 504,000 had acquired permanent status abroad, leaving 612,000 refugees in need of solutions. Of the over 1 million Bosnians displaced internally, a net total of 153,000 had returned to their homes, almost all to areas controlled by their own ethnic group. Only 45,500 had returned to areas in which they formed a minority, of whom a paltry 2,200 had returned to Republika Srpska (plus 2,400 to Brcko's Zone of Separation). Most of the remaining 612,000 refugees and 816,000 internally displaced Bosnians would be in the minority if they returned to their homes. Alternatively, they could be relocated in areas in which they belong to the ethnic majority. <p> Relocation is the preferred solution of Bosnia's nationalist parties which urge further ethnic consolidation accompanied by property exchanges and the construction of new accommodation. Despite the nationalists' rhetoric of "voluntary relocation", displaced Bosnians have little choice in matters as a result of their precarious existence and the level of official manipulation. Further, relocation makes it increasingly difficult for those who, nevertheless, wish to return home, as is their right under the DPA, to do so. Relocation risks leaving a frustrated, hate-filled and despairing population, which never had a chance to return to their homes, and abandoning entirely the concept of multi-ethnicity in Bosnia. <p> Germany is host to the largest number of refugees in Western Europe. Of some 345,000 who fled there during the war, about 100,000 had returned by the end of 1997. German refugee policy is made largely by the L�nder (state) governments. Given that Bosnian refugees cost the L�nder more than 200 million DM a month, the desire to repatriate as many and as fast as possible is obvious. <p> German policy is to encourage voluntary repatriation by a variety of means, including incentive packages and repatriation assistance. In addition, the threat of being forcibly repatriated is real: some 1,000 Bosnians were deported in 1997; and tens of thousands of refugees from Republika Srpska have received notice that they must leave Germany before July 1998 or risk deportation. German policy-makers argue that they have already been extremely generous to Bosnian refugees; that the appointment of a new Prime Minister has transformed conditions for return in Republika Srpska; and that increased Western aid to that entity makes minority returns immediately possible. While an intelligent and co-ordinated international policy may in time pave the way for the return of refugees to Republika Srpska, officials on the ground warn that hasty and ill-prepared returns will destabilise the entity and that, unless the German governments work within an international framework, they will undermine prospects for minority returns. <p> To date, five main strategies have been pursued for minority return in different parts of the country. These are the "Open Cities Initiative"; formally drafted regional return plans; political support for returns initiated by displaced persons; return conferences in Sarajevo and Banja Luka; and internationally-supervised returns to Brcko. <p> Though the "Open Cities Initiative" forms the backbone of UNHCR's policy towards minority returns and 80 percent of the agency's 1998 funds are earmarked for the programme, the results have been disappointing. The initiative has failed to increase minority returns or to channel significant assistance to municipalities deemed "open" as compared to those not included in the initiative. The initiative suffers from several defects, including the lack of a transparent selection procedure; inadequate monitoring; and failure to address issues such as property rights violations, housing shortages and double occupancy. <p> The late Senior Deputy High Representative Gerd Wagner helped open the Central Bosnia Canton to minority returns in August 1997 by brokering an agreement between senior Croat and Bosniac officials following large-scale violence in Jajce. This was then institutionalised into a return plan. Recent developments in Central Bosnia have been cautiously encouraging. However, a number of new planning mechanisms and bodies geared to returns have been set up in recent months, which will inevitably depend on the good will of the authorities. Where this good will is lacking, planning mechanisms will be time-consuming and achieve little. <p> Displaced persons associations have generated comparatively large-scale minority returns, including to Drvar and Jajce. The groundwork for returns to these two areas was laid by effective displaced persons associations and return initially took place without international assistance. Although returnees face personal danger, they appear to consider this a risk worth taking. However, faced with fresh outbreaks of ethnic violence, these return movements relied on a determined international response to maintain the momentum. While this was the case in Jajce in 1997, violence in Drvar in April 1998, targeted at returnees and international organisations, led to no such response. Some international organisations insinuated that the main fault lay with the returnees and those who encouraged them to return too rapidly, and not with the organisers of the violence. The lack of reaction bodes ill for similar return efforts to Stolac, Prozor-Rama, Prijedor and Sanski Most. <p> A highly-visible return conference took place in Sarajevo in February 1998 hosted by the OHR, the US Government and the European commission. The conference led to key amendments in the hitherto discriminatory property legislation and to the formation of the Sarajevo Housing commission, intended to curb the misallocation of housing. Overall, however, the results of the conference have been disappointing. Another return conference was held on 28 April in Banja Luka. <p> In Brcko, a contested municipality whose fate is still to be decided by international arbitration, an international supervisor is overseeing returns. As a result, some 930 Bosniac and Croat families have returned to their homes in Republika Srpska and the pace of return has accelerated since the change in regime in that entity. Nevertheless, the most difficult challenge -- initiating minority returns to Brcko town -- lies ahead. Further, Brcko's unique position and the intense commitment of resources to the area mean that it is not a model which can be repeated elsewhere in Bosnia. <p> Important lessons can be drawn from the various approaches tried to date. First, the key actors in making minority returns successful are not local authorities or international organisations, but the displaced persons themselves. The Coalition for Return, formed in October 1996 by the OHR, has been a low-budget, high-impact initiative. The North-West Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) has been particularly effective in harnessing the creative energy of displaced persons in supporting minority return. Second, successful minority return is in general the return of groups, not of isolated individuals. Third, in all cases of successful minority return security risks could not be eliminated but could be contained. In cases of violent obstruction, a robust and immediate response by SFOR and other members of the international community has been crucial. Fourth, an inter-agency approach -- modelled on the work of the North-West RRTF -- is essential. <p> In order to build on the experience of the first two years of the peace process and make the "year of minority return" more than just a hollow promise, ICG urges the following: <ul> <li>robust response by the international community to the violence at the end of April in Drvar, including significant measures against the HDZ and those in Croatia ultimately responsible for the HDZ's obstruction of DPA implementation in Bosnia; <li>credible pressure against Croatia to allow the return of Croatian Serbs to their homes, including the threat of sanctions; <li>improved security framework for minority returnees, including the recruitment of minority police officers, the removal of security personnel who fail to respond effectively to violence against returnees, and the deployment of international troops with experience in dealing with crowds of hostile civilians; <li>a stop to deportations when a refugee's home municipality is not open to minority returns and the refugee has no other choice but to relocate upon return; <li>fundamental reform of the Open Cities Initiative, including tighter criteria for selection, substantially improved monitoring, and reallocation of resources; <li>increased support for the Coalition for Return and other displaced persons associations; <li>identification of opportunities for sustainable minority return based on consultations with displaced persons associations; <li>improved targeting of resources to areas where minorities are returning or are likely to return and creation of a flexible fund with the capacity to disburse rapidly when breakthroughs in minority returns occur; <li>improved co-ordination of international political intervention, backed by willingness to exert financial, diplomatic and military pressure; and <li>increased resources and authority for regional RRTFs, to enable them to pursue a pro-active approach. </ul> <p align="right">Sarajevo, 14 May 1998</p> <p> <br> <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="1"><h2>I. INTRODUCTION</h2></a> International organisations working to help displaced Bosnians return to their pre-war homes have declared 1998 the "year of minority returns". This is because the vast majority of the 612,000 refugees and 816,000 internally displaced Bosnians who continue to live in hope of returning to their pre-war homes<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#1" target="notes"><sup><b>1</b></sup></a> -- as is their right under the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#2" target="notes"><sup><b>2</b></sup></a> -- would belong to a minority if they did so<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#3" target="notes"><sup><b>3</b></sup></a>. Because of the complexity of minority returns, international agencies focused during the first two years of the peace process on the easier task of returning displaced Bosnians to their homes in areas controlled by the armed forces of the ethnic group to which they belong. As a result, by the end of 1997 only 45,500 Bosnians had returned to areas in which they formed a minority, of whom a paltry 2,200 had returned to Republika Srpska (plus 2,400 to Brcko's Zone of Separation). Despite the shift in priorities towards minority returns, four months into the year there is the distinct possibility that 1998 will become a "year of mass relocation". This need not be the case. The political climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) has shifted in recent months and, despite a major set-back in Drvar in April, minority return success stories have begun to emerge. In order to turn the current trickle of minority returns into a steady flow, the lessons of past failures and successes have to be learned. <p> This paper examines the evolution of approaches pursued to promote minority returns during the year since the International Crisis Group (ICG) published its first in-depth report on the question, Going Nowhere Fast. It considers the returns record to date; the arguments for minority return and against relocation; and plans of many of the German states to deport large numbers of Bosnians by mid-1998. The report examines in particular the "Open Cities Initiative", the return plan model, return conferences, the process of internationally-supervised returns to Brcko; and returns driven by displaced persons organisations. It draws conclusions and suggests recommendations. <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="1a"><h3>A. Returns During 1996-97: Ethnic Consolidation</h3></a> The ethnic cleansing which characterised the Bosnian war did not end when the guns fell silent. Hard-line Croat and Serb leaders continued their campaigns of ethnic separation following the signing of the DPA. They did so by terrorising "their" people into leaving areas no longer controlled by "their" armies, and by offering incentives to settle in strategic areas under their control, usually in homes vacated by people of different ethnic groups who had been forced to flee. <p> From the outset, inter-agency co-ordination in Sarajevo dealing with return and return-related reconstruction was handled by institutions with non-political mandates, in particular UNHCR and the World Bank. They focused on the easiest tasks: returning displaced persons to areas controlled by their own ethnic group and rebuilding the least damaged housing units.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#4" target="notes"><sup><b>4</b></sup></a> They, along with their implementing partners, worked with local authorities, giving them the power to choose the homes to be reconstructed and identify the pre-war occupants who were entitled to the reconstructed flats. Thus, local authorities throughout the country chose for reconstruction homes belonging to political supporters and members of their own nationality, or granted occupancy rights to such people regardless of actual entitlement. The international agencies and their implementing partners provided little oversight, since insisting on compliance with strict criteria for housing reconstruction and occupancy would result in delays. Reliance on the main nationalist parties -- Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS), the Bosnian Serb party founded by indicted war-criminal Radovan Karadzic; the Bosnian Croat Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ); and the Bosniac Stranka demokratske akcije (SDA) -- to promote returns without discrimination was a doomed undertaking.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#5" target="notes"><sup><b>5</b></sup></a> <p> International organisations found little support among member-states of the Contact Group -- France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States -- to devote the resources and high-level political interventions necessary to promote minority returns.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#6" target="notes"><sup><b>6</b></sup></a> The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) did not want to get entangled in "civilian implementation", and often refused to provide area security even for minority assessment visits to former homes. <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="1b"><h3>B. Policy Shift in 1997: Assuming Responsibility for Minority Returns</h3></a> Beginning in the spring of 1997, there was a growing awareness among leaders of the Contact Group, especially in Washington, that unless they radically changed their policies, there would be no progress in creating conditions for the withdrawal of NATO-led forces, which had been reduced in number and renamed the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in mid-December. <p> In April 1997, then High Representative Carl Bildt singled out the SDS's hold on power and the continuing influence of Radovan Karadzic and other indicted war criminals within the SDS as the root cause for the failure to implement the DPA in Republika Srpska.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#7" target="notes"><sup><b>7</b></sup></a> Through a variety of methods, such as SFOR's seizure of transmission towers that broadcast inflammatory statements against the international community and the removal of police chiefs who violated DPA requirements, SDS hard-liners' grip on power was weakened. They lost control over the Republika Srpska Parliament in the November 1997 elections, and a moderate, Milorad Dodik, became Prime Minister shortly thereafter. At the Bonn Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) in December 1997, the Contact Group called on the High Representative to "use his authority fully to facilitate the resolution of difficulties," and gave him the power of binding arbitration and the right to remove obstructionist officials. <p> In addition, the authorities of Bosniac municipalities in Central Bosnia (such as Bugojno and Vares), governed by hard-liners, and even the symbol of multi-ethnicity, Sarajevo, came under increasing pressure to improve conditions for return. And in early 1998, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) cited the Bosnian Croat nationalist party, the HDZ, as the major obstacle to DPA implementation. Principal Deputy High Representative Jacques Klein asserted that pressure by the HDZ and the HVO (Bosnian Croat Defence Council) on Croats to relocate is "very counterproductive, and aims to destroy the presence of Croat-Catholics in Central Bosnia."<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#8" target="notes"><sup><b>8</b></sup></a> <p> By the autumn of 1997, the international community showed new resolve in countering violent opposition to "minority returns"<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#9" target="notes"><sup><b>9</b></sup></a>. The turning point came when several hundred returning Bosniacs were expelled from their homes in the Central Bosnian town of Jajce at the end of July 1997 by a violent crowd instigated by local Bosnian Croat police. Following the violence, the late Deputy High Representative Gerd Wagner pushed through an agreement which allowed for the immediate return of all 450 expelled Bosniacs within weeks. Ambassador Wagner then used the momentum to press for similar openings in other parts of ethnically mixed Central Bosnia.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#10" target="notes"><sup><b>10</b></sup></a> It was the first time that the OHR became directly involved in politically "brokering" minority returns. <p> The OHR established the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) in January 1997 as a forum for co-ordination. The RRTF is chaired by the OHR and is made up of the UNHCR, the European commission including the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC), the World Bank, the International Management Group (IMG), the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF), SFOR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United States Government and Germany's Federal commissioner for Refugee Return and Related Reconstruction. Regional branches were subsequently established in Brcko, the North-West (Banja Luka) and Sarajevo. The North-West RRTF set a new standard for inter-agency co-operation which enabled it to respond flexibly to important breakthroughs in late 1997 in Drvar and Grahovo, and in early 1998 in Prijedor and Sanski Most. In 1998 a regional RRTF was also established in Central Bosnia and in the South-West (Mostar). <p> The Bonn PIC document strengthened the RRTF by granting it additional resources and appointing a Deputy High Representative to lead it. In addition, the RRTF was to pursue a political, as distinct from a humanitarian or technocratic, approach to minority returns, and was to "support brokered breakthroughs in minority return movements at the local level." The PIC document referred to Central Bosnia and its return process as a model to be applied in other parts of the country.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#11" target="notes"><sup><b>11</b></sup></a> <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="1c"><h3>C. The Return Scorecard</h3></a> Bosnia had a pre-war population of 4.3 million. According to UNHCR, 43 months of war resulted in over 1 million people being internally displaced within Bosnia, and more than 1.2 million seeking refuge abroad in 25 host countries<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#12" target="notes"><sup><b>12</b></sup></a>. More than two years after the war's end, return figures, and especially those to minority areas, are not encouraging. According to UNHCR, the following number of returns have taken place:<p></td> </tr> <tr> <td><p> <table cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2" border="1" bgcolor="#C6d6f7" class="small"> <tr> <td colspan="4" align="center" class="small">RETURNS IN 1996<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#13" target="notes"><sup><b>13</b></sup></a></td> </tr> <tr> <td><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">REFUGEES</td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">INTERNALLY DISPLACED</td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">TOTAL</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">TO FEDERATION</td> <td align="center" class="small">80,114</td> <td align="center" class="small">102,913</td> <td align="center" class="small">183,027</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">TO RS</td> <td align="center" class="small">7,925</td> <td align="center" class="small">61,854</td> <td align="center" class="small">69,779</td> </tr> <tr> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">TOTAL</td> <td align="center" class="small">88,039</td> <td align="center" class="small">164,767</td> <td align="center" class="small">252,806</td> </tr> </table> <p> <table cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2" border="1" bgcolor="#C6d6f7" class="small"> <tr> <td colspan="4" align="center" class="small">RETURNS IN 1997</td> </tr> <tr> <td><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">REFUGEES</td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">INTERNALLY DISPLACED</td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">TOTAL</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TO FEDERATION</td> <td class="small" align="center">111,650</td> <td class="small" align="center">53,160</td> <td class="small" align="center">164,810</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TO RS</td> <td class="small" align="center">8,700</td> <td class="small" align="center">5,200</td> <td class="small" align="center">13,900</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TOTAL</td> <td class="small" align="center">120,350</td> <td class="small" align="center">58,360</td> <td class="small" align="center">178,710</td> </tr> </table> <p> <table cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2" border="1" bgcolor="#C6d6f7" class="small"> <tr> <td colspan="4" align="center" class="small">TOTAL RETURNS IN 1996 AND 1997</td> </tr> <tr> <td><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">REFUGEES</td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">INTERNALLY DISPLACED</td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">TOTAL</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TO FEDERATION</td> <td class="small" align="center">191,764</td> <td class="small" align="center">156,073</td> <td class="small" align="center">347,837</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TO RS</td> <td class="small" align="center">16,625</td> <td class="small" align="center">67,054</td> <td class="small" align="center">83,679</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TOTAL</td> <td class="small" align="center">208,389</td> <td class="small" align="center">223,127</td> <td class="small" align="center">431,516</td> </tr> </table> <p> <table cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2" border="1" bgcolor="#C6d6f7" class="small"> <tr> <td colspan="4" align="center" class="small">MINORITY RETURNS IN 1996<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#14" target="notes"><sup><b>14</b></sup></a></td> </tr> <tr> <td><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">REFUGEES</td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">INTERNALLY DISPLACED</td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small">TOTAL</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TO FEDERATION</td> <td class="small" align="center">figures not available</td> <td class="small" align="center">8,354</td> <td class="small" align="center"><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TO RS</td> <td class="small" align="center">figures not available</td> <td class="small" align="center">1,096</td> <td class="small" align="center"><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" bgcolor="#ffffff" align="center">TOTAL</td> <td class="small" align="center">2,216</td> <td class="small" align="center">9,450</td> <td class="small" align="center">11,666</td> </tr> </table> <p> <table cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2" border="1" bgcolor="#C6d6f7" class="small"> <tr> <td colspan="10" align="center" class="small">MINORITY RETURNS IN 1997</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" align="center"><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> <td colspan="2" class="small" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff">BOSNIACS</td> <td colspan="2" class="small" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff">CROATS</td> <td colspan="2" class="small" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff">SERBS</td> <td colspan="2" class="small" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff">TOTAL</td> <td colspan="2" class="small" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff"><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> </tr> <tr> <td><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">REF</td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">IDP</td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">REF</td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">IDP</td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">REF</td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">IDP</td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">REF</td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">IDP</td> <td bgcolor="#ffffff" class="small" align="center">TOTAL</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff">TO FEDERATION</td> <td class="small" align="center">4,822</td> <td class="small" align="center">4,018</td> <td class="small" align="center">12,260</td> <td class="small" align="center">4,923</td> <td class="small" align="center">2,777</td> <td class="small" align="center">3,914</td> <td class="small" align="center">19,859</td> <td class="small" align="center">12,855</td> <td class="small" align="center">32,714</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff">TO RS</td> <td class="small" align="center">234</td> <td class="small" align="center">734</td> <td class="small" align="center">113</td> <td class="small" align="center">42</td> <td class="small" align="center"><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> <td class="small" align="center"><img src="../../../images/clear.gif" width="1" height="1" border="0"></td> <td class="small" align="center">347</td> <td class="small" align="center">776</td> <td class="small" align="center">1,123</td> </tr> <tr> <td class="small" align="center" bgcolor="#ffffff">TOTAL</td> <td class="small" align="center">5,056</td> <td class="small" align="center">4,752</td> <td class="small" align="center">12,373</td> <td class="small" align="center">4,965</td> <td class="small" align="center">2,777</td> <td class="small" align="center">3,914</td> <td class="small" align="center">20,206</td> <td class="small" align="center">13,631</td> <td class="small" align="center">33,837</td> </tr> </table> <p>   <p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> <p> By the end of 1997, 208,000 refugees had returned to the country and another 504,000 had found durable solutions abroad<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#15" target="notes"><sup><b>15</b></sup></a>, leaving 612,000 refugees still in need of a solution<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#16" target="notes"><sup><b>16</b></sup></a>. In 1996, 165,000 internally displaced persons returned home, but at least another 70,000 were freshly displaced. In 1997, 58,000 internally displaced persons returned to their homes, for a net total of 153,000, almost all to areas under the control of their own ethnic group. UNHCR estimates that, at the end of 1997, there were 816,000 Bosnians displaced internally (366,000 in the Federation and 450,000 in Republika Srpska), plus 40,000 Serb refugees from Croatia in Republika Srpska. <p> There was an almost complete failure to promote minority returns: 11,666 minorities returned in 1996 and 33,837 in 1997, most of whom were elderly. Only some 2,200 minorities returned to Republika Srpska in two years, and an additional 614 non-Serb families (roughly 2,400 people) "returned" to Brcko's Zone of Separation (ZoS)<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#17" target="notes"><sup><b>17</b></sup></a>, although many of these families do not live in their ZoS homes for security reasons. <p> The trickle of minority returns did not increase in the first months of 1998, except to the Brcko ZoS, where 315 more families had returned by 24 April.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#18" target="notes"><sup><b>18</b></sup></a> Elsewhere, according to UNHCR, there were a total of 673 minority returns in January and February: 12 to Republika Srpska outside of the ZoS and 661 to the Federation. 345 Serbs returned to the Federation, including 217 to Sarajevo and 100 to Drvar, 98 Bosniacs returned to Croat majority areas and 218 Croats returned to Bosniac majority areas.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#19" target="notes"><sup><b>19</b></sup></a> <p> As a consequence, overwhelming ethnic majorities exist in most of Bosnia, with only a handful of areas containing minority populations greater than 10 percent (about 13 percent in the Tuzla and Sarajevo cantons). <p> By the start of 1998, most of the estimated 612,000 remaining refugees and 816,000 internally displaced persons would be in the minority if they returned to their pre-war homes. As UNHCR pointed out in the summer of 1997: "Those persons who could easily identify solutions for themselves on return have already done so.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#20" target="notes"><sup><b>20</b></sup></a>" Thus, whatever returns take place in 1998 will be either "minority returns" or relocations. <p>   <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="2"><h2>II. THE SPECTRE OF MASS RELOCATION</h2></a> UNHCR predicts that in 1998 up to 200,000 refugees might return from abroad, mostly Bosniacs presently in Germany but originally from territory now within Republika Srpska. UNHCR notes that unless there is a "major breakthrough in minority return movements," this repatriation will in fact entail relocation to majority areas, mainly of Bosniacs to Sarajevo, the Una-Sana Canton and the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#21" target="notes"><sup><b>21</b></sup></a> <p> Relocation has already emerged as a dominant reality in the past two years. An estimated 70 percent of the repatriations from abroad that took place in the second half of 1997 led to relocation.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#22" target="notes"><sup><b>22</b></sup></a> A survey conducted by the Swiss Government concluded that 67.5 percent of the Bosnian refugees who returned from Switzerland in 1997 did not return to their pre-war homes.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#23" target="notes"><sup><b>23</b></sup></a> <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="2a"><h3>A. Arguments Against Relocation</h3></a> <p> Because relocation will consolidate ethnic separation and make it more difficult for minorities to return if their homes are occupied by "relocatees", in January 1998 the Council of Europe called on member states to "refrain from forced repatriation of refugees originating from minority areas in order to avoid further destabilisation of the ethnic composition of the country."<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#24" target="notes"><sup><b>24</b></sup></a> As the RRTF explained in December 1997: <p> The trend in international assistance is moving away from housing reconstruction. Unless the international community decides to change this trend, the "race" between minority returnees and members of the majority community relocating will become a reality in 1998. The choice is simple: either major breakthroughs in minority return take place in early 1998, allowing refugees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war dwellings, or the space will be filled by relocating persons, property legislation notwithstanding... It is also of paramount importance that host countries must act responsibly by pressuring openings for return instead of accepting and inducing relocation<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#25" target="notes"><sup><b>25</b></sup></a>. <p> The overall international reconstruction programme for Bosnia was "front-loaded", with most of the money for housing reconstruction spent in the first two post-war years<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#26" target="notes"><sup><b>26</b></sup></a>. In 1996 and 1997, 400 million US$ were pledged for housing reconstruction, 300 million US$ of which have already been disbursed. According to the International Management Group (IMG), the largest donors for housing reconstruction, were the European commission, including the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the governments of the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, the USA, UNHCR and the World Bank. IMG also estimates that, in 1996, 40,000 housing units were repaired, and in 1997 around 23,000<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#27" target="notes"><sup><b>27</b></sup></a>. <p> A shift away from investment in housing and infrastructure will become a reality in 1998, with an increased emphasis on policy-oriented lending. For example, the World Bank has withdrawn from housing reconstruction in the Federation, where it spent 15 million US$ since the end of the war, and will only spend about 5.5 million in Republika Srpska in 1998. UNHCR repaired 16,000 homes in 1996, 8,000 in 1997, and plans to repair 5,000 in 1998. In 1998, the RRTF estimates that an additional 125 million US$ will be needed for housing to accommodate the anticipated return of 200,000 refugees<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#28" target="notes"><sup><b>28</b></sup></a>. <p> A study jointly commissioned by UNHCR and the commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) concluded that "the return of refugees in 1997 has contributed significantly to the displaced persons problem within Bosnia, and this is likely to worsen with future returns.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#29" target="notes"><sup><b>29</b></sup></a>" Refugees who relocate often occupy houses of minorities who are at present internally displaced. The RRTF noted that "even where [relocation] takes place as a result of individual, informed decision-making it remains problematic. Relocation puts pressure on the existing housing stock, notably in popular return destinations such as cities with economic growth potential.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#30" target="notes"><sup><b>30</b></sup></a>" <p> Whereas the RRTF maintains that "relocation is not a solution to the refugee problem,<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#31" target="notes"><sup><b>31</b></sup></a>" UNHCR considers that "relocation is an important component in the search for durable solutions for displaced persons and refugees.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#32" target="notes"><sup><b>32</b></sup></a>" A document published by UNHCR in December 1997 distinguishes between different forms of relocation: "voluntary relocation" after the sale or exchange of property by consent; "passive relocation" refers to internal displacement which is not based on free will; and "hostile relocation" refers to the deliberate placement of groups of people in housing belonging to other ethnic groups, to secure control over territory and prevent minority return. UNHCR supports only voluntary relocation<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#33" target="notes"><sup><b>33</b></sup></a>. <p> However, in the present environment, it is debatable whether most relocations deemed voluntary are indeed so, given the persistent obstruction of minority returns throughout Republika Srpska and Croat-controlled parts of the Federation in 1996 and 1997. Relocation only becomes "voluntary" if there is a genuine option to return to pre-war homes in dignity and security. <p> Relocation is clearly unacceptable when it takes place as a result of official manipulation and would likely leave behind frustrated, hate-filled or despairing refugees. It would also play into the hands of those forces who most want to destroy all potential for restoring a multi-ethnic Bosnia<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#34" target="notes"><sup><b>34</b></sup></a>. <p> Moreover, the RRTF has concluded that, "relocation is costly.... It is therefore justified also from the point of view of resource allocation, to actively pursue return to homes of origin as a priority.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#35" target="notes"><sup><b>35</b></sup></a>" Where relocation is supported by nationalist politicians, such as in Western Croat-controlled parts of the Federation, new villages are constructed requiring new infrastructure. Returnees are often motivated to contribute themselves to the reconstruction of their houses. For all of the above reasons, the RRTF recommends "that international grant aid should not be used to support relocation at this stage of the peace process.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#36" target="notes"><sup><b>36</b></sup></a>" Both the RRTF and UNHCR advise that new construction to house relocatees should be limited to municipalities that also accept minority returns<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#37" target="notes"><sup><b>37</b></sup></a>. The RRTF adds that new construction should be limited to "accommodating secondary movements of displaced persons, when necessary because of the return of original inhabitants to occupied housing space." In certain circumstances, "buffer" accommodation, to house returnees while they wait to get their own houses back, or for other emergency or short-term needs, may also warrant international support. <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="2b"><h3>B. Relocation as a Political Programme of the Nationalist Parties</h3></a> The main proponents of relocation are Croat and Serb hard-liners: the HDZ, the SDS, the Serb Radical Party (SRS, Srpska radikalna stranka), the SNS (Srpski narodni savez) party of President Biljana Plavsic, and the Serb Party for Krajina and Posavina (SSKIP)<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#38" target="notes"><sup><b>38</b></sup></a>. <p> The hard-line Bosnian Croat and Serb leaders argue that the international community should support relocation to majority areas and property exchanges in order to implement Article I, paragraph 4 of Annex 7 of the DPA, which states that: "Choice of destination shall be up to the individual or family. The parties shall not interfere with the returnees choice of destination, nor shall they compel them to remain in or move to situations of serious danger or insecurity, or to areas lacking in the basic infrastructure necessary to resume a normal life." <p> While using the rhetoric of "choice" and "voluntary relocation", the HDZ and SDS have forced relocation through incentives, intimidation, and neglect of those who choose to remain in or return to areas not within their control. Bosnian Croats, including priests and Franciscans, have been intimidated when they openly advocated the return of Croats to areas outside of HDZ control. During the period before the municipal elections in September 1997, the HDZ and SDS put pressure on their "own" people currently displaced, to register to vote in their new home areas rather than in their original municipalities. While the HDZ registered to participate in the 1997 Republika Srpska Assembly Elections, it did not campaign and failed to win a single seat. The SDS did not even register in the Federation in the 1997 municipal elections. It had accomplished the relocation of Serbs, including more than 60,000 from the Sarajevo suburbs, to Republika Srpska quickly and by force. By March 1996, few Serbs remained in the Federation. <p> There are many examples of the HDZ's policy of ethnic engineering. Leaflets have been distributed among Croats in Central Bosnia and Croat refugees in Germany calling on them to relocate to Herzegovina, some even providing a contact number in Zagreb of the Croatian Government's Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR). Croat displaced persons have been resettled by the HDZ to occupy Serb houses in Drvar or Bosniac houses in Stolac. On numerous occasions Croat displaced persons meeting with potential Serb or Bosniac returnees warned representatives of the international community that their authorities would not approve of such contacts. <p> The Croatian Minister for Reconstruction, Jure Radic, admitted in 1997 that the Republic of Croatia was the main donor for housing reconstruction in Southern Herzegovina, even in Capljina where in 1996 the OHR imposed an international embargo against all aid and investment because of non-co-operation by local authorities in setting up a multi-ethnic municipal administration. Zeljko Matic, chairman of the Association of Croats from Republika Srpska, explains that the only durable solution for the 230,000 Croats displaced from Republika Srpska is to build new villages in Croat-controlled Federation in the Neretva valley and the Stolac plateau<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#39" target="notes"><sup><b>39</b></sup></a>. Houses are constructed close to abandoned, destroyed Bosniac and Serb villages in the areas of Stolac, Capljina, Mostar and Zitomislica as witnessed by anyone travelling on the road from Mostar towards the Adriatic coast. As of June 1997, some 2,000 houses were under construction in Capljina and Stolac alone. Newspapers close to the HDZ write that Croats from Central Bosnia are fulfilling their "natural calling" as guardians of Dubrovnik's hinterland by settling in these areas<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#40" target="notes"><sup><b>40</b></sup></a>. <p> Some Bosniac politicians have supported the relocation of Bosniacs who previously lived in areas that are now Serb or Croat-controlled. The SDA views such resettlement as temporary and advocates return to original homes. However, given the eagerness of European countries to repatriate refugees, the SDA has taken advantage of the influx of Bosniacs to the Federation to relocate them to areas of strategic importance, in particular, the Una-Sana and Sarajevo Cantons. Some relocation to the Una-Sana Canton made sense, especially for Bosniacs displaced from the Banja Luka region, because their presence there may facilitate reciprocal returns of Serbs from the Canton now displaced in Banja Luka. However, the degree of relocation that has taken place in the Una-Sana Canton, especially in Sanski Most, supported in large part by funds from West European countries that host refugees, has now rendered the return of Serbs exceedingly difficult. <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="2c"><h3>C. The Trap of Reciprocity</h3></a> Hard-line nationalists often block minority returns by insisting on "reciprocity". For instance, in the view of the HDZ, Bosnian Serbs should only be allowed to return to their homes in Drvar if Croats are able to return to Kakanj in the Federation or to Bosanski Brod in Republika Srpska. For Serb nationalists, returns to Republika Srpska are not possible without prior return of Serbs to Croatia. The Sarajevo authorities maintain that Croats and Serbs cannot reclaim their homes until Bosniacs who were forced to flee Croat- and Serb-controlled areas are able to return to their homes, or at least have adequate alternative housing built for them. These objections are raised even when returns are planned to vacant houses or villages. <p> Insistence on reciprocity serves to block all returns, especially when accompanied by one or another party's strong-arm tactics to block its own people from returning. The HDZ's obstruction is well illustrated by the UNHCR's efforts to broker reciprocal returns in Prozor-Rama, a split municipality in the north of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton mostly controlled by the HVO. Between March and September 1997, some 35 Bosniac families returned to the Croat-controlled village of Duge. However, no returns of Croats took place to Hudutsko, a Bosniac-controlled village, despite international appeals to the Croat authorities to provide names of interested displaced persons. In May 1997 the local HDZ leader warned of "unpleasant consequences" because the agreement "had been broken": "no family will return to Duge until the same is allowed for the villagers of Hudutsko.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#41" target="notes"><sup><b>41</b></sup></a>" No Croats have yet returned. <p> To counter the concept of reciprocity, the North-West RRTF instead calls for the international community to place "equal emphasis" on all communities. This it regards as a responsibility of the international community. However, the concept cannot serve as an excuse for obstructing returns. <p> <p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="2d"><h3>D. Refugee Repatriation from Germany and Relocation</h3></a> As of 1 December 1997, 612,000 Bosnian refugees are still without durable solutions, 89 percent of whom are in only three countries: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (249,000), Germany (220,000) and Croatia (77,000). Other countries still hosting refugees with unresolved status include Switzerland (11,658), Italy (9,285), Austria (8,300) and France (7,400)<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#42" target="notes"><sup><b>42</b></sup></a>. <p> The 249,000 Bosnian refugees in FRY (most of whom are Serb) and the 77,000 Bosnian refugees in Croatia, most of whom are Croats, without a permanent solution are not likely to repatriate in the foreseeable future as they are not under pressure from authorities to do so. However, refugees in Germany do face pressure. <p> Among the West European countries, Germany has been host to the largest number of refugees from Bosnia: some 345,000 by the end of the war. Approximately 100,000 had returned to Bosnia by the end of 1997, and an additional 6,000 returned during the first two months of 1998. UNHCR estimates that about 220,000 Bosnian refugees remain in Germany, of whom between 140,000 and 170,000 are Bosniacs and Croats from Republika Srpska. UNHCR anticipates that between 120,000 and 200,000 refugees from Germany may "voluntarily" return between March and September of this year. <p> German refugee policy is made by several bodies. The most important are the Conference of Interior Ministers of the 16 German Federal L�nder (states), and its subcommittee, the Arbeitsgruppe R�ckf�hrung (working group on returns). The Arbeitsgruppe includes representatives from the German Federal Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Development Co-operation and Defence and, most importantly, from the Interior Ministries of the 16 L�nder. Though they generally try to co-ordinate policy, the L�nder are autonomous in deciding whether to commence deportation proceedings against individual refugees. The Federal Government in Bonn is not in a position to dictate to the L�nder a refugee and repatriation policy, although it can exert political pressure. Another important actor is the German Government's Special Representative for Repatriation, Dietmar Schlee, who maintains a permanent staff and office in Sarajevo<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#43" target="notes"><sup><b>43</b></sup></a>. The "Schlee team" relies on a 60-person contingent of German SFOR soldiers who gather technical and political information, largely from the local authorities. Schlee regularly sends representatives to the national RRTF meetings held in Sarajevo. <p> The L�nder and their municipalities cover the costs of refugees while in Germany. According to Schlee, the cost of keeping Bosnian refugees in Germany runs to more than 200 million DM per month, money which he believes "should rather be spent in Bosnia."<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#44" target="notes"><sup><b>44</b></sup></a> <p> Interior Ministers agreed on a framework for refugee repatriation including that by 30 June 1997 all refugees without children had to leave Germany. The repatriation of Bosnian families, traumatised Bosnians undergoing treatment and pupils or vocational trainees who expect to receive a diploma in the near future was to begin in May 1997 and be completed in the course of 1998. <p> From the start, while most of the German L�nder agreed not to repatriate non-Serbs to Republika Srpska, they pursued a policy of repatriating Bosniacs originating from Croat-held Western Herzegovina, despite information and pleas from international organisations, including UNHCR, that the situation there was difficult. <p> In June 1997, the Interior Ministers reached a consensus that the "deportation of Moslems [Bosniacs] and Croats from Republika Srpska should in principle be regarded as being of low (secondary) priority". However, that consensus started to fray towards the end of 1997 as pressure built for the repatriation of all remaining refugees. At the beginning of 1997, refugees in Germany received notifications from the Interior Ministries of a number of L�nder to prepare for impending repatriation; this time the notifications were also sent to Bosniacs and Croats originating from Republika Srpska. The Interior Ministers repeatedly expressed the view that, with some Bosnian refugees having lived in Germany already for more than six years, the process of repatriation had to be accelerated. This cross-party consensus on a "get tough" policy is in anticipation of the general elections scheduled in Germany for the autumn of 1998. <p> Since late 1997, a stream of German delegations has been visiting Sarajevo with the intention of "reconfirming that conditions for repatriation are right". German officials and news media increasingly reported that conditions throughout Republika Srpska had changed sufficiently to allow non-Serbs to return in safety. For instance, a delegation from Stuttgart, the capital of Baden-W�rttemberg, claimed that the Bishop of Banja Luka had urged the return of refugees to Republika Srpska so as not to cement the results of ethnic cleansing. However, while the Bishop welcomed minority returns, he stated that minorities would face discrimination and security threats if they returned.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#45" target="notes"><sup><b>45</b></sup></a> <p> While Germany encourages voluntary repatriation with incentive packages and repatriation assistance<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#46" target="notes"><sup><b>46</b></sup></a>, deportations are on the increase as well. During 1997, some 1,000 refugees were deported and in the first two months of 1998 alone that number stood at 400. Bosniacs were taken by police from their homes to the airport, to be sent straight to Sarajevo. An open protest letter, signed by prominent German politicians, among them Hans Koschnik, former EU administrator in Mostar, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, International Mediator for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former Foreign Minister sharply criticised these practices in early 1997. The letter stated, "Even refugees coming from Srebrenica, whose title to fame sadly derives from the mass murder of thousands, are receiving deportation orders.... A clear policy correction is needed." In the first months of 1998, tens of thousands of refugees received warnings that they would be deported if they remained beyond July. <p> German decision-makers justify the present policy with three main arguments. The first, that Germany had long been extremely generous to Bosnian refugees, cannot be disputed. However, the two additional claims -- that appointment of Milorad Dodik as Prime Minister of Republika Srpska has transformed conditions for return there, and that increased Western aid to Republika Srpska would make minority returns immediately possible -- are based on mistaken assumptions. <p> Despite encouraging first steps by the Dodik government, obstructionist political forces remain in control at the local level, with a particularly tight grip on police forces in eastern Republika Srpska. Moreover, many of the areas where refugees lived before the war now in Republika Srpska are hosting thousands of Serb refugees from Croatia, for whom no solution is likely to be found within the next several months. In addition, many basic laws essential for minority returns have not yet been passed in Republika Srpska, including an amnesty for deserters and draft evaders and an equitable property law. <p> While some of these concerns could be addressed by a coherent international policy, this is unlikely to come in time for the refugees facing deportation from Germany during this year. The political "brokering" required to open up areas such as Prijedor, Banja Luka, the Doboj Hub and the Posavina, is only now beginning in earnest. The regional RRTF for the Doboj area and the Posavina, where significant minority returns are expected, is yet to be formed. <p> Informed observers in Republika Srpska believe that he Dodik government will fall if in the next three months 20,000 Bosniacs arrive in Banja Luka. This is not an argument against pushing for minority return; it is, however, a consideration that militates against indiscriminate and ill-prepared returns. <p> Nor is the economic situation as favourable as many in Germany seem to believe. The Republika Srpska economy remains desperate, with official unemployment rates greater than 27.3 percent and average income half that in the Federation.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#47" target="notes"><sup><b>47</b></sup></a> Most internationally-financed reconstruction projects only begin in the early summer, and will have had minimal impact before returnees begin to arrive. <p> The combination of political resistance in many parts of Republika Srpska and a weak economic foundation leaves one likely solution for the vast majority of returnees: relocation. For a select few, relocation will be financed by German or other international donors. For instance, Berlin has a programme that requires the estimated 22,000 refugees, more than 70 percent of whom originate from Republika Srpska, to leave voluntarily within the next months if they are to receive additional repatriation assistance. It also offers the receiving municipalities reconstruction support of 1,500 DM per returnee. This is likely to encourage municipalities in the Federation to follow the "Sanski Most model" of attracting relocatees<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#48" target="notes"><sup><b>48</b></sup></a>, in order to benefit from international support. There is no component in the Berlin package addressing the issue of whether return to original homes is actually possible. <p> In Breza in Bosniac-controlled Central Bosnia, a housing project financed by the Land of Berlin, with assistance from German SFOR engineers, will result in the reconstruction of 90 apartments for about 500 refugees from Berlin and 90 others for local residents in Breza. During a visit at the end of March, the Mayor of Berlin praised this as a model for the future, and announced that the refugees in Berlin would indeed be forced to return this year.<a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh33n.html#49" target="notes"><sup><b>49</b></sup></a> However, the total amount to be spent by the European commission on return-related housing and infrastructure projects in 1998 is about 87 million ECU (174 million DM), which even if devoted only to housing could finance the reconstruction of only some 5,000 housing units. If Breza is a model, the entire EC housing fund would be needed to accommodate returnees from Berlin alone. <p> Thus, if there is massive repatriation from Germany in 1998, Bosnian refugees will not be returning to their pre-war homes but will be relocated, thus inflating the ranks of the internally displaced and worsening the situation of those already displaced. <p> <table border="0" cellpadding="5" cellspacing="5"> <tr> <td class="small"><a href="/#3" class="linksm">[Part 2 of 4]</a> - <a href="#top" class="linksm">[Top]</a> - <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/Default.html" target="_parent" class="linksm">[Bosnia Menu]</a> - <a href="../../../icghome.html" target="_parent" class="linksm">[ICG Home]</a></td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> </table> </body> </html> </body> </html>