OVERVIEW
The international community is often left to bemoan the fact
that it lacks effective early warning tools for major humanitarian crises and
conflicts. Yet, today in Liberia it is presented with almost a textbook case of
all the major warning signs of a deteriorating situation across a range of
political, military, economic and social fronts. The real question will be
whether it can not only recognise these signs, but also muster the will to take
effective action to prevent the situation from escalating into broader
violence.
Liberia’s continuing, but somewhat sporadic, civil war –
pitting government forces against rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy (LURD) forces – is the most obvious manifestation of the current
crisis. While the government has enjoyed some recent battlefield successes,
recapturing Tubmanburg in mid-July 2002, for example, after the town had been
held by the LURD since 11 May, rumours of LURD counteroffensives, including a
potential assault on Monrovia itself, are dominant. While it does not appear at
this time that the LURD has the military strength to take the capital, any
attack on Monrovia would cause widespread panic, likely trigger broad movements
of internally displaced people and drive undisciplined and poorly coordinated
official government forces and associated militias to launch sharp reprisals
against civilians it accuses of serving as rebel “collaborators”.
The sentiment in Monrovia is that civilians would be the
biggest losers in any direct struggle for the capital, and President Taylor has
made clear that he would not shy from a broader military conflagration – at
times sounding almost as if he would relish the prospect. Liberians are not
prepared for a return to war and have chosen to tolerate Taylor for the
immediate future. As one senator within Taylor’s National Patriotic Party
argues, “Liberians are tired of Charles Taylor, but the bullet is not a
friend”.
This dangerous military equation has developed against a
backdrop of a steadily eroding economic, political and social situation. The
salaries of most government officials, including the military and militia
groups, are at least six months in arrears. Both government forces and the LURD
rebels have resorted to looting civilians and humanitarian aid to finance their
operations in recent months. The government of President Taylor is quick to
blame its myriad financial and military woes on the impact of international
sanctions and an arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council in May 2002.
The economic situation remains quite grim, with high unemployment, more than
100,000 people already internally displaced by the fighting, 40,000 to 60,000
Liberians who have fled to neighbouring countries as refugees this year alone,
rampant corruption and an understandable lack of international investor
confidence. Many Liberians now believe they are entering a catastrophic
humanitarian emergency phase reminiscent of the 1989-1996 civil war.
The pressure is also mounting on Sierra Leone, which is
trying to rebuild following its eleven-year war, which ended with elections in
May. Daily reports from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
highlight the number of Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers now crossing into the
country – some simply to loot, others as deserters. There are growing concerns
that President Charles Taylor might use their presence in Sierra Leone as a
pretext to raid border towns in order to ward of potential attacks from the
LURD or other anti-Taylor forces. In June and July, senior UNAMSIL military
personnel went to various Sierra Leonean border towns to monitor the impact of
Liberia’s conflict.
The domestic political situation also remains quite
convoluted as the country moves toward a presidential election currently
scheduled for October 2003. Opposition to President Taylor is deeply divided.
Opposition political parties have little presence in the outlying counties, and
many opposition leaders remain regrettably committed to the sole goal of
securing the presidency for themselves at any cost. “Everyone wants to be
president” is the common cry of civilians frustrated at opposition groupings
that lack any serious program to govern.
While opposition groups portray their ineffectiveness as
entirely stemming from government intimidation, their own winner-take-all
approach seems to vary little from that of the current government. President
Taylor recently argued that Liberia’s political feuds are so entrenched that
they “border on hatred”. Further, the failure of the LURD rebels to articulate
any political platform beyond Taylor’s removal, and the general unwillingness
of those opposition figures backing the LURD to step forward publicly, have
left Liberians and the international community unclear as to whether the
military alternative to Taylor would prove politically more attractive.
The international approach to Liberia has put considerable
pressure on Taylor’s government, without establishing a clear roadmap toward
either reforming, replacing or working with that government. Both the United
States and the United Kingdom have pushed for isolating Taylor, largely in
response to his role in backing the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel
group in Sierra Leone’s civil war and supporting rebel counter-incursions into
Guinea during 2000. The Liberian government has frequently accused the U.S. and
UK of supplying and training the LURD. However, Liberia has clearly been low on
Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities, and internal Bush
administration splits on Liberia policy have caused a general drift. The
European Union has more broadly sought to engage with the Taylor government and
establish benchmarks for progress, but this approach has also seen limited forward
movement. In short, the international community’s awkward stance – working
neither to engage nor to remove President Taylor – has produced a wounded
government that is increasingly desperate, in the face of a steady civil war
and a general population that remains braced for the worst.
This briefing argues that the international community will
need to arrive at new clarity in dealing with Liberia and choose between the
poles of engagement and isolation. The most promising approach, although one
obviously deeply controversial and with its share of shortcomings, is reaching
some accord directly with President Taylor that would achieve his graceful
retirement at the end of his presidential term in October 2003 – and permanent
departure from the political scene – in exchange for guarantees of his safety
and protection against prosecution by the recently convened Special Court in
Sierra Leone. Such a transition would also need to be supported by a general
ceasefire with LURD and the introduction of a stabilisation force along the
lines of the one currently operating in Sierra Leone.
Freetown/Brussels, 19 August 2002
