OVERVIEW
The release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest on 6 May
2002 has generated some optimism about political progress in Myanmar. It
remains to be seen, however, whether all political actors will be able to
translate the new cooperative atmosphere into actual compromises in key policy
areas.
This briefing focuses on some of the most critical issues
that will have to be dealt with in a political transition – the composition,
management and responsibilities of the Myanmar armed forces (the Tatmadaw) as a
military institution. First, it reviews the ongoing expansion and modernisation
of the Tatmadaw, and lays out the visions of respectively the State, Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) and the National League for Democracy (NLD) for the
armed forces of the future. Secondly, it considers the prospects for a
compromise between the two protagonists that satisfies core values on both
sides; it outlines the possible contours of such a compromise, and it
identifies key problem areas.
Since 1988, the military government has carried out an
ambitious expansion and modernisation of the armed forces. As a result, the
Tatmadaw today is an entirely different organisation from that of a decade ago.
It is now able not only to crush civil disturbances in the cities and respond
to periodic guerrilla attacks in the countryside, but also to conduct much
larger and more effective counter-insurgency operations. For the first time in
its history, it also has the means to carry out extended conventional
operations in defence of Myanmar‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
While the military government faces pressing concerns from
both within and outside the country, including serious economic problems, the
SPDC has given clear signs that it is determined to continue its comprehensive
defence improvement program. Whatever differences members of the military
hierarchy may have over other policy questions, they share a vision of the
Tatmadaw being the envy of its regional neighbours, and capable of defending
Myanmar against even the most sophisticated and well-equipped adversaries. There
also seems to be a shared conviction that – regardless of any changes that
might need to be made in the way the country is governed – the armed forces
should remain the ultimate arbiters of power in Myanmar and have all the means
necessary to impose their will on the country.
The NLD, which has operated under enormous restrictions
including the imprisonment of most of its leadership, was slow to formulate and
articulate its views on defence issues. Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders,
however, have made repeated references to the place of the armed forces in
Myanmar society, and in 1999 these views were incorporated into a formal
defence policy platform, which clearly set out a broad vision for the Tatmadaw
under a democratic government. In some key respects, this vision is not too
different from that of the military hierarchy. Yet, given the profound
differences between the two sides in their approach to governing and defending
Myanmar, there is also a considerable divergence of views. The NLD, for
example, favours smaller, more professional armed forces under full civilian,
political control. Particularly contentious issues would likely include the
role of the powerful intelligence apparatus, the question of amnesty for
members of the armed forces guilty of human rights violations, and the
ideological foundations and indoctrination of future members of the armed
forces.
The NLD has made it clear that it is ready to discuss the
position of the armed forces under a democratic government. The military
leaders, however, remain convinced that they alone have the right and the
ability to decide such core issues as the size, shape and management of the
armed forces, which not only constitute their main power base, but also are
central to their self-image and world view. Thus, they have dismissed the NLD’s
attempts to devise and promulgate an alternative defence policy not only as
having little worth but, more importantly, as having no legitimacy. Indications
are that advice from foreign governments and independent groups on this subject
is accorded much the same treatment.
On the amnesty issue, even though Aung San Suu Kyi has
already made it clear that a NLD government would not engage in a campaign of
reprisals against serving or retired members of the Tatmadaw, these assurances
have so far failed to meet the concerns of the officers most likely to be
affected.
To outside observers, it would seem to be in the long-term
interest of the Tatmadaw itself to reach an accommodation with the NLD and other
political forces that would reduce the opprobrium it currently faces both
domestically and internationally. Yet the military hierarchy appears to feel
that it is already capable of defending its own policies and – despite the
costs to the wider community – sees continuing high levels of defence
expenditure as both necessary and justifiable. It believes that the armed
forces are behaving honourably, holding the Union together, maintaining
internal peace and stability, and defending the country against diverse
external threats. The senior ranks of the armed forces thus do not share the
sense of urgency felt by the international community over the need for a
compromise with the democratic opposition, at least not in the critical area of
national security.
Bangkok/Brussels, 27 September 2002
