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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The democratic government elected in Belgrade
in 2000 did not end the extensive busting of arms sanctions engaged in for many
years by its predecessor, the Milosevic dictatorship. The NATO (SFOR) troops
who raided an aircraft factory in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska on 12 October 2002
found documents that have begun to strip the veils of secrecy from this
significant scandal. From ICG’s own investigations, as well as from those
initial revelations and stories that have appeared subsequently in the Serbian
press, it appears that arms deals of considerable monetary value continued with
Iraq and Liberia despite the change of administrations.
In the case of Iraq,
the international community still needs to ascertain or clarify many important
details, but it is already apparent that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) has engaged in transactions respecting missile, aviation and chemical
technology and equipment that contravene United Nations sanctions. These
transactions may have assisted Saddam Hussein’s efforts to develop a primitive
cruise missile and to maintain or develop chemical weapons capabilities, as
well as to repair or preserve his conventional military capabilities with
respect to air defence, artillery, and security of bunkers. Weapons grade
nuclear material does not appear to have been involved though the possibility
of nuclear technology transfer to third countries requires further exploration.
Extensive, though less technically sophisticated, Yugoslav arms have also been
sold to Liberia which is likewise under a UN arms embargo.
This activity raises serious questions about how much has
changed in Belgrade since Milosevic’s day, or even since there was a single,
unified Yugoslavia – specifically with regard to respect for international
obligations (commitments under arms control conventions as well as UN
sanctions), the power of Communist-era networks linking military, industrial
and criminal elites, and the willingness or ability of civilian political
leaders to control the security sector.
Significant elements of the arms activity, as the NATO raid
indicates, were spread across borders to include not only the Serb entity in Bosnia
but also the Federation. Likewise, there was Montenegrin involvement. Top
authorities, including President Kostunica, Federal Premier Pesic, Serbian
Premier Djindjic, Defence Minister Radojevic, the Chief of the General Staff,
and the Federal and Serbian Interior Ministers either knew about the sales and
did nothing to halt them – or should have known and acted.
The disclosures open a window on the real power structures
inside Yugoslav politics. That the special relationship with Iraq (and with
Liberia) continued indicates that civilian control over the military is still
absent, that connections between criminal, military and political elements are
extensive, and that the two strongmen of the post-Milosevic era, Kostunica and
Djindjic, have thus far been impotent or unprepared to assert civilian control
over the military or remove Milosevic cronies from top positions.
Belgrade’s
political leadership and the international community must get to the bottom of
the arms scandal itself and attack the fundamental problems it illustrates. The
ultimate responsibility for these twin tasks falls on the FRY authorities. The
political paralysis produced by the long-running Kostunica-Djindjic power
struggle as well as the apparent convergence of interests between many
politicians and arms merchants, however, make it likely that serious remedial
measures will only be taken if the international community insists – firmly and
consistently.
The stakes are high. Failure to achieve reform would leave
the FRY still a potential threat to regional stability. Moving this important
Balkan country toward Euro-Atlantic integration will require the international
community to use all the diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal to
weaken the extensive remnants of the old guard and strengthen reformers in Belgrade.
The time for special treatment for Yugoslavia because it has rid itself of
Milosevic has passed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the governments of Yugoslavia and Serbia:
1. Make full disclosure of all weapons sales and technology
transfers to countries under UN arms embargos, especially Iraq,
and assist the international community to get to the bottom of the arms
transaction scandal by answering such specific questions as:
(a) whether chemical munitions were sold to Iraq;
(b) what happened to the stocks of chemical munitions removed
from Hadzici (Bosnia) in 1992;
(c) whether precursors or manufacturing equipment or technology
for chemical weapons were sold to Iraq; and
(d) whether any nuclear materials or technology were sold to
third countries prior to the U.S. removal of remaining nuclear materials in July 2002.
2. Reform the security sector completely and rapidly by:
(a) placing the military under control of the Ministry of
Defence;
(b) making the Ministry of Defence, the military and military
industrial relations fully accountable to parliament and under its transparent
control;
(c) requiring transparent parliamentary approval for all foreign
weapons sales; and
(d) placing the state-owned arms firm Jugoimport-SDPR under
transparent parliamentary control and replacing its entire board of directors.
To the international community:
3. Apply consistent and continuing
pressure on Serbian, Montenegrin, and Yugoslav authorities to undertake the
requisite reforms, using conditionality in the following areas as a positive
tool to help willing politicians:
(a) membership of the Council of Europe;
(b) membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace;
(c) negotiations on a Stability and Association Agreement with
the EU;
(d) Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the United States;
and
(e) other financial and economic assistance.
4. Consider, if Belgrade shuns reforms and does
not comply with its international obligations,
suspending bilateral and multilateral aid, including through the international
financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, EBRD).
Belgrade/Brussels, 3 December 2002