EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Iran is at a crossroads. More than two decades after the
revolution that swept Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini into power,
its people and leaders are deeply torn about the country’s future. The outcome
of the struggle for the revolution’s soul will resonate across the Middle East
and have major implications both strategically and for ongoing efforts to curb violence,
including terrorism, in
the region. The internal struggle is fluid and unstable. While the notion of a
clear-cut battle pitting conservatives against reformers is appealing, it does
not do justice to the reality. There are divisions within both camps and
connections between them; indeed, some actors may be “conservative” on certain
issues and “reformers” on others. Likewise, the idea that Iran’s rulers can be
dismissed en bloc as obstacles to reform overlooks the genuine differences that
exist regarding the proper role of religion, democracy, social norms, economics
and foreign policy. The complexity of Iran’s domestic situation makes it all
the more difficult – but also imperative – for the international community to
exercise caution, properly fine-tune its actions and anticipate their impact.
Powerful
conservative clerics and security officials do maintain significant control
over many key centres of power, including the military, intelligence services
and the judiciary, and use covert means to circumvent their rivals’ nominal
control of the foreign policy apparatus. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor, stands at the head of this loose coalition.
Although Khamenei still wields tremendous power, it is far less than that
enjoyed by Khomeini, whose authority from 1979 to 1989 was undisputed,
restricted by neither constitution nor parliament. In contrast, Khamenei does
not possess the personal authority or full religious credentials to neutralise
the rival clerical camps. As a result, he has to work much more actively to
maintain a conservative coalition that supports his over-arching role in
Iranian society.
At
the same time, driven by economic dissatisfaction, a thirst for greater
political representation and a decline in revolutionary passion, increasing
numbers of Iranians are pushing for broad social and economic change. Forms of
democracy unknown to most of the Middle East region have appeared, and the once
all-powerful conservative clerical elite must contend with competing actors and
institutions, as well as with an increasingly young and restive population that
demands wholesale political, social and economic reform. President Mohammad
Khatami, a liberal cleric elected in 1997 and re-elected in 2001 by wide
margins, has become the symbol of Iran’s reform movement. Pro-reform candidates
have consistently won roughly 70 percent of the vote in parliamentary and local
elections. As a result, a disparate group of reformers has taken over all the
country’s elective offices, though conservatives still control key non-elective
positions, including that of the Supreme Leader, and the principal levers of
power.
The
composition of the reform movement is symptomatic of its growing appeal. Today,
it is a coalition of the modernist (technocrat) right and the Islamic left – a
remarkable evolution from only a decade ago, when the Islamic left, which had
directed the take-over of the U.S. embassy in November 1979, still advocated
hard-line, radical positions. At the same time, a strong internal movement of
Islamic and intellectual dissent is appealing to sections of public opinion.
The
power struggle between conservatives and reformers has largely resulted in
deadlock in domestic and foreign policies alike. Forced to engage in a
perpetual balancing act to sustain reform momentum without provoking a
backlash, and unable to control vast areas of internal and external policy,
President Khatami has been unable to undertake meaningful economic reform,
significantly curb the power of the security services or open up the system to
allow genuine freedom of speech and political participation. Since Supreme
Leader Khamenei has ultimate authority over the army and an array of other
security organisations – the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij militia, Law
Enforcement Forces and intelligence agencies – conservatives enjoy a de facto
monopoly on coercive force.
While Khatami has improved relations with Europe and much of
the Arab world, relations with the U.S. remain hostage to hostile actions of
the more conservative elements of Iran’s power structure. The ambiguities of
Iran’s foreign policy are especially significant with respect to the highly
sensitive issues of terrorism. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that
Iranian security services continue to give support to political groups that
resort to violence and acts of terror, particularly in the Middle East, where
Iran’s policies have deliberately sought to undermine the peace process.
Iran’s political turmoil comes at a time – not
coincidentally – of renewed debate in the West and particularly in the United
States concerning policy toward that country. The reformers´ inability to take
control of domestic and foreign policy has of late led to divergent policy
responses by the West. The European Union, believing that it can bolster the
more moderate elements of the regime, is continuing the cautious engagement
policy it calls “critical dialogue”.
The United States has traditionally shared the goal of
moderating Iran´s policies and strengthening the reformist wing but believed
that this could best be achieved through the imposition of strict economic
sanctions coupled with discrete overtures to the regime and the incentive of
further engagement. Convinced that this policy mix has failed to alter Iran’s
domestic and especially foreign policies, however, the United States more
recently appears to have given up on the reformers’ ability to fundamentally
transform the regime from within. Instead, it is increasingly placing its hopes
in the popular movement of Iranians who support democracy.
The international debate about how best to deal with Iran
reflects genuine uncertainty about how certain actions will play out in Iran’s
highly complex and fluctuating domestic environment. Neither the outcome of the
current internal power struggle nor the precise impact on that power struggle
of specific outside interventions can be predicted with any certainty. Perhaps
all that can be said at this stage with any confidence is that:
q
Europe’s policy of critical dialogue has not yet
translated into any fundamental change in Iran’s policies – whether in terms of
its support for groups engaged in political violence and terror abroad or
repression of those seeking greater freedom at home.
q
A policy of blatant intervention in favour of the
reformers within the ruling circles is not likely to be helpful, risking
exposing them to the accusation of being agents of foreign design.
q
Wholesale denunciation of Iran’s rulers threatens to
force reformers in the power establishment, fearful of being branded as
traitors to the revolution, to reluctantly close ranks with their conservative
adversaries for the sake of national unity. Moreover, by allowing the
conservatives to foster a siege mentality, such an approach is likely to help
them perpetuate their hold on power.
q
While frustration with the pace of reform and with the
conduct of Iran’s foreign policy is understandable, it is too early to conclude
that the conservatives have definitively neutralised the reformers.
q
It is hard to believe that a popular uprising against
the regime lies around the corner. Analogies with the situation that existed in
the 1970s are tempting but misleading. Unlike the Shah’s regime, the current
regime enjoys genuine support from significant sectors of the population,
including among some who strongly oppose its policies.
This report seeks to make clear, above all else, that the
situation in Iran is one of great fluidity. There are complex connections
between conservatives and reformers, neither of which should be seen as a
homogenous group. At the same time, and while the differences between the two
coalitions probably are less than originally hoped, they almost certainly are
greater than currently feared. Distinctions on important policy issues exist
between Khatami and Khamanei; moreover, while the reform coalition may be
forced to compromise with conservatives to avoid triggering a violent confrontation
that few Iranians desire, it is steadily broadening the space in which civil
society can operate.
Given the current context, the international community must
carefully calibrate its actions toward Iran, recognising that conservatives
continue to dominate and to thwart reform initiatives, and at the same time
seeking to strengthen the reform process without stripping legitimacy from its
adherents by making them appear beholden to the West. This will mean the West
listening carefully, as we have sought to do in preparing this report, to the
voices of those many people at all levels of Iranian society and government who
want reform.
This approach will require the European Union to take even
more seriously concerns about Iran’s human rights record and support for groups
that engage in acts of violence, particularly in the Middle East. It also means
that the United States should seek ways to reach out to various Iranian
political constituencies both within and outside the regime and intensify
people-to-people contacts, resisting the temptation both to lump conservatives
and reformers together and to wager that popular discontent somehow can be
translated into rapid – and constructive – political upheaval.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Iran:
1. Abide
by Iran’s own public statements and undertakings and, in compliance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, refrain from providing arms, military
training and covert assistance to groups that resort to violence, including
terrorism, to advance their cause in the Middle East or anywhere else, and
denounce violence and those acts of terrorism when they occur, regardless of the
perpetrator.
2. Cooperate fully with other nations seeking to investigate
and prosecute those suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism, in
compliance with UNSCR 1373.
3. Comply fully with Iran’s undertakings under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Weapons Convention to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in
the region.
4. Allow all political forces and individuals willing to adhere
to the Iranian constitution and the rule of law and eschew violence to
participate in parliamentary, provincial and presidential elections.
5. Respect the rights of Iranian citizens as delineated in the
constitution and international conventions to which Iran is party, including to
a fair trial, freedom of expression and freedom of association.
6. Appoint an independent commission to review the many cases
of political figures, intellectuals and journalists imprisoned for expressing
their views; allow development of a free press; and establish a process for
reviewing alleged press violations in a fair and impartial manner.
To the International Community:
7. To the extent possible, seek common ground between the U.S.
and the EU on steps to encourage Iranian reform and, in the event of continuing
Iranian support for terrorist activity, on appropriate international responses.
8. Insist on fulfilment by Iran of its obligations to act as a
constructive international player, making clear that failure to do so will be
bound to impact negatively on the West’s capacity and willingness to engage
more actively. These obligations include:
(a) strict compliance with the commitments it has undertaken as
a party to international human rights treaties, most importantly the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to protect its citizens’
rights to freedom of expression, freedom to impart or receive information, and
freedom of association;
(b) strict compliance with the commitments it has undertaken as
a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
(c) strict compliance with UNSCR 1373 and UN conventions with
respect to cessation of support for violent activities, including terrorism, in
particular in the case of groups seeking to advance their cause in the Middle
East;
(d) cooperation with ongoing investigations of involvement in
acts of terrorism.
9. Establish with Iran a cooperative framework on issues of
mutual interest that includes the following:
(a) expanded efforts to assist Afghan and Iraqi refugees in
Iran;
(b) help to Iran to deal with its alarming drug problem and related
growing incidence of HIV/AIDS by bolstering regional efforts against drug trafficking,
and exchanging information on HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care; and
(c) assistance to Iran in improving its environmental standards.
10. Intensify people-to-people exchanges with Iran in all fields
– including cultural, academic, athletic and political – and specifically:
(a) increase the number of Iranian students with university
scholarships in Europe and the U.S.;
(b) encourage visits to Europe and the U.S. by Islamic
intellectuals and clerics – both men and women – from across the political
spectrum; and
(c) conduct exchange visits between current and former members
of Western parliaments and the Iranian parliament, or majles.
11. Encourage Iran to
make practical contributions to peacemaking efforts along the lines of its
activity in UN non-proliferation committees, the Tajikistan peace process, the
Afghan Six-Plus-Two arrangement and the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in 2001.
12. Develop and fund joint programs (including workshops,
conferences and training) to promote small and medium-size private enterprises,
strengthen democratic structures and civil society at the communal level
(particularly in areas deemed less politically sensitive such as urban
development, traffic and deforestation), and improve the social and legal
status of women.
13. Lift such opposition as continues to Iran’s entering
negotiations aimed at joining the World Trade Organisation so as to encourage
the kinds of economic reforms – including transparency and the rule of law –
that would strengthen the reform wing in Iran and weaken the hold of the
economic foundations that form one of the pillars of the conservatives’ power.
14. Avoid categorising Iran in one-dimensional terms that
disregard the continuing political contest occurring in Iran and tend to bring
all Iranian factions together, thereby limiting the political space in which
reformers can operate and the ability to work with Iran on areas of mutual
concern.
Amman/Brussels, 5 August 2002
