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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
President Bush, announcing U.S. policy towards the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict on 24 June 2002, has set the terms of the
international response to the conflict for the immediately foreseeable period.
Before peace can be negotiated the violence has to stop. If the Palestinians
are to have their own state – and the clear message is that they should – it
must be one based on the principles of democracy, transparency and the rule of
law. For that to happen the current leadership needs to go. The logic is
sequential: political progress is conditional on a new security environment,
institutional reform and, in effect, on regime change.
But as much as we would wish events to prove us wrong, it is
difficult to believe that the present Bush Plan can stop the violence and
deliver a fair and sustainable peace within a reasonable time. The ends stated
by the President are laudable – an end to the Israeli occupation, a two-state
solution, and resolution of the questions of borders, Jerusalem and refugees
within a relatively short period. But the means are questionable. The first
incentive offered is the prospect of a "provisional State of
Palestine", but one without permanent borders, a capital or anything resembling
the usual attributes of sovereignty. The second is the possibility of final
status negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians being concluded within
three years, but no roadmap is on the table, nor any clear international
commitment to making it happen.
It is hard to conceive
that violence will come to an end – morally wrong and politically counterproductive
though its worst manifestations may be –
before Palestinians see a genuine alternative path to ending the occupation and
realising their legitimate aspirations. The call to choose new leaders and to
reform institutions is more likely to generate increased support for Arafat,
and undermine those within Palestinian society who have long been calling for
fundamental change. Without more stimulus than what is now on offer, regional
and local dynamics are unlikely to change in any constructive way.
ICG argues in this report, and its two companions published
simultaneously, that while there are other approaches which could add real momentum to the peace
process (including in particular a comprehensive settlement initiative by a
broad-based Israeli-Palestinian peace coalition), there is only one way to
ensure an end to the violence and produce a fair, effective and sustainable
resolution of the region’s problems in a timely fashion. And that is for the
key international players, led by the U.S., to put on the table clear, detailed
and comprehensive blueprints for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian agreement –
and for Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon peace treaties as well – and to press
strenuously for their acceptance.
The key players for this purpose are the already established
Quartet (U.S., EU, Russia and UN Secretary-General) and the influential Arab
“Trio” (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan), who would together constitute a
Contact Group to lead the strategy and oversee its implementation. An
international peace conference, of the kind floated but for the moment
abandoned by the U.S., would be a useful forum to lay out – alongside the other
tracks (security, institutional reform and economic support) which should be
pursued in parallel on the Israeli-Palestinian front – the comprehensive
political plans required, and demonstrate, unequivocally, the degree of
international support for them. We do not suggest that a comprehensive
political blueprint is the only necessary ingredient in the international
policy mix - but at present it is the indispensable missing one.
The goal would not be to impose a settlement on the
Israeli or Palestinian leaderships but rather to generate so much domestic and
international support for it that opposition would become increasingly hard to
sustain and the momentum for change gradually would become irresistible. The
presentation of a comprehensive settlement plan would need to be seen as the
beginning, not the end, of the public diplomacy required, which would be aimed
above all at changing attitudes and reshaping the political environment among
Israelis and Palestinians.
This first “Endgame” report describes the overall strategy
required, assesses the degree of political difficulty involved in implementing
it, and sketches in outline form the content of the comprehensive Israeli-Arab
settlement plans we propose. The second and third reports go into much more
detail on the substance of, respectively, an Israeli-Palestinian settlement,
and Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon peace treaties. These latter two are
critical as well, for winning over the Israeli public will require that leaders
of the Arab world state their readiness to normalise relations with Israel,
something that is hard to imagine without a settlement of all
outstanding Arab-Israeli disputes. Moreover, the Israeli-Lebanese border
remains volatile and arguably presents a greater threat to regional stability
than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In outline form, the elements of the various agreements
suggested by ICG, based on our presence in the region and extensive
consultations around it over the last few months, are as follows:
Bilateral Israeli-Palestinian agreement
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The borders of the State of Palestine will be based on
the lines of 4 June 1967. Israel will annex up to 4 per cent of land in the
West Bank to accommodate a majority of its settlers; in exchange, Palestine
will receive land from Israel of equal size and actual or potential value.
q
Palestine will be a non-militarised state; and there
will be a fully-mandated and capable U.S.-led multinational force to monitor
implementation of the agreement and enhance both sides’ sense of confidence and
security.
q
Israel will have sovereignty over West Jerusalem and
the Jewish neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem which, together, will constitute
its capital. Palestine will have sovereignty over the Arab neighbourhoods of
East Jerusalem, which will constitute its capital.
q
There will be a special regime governing the Old City,
which will remain open, and sites of special significance in Jerusalem’s
Historic Basin. Under this regime, Palestine will govern the Haram al-Sharif
(Temple Mount) and Israel will govern the Kotel (Wailing Wall). There will be
internationally-backed guarantees against any excavation of or building on the
Haram al-Sharif without the parties’ express consent.
q
The refugee issue will be resolved in a way that
addresses the Palestinians’ deep sense of injustice without undermining
Israel’s demographic interests. Both parties will agree that UN General
Assembly Resolution 194 will be satisfied by Palestinian refugees receiving
financial compensation and resettlement assistance; having the choice between
relocation to Palestine, relocation to lands within Israel proper that will be
swapped with the state of Palestine, relocation to third countries or
rehabilitation in host countries; and returning to Israel on the basis of
family reunification and humanitarian programs continued or newly established
by Israel.
q
The agreement will mark the end of the conflict. The
only claims either party can raise that arise out of their historic conflict
will be those related to implementation of the agreement.
Multilateral supporting agreement
q
International recognition of the States of Israel and
Palestine, with Arab states fully normalising relations with Israel.
q
A U.S.-led multinational force to monitor compliance
with the agreement, patrol and monitor Palestine’s international borders, and
deter by its presence attacks against either party.
q
An international police presence and civilian
administration for the Old City and Historic Basin sites to assist in the
policing, protection and preservation of this area.
q
An international commission on refugees responsible for
implementing all aspects of the bilateral agreement.
q
Major commitments by the international donor community
to assist in Palestine’s reconstruction and long-term development.
Israel-Syria agreement
q
The boundary between Israel and Syria will be the line
of 4 June 1967. A commission headed by the Chief Cartographer of the United
Nations will demarcate the precise line.
q
Syria will have sovereignty over the land up to the
Kinneret/Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River and access to the adjoining water;
Israel will have sovereignty over the Kinneret/Lake Tiberias and the Jordan
River and access to the adjoining land.
q
There will be demilitarised zones and areas of
limitation in armament and forces in Syria and in Israel.
q
A U.S.-led multinational monitoring, inspection and
verification mechanism will verify implementation of the security arrangements,
and the U.S. will operate an early warning station on Mount Hermon.
q
The parties will
rapidly establish diplomatic ties once the treaty has come into effect and will
implement steps that characterise peaceful, normal relations between
neighbours.
Israel-Lebanon agreement
q
The boundary between Israel and Lebanon will be the
1923 boundary. A bilateral Boundary Commission will demarcate the precise and
final border.
q
Within a “frontier zone” consisting of southern Lebanon
and northern Israel, each side will exclude irregular armed groups and
individuals bearing weapons and will maintain sufficient official forces to
implement the exclusion.
q
Israel and Lebanon will prevent the operation within
their territory of any group that threatens the security of the other.
q
The parties will establish diplomatic ties and
implement steps characteristic of peaceful, normal relations between
neighbours.
In the current environment, ICG has no illusions about the
degree of difficulty involved in persuading the U.S. administration to change
its present course, and getting our preferred approach to take wing. Other
potentially productive approaches all have their own problems: so far as the
emergence of a strong locally-based Israeli-Palestinian peace coalition is
concerned, the ground is stony indeed.
But nor can anyone ignore the immensity of the pain and
suffering that continues to afflict Israelis and Palestinians as a result of
the present conflict. There is
something deeply disturbing, even tragic, in the endless pursuit of yet another
interim or partial cure when the outlines of a fair, lasting and comprehensive
agreement are there for all to see.
Our assessment
is that this cycle of violence will persist until a dramatic new initiative is
taken – one that has a real chance of fundamentally changing the dynamics on
the ground on both sides. This report, and its companions, provide the
arguments – and treaty building blocks – for such an initiative.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the “Quartet” (U.S., EU, Russia and UN Secretary-General) and “Trio” (Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan)
1. Craft comprehensive
Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese peace settlements. These settlements should
be detailed enough to leave little room for ambiguity and seek to address all
sides’ core interests. In the Israeli-Palestinian context in particular, the
proposed settlement should involve an important role for a U.S.-led multinational
presence to make up for the lack of trust between the two sides.
2. Present and promote these settlement plans in
such a way as to maximise international pressure and confidence-building. An international peace conference would be a
useful forum for presenting the plans and demonstrating international support
for them. The primary target audience
should be the Israeli and Palestinian people, whose support will be critical.
They should see clearly before them a concrete alternative to the current situation,
backed in words and in deeds by key members of the international community.
These countries should pledge to support implementation of the agreement
through concrete military, economic and diplomatic means.
3. In parallel, intensify efforts on other Israeli-Palestinian
issues. The international community should simultaneously seek to bring an end to the
violence, promote Palestinian institutional reform and assist in the economic
rehabilitation of the West Bank and Gaza.
To the European Union, the Arab world and other relevant parties
4. Seek to persuade the
United States of the urgency of pursuing a comprehensive settlement initiative. Persuasion must be more
than verbal alone and should involve pledges of concrete support in the event
the U.S. responds. In particular, Arab countries should commit to publicly back
a detailed U.S. peace plan and take other steps to reassure the Israeli public
of its intentions. European countries, Canada, Japan and others should commit
to providing substantial logistical and financial assistance in the event an
agreement is reached and helping with the rehabilitation and relocation of
Palestinian refugees.
5. As a fallback, try to
encourage the U.S. to at least amend its approach by front-loading political
elements and watering down its strict conditionality
To Israelis and Palestinians
6. Seek to reach a comprehensive, non-official
Israeli-Palestinian settlement agreement. A broad-based coalition of Israelis and
Palestinians should seek to agree on terms of settlement addressing in detail
the two sides’ vital needs. To maximise its impact and credibility, this
agreement should be endorsed on the Palestinian side by at least some
significant Palestinian Authority officials, and on the Israeli side by
individuals trusted by large segments of the public.
Amman/Washington/Brussels, 16 July 2002
