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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Israel-Lebanon border is the only Arab-Israeli front to
have witnessed continuous violence since the late 1960s and it could become the
trigger for a broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, in recent times it has been
the object of very little international focus. Amidst raging warfare between
Israelis and Palestinians and mounting war-talk surrounding Iraq,
there is scant energy to devote to a conflict that, since Israel’s
May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon,
appears devoid of justification and which neither of its principal protagonists
seems interested in escalating. But ignoring it could be costly. Neither its
roots nor its implications have ever been purely local. Israel’s
withdrawal has lessened the immediate costs but in some ways rendered the
problem more unpredictable. Stripped of its cover as an Israeli-Lebanese border
dispute, it has laid bare both the underlying Israeli-Syrian confrontation and Iran’s
involvement in the conflict.
The past two years have seen a proliferation of small disputes
over territory and resources along the “Blue Line,” the demarcation line
between the two countries drawn by the UN in 2000 to confirm that Israel’s
withdrawal complied with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In other
circumstances, disputes of this nature could be managed or even resolved with a
modicum of ease. Yet in the absence of a comprehensive peace deal between Syria
and Israel,
southern Lebanon
will remain both an instrument of and a possible trigger for broader regional
disputes. Concrete, practical steps are urgently needed to minimise the risk of
a dangerous conflagration.
Lebanon
is not a major actor in Arab politics. Even its most potent political/military
actor, Hizbollah, though it can inflict heavy casualties in Israel,
has only a few hundred full time fighters. But Lebanon’s
role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has principally been as a theatre in which
various actors – mainly Syria,
Iran, Israel,
Hizbollah and the Palestinians – believe they can wage surrogate battles.
Hizbollah and southern Lebanon
in particular gained importance by becoming ideal proxies for the larger
regional conflict, inflicting and absorbing military blows intended by and for
others. Paradoxically, it is precisely Lebanon’s
relative military insignificance that has made it and continues to make it so
volatile and crucial an actor. Despite Israel’s
withdrawal from Lebanon
in May 2000, little has changed in this respect.
Since Israel’s
withdrawal, the casualty rate has been dramatically reduced and the burden of
the occupation lifted for both Lebanese and Israelis. Many factors that helped
contain the conflict during the years of the occupation remain, notably that
the protagonists, each for its own reason, do not appear to desire a full-scale
war. Moreover, UN personnel and principally Western embassies continue to
encourage restraint. As a result, occasional border skirmishes so far have been
limited and localised.
However, the withdrawal also has introduced a dangerous
sense of uncertainty. Two flashpoints have special potential to trigger major
confrontation. First, Syria
and Lebanon
insist Israel
still occupies a 25-square km. area, the Shab’a Farms, which, on flimsy
evidence and despite considerable proof to the contrary, they claim to be
Lebanese. Over the last two years, the area has seen repeated exchanges of
fire. Twice Israeli reprisals have hit Syrian military installations deep
inside Lebanon.
Secondly, there is the lingering dispute over water rights in the Hasbani
River and the adjacent Wazzani Springs.
Israel insists
that Lebanon’s
decision to install pumping installations infringes on its rights to use shared
water resources, threatening a forceful reaction and reminding Lebanon
that Arab attempts to divert the sources of the Jordan River
were a factor leading to the 1967 War.
The Blue Line and the Hasbani
River contain ample sources of
friction but the reasons for continued tension evidently lie elsewhere. The
withdrawal removed the most obvious and apparent source of tension (Israel’s
two-decades old occupation of Lebanese territory) without removing its
underlying cause (the Israeli-Syrian conflict). In addition, it terminated both
the old rules of the game and its accompanying international mechanism of
conflict management (the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, ILMG) without
introducing alternative rules, redlines or mechanisms. Syria
still wants to maintain tension on the border to remind Israel
that their conflict continues and to retain leverage in future negotiations
over the Golan Heights. But Israel’s
willingness to limit its military responses to Lebanese targets has been
reduced now that its occupation of Lebanese territory is over, bringing the
conflict closer to its Syrian-Israeli-core.
Other factors also exacerbate tension. Lack of a realistic
short-term prospect even for negotiations on that core dispute coupled with its
sense of isolation give Damascus
motive to find ways to bring itself back to Israeli and U.S.
attention. As a result of its own regional calculations and the hybrid nature
of its leadership, Iran
remains an unpredictable and potentially menacing actor. The conviction shared
by Prime Minister Sharon and high
echelons of Israel’s military establishment that Israel’s deterrence
credibility has been badly eroded – by absorbing Iraq’s Scud attacks in 1991,
unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, and continued negotiations with the
Palestinians after the intifadah began – means Israel is less likely to show
restraint in the face of provocation from Hizbollah. Nor can one exclude that Israel
might seize upon Hizbollah activity or a U.S.
attack against Iraq
to try to deal Hizbollah a crushing blow. At the same time, mounting
Palestinian casualties, and the reoccupation of West Bank
cities have further radicalised Hizbollah and increased its desire to take
action against Israel,
while the possibility of war against Iraq
only further inflames its rank and file. U.S.
allegations of Hizbollah involvement in global terrorism and hints it may be Washington’s
next target arguably moderate the group’s actions but could also could produce
the opposite effect or embolden Israel
to take matters into its hands.
Domestic interests may well have compelled Hizbollah to
reduce its military operations in southern Lebanon
but the party enjoys a special status and a degree of insularity vis-à-vis Lebanon's
society and political system enabling it to carry out actions against Israel
despite local criticism. Both Beirut
and the international community missed the chance of Israel’s
withdrawal to turn the South into a populous, economically active area. The
constraints everyday civilian life and economic activity should present failed
to materialise, enabling the belligerents to treat the area less as a hindrance
to military activity than as a relatively cost-free shooting range.
The international community also should reiterate and
emphasise its two-pronged position on the Blue Line: first, that it cannot
suffer any challenge; but secondly, that it is not a final boundary but only a
temporary point of reference to be adhered to while efforts for a comprehensive
peace are undertaken. Moreover, international mediation mechanisms tend to be
ad hoc, set in motion only when escalation threatens.
The list of possible catastrophic scenarios is long – for
example, a deadly Hizbollah attack followed by Israeli retaliation against
Syrian targets, then ever stronger counteractions as Syria
seeks to maintain its credibility and Israel
its deterrence. Any military act risks spiralling out of control, as one cannot
be sure of the opponent’s resilience or intent.
In the long term, conflict management cannot substitute for
a comprehensive solution of the wider conflict in which Israel,
Syria and Lebanon
have been embroiled for more than 50 years but that is not immediately realistic.
Nor is a total cessation of hostilities. Still, the conflict in southern Lebanon
must be addressed. This report outlines a variety of concrete, practical steps
that can diminish the impact of the underlying political dispute, bolster
constraints, amplify and institutionalise international mediation and so
minimise the risks of escalation that could spiral out of control.
RECOMMENDATIONS
On containing and defusing the conflict
To members of the UN Security Council and the wider
international community:
1. Seek to minimise the impact of the underlying
conflict by:
(a) inviting Syria
and Lebanon to
participate or assist in any mechanisms aimed at resuscitating the Middle
East peace process, for example by institutionalising their
consultative role in talks held by the Quartet and setting a clear framework
for negotiations and a timetable for their completion. The U.S.
in particular should engage Syria
on this and other issues, such as the future of Iraq;
(b) stating publicly and emphatically that while the Blue Line
is not a final demarcation of the international border, it is the
internationally recognised reference point for purposes of compliance with
UNSCR 425, and challenges to it are unacceptable;
(c) while not endorsing or legitimising the perpetuation of any
part of the Israel-Lebanon-Syria border conflict, but recognising that in the
short term achieving a complete cessation of hostilities is not realistic,
continuing to work to contain such conflict as does occur to the Shab’a farms
area;
(d) while meeting all existing financial commitments to UNIFIL
so it can satisfy conflict management and military observation needs, reduce
its size to a level that will induce the Lebanese government to send its
regular troops to the southern border; and
(e) initiating regular talks between, on the one hand, U.S., EU
and Russian ambassadors in Lebanon and the UN Personal Representative for
Southern Lebanon, and, on the other hand, representatives of the Lebanese and
Syrian governments to discuss developments in the conflict in southern Lebanon.
To Hizbollah:
2. In the spirit of the April 1996 understanding,
refrain from carrying out or supporting attacks against civilians and publicly
so declare.
3. Fully respect the Blue Line as the provisional
demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon border; insofar as Hizbollah challenges the
Blue Line, under no circumstances should it further extend the conflict beyond
the Shab’a Farms area.
To the government of Israel:
4. In the spirit of the 1996 understanding,
refrain from carrying out attacks against civilians and seek to limit the
conflict to the Shab’a Farms area.
5. Cease intrusive violations of Lebanese airspace
and territorial waters by the Israeli air force and navy in accordance with
UNSCR 425.
To the government of Lebanon:
6. Continue
the process of deploying the army throughout southern Lebanon to the Blue Line in accordance with
UNSCR 425 and subsequent resolutions.
To the governments of
Israel, Lebanon and Syria:
7. Publicly
recognise the Blue Line for the purpose of verifying compliance with Resolution
425 while, in the case of Israel, underscoring that this will not
affect the final location of the border to be established in future peace
negotiations.
To the governments of
Lebanon and Israel:
8. Resolve
peacefully the dispute over water resources derived from the Hasbani River and Wazzani Springs, with Lebanon in the first instance coordinating
any initiative regarding use with the UN Personal Representative for South Lebanon, the U.S., and the bilateral European
Partnership Commissions to prevent any misreading of intentions.
To the governments of
Syria and Iran:
9. Refrain
from any action that encourages, supports or endorses Hizbollah attacks against
Israeli civilians or that further extend the conflict beyond the Shab’a farms
and press Hizbollah to cease such attacks.
10. Do not
provide or help Hizbollah obtain weapons that can be used to extend the
conflict, not least longer-range rockets or missiles, and publicly inform the
Security Council of that commitment.
To the government of Syria:
11. Allow Lebanon to undertake the measures mentioned
in these recommendations in accordance with Syria’s commitment to Lebanon’s sovereignty as stated in the
Ta’if Accord.
On creating economic
conditions for conflict prevention
To the government of Lebanon:
12. Accelerate
reconstruction efforts in the South by:
(a) strengthening and reforming local
institutions of government, initially by releasing fees due from centrally kept
funds earmarked for the municipalities;
(b) establishing a "Permanent Conference for Development in the South" to
supervise and coordinate reconstruction and provide a platform for improving
sectarian relations;
(c) pressing for the international donors conference to be convened
urgently; and
(d) establishing an "International Solidarity Fund for Development in the
South" to solicit donations from Lebanese expatriates and be managed by a new
Ministry of the South and/or the UNDP Coordination Forum for southern Lebanon, in coordination with the World
Bank.
13. Reverse and
stop handing out sentences that prevent convicted SLA members from returning to their
homes and instead introduce sentences that include community service, thus
encouraging local projects and the former convicts’ reintegration.
To other members of
the international community:
14. Support
efforts at economic reconstruction in the South by:
(a) urgently convening the international donors conference.
Assistance should focus on schools and irrigation infrastructure;
(b) indicating interest in expanding economic relations when
security conditions permit; the EU should use the particular leverage of its
Partnership with Lebanon
to engage in a dialogue on the economic and fiscal crisis;
(c) improving coordination between individual development
projects by taking part in the UNDP Coordination Forum and following its
guidance regarding international assistance; and
(d) supporting the demining process without insisting that Lebanon
first join the Mine Ban Treaty.
To the World Bank:
15. Conduct a
comprehensive survey of the economic consequences of continuing conflict, or
the threat thereof, in southern Lebanon, including by polling expatriate
businessmen on what it will take for them to return and Arab and other
international businessmen regarding the impact on investment decisions.
To Hizbollah:
16. Advocate in
parliament a “Permanent Conference for Development in the South” to supervise
and coordinate government reconstruction efforts, in accordance with the
party’s own proposals.
On creating political
conditions for conflict prevention
To the government of Lebanon:
17. Give
independent and moderate candidates with strong grassroots support in southern Lebanon a fair chance by respecting Ta’if
Accord and constitutional stipulations for parliamentary elections based on the
smaller constituency of the single governorate (muhafaza), not the merged governorates
of Sidon and Nabatiya.
18. Increase
Hizbollah's stake in the South's development by offering it a government
portfolio (a new "Ministry for the South").
To the government of Syria:
19. Allow
Hizbollah to run independently in the South, rather than having it run on a
joint list with Amal. This will enable Hizbollah’s share of parliamentary seats
to more accurately reflect its popularity.
To other members of
the international community:
20. Increase
the role and voice of constituencies in southern Lebanon by:
(a) using the demining process to establish contacts with local
municipalities and notables and initiating debate on the economic costs of the
continuing conflict at the Blue Line; and
(b) carrying out development projects in direct cooperation with
municipalities.
To Hizbollah:
21. Take better
into account the views and interests of its constituencies by:
(a) Modifying the composition of its
governing Majlis as-Shura to reflect
the party’s wider political and social role in Lebanon;
and
(b) Soliciting and abiding by the views of community representatives and
village elders regarding any attacks staged within the vicinity of their
villages near the Blue Line and regarding the desires of villagers living on
the Israeli/Syrian side of the Blue Line not to be "liberated" by any Lebanese
party.
Amman/Brussels, 18 November 2002