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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Nine years after the
1994 genocide, Rwanda has reached another crossroads. The transition period defined by the
Arusha Accords will be concluded in less than a year by a constitutional
referendum and by multi-party elections which should symbolize the successful
democratisation of the country. Today, however, there are multiple restrictions
on political and civil liberty and no sign of any guarantee, or even
indication, in the outline of the constitutional plan that the political
opposition will be able to participate in these elections on an equal footing
with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), in power since 1994.
Control over the
activities of political parties was until now partly justified by the fragile
security situation that Rwanda has experienced since 1994, during which it has
been in a state of almost permanent war with the Hutu heirs of the Habyarimana
regime on the DRC territory. The constant political and military support
provided to the Rwandan Hutu militia by the successive Kabila regimes since
1998, has maintained a continuing security threat to the country. The
restrictions on political participation can also be explained by the RPF's
distrust of multi-party politics and unrestricted electoral competition,
inspired directly by the experience of the country’s political disintegration
in early 1990s leading into the genocide.
Faced with the risk
of electoral competition based exclusively on ethnic lines, the RPF wants first
and foremost to restructure Rwandan political culture through popular education
and the increased accountability of political leaders. The Rwandan leadership
argues, in effect, that the transformation of existing states of mind is the
prerequisite for the restoration of full civil and political rights. Thus, for
the past three years, the political parties have either been dismantled or
forced to accept the consensus imposed by the RPF, the independent press has
been silenced, and civil society forced to exist between repression and
coercion. The RPF wields almost exclusive military, political and economic
control and tolerates no criticism or challenge to its authority. The
opposition has been forced into exile, and anti-establishment speeches relegated
to secrecy. In the name of unity and national reconciliation, the various
segments of Rwandan society are subjected to a paternalistic and authoritarian
doctrine and cannot express themselves freely.
But the RPF should
recognise that its authoritarian actions, whatever their motivation, has worked
against its own stated objectives and is creating its own opposition. The
government's repression of critical voices creates a vicious circle by
radicalizing the opposition both inside and outside Rwanda. A blood pact, or "Igihango", has
even been sealed between certain heirs of the "Hutu power"; and
survivors of the genocide. This kind of alliance lends a dangerous legitimacy
to an armed Hutu opposition whose position regarding the genocide remains ambiguous.
Given the unstable regional dynamics, the rise to power by the opposition
forces and the propagation of genocide denial pose a serious threat to the stability of the country,
particularly at a time when the Rwandan government is preparing to liberate
tens of thousands of prisoners through gacaca
courts and to repatriate and demobilise a large part of its army and rebel
combatants.
The Rwandan
government has honoured its commitments to the Congolese peace process and has
withdrawn its troops from the Kivus. It should now display the same goodwill
for the end of the transition. The RPF must allow public criticism and stop
being judge and jury, as well as participant, in the process of political
competition. A neutral institution, such as an ombudsman’s office – equipped
with political, administrative, and financial independence – must be allowed to
establish equitable standards for political competition and to define the
limits of freedom of expression and association, in order to avoid abuse bound
to lead to ethnic tensions.
ICG does not argue
that all surveillance and all restraint should be removed from party, media and
civil society activities. The external security situation, and the fragility of
the internal reconciliation process, make continuing caution appropriate. But
the regulation of political parties should be seen to be above partisan
manipulation, with standards imposed not by the RPF but a wholly independent
authority. The government must give Rwandan society the chance to regulate
itself, to assume its own responsibilities towards the genocide and to create
the foundations for general reconciliation, and not seek to impose every
element of that process. It must not destroy the institutions of common ground
where Hutus and Tutsis can meet, talk, argue and ultimately agree on the future
of the country. It must reach out to the opposition in exile and offer it
participation in a national debate on the country's future.
The year to
come will be a crucial one for the credibility of Rwandan constitutional
reform, electoral deadlines and post-transition institutions. The international
community cannot remain silent accomplices to the authoritarian actions of the
Rwandan government. It cannot finance elections that offer no political
guarantees for a minimum of equity among the forces present. Today, eight
months before the end of the transition period, the Rwandan government must
bring itself to accept political liberalisation and reform.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Rwanda:
1. Cease all harassment of civil society and revise the law on
associations to allow them to operate freely in the entire country without the
constant control of government agents;
2. Encourage the emergence of a responsible and independent
press by allowing it to regulate its activities in the framework of its
professional associations;
3. Liberalise political activities across the entire country;
and engage in a national debate on the rules of integration for all political
constituents in the country in preparation for the next elections;
4. Allow the return and the participation of political parties
in exile in time for the next elections, on condition that they cut all links
with the armed groups, clearly and convincingly acknowledge and deplore the
genocide, and commit themselves to a reconciliation process;
5. Create an Ombudsman’s office, directed by a committee of
“wise men” representing different sections of Rwandan society and equipped with
political, administrative, and financial autonomy from any branch of
government. This office would have the responsibility of determining the rules
of good conduct for politicians, establishing clear distinctions between
legitimate criticism and genocide-denying or hatred-inciting behaviour. The
ombudsman could also be mandated to recommend appropriate measures to deal with
similar concerns arising in the press and civil society.
To the opposition in exile:
6. Make contact with the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) and participate in the transfer of génocidaires within the
framework of the Pretoria agreement;
7. Stop immediately armed opposition and station, demobilise,
and repatriate all its troops;
8. Clarify its own political agenda for the future of Rwanda
and spell out the programs by which it would advance reconciliation;
9. Make clear its acknowledgment and deploring of the genocide
and its rejection of revisionist sentiment;
10. Participate in a national political conference in Kigali
with the aim of debating the constitutional framework of the post-transition
period, as well as its own participation in future elections.
To the international community and donors to Rwanda:
11. Demand the unconditional release of Pasteur Bizimungu,
Charles Ntakiruntika, Jean Mbanda, Pierre Gakwandi and all other Rwandan
political prisoners;
12. Support the establishment of an Ombudsman’s office and grant
it the means of financial independence;
13. Refuse to finance the 2003 elections and the establishment
of post-transitional institutions unless they are not preceded by the
liberalisation of political activities and a marked improvement in respect for basic
freedoms of association and expression;
14. Support immediately the creation of a program to monitor the
electoral campaign and the elections themselves.
15. Actively support the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and particularly the
disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR)
program for the Hutu rebels and commit to a serious surveillance of the
security situation in Eastern Congo to allow the government of Rwanda to pursue
its reconciliation and political program in a peaceful environment.
To the Government of South Africa:
16. Convince Rwanda
to liberalise its internal political environment and to adopt an open-door
policy towards exiled political parties, provided that they reject all links
with the armed groups, contribute to the arrest and prosecution of known
genocidaires at the ICTR, condemn
genocide and clarify their stand regarding reconciliation in the country.
17. Engage in cooperation with The United Nations Observer
Mission to the Congo (MONUC) in a negotiation with other African countries on
the resettlement of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
combatants who are ready to lay down their arms but refuse to be repatriated to
Rwanda.
Nairobi/Brussels, 13 November 2002
