EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Put together under the tutelage of representatives of the
international community in the aftermath of the November 2000 general elections,
the ten-party coalition known as the Democratic Alliance for Change has governed
the larger of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s two entities and led the state-level
Council of Ministers since early 2001. Intended by its sponsors and members to
sideline the three nationalist parties that had fought the 1992-95 war and ruled
their respective pieces of BiH thereafter, the Alliance was also expected to
undertake thoroughgoing reforms and to provide proof that implementation of the
Dayton Peace Accords might yet produce a viable state.
This alliance of Federation-based parties of disparate size,
ideological orientation and national coloration has cooperated at state level
with parties from Republika Srpska that are both in power and in opposition in
that entity. The Alliance has thus lacked cohesion on both levels of government.
It has sought to push a reform agenda, but one that cannot help but reflect the
lowest common denominator of what is acceptable to its different sets of
partners in the Federation and the Council of Ministers. Changes acceptable to
the Federation parties have often proved anathema to those from the RS. Even in
the Federation, the Alliance has had difficulty in carrying with it the cantonal
governments that are meant to be under its control.
Given
its unnatural birth and incoherent membership - not to mention the limitations
imposed by Bosnia’s dependent status and relative poverty - the Alliance for
Change has registered significant successes. They have not proved sufficient,
however, to bind the Alliance parties together, whether in respect to what
remains undone among promised reforms or to fight the forthcoming elections as a
bloc. The Alliance is now expiring. Not only are its member parties and their
headstrong leaders busy positioning themselves separately for elections that
will be conducted according to new rules, but the Alliance as a whole is being
subjected to sustained attack from inside and without as the race commences.
The
5 October 2002 general elections will for the first time be run by Bosnians and
elect governments that will serve for terms of four rather than two years. They
will also have to give effect at entity level to the constitutional amendments
agreed with or imposed by former High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch in April
2002. These provide for fair representation of each of BiH's three
‘constituent peoples’ in both entities’ legislatures, governments,
judiciaries and administrations. Four-year mandates, for their part, will give
the victors opportunities actually to accomplish something while depriving them
of excuses for failing to do so. The pursuit of narrow party political or
national interest, the absence of vision or application and manifestations of
incompetence or criminality will be less tolerable. In order, however, to take
advantage of the new circumstances and to enhance their chances of moving Bosnia
forward, any new coalition or alliance will need to learn the lessons of the
Alliance for Change’s brief exercise of power.
Both
the international community and non-nationalist Bosnians expected much from the
Alliance: the eradication of rampant corruption, economic reforms, jobs, regular
pensions and a new relationship with BiH’s foreign overseers. Improvements
indeed followed in those areas where consensus existed (enhanced revenue
collection and fiscal reforms such as the merger of pension funds), or where
there was little resistance (fulfilment of conditions for accession to the
Council of Europe) or that were perceived as inevitable (constitutional reforms
and anti-terrorist measures). But in those spheres requiring a commitment to
overcome diverging interests within the Alliance – such as reform of the
social service sector, privatisation and, above all, economic revival – action
was to be deferred or abandoned.
In governing the Federation, the Alliance has had the
daunting task of doing battle with the legacy of corruption,
national-territorial division and near bankruptcy bequeathed by the long years
of parallel rule by the (Bosniak) Party for Democratic Action (SDA) and Croatian
Democratic Union (HDZ). It has also had to cope with the fact that these two
entrenched power structures retained or shared power with Alliance parties in
various cantons, cities, government institutions and public enterprises.
Moreover, the installation of the Alliance was soon followed by a constitutional
crisis provoked by the HDZ, which proclaimed ‘Croatian self-rule’ in March
2001. Once this challenge was seen off, the Alliance confronted, in the
aftermath of the 11 September attacks on the U.S., the urgent necessity of a
reckoning with Islamist elements formerly patronised and protected by the SDA.
In taking on such people the Alliance risked upsetting its core Bosniak
constituency and destroying its own tenuous unity. It also exposed itself to
accusations that it was forsaking human rights and the rule of law in order to
do America’s bidding.
Despite
such trials, the Alliance has managed to make notable improvements in areas such
as budgetary and financial discipline in the Federation. At the level of the
state it has focused with some success on boosting the dignity, competence and
image of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Albeit oversold as a slogan,
‘partnership’ with the international community has replaced the
confrontation that characterised the old regime. Bosnia has finally become a
member of the Council of Europe and may be on the threshold of completing the
‘road map’ that will make it eligible for a feasibility study leading to a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union (EU). Finally,
the Alliance made a significant difference in negotiating the entity
constitutional amendments that constitute the first major step in revising
Dayton structures and which should gradually transform state and entity
governance over the next few years.
Yet the Alliance has failed to fulfil expectations that it
would put more bread on Bosnian tables. In the first place, it has been too
cautious in pushing the fundamental reforms required to unify the BiH economic
space and restructure the economy by completing privatisation and liberating the
private sector. It has busied itself instead with establishing its member
parties’ control over public companies and disputing - to no discernible
benefit - the previous privatisations of money-spinners such as Fabrika Duhana
Sarajevo (Sarajevo Tobacco Factory, FDS) and Aluminium Mostar. Attempts to gain
control over public-sector firms have resembled an endless chess game among the
Alliance parties. Privatisation has only crept forward, burdened both by an
ill-conceived method imposed by the international community and by the
reluctance of the Alliance parties to divest themselves of their principal –
if ever diminishing – source of power, patronage and funds.
Secondly, the Alliance has wasted valuable time that it might
have used to devise a coherent economic development plan. There is still no
agreed vision of Bosnia’s economic future, and the various schemes promoted by
one or another Alliance party have remained vague, fragmentary or mutually
exclusive, ranging from ardent Thatcherism to reform socialism. Unfortunately,
the absence of an agreed reform agenda has extended to other spheres as well:
rule of law, state-building and refugee return.
Although it is too late now to remedy this lack in
practice, Bosnia's political parties - and especially the Alliance parties -
should use the current campaign for more than slinging mud, revelling in
scandals and glorifying their leaders. They need to think and plan ahead,
offering voters positive manifestos as well as negative attacks on their rivals.
The issues and challenges that will confront the governments formed after 5
October are already apparent. The formation of a new alliance will prove easier
- and its chances of delivering on its member-parties' promises will be greater
- if a measure of programmatic clarity and, perhaps, even concord can be offered
to and endorsed by Bosnian citizens over the months ahead.
To help
focus the election campaign on fundamental issues of economic development and
reforms of the social, fiscal and governance sectors and, thereby, to enhance
the chances that the coalition governments which emerge will be both committed
and equipped to pursue a clearly defined reform agenda, ICG makes the
recommendations that follow.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To International
Organisations, Civil Society Groups and the Bosnian Media:
1. Press
the political parties to acknowledge and take positions on the most important
economic and political challenges facing BiH and in particular invite them to
sign a pre-election compact (or social contract) committing to plans for
resolving the economic and social crisis confronting BiH.
To
Donor Countries and Other Friends of BiH:
2. Based
on the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Council, the post-accession
requirements of the Council of Europe and the various international credit and
stand-by arrangements to which BiH governments are committed, assist those
parties willing to cooperate to draw up manifestos for reform that set out
clearly defined goals and identify agents of change in the economic, social,
legal, fiscal and refugee-return sectors.
3. Publicise
fully the cooperation or non-cooperation of individual parties.
4. Use
such manifestos for establishment of benchmarks against which to measure the
performance of post-election governments and to push for further reforms.
Sarajevo/Brussels, 2 August 2002
