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The Urgent Need for a Sustainable Policy ICG Bosnia Project, July 18, 1997 (Part 1 of 2)
Executive Summary This report outlines the landmine crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to review the national and international demining initiatives that have gradually taken shape since the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in December 1995. The UN Mine Action Centre (MAC) estimates that 300 square kilometres of the 51,600 square kilometres in the country pose a definite mine threat, and that another 200 square kilometres are subject to suspicion. These are concentrated along the current Zone of Separation which generally corresponded with the front line during most of the war, but they also include considerable areas scattered inside the entities which were combat zones, and territory which military units occupied or through which they retreated during the war. The MAC has revised the initial estimates of 3.5 million mines in Bosnia down to 750,000 to 1,000,000, scattered around 19,000 recorded minefields. However, very few of the mines were laid down by military engineers. Most were laid in a disorganised way by infantry or by local defence forces, and were not recorded or marked. This has complicated the demining task in Bosnia and is one of the reasons that, more than 18 months after the DPA came into force, UN officials say only a tiny fraction of the land poisoned by hidden explosives, probably less than 1 per cent, has been cleared for confident use. An even greater obstacle to the development of a national demining plan has been the political turmoil that has impeded many other aspects of post-war recovery in Bosnia. The first Bosnian demining unit, the Mine Protection and Removal Agency (MPRA), was paralysed throughout 1996 by inter- and intra-entity disputes. Moreover, some Bosnian officials involved with demining seemed to regard the demining effort as a commercial windfall, attempting to direct contracts to firms with strong political connections but limited competence in mine clearance. Some of the troubles were overcome with the establishment in February 1997 of the National Demining Commission (NDC). The NDC is projected to assume overall responsibility in December 1997, at which time the UN is scheduled to transfer the MAC data base and its developed assets to the NDC. Because the support given the NDC by the Council of Ministers has been ambiguous, however, it is still far from clear whether the NDC will be capable of assuming that responsibility. The international players -- which include individual governments, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), the World Bank, the European Commission, and NGOs -- have been striving for more than a year to fashion a multi-faceted mine-clearance programme. Some of the organisations work within and through the MAC, while others have kept a certain distance. Meanwhile, the NATO-led force in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) has done no mine clearance that was not directly necessary for "force protection", that is, for the efficiency of its own operations and the safety of its own personnel. Accordingly, the NATO presence has had less impact on Bosnia's mine problem than would otherwise have been the case. Some countries which are otherwise involved in Bosnia remain conspicuously absent from the list of donors supporting the demining effort. France and Great Britain fall into that group, but the country that is most notable for its absence is Germany, which reports that its 320,000 Bosnian refugees require over $3 billion per year in social service assistance. Allocation of even one per cent of that sum would give an enormous boost to the mine clearing effort in Bosnia -- and might partially answer international concerns about German refugee return policy. Several unresolved issues that concern demining activities world-wide will have a bearing on mine clearance in Bosnia. The UN is reviewing its structure for dealing with "complex emergencies". The need for a world-wide demining agency with political clout and operational capability is evident. It is widely recognised that mine clearance is not only a vital element in the recovery of many war-torn countries, but an expensive undertaking. If it is not to be subject to the ebb and flow of voluntary contributions to a UN trust fund, it must be funded by assessed contributions. Finally, there is a need for an accelerated effort to develop improved mine detection technology, to bring it out of the test laboratories and apply it flexibly in field situations. Bosnia is one of the places where that technology could and should be field-tested. Two closely related questions overshadow mine clearance in Bosnia at this time: Will the Council of Ministers give unambiguous backing to the National Demining Commission? And will the forthcoming Donors Conference commit sufficient funding to put an end to the endless ad hoc fund raising that has impeded the Mine Action Centre's efforts to date?
The people of Bosnia are faced with a landmine plague that is only one part lethal explosives, scattered over the land. The other elements, no easier to deal with, are nationalist politics and post-war profiteering, coupled with international uncertainty about how to respond most effectively to this complicated challenge. The treatment for this plague, a sustainable national demining programme designed with the help of mine-clearing specialists from around the world but run by those Bosnian leaders whose first priority remains the needs of their people, is still being invented. Step by step, however, that programme is coming together. The broad purpose of this report is to outline the landmine crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to identify the main complicating factors, and to review the national and international demining initiatives that have gradually taken shape since the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in December 1995. The report will also attempt to place the mine clearance effort in Bosnia in a broader context, touching on some technical and intergovernmental issues that require urgent attention in the Secretariat of the United Nations and in the governments of key member states. The infestation of hidden landmines in Bosnia and Herzegovina is among the most jarring physical after-effects of the 1992-1995 war. Vast swathes of territory -- between 300 and 500 square kilometres -- have been poisoned. That landscape is now unsafe for returns of displaced persons, for housing reconstruction, for farm work, for weekend outings, for children's games. Clearing mines is sensitive work under the best of circumstances, but it is much more difficult than usual at this time in Bosnia. Although a group of specialists with extensive, world-wide experience in the technical aspects of demining has been assembled here, the political complexities of this semi-partitioned country have hampered their effort, as has been the case in all other aspects of post-war recovery. Meanwhile, exploding mines continue to cause gruesome maiming injuries and deaths 50 to 80 times per month, almost always to civilians, often to children, and not infrequently to deminers operating without adequate training or supervision. The numbers are rising as displaced persons return and as more and more citizens attempt to reclaim land in former front-line areas. The fear these casualties inspire impedes the return of displaced persons and undermines the sense of personal security that should be part of normal living. It is profoundly debilitating to the national psyche and is a barrier to investment and economic revival. In recent months, the groundwork for a sustained national mine clearance programme has been laid. A rapid increase in the pace of mine clearance appears possible during the remainder of 1997 and on into the future, assuming that mine clearance receives more serious attention within the Bosnian government and better co-ordinated and more fully funded support from the international community. A full 18-months after Dayton, UN officials say only a tiny fraction of the land poisoned by hidden explosives, probably less than 1 percent, has been liberated for confident use. Nonetheless the summer of 1997 may come to be seen as the season of lift-off. Much of the technical equipment that is necessary to locate and destroy landmines has been assembled. Initial hurdles have been overcome and international officials have learned many lessons from hard experience. A sizeable and growing corps of Bosnian deminers has been trained to international standards and organised in civilian companies, military units and non-governmental organisations. The United Nations has developed the infrastructure -- the Mine Action Centre in Sarajevo -- which is needed to identify and assist in setting priorities among the nearly 19,000 suspect areas that have been recorded to date, and to guide the national demining programme as it expands to full capacity. The Mine Action Centre estimates that with a national corps of 2,000 trained, well-equipped deminers and minefield surveyors -- about three times the number available at present but a target believed attainable by the end of 1997 if there is adequate international support -- the national programme could clear 15 square kilometres in its first full year. That figure could increase to 60 to 70 square kilometres per year as the programme makes fuller use of mine-sniffing dogs and mechanical clearance support, and as survey teams are equipped with emerging mine detection technology that is under development in various countries but has not yet been deployed in Bosnia. At that rate, the mine threat in Bosnia would be radically reduced in less than five years. But it will happen only if there is an enhanced sense of purpose among Bosnian officials, and continuing support at the international level. Demining has been hindered in the past year by the intragovernmental divisions that have pitted authorities among the three national groups -- Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs -- against each other, thus preventing the adoption of the coherent country-wide policies that are essential to attract sufficient and sustained international support. Civilian and military leaders in all corners, from the Presidency to the municipalities, share responsibility. One immediate issue is whether the Council of Ministers will put unambiguous support behind the tripartite Bosnia and Herzegovina Commission for Demining, known commonly as the "National Demining Commission" (NDC), that was established in February to serve as the nexus between the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the UN-sponsored Mine Action Centre. Three months after being formed, the NDC almost collapsed in May because the Council of Ministers, wrangling over the economic "Quick-Start Package", had not gotten around to endorsing the NDC plan of action or even to authorising NDC salaries. It has still not done so today. Whether the Council of Ministers and other bodies of the federal government are prepared to support the NDC wholeheartedly is one of the questions being closely watched by the international community as the date for the next Donors Conference of the Peace Implementation Council approaches. Ambassador Kai Eide, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, has warned the Council of Ministers that unless the national commitment to demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina is seen to be rock-solid, the donor community cannot be expected to commit further substantial funding. The landmine crisis in Bosnia involves political and organisational conundrums at the international as well as the national level. Despite a substantial effort, progress has come in fits and starts and the result measured in areas cleared has been disappointing. Recently, however, the pace of demining began to accelerate, and the Mine Action Centre (MAC) has reported that more than 80,000 square metres of land were cleared of mines in June alone. The international players -- which include individual governments, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), international bodies such as the World Bank and European Commission, and NGOs -- have now begun to fashion a multi-faceted mine-clearance programme. Some of the organisations work comfortably within and through the UN, while others keep a certain distance, tending to go-it-alone. Although these international players differ to some degree in their priorities and emphasis, their work will be broadly complementary, so long as there is agreement on the goal of establishing a mine clearance programme that is sustainable over the long term, as opposed to a short-term bandage approach that treats the issue superficially without attempting to cure it. The immediate issue for the international players is committing long term funds to maintain the momentum that has developed. The focus at the next Donor's Conference will rest in particular on a number of states that have not yet contributed substantially, or at all, to mine clearance in Bosnia to date.
Factors That Have Impeded Demining In many aspects of post-war recovery anywhere, there is already an infrastructure in place. At least some of the officials who held responsibility before the war for sectors such as transportation or housing or the economy are still on hand, and so a knowledgeable "directorate" can be brought together quickly. In the case of demining, however, the task is wholly new and the infrastructure has to be built from scratch. Moreover, the international expertise on mine-clearance is also at a relatively early stage of development. Although the threat to civilians posed by the proliferation of landmines became evident in Southeast Asia thirty years ago, and then in parts of Asia, Africa and Central America, it was not until the late 1980s in Afghanistan that the international community began to develop a coherent methodology for humanitarian demining. That structure is still incomplete -- indeed it is one of the important topics on the agenda for United Nations reorganisation this year. This is one important, if tangential, element in Bosnia's landmine problem. The aim of the international effort has been to construct a national demining organisation that will be durable because Bosnians regard it as a priority and Bosnia authorities in all three groups are committed to it. The political and organisational difficulties that have impeded all aspects of post-war recovery in Bosnia, however, all but crippled demining in the first year after Dayton. Some of the most troubling appear to have been overcome with the establishment in February of the tripartite National Demining Commission. The NDC is projected to assume overall responsibility in December 1997, at which time the UN is scheduled to transfer the MAC data base and its developed assets to the NDC. Because of the ambiguous response of the Council of Ministers, however, it is still far from clear whether the NDC will be capable of assuming that responsibility. The predecessor of the NDC, which was known as the Mine Protection and Removal Agency (MPRA), was paralysed throughout 1996 by inter- and intra-entity disputes centring on the fundamental political question in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is reconciling the idea of one Bosnia with the existence of three government structures with diverging agendas that are in effective charge of different regions of the country. In the meantime, many of those involved in the demining effort now say, the pressure to achieve quick results was unrealistic and counterproductive.
In part for the reasons noted immediately above, international financial support has been tentative to date. The United Nations has received only $6.8 million of the $38.9 million requested since October 1996 to support the Mine Action Centre, to develop its data bank, mapping and administrative systems, to establish four regional offices and to build the necessary corps of deminers 1.
Some countries which are involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina and have the know-how, military-technological base and economic wherewithal to play a role in demining remain conspicuously absent from the list of donors supporting the demining effort. France and Great Britain fall into that group, but the country that is most notable for its absence is Germany. Germany has sent numerous observers to Bosnia, expressing interest in the demining issue, and it contributes to demining in Africa and Asia. Yet Germany has provided no support to the demining effort in Bosnia to date, apart from a recent nominal in-kind contribution, the assignment of two German military officers to the international staff at the MAC, and support for a small NGO. By comparison there are six Canadian, four Austrian, two Swedish, four Norwegian, one French, one British and two Swiss citizens on the staff of the MAC. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry alone has put $8 million into Norwegian People's Aid, an NGO that is considered a standard-setter for the demining effort. According to the German Embassy in Sarajevo, Germany has a Bosnian refugee population of some 320,000 which requires over $3 billion per year in community social service aid. Presumably this gives Germany a far greater direct interest than any other country in creating conditions for safe and responsible refugee returns to Bosnia. Allocation of one percent of the annual German refugee expenditure to support the international demining effort would give an enormous boost to mine-clearance in Bosnia. It would also neutralise, at least partially, the inevitable perception that Germany's "induced voluntary return" policy is irresponsible. Asked to explain Germany's reluctance to participate, the German Embassy in Sarajevo replied only that refugee social aid is paid for at the community level, whereas demining is funded by the federal government, adding that federal expenditures are unpopular in Germany, as elsewhere. The casual treatment of landmines in the Dayton Peace Agreement has not had a positive impact on demining in Bosnia. The drafters of Annex 1-A committed the former warring parties to "begin promptly and proceed steadily to complete ... within 30 days" after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR (or as might be determined by the IFOR commander) the demining of the Zone of Separation, 1075 kilometres long, and four-kilometres-wide. 2
With hindsight, a rereading of the DPA suggests that the drafters of the treaty were interested in mine removal primarily, if not only, to the extent that mines left in place would hamper the activities of the NATO-led force. A 30-day deadline for clearing mines from roads and areas that IFOR itself needed was perhaps a reasonable objective, even in winter.
"Demining": Not An Abstraction
Demining is a deceptively simple sounding word that in standard usage becomes an abstraction. In reality, however, demining is a sensitive and protracted undertaking, and not merely because mines must be approached in exactly the right manner, but because first they must be located. Whereas minefields that are laid by engineering units of advanced militaries -- as in the Gulf War, or along the Korean Demilitarised Zone, or the border between China and Russia -- are generally well recorded, many of those in Bosnia were recorded haphazardly, if at all. As a result, distinguishing the at-risk areas from the relatively safe areas is the primary challenge in a humanitarian demining effort like the one in Bosnia, which aims to return land to safe civilian use to permit large-scale return of displaced persons. Although it is wrong to imply, as media coverage sometimes does, that all of Bosnia is a minefield, the suspect areas are extensive. The MAC estimates that 300 square kilometres of the 51,600 square kilometres in the country pose a definite mine threat, and that another 200 square kilometres are subject to suspicion. These are concentrated along the current Zone of Separation which generally corresponded with the front line during most of the war, but they also include scattered areas inside the entities which were combat zones, and territory which military units occupied or through which they retreated during the war. In the former Yugoslavia the basic military doctrine stressed defensive tactics, and the use of land mines was familiar to most Yugoslav soldiers and former soldiers. Thus when the war started in Bosnia, mines were widely employed by all sides. Much of the time during the war, small poorly supported units of infantry were struggling to hold tactical positions. Mine fields offered a warning of attack, as well as a way to channel enemy assaults into areas that could be covered with defending fire. Moreover, in some cases farmers and other civilians who had become familiar with mines in military training used them to protect crops and property. In other cases, populations abandoning territory seeded houses and urban terrain with atypically placed mines and "booby traps" to extract a price from the occupiers. This was the case in parts of Sarajevo and many other towns. International demining specialists working in Bosnia note the lethal ingenuity displayed by booby-trappers in Bosnia. One faint ray of encouragement comes from the increasing belief of MAC officials that the number of mines seeded in Bosnia is lower than was initially assumed. The US State Department estimated in a 1993 report that there were 3.5 million mines in Bosnia. MAC officials who have spent a year compiling data now believe that the number may be far lower, perhaps 750,000 to 1,000,000. This is based on analysis that suggests some 70 percent of the nearly 19,000 recorded minefields in Bosnia appear to contain fewer than 10 mines. 4
There are proven labour-intensive means for finding and removing mines, but they are painfully slow. Potential advances that could speed mine detection have not yet been fully pursued in the countries that possess the necessary technological base, much less deployed in Bosnia. Mine casualties often suffer grave abdominal, genital and facial injuries, including blindness, as well as the more common crippling injuries and amputations. Since mines are rarely laid in isolation, disturbing situations have occurred with frequency, with relatives or friends injured or killed while trying to rescue other victims. Many anti-personnel mines are not designed to kill victims but rather to maim them. A badly injured mine victim can have a greater impact on an army (or a community or family) than a dead one, because of the requirement for prolonged medical care, rehabilitation and assistance. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which maintains a detailed data base on mine accidents, reports that about 50 persons were injured per month in 1996 with 20 percent dying, 40 percent suffering amputations and 40 percent suffering fragmentation wounds. Most are males engaged in field labor, but about 20 percent are children. Displaced persons returning or moving to former front-line areas are frequently victims because they were absent during the war and hence lack the local knowledge that others might have of the placement of minefields. As of early summer 1997, mine accidents have been occurring in Bosnia about 80 times per month, according to the Mine Action Centre, and 50 times per month according to ICRC. There has been a spate of recent casualties among Bosnian military deminers, including two incidents in June in which four HVO soldiers were killed and two gravely injured while attempting to lift mines.
There is an important distinction between the incomplete mine lifting that is customarily conducted by military units and the thorough mine clearing which is the objective of "humanitarian" demining operations. Humanitarian demining aims at removing all the mines, so that there will be no casualties at all among the civilians who return to the area. Attaining the level of clearance expected in humanitarian demining is an extremely slow and laborious process, especially in a situation such as post-war Bosnia in which minefield records are incomplete. Military mine lifting procedures, on the other hand, are relatively quick and dirty. The aim is either to open a narrow path through a minefield so troops can cross it in combat, which is called "breaching", or to clear most (but possibly not all) mines from an area in which the military needs to operate, which is called "tactical mine lifting". Casualties are expected in either case since speed is of the essence and risk is simply part of the price of doing business. 5
The fact that, despite extra training, four soldiers of the former warring factions have been killed in mine lifting operations in recent weeks, underlines the belief of humanitarian demining officials that the military approach to mine-lifting in Bosnia is far too slip-shod to provide a basis for safe civilian returns. Humanitarian demining involves a series of steps that must be approached in a methodical way: first identifying suspected mined areas and "surveying" them to determine their edges; next marking the dangerous areas so that civilians stay clear; then finding and removing the mines, or detonating them in place; and finally keeping records that accurately describe what has been accomplished. The last step is as crucial as the others, because without it there is no way of keeping track of the formerly suspect areas that are now safe for civilian use, and no way of setting orderly priorities. Under normal circumstances, demining is done by individual deminers wearing protective clothing and helmets and moving cautiously through a suspect area, first using hand-held metal detectors to identify metal in the ground, and then often lying face down and probing the ground ahead with a rod to see whether the detected object has the size and shape of a mine or is simply a piece of scrap metal. Deminers encounter numerous, time-consuming false alarms, especially in former combat areas where there are shell casings and fragments in the ground. House clearance, which is a variant requiring specialised training, goes even more slowly because of the threat of booby traps with ingenious hair-triggers hidden, for example, in ceilings or under floor-boards. The process of clearing open land can be speeded with the use of "brute force" mechanical devices, usually tank-like vehicles that pull or push rollers or "chain flails" across suspect areas to detonate mines in place. Under the right conditions, brute-force techniques can greatly increase the pace, because they skip over the step of identifying individual mines and simply aim to detonate or destroy all mines in their path. They also make mince-meat of the heavy undergrowth that is a hazard for manual deminers in many parts of Bosnia. But most of the five or six existing brute-force mine-clearing systems are extremely expensive to buy and operate, are plagued with mechanical difficulties, and are so unwieldy that they can operate only on open ground. At a frustrated moment, one demining co-ordinator dismissed the system his organisation has been experimenting with as "52 tons of scrap". There is no doubt, however, that some mechanical models can be effective. Humanitarian deminers are particularly interested in testing some new, lightweight, remote-control designs that are cheaper and simpler to maintain, closer in size to an industrial-sized lawnmower than a tank, and hence more manoeuvrable in close quarters. The process of surveying is critically important because, if it is done efficiently, many suspect areas can be narrowed rapidly. Sniffer dogs can sharply increase the pace of clearance, perhaps by a factor of five or six. But dogs are expensive to train and deploy, tire easily especially in hot weather, and are only as good as the handlers working with them. Moreover they cannot work effectively in some former battlefield areas because they cannot always distinguish the scent of shell fragments from the scent of mines. There are some new technical means under development that within a few years may accelerate the process of surveying suspect mined areas, but the advanced military powers have been slow to develop them and have not released them for field testing in Bosnia. The final step in humanitarian demining is "quality assurance", that is, determining that ostensibly cleared areas can be returned to confident use by civilians. Under any circumstances this is a daunting responsibility, and officials and organisations are unlikely to "guarantee" results. UN officials say that in other operations such as Afghanistan, mine-clearers have usually handed over former mine-fields by walking over them in front of local village authorities, and if that is not sufficient to win their confidence, playing football on them. Quality assurance in mine clearance is not a matter of "signing off" like a final inspector who examines a product on an assembly line. Rather it must be based on consistent monitoring that takes place throughout the process. Just as engineering inspectors must check the quality of the cement and steel that goes into a bridge while it is being built, demining monitors must consistently observe a demining unit's training and operating procedures and its conformity with those procedures. This is one of the reasons that the MAC's systematic approach to the national demining effort is vital. As noted below, it also points to a serious drawback of the SFOR approach to demining, which is to coerce the former warring factions to conduct mine-lifting operations without close supervision and more or less against their will. Mine-clearing is not necessarily highly dangerous work if it is done cautiously, but it requires great discipline and frequent rest periods because boredom and carelessness can be lethal, either to the deminers or to those who follow after. The ideal in humanitarian demining is to reduce the actual and perceived threat to zero percent. The reality, however, is that a lingering trace of doubt is the inevitable legacy of mine warfare. Under the best of circumstances Bosnians will face a slightly elevated plateau of risk that can only fade away over time. Still, it can be radically reduced if there is a serious national and international effort. Those who engage in demining do so out of a variety of motives. A Bosnian farmer with military experience may accept the risk of clearing his own field because no one else has showed up to do so and he needs to plant crops. Most civilian deminers, however, are unlikely to enter a training programme and demine for a living unless paid a substantial salary. In Bosnia, the current going rate is over 1,200DM per month. Active-duty soldiers who have received training under a US State Department programme seem to be resigning as quickly as possible to apply for work in private sector companies. A recent theft of mine detectors from a MAC facility in Livno is believed to have been carried out by persons intending to use them for commercial purposes. Some internationals with a military engineering background have come to Bosnia and gone to work for the UN out of humanitarian motives. Others are surely attracted by the pay scale for service as a trainer in some of the private-sector companies, which is extremely high. Indeed military and UN staff speak of the commercial demining circuit for former military engineers as "the gravy train." The gravy is thickest in certain commercial firms where salaries are reportedly about twice what they are for UN employees. Commercial companies, of which there are about a dozen with international reputations, come seeking profits. The ideal place for them would of course be "a Kuwait", a country with a huge mine problem and a vast supply of petro-dollars to pay for services. Bosnia, as has often been noted, however, is no Kuwait. Companies operating here usually have to adjust their pay scales and lower their profit margin to what the donor market will bear. There is an inevitable tension between speed and thoroughness in commercial demining. If commercial deminers bid on a contract but fall off the pace they expected, they loose money. If they hurry the pace, they endanger their deminers and do an incomplete job. An expensive company, national or international, may be worth what it is paid, but only if the results are commensurate. If companies do not give good value, they may have trouble securing future contracts. But politicians and officials, whether national or international, sometimes have business links and conflicts of interest that colour their judgements as to where contracts should be awarded. During 1996, international officials were alarmed at the orientation of some Bosnian "cowboy" companies which had links to government officials and could thereby gain access to World Bank funds. These seemed to deliver fast work by poorly trained deminers, at the expense of thoroughness and safety. One Japanese NGO funded a demining contract with such a company and then was dismayed when a deminer was killed due to inadequate training and procedures. The fear of being held to blame for injuries in inadequately cleared areas, or for injuries to deminers, has added to the reluctance with which some organisations such as the World Bank have approached demining. For international organisations such as UN agencies and the World Bank, demining is regarded as a risky enterprise, albeit necessary to the recovery of war-torn countries. Since humanitarian demining is very expensive and since the international community has been slow to come forward with funds, organisations that accept the task of organising a demining programme run the risk of exposure to many complaints, with few expressions of gratitude. The military forces of the former warring parties in Bosnia inevitably have complicated motives. As long as the possibility of renewed hostilities hangs over Bosnia, it is in their interest to leave minefields that may yet prove useful in the ground. The SFOR command tacitly recognises this in its instructions to the faction forces, directing the compulsory mine-lifting activities to "large or high density, easily accessible, known military mined areas which were laid by the respective party and to which there is no significant political or military significance or sensitivity." SFOR officials believe that some of the minefield records that should have been turned over SFOR have disappeared in a "scorched filing cabinet" policy. They acknowledge that around certain critical areas such as Brcko and Gorazde, which would be immediate strategic objectives if the war resumed, Bosnian military units of various former warring parties frequently merely go through the motions. Finally, governments may have mixed agendas too. For example the US government has declined to contribute to the UNDHA trust fund for demining, apparently partly out of the ideological objections to multi-lateral and UN-centred efforts that are frequently voiced in the US Congress.
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