United Nations Transitional Authority
in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES)
ICG Bosnia Project, 30 April, 1996
Background
UNTAES was established under the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1037 (1996) to govern the region during a 12 month-period, extendible for an additional 12 months at the request of one of the parties, and to carry out tasks associated with demilitarization, the establishment of police forces, population movement, the restoration of property and assistance in reconstruction. An initial report from the ICG Bosnia team indicated the presence of a degree of risk that the Basic Agreement, the foundation upon which the UN resolution was based, would fail and that military intervention by Croatia would ensue. The report also included a list of possible indicators which would help to determine whether this risk was increasing or decreasing as the operation unfolded. These included:
- delay in troop arrivals past 1 May 1996
- delay in readiness to begin demilitarization past 1 June 1996
- Serb obstruction to the demilitarization process
- inability to, or delay in, setting up joint policing past about 15 June 1996
- failure of the joint policing policy and other confidence building measure to eliminate unease, past mid August
- failure to initiate a plan to provide housing and an adequate level of security for the Serbs returning to their home in Croatia.
This should be underway by July-August.
A follow-up visit was therefore carried out on 26-28 April in order to examine the indicators and to provide an updated assessment.
Report summary
Under the dynamic leadership of Jacques Klein, and with the apparent support of both the Croatians and Serbs, there is an increasing possibility that the operation will succeed. Serious obstacles remain, however, including the need to put in place and maintain a degree of law and order sufficient to reduce the fear and anxiety which both communities share over the change which is underway.
Report
The ICG team met with the Transition Administrator, Jacques Klein, with the deputy head of Civil Affairs, Graham Day, Steve Green, whose responsibility it is to chair the central Joint Implementation Committee and an experienced UN military observer, Major Steiner. Their views are summarized in the following paragraphs.
Political Aspects
The Serb leader, Goran Hadzic, wants Serbs to stay; unfortunately neither he nor his people have the experience or intelligence to inspire. Assumed to have been inserted by Milosevic, he is seen as a transitional leader; however there is no indication of how long that might be although there are rumours that Mikelic, the former "prime minister" of the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina, could be ready to step in and to follow the same agenda. President Milosevic has also confirmed to Klein that he does not want a further 80,000 refugees in Serbia. Within the region, the ideal and idea of forming a Greater Serbia (if in fact it was ever present) seems to have been tempered by reality; the 8-10,000 Bosnian Serbs seem to have been marginalized. Some are reported to be living in conditions of severe hardship and destitution.
For his part, President Tudjman seems to have told his people to give the Serbs "anything they want" (Klein) in terms of political autonomy. How and to what extent this is interpreted has yet to unfold although there are some positive signs as will be seen.
Demilitarization
All contend that this will be easy to implement. It is estimated that by the time of the deadline on 30 June, all but the most decrepit weapons will have been transported well into Serbia. Similarly, 800 of the 2500 Serb militia/police have left, with both positive and negative consequences. (See paragraph on Security, Law and Order below.)
Implementation of the Transitional Administration
As the Serbs have asked for the longer transition period to be put in place, that is 24 vs 12 months, Klein has decreed the 1 July 1997 will mark the end of the transition period and his mandate.
Although more than a dozen Implementation Committees have been set up, progress within them has been frustratingly slow. Encouraging signs from outside the purview of these committees, primarily ones initiated by Klein himself, could help to start the process. These include, inter alia, the ceremonial opening of the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity to Lipovac in early May, the payment of pensions by Croatia to some 12,000 Serbs (already started) and, of utmost importance and albeit tentative at this stage, the initiative underway to return displaced Serbs to the Pakrac area of Western Slavonia. Of equal importance has been the half dozen visits carried out by women to their former villages and homes; all but one were welcomed by the current village inhabitants. Practical measures of transition (money and postage for example) are being put in place.
Economy and Reconstruction
Klein confirmed that he has no money for reconstruction and admits that President Tudjman will have serious political difficulties if he provides housing assistance to the Serbs while so many Croatians remain displaced. One positive development however is the probable turn over of the Deletovci oil field in the first week in May, coincident the opening of the Adriatic pipeline into Serbia.
Security, Law and Order
While the removal of the Serb Militia/Police is a positive indicator, their presence is a factor in the maintenance of law and order. Sadly, the same can be said about the presence of Arkan's henchmen. There is concern that the precipitous removal of these elements will have negative consequences if the arrangements for transition are not fully in place. Arkan's Tigers are said to number about 30 while the so-called Scorpions (or jumping snakes - I can't keep up with his menagerie) have decreased in number from 600 to about 200. Although bi-communal police training is being done in Hungary, the numbers are insufficient to undertake combined police work during the transition. (According to one interlocutor, crime is on the increase.) Although they can monitor and facilitate, the UNCIVPOL are incapable of filling the gap. The lack of competent and credible police protection may be the Achilles' heel of the operation.
The delay in obtaining sufficient numbers has much to do with the screening process established by the Croatians who insist that each and every case be handled separately. Graham Day contends that only a proclamation of amnesty for all except of course those suspected of crimes under International Humanitarian Law will break the logjam. The solution, therefore, is in the hands of President Tudjman and the local Serbs; not with the UN or UNCIVPOL .
United Nations issues
The precarious financial position of the UN does not help; the UN has been unable to pay its fuel bills, for example. Troops have arrived, however, and most likely will be ready on time. Likewise, UNCIVPOL will have its full complement but will have insufficient clout to do more than monitor. As has been implied, however, the parties must accept their responsibilities with respect to protection and security issues.
Conclusions
Signs that a rising level of risk is present in Eastern Slavonia are simply not there. Although the word optimistic is still not being used, the situation and the prospects for mission success are somewhat brighter than they were a month ago. Certainly the prospect of Croatian military intervention appears to have been at least postponed. and the set up and operation of UNTAES seems to be going better than expected. The brilliant move by Klein to set up his headquarters in Vukovar as well as his personal dynamism have much to do with the current situation.
But there is still much to be done and a watch for signs indicating an increasing risk of failure leading to military action by Croatia must be maintained. The key indicators are now down to three with the timeframe extended to conform to the end date of July 1997:
- inability to, or delay in, setting up joint policing past about mid July 1996
- failure of the joint policing policy and other confidence building measure to eliminate unease, past mid September
- failure to initiate a plan to provide housing and an adequate level of security for the Serbs returning to their home in Croatia.
This should be underway by the end of September.
In the meantime, efforts should be underway to encourage President Tudjman to agree to amnesty, and to seek financial support for both the UNTAES operation and reconstruction.
