In FrenchIn SpanishIn Russian
Central Africa
West Africa
Afghanistan & Pakistan
Central Asia
Who's on ICG's Board
Who's on ICG's Staff
What they say about ICG
Latest Annual Report
Internal News
Web site of Gareth Evans
How to help
ICG Brussels
ICG Washington
ICG New York
ICG Paris
ICG London
Media Releases
Media Contacts
About ICG
Latin America
Middle East

Subscribe to ICG newsletter

Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union


On 14 March 2002 the leaders of Serbia, Montenegro and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) signed an agreement in Belgrade to replace FRY with a new "state community": a "union of states" to be called "Serbia and Montenegro".

If the agreement can be implemented, it will establish a loose association in which the two "member-states" enjoy virtually all the prerogatives of independence except those that depend on international personality (e.g. UN membership). The republics will control their borders - including customs - and become fully responsible for their economies and internal security. The union will depend on the republics to fund its institutions: an assembly, president, council of ministers, court, and the armed forces.

This agreement was the direct outcome of the European Union's determination to block Montenegrin separatism and keep the two republics together. Before EU High Representative Javier Solana intervened last November, the two republics were close to approving a Montenegrin referendum on independence. By cajoling Montenegro's and Serbia's leaders, and warning the former of negative consequences if they pursued independence, Solana pushed them to preserve some sort of federal union.

The 14 March agreement, however, falls short of the EU's original ambition, neither securing a federal state nor closing the debate on Montenegro's status. It is provisional (either party can review the arrangement after three years), ambivalent, and very incomplete; and its terms satisfied very few in either republic. Pro-independence Montenegrins were resentful at the intense pressure to head off a referendum, while many in Serbia believed that Solana had yielded crucially to Djukanovic on substance.

That said, Solana's agreement is significantly redeemed by its pragmatism. While the Montenegrins did not get their early referendum, the envisaged union will conform much more closely to Montenegro's negotiating platforms than to Belgrade's proposals since January 2001. There will be no roll-back of either republic's economic reforms to date. The three-year moratorium on independence should assist serious dialogue among the parties in Montenegro, where voters are split almost down the middle over independence. Another likely achievement is that the federal (Yugoslav) military's room for making political mischief should be considerably reduced as the federal budget dwindles, the republics insist on greater civilian control over the armed forces, and border control duties pass to the republics.

Since 14 March, the governments have begun to address the range of practical issues raised by the agreement, on the apparent assumption that Serbia and Montenegro will act as semi-independent states. The immediate challenge is for them to agree on the detailed content of their new union. This will not be easy. The timetable given in the agreement to establish the union is unlikely to be fulfilled. None of the three parliaments can be counted upon to adopt a Constitutional Charter by the required majority. Although both of the republic parliaments have approved the Solana plan, the federal parliament has yet to do so, due to wrangling between pro-republic and pro-federal forces.

In short, the 14 March agreement may not be implementable even with good faith efforts in both republics, and certainly will not be so without continuing EU pressure. Moreover, even if a new union does take shape, it may not prove to be durable. Especially as the Serbian government takes over federal competencies, the trend of political and public opinion in both republics may create a momentum of disaggregation that carries the two republics beyond the union and towards formal separation, even within the agreed three-year limit. Already, since 14 March, the question of Serbian independence has become a mainstream political issue for the first time.

Should this occur, the international community must stand ready to reopen the agreement; it should not be seen as an end in itself but only a means to an end - a stable, sustainable solution, based on democratic legitimacy. The EU should stop trying to decide on behalf of the republics themselves what their relationship should be. It is simply not critical for the future stability of either entity or the wider Balkans region that a union of some kind between Serbia and Montenegro be maintained. In particular, it would be rash for the EU to rush into signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement purely to bind the union together before the questions of Montenegro's and Kosovo's status have been resolved; the European integration process must include Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia appropriately on their own merits.

Rather, the EU should use the new agreement by helping Serbia and Montenegro to build a lasting solution. Only if it serves this purpose will Javier Solana's intervention have bought time to good effect.


To the International Community

  1. The European Union (EU) should be ready to accept whatever solutions Serbia and Montenegro can agree upon for their future relationship, in line with the 14 March agreement, including the possibility of eventual separation. It should not seek to impose solutions.

  2. Member states and organs of the EU should cease to insist on rebuilding the competencies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which have largely been taken over the republics - a process that the 14 March 2002 agreement effectively ratifies and practically encourages.

  3. The EU should be ready to provide impartial technical assistance to Serbia and Montenegro on the practical issues that need to be resolved whatever the form of their ultimate relationship.

  4. In applying the Stabilisation and Association process (SAp) to the FRY, or its successor "Serbia and Montenegro", the EU should ensure that Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro are all three properly included.

  5. The EU should not sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the FRY, or its successor "Serbia and Montenegro", before the status of all of its entities has been resolved.

    To Serbia and Montenegro:

  6. Serbia and Montenegro should now concentrate on resolving the concrete issues involved in their future relationship, within the framework of the 14 March agreement, irrespective of what eventual form that relationship might take.

  7. Delegates to the Constitutional Commission envisaged in the 14 March agreement should work constructively to agree a constitutional model for the new union in line with the agreement.

Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels, 7 May 2002

Home - About ICG - Montenegro Menu - Publications - Media - Contacts - Site Guide - TOP - Credits

Back to the homepage
Latest Reports
Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union
7 May 2002

7 May 2002

"ICG-CEPS open letter on Montenegro"  
14 February 2002

"Let the Montenegrins Have Their Say"
Comment by ICG Board Member Morton Abramowitz, International Herald Tribune, 31 December 2001

31 December 2001

Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock
1 August 2001