The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo

An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace

20 August 1999

This report is also available for download as an Adobe Acrobat PDF file

Part 1 of 2

Contents

Contents

Executive Summary

After a year of failed attempts by Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), South Africa and other regional powerbrokers, the six countries involved in Africa's seven-nation war in the Democratic Republic of Congo signed the Agreement for a Cease-fire in the DRC in Lusaka on 10 July 1999. The war has pitched Kabila and his allies, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia against a Congolese rebellion backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi since August 1998. The main provisions of the agreement include: immediate cessation of hostilities; the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of the belligerent parties to investigate cease-fire violations, to work out mechanisms to disarm the identified militias, and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops according to an established calendar; the deployment of a UN chapter 7 force tasked with disarming the armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to the displaced persons and refugees; and the initiating of a Congolese National Dialogue intended to lead to a "new political dispensation in the DRC".

However, a month after signing, the war continues. While it does not dispute the content of the document, the main rebel group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) has refused to sign the agreement. The RCD split earlier in May, when Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was ousted as head of the group, but refused to step down and established his headquarters in Kisangani with Ugandan backing. Both the RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda, and the RCD-Kisangani, supported by Uganda, have demanded the exclusive right to sign the peace agreement. This has delayed the implementation of the agreement and encouraged factions to engage in strategies to buy time. Since the signing, more troops have been deployed and the rebels and their allies have continued to make territorial advances. Many claims and counterclaims of violations of the agreement have already been made, making the commitment by both parties to the cease-fire agreement more and more suspect.

Relations between Rwanda and Uganda have grown increasingly strained since the RCD split. Soldiers from both countries have been stationed at the airport and control separate parts of the city of Kisangani. Despite recent efforts by South Africa and Zambia to verify leadership claims and to put pressure on both factions to sign, the disagreement degenerated into open urban warfare between the two armies on 14 August. The former allies fought for the control of several installations as well as of the city international airport, employing heavy artillery. On 17 August, Rwanda and Uganda agreed on a cease-fire. They say they will send a military team to find out why the fighting erupted. They also agree that they will respect the outcome of the investigation on leadership claims within the RCD undertaken by the South Africans and the Zambians. If the investigation committee doesn't come up with a clear result, both will recommend that the 28 founders of RCD should sign the agreement.

The Lusaka agreement, however, meets the demands of the rebels and their supporters, and more specifically of the Rwandans by recognising their pledge to disarm the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in the Great Lakes region. But the current fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani makes quite clear that the security interests of those countries, which their intervention in the DRC was supposed to protect, are not the only motivation for the war. There are neither Rwandan nor Ugandan rebel groups in Kisangani that could justify the presence of the two countries armies. Instead, the conflict seems to be a battle for commercial influence to control diamond, gold and coffee concessions, and for political influence in the region after the war is over.

The fighting between Uganda and Rwanda also legitimises Kabila's claim that those countries are aggressors, an argument the Congolese leader seized upon when he called on the Security Council to strongly condemn the violations of the cease-fire and to demand the "immediate departure" of forces from Uganda and Rwanda. His Justice Minister Mwenze Kongolo even said at the SADC meeting in Maputo that: "as far as we are concerned the Lusaka protocol is dead".

Key questions remain unanswered. Is peace in sight at last or is the stage set for the war to continue? Can the Lusaka cease-fire agreement be resurrected in light of the glaring cease-fire violations by both sides in the conflict? Can the pressure that was put on all the parties to sign the agreement be sustained?

The high level of tension between Uganda and Rwanda is likely to affect the geopolitical order of the region; it could lead to further fragmentation and a de facto partition of the DRC, with each army occupying a sector and a very volatile military situation. If Ugandan troops remain in the North, Rwanda could be tempted to concentrate its efforts on Mbuji-Mayi. It could also convince Uganda to give up and withdraw, leaving Rwanda alone facing accusations of aggression. Parliament members in Uganda have already announced its intentions to move a motion seeking the complete withdrawal of the troops from the DRC. And last, but not least, anti-Rwanda feelings are already growing in the Ugandan army, even though government officials in both countries have played down the impact of the Kisangani clash on the broad alliance of Uganda and Rwanda. The Ugandans have lost a lot of soldiers in the battle and some of their strongholds have been taken by the Rwandans, which is perceived as a humiliation by the UDPF.

Since the beginning of the war, the fragility of the Congolese state has been exploited by all foreign forces, whether allies or enemies of the Kabila government. For the first time, with the Lusaka agreement, the Congolese domestic agenda was brought back to the centre stage. If the cease-fire agreement is not implemented, the continuation of violence could postpone the National Dialogue, which is key to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the formation of a new Congolese army and the re-establishment of state administration on DRC territory. As long as the military situation remains unresolved, it is unlikely that the Congolese will be in charge of their own fate.

This report analyses the motivations of each of the main parties to the conflict to sign the Lusaka agreement. It also looks at the difficulties that lie ahead if the agreement is to be implemented.

Each belligerent party took the opportunity to put his own domestic concerns on record, especially by demanding that rebel groups fighting their governments be disarmed, and also by securing a regional commitment to address their national security interests. One of the main precedents created by the agreement is that the belligerent parties are, through the JMC, turned into the enforcers of the agreement. The JMC is supposed to share intelligence regarding militias and work out mechanisms to disarm them. However, it will take time for the parties to overcome their suspicions and do more than make sure that their enemies don't continue supporting the rebels. Furthermore, it will be difficult for Kabila and Zimbabwe to turn against and disarm their allies, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. Intelligence reports have already indicated that some armed groups have started going underground.

The DRC conflict has three dimensions: local, national and regional. For peace to return to the DRC, the peace process should comprehensively deal with the conflict at all three levels. For the international community, this is a unique opportunity to re-engage with the region, to demonstrate commitment to African peace processes, and to rebuild credibility with national partners in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. In particular, the international community should support regional efforts to restore the territorial integrity of the DRC and to resolve its security issues. Given the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and to address the long term security issues it created, ICG recommends that the UN Security Council, its members, and the OAU seize the opportunity to:

At the Regional Security Level

  1. Put continuous pressure on all rebel factions to sign the Lusaka cease-fire agreement and on all parties to respect it

    US, Security Council and regional diplomatic pressure should be directed towards Uganda and Rwanda to respect the Kisangani cease-fire; to respect their commitment to the Lusaka cease-fire; and to take a common stand on the issue of the RCD signature, so that the Congolese may start their National Debate process. Although the rebel leaders have developed their own individual and group interests, Rwanda and Uganda can still prevail on them.

  2. Support the Joint Military Commission (JMC)

    The Security Council Member states should undertake a serious examination of the needs of the JMC, and support those needs fully.

  3. Strengthen the mandate of the OAU-appointed chairman of the Joint Military Commission

    Understanding that the JMC is composed of representatives of the belligerent parties and has no accountability nor supervision mechanism by any neutral body, ICG recommends that the OAU should play a more active role as arbitrator of the agreement and carry out that role until the UN PK force is able to provide accountability and supervision, as mandated in the agreement.

  4. Mobilise international and regional efforts for a proactive non-military response to the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe problem by:

    • Putting pressure on the Kabila and Zimbabwe governments to demobilise Interahamwe and ex-FAR as a gesture of good will in the regional peace process;

    • Encouraging the neighbouring countries of the DRC to make a special effort to arrest the leaders of those groups responsible for the genocide and whose names are on the list of the International Tribunal in Arusha;

    • Supporting a demobilisation and re-integration plan for the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, who are estimated to count between 30,000 and 45,000 members. This recommendation is based on the experience of successful re-integration of Interahamwe and ex-FAR (since February 1999) into Rwandan society.

  5. The governments of the region should be strongly encouraged to practice inclusive politics and offer reintegration alternatives to their respective rebellions

  6. Support a peace-keeping force in the DRC with a realistic and concrete mandate

    The terms set by the Lusaka agreement ask for a chapter 7 force that will have the mandate to, among other things: "track down all armed groups in the DRC." A chapter 7 force would require at least 100 000 soldiers to monitor the situation from the Sudanese to the Zambian borders and from the Congo-Brazzaville to the Tanzanian borders. In the event the Security Council doesn't authorise a chapter 7 force, support should be given to the JMC to carry out that mandate and more UN/OAU observers should be sent. In a second stage, a chapter 6 force should be authorised by the Security Council as a confidence building mechanism and sign that the international community has an interest in the DRC; as an observer of the implementation of the agreement; as an investigator of the violations of the cease-fire and protector of civilian populations; as a catalytic mechanism to help the population distance itself form the fighters; and as a provider of humanitarian assistance.

At the National Level

  1. Support the Congolese National Dialogue and Reconciliation Debate by:

    • Giving expert technical support to the Facilitator chosen by SADC;

    • Encouraging the Facilitator to include Congolese armed groups that were not represented in Lusaka. These are the Mai - Mai, the Banyamulenge and the former Mobutu soldiers, and to make sure no potential disrupters are excluded;

    • Enforcing the provisions in the agreement stating that all participants should have an equal status;

    • Monitoring the proceedings of the debate and ensuring that they are free of manipulation and intimidation.

At the Local Level

  1. Create a donor liaison group to mobilise resources for humanitarian assistance, local reconstruction, rehabilitation of infrastructures and reconciliation initiatives at the community level

Contents

Introduction

After one year of failed attempts by SADC and other powerbrokers to reach a settlement on the DRC conflict, the belligerents signed an agreement for a cease-fire in Lusaka on 10 July 1999. This war is the second taking place on DRC territory in two years and pits the allies of the first war against each other: rebels backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have been seeking to overthrow Kabila through the military option, while Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia intervened on behalf of SADC to protect DRC's sovereignty and Kabila's government. For the first time, the separate disputes being waged on DRC territory as well as the Congolese agenda were addressed in the Lusaka agreement. However, the commitment of the parties to the agreement remains suspect and violence can not be ruled out.

This report has been written on the basis of many interviews with all belligerents during the Lusaka negotiations in July, and analyses the chances for peace contained in the agreement as well as its loopholes. The main components of the documents are:

  • Creation of a Joint Military Commission composed by the Belligerents and Creation of an OAU/UN Observer Group

A Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of two representatives from each party to the conflict under a neutral chairman to be appointed by the OAU is to be established. Signatories to the conflict have already nominated representatives to the Commission. The duties of the JMC and of the OAU/UN Observer Group are among other things to investigate cease-fire violations, working out mechanisms to disarm militias and monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops. Both the JMC and the Observer Groups are supposed to start executing peacekeeping operations until the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force 1. The Security Council authorised the deployment of 90 military observers on 6 August 1999.2

  • Deployment of a Peacekeeping Force

The UN is requested to deploy an appropriate chapter 7 force to ensure implementation of the accord. The role of the force will be to disarm the militias identified in the agreement, collect weapons from civilians, supervise the withdrawal of all other foreign troops, and provide humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and refugees 3.

  • Disarmament of Militia Groups
The agreement envisages the tracking down and disarming of armed groups. The screening of mass-killers and war criminals and handing them over to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania 4.

  • Congolese National Dialogue and Reconciliation Debate

45 days after the signing of the cease-fire agreement, the DRC government, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), unarmed opposition groups and the Congolese civil society are supposed to begin open political negotiations that should result in a new political dispensation in the DRC. All parties will have equal status in the debate. The negotiations will be held under the authority of a neutral facilitator. Topics to be tackled in the debate are democratic elections, the formation of the national army and the re-establishment of state administration throughout the DRC 5.

Contents

Motivations and strategies of the players: why sign now?

A Step Towards Peace

  1. External Pressures and a New Realism

    External pressures played a key role in the signing of the cease-fire agreement for both sides. Tanzania and South Africa, in particular, were instrumental in securing the rebels' allies signatures on the agreement. However, the rivalry between Emile Ilunga and Professor Wamba dia Wamba for RCD leadership prevented the rebels from signing. From 3-9 June, 1999, Tanzania tried to mediate these leadership wrangles between RCD Goma and RCD Kisangani factions, and the MLC in Kabale, Uganda, the objective being to agree on a common negotiating position in the Lusaka talks. The participants suggested that two committees be set up to deal with the leadership issue and define a negotiating strategy, but the committees never met. At the last minute, RCD Goma and the Rwanda delegation decided to go to South Africa to attend President Mbeki's inauguration and did not show up in Kabale. These failed attempts explain why the different rebel factions have not reached a consensus about their representation in the Lusaka peace process.

    South Africa has also been putting intense pressure on the rebels and their allies to end the war. Since the beginning of the conflict in the DRC, former President Mandela has played an active role. He succeeded in pressuring Rwanda to admit the presence of its troops in the DRC. As soon as Thabo Mbeki took over, he presented a peace plan that suggested, among other things, a formula that would turn the warring parties into peacekeepers and allow an immediate start to the Congolese National Dialogue and Reconciliation Debate.

    South Africa and Tanzania are now driving the diplomatic efforts to persuade the RCD to sign the Lusaka agreement. In a joint press conference with Kabila in Pretoria on 29 July 1999, President Thabo Mbeki called on the rebels to sign the cease-fire agreement. As part of his diplomatic initiative to end the conflict in the DRC, he also hosted a meeting on 8 August 1999, with the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, and appointed his Foreign Minister Zuma Nkosazana to work with the Zambian Minister of State, Eric Silwamba, to verify leadership claims within the RCD. Mbeki's aim is to establish the true power base of the RCD movement, thus expediting the signing of the agreement.

    Pressure is also being applied to the rebels to sign the agreement by the United States who are "strongly but quietly supportive" 6 of a regional solution to the conflict. Although the United States has not taken a lead role in the negotiations, they have been actively engaged behind the scenes. They have been urging Rwanda and Uganda to use their influence over the rebels to make them sign. Uganda subsequently secured the signature of Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the MLC, but is still demanding that Wamba signs either for the entire RCD, or at least for RCD-Kisangani. Rwanda has not yet prevailed on RCD Goma to sign the agreement. The Security Council also expressed "deep concerns that the RCD has not signed the agreement and calls upon the latter to sign without delay"7 .

    Aldo Ajello, EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, on 10 August 1999, announced that the EU would pressure the rebels to sign the agreement and called on the rebels to differentiate between leadership wrangles and the continuation of the war. Ajello praised the Kabila Government for its courage in signing the agreement, and committed EU support to the National Dialogue. He also indicated the willingness of La Francophonie and Community of Sant' Egidio to facilitate the National Dialogue.

    Also using indirect tactics, and in a significant and symbolic show of support to the process, the EU gave US $3 million in July 1999 to the mediator in the DRC conflict, President Fredrick Chiluba of Zambia. The funds are to facilitate meetings related to the peace process.

    The support given to the cease-fire agreement by the international community, especially by the United States, is based on the need to reconstruct the regional power systems and solidarity that have been shattered by the current DRC war. The impact of the war on commerce, economic stability and growth in the region has been profound and has delayed regional economic integration and democratisation processes.

    On both sides of the conflict, Uganda and Zimbabwe are playing leading political and military roles. The international community realises that engaging Mugabe and Museveni and rebuilding a Uganda-Zimbabwe axis offers the best hopes of implementing the cease-fire agreement.

  2. Identifying the Problem by Recording the Parties Demands

    A major consideration in stitching together the cease-fire agreement was to break down, record and represent the requirements of the various belligerents should they stop fighting. Each belligerent seized the opportunity that the agreement gave them to include domestic concerns, especially in identifying the rebel groups fighting their governments, and demanding that they be disarmed: Interahamwe and ex-FAR for Rwanda; FDD for Burundi8 ; ADF, LRA, West Nile Bank Front, UNRFII, NALU for Uganda and UNITA for Angola. Through the agreement, he belligerent governments are securing a regional commitment to deal with their national security interests.

    Therefore the provisions spelled out in the agreement can be interpreted differently by each signatory. Each party to the agreement has different priorities. For the Kabila government, the agreement should secure its legitimacy and re-establish state authority over DRC territory. For Zimbabwe, the agreement emphasises the DRC's sovereignty, legitimising therefore their intervention and ensuring Zimbabwe a lead role in the solution to the DRC conflict. Angola's inclusion of UNITA on the list of groups to be disarmed gives the Angolan government the opportunity to shop for diplomatic support against UNITA, ensure that whoever succeeds Kabila is not sympathetic to UNITA, and secure a commitment to closing down UNITA supply routes through Congo. For Rwanda, the agreement recognises for the first time the security threat posed by the Interahamwe and ex-FAR and calls for a regional response. For Uganda, the agreement weakens Kabila by calling for a National Dialogue, rebuilds regional solidarity under Ugandan political and economic leadership, and places Museveni in a position of unrivalled power in East and Central Africa. By making the Congolese rebels signatories, the agreement brings them international recognition and weakens Kabila.

    This range of different interpretations and expectations could lead to delays and disruptions in the implementation of the agreement.

  3. The Impact of the Agreement on Political Participation at the National Level in DRC

    Until now, the war in Congo has offered little choice to the DRC population. The war has only involved two parties, the rebels and the Government, leaving no room for unarmed actors, a significant and diverse set of players, to have any input in the future of their country. The agreement forces two radical departures from the binary power play of the last eleven months and provides a process for their participation in determining the future of their country through the National Dialogue initiative. It also provides a framework for tackling other critical domestic political and military issues: the re-establishment of state administration throughout the DRC, ensuring state provision of healthcare and education, guaranteeing freedom of movement within the country; and the formation of a national army and the disarming of civil populations.

    The population of Eastern Congo wants peace more than ever and feels that it is critical that the Lusaka agreement be signed by all factions. A strong consensus has developed among the Congolese since 1996 that all foreign forces should leave their country. Following the signing of the agreement, a number of important developments have been observed at the community level: there seems to be a deterioration of the relationship between elements of civil society in South Kivu and the Interahamwe, and consequently the Mai-Mai who are associated with them. These militias are now seen as predatory forces that bring hardships on local populations, take away the power of traditional leaders and aggravate the dramatic social and economic situation. Though anti-Tutsi feelings remain very strong in South Kivu, civil society representatives express as much frustration with the Interahamwe as they used to express about the RPA. In North Kivu, though it seems that some Mai-Mai groups have reached military understanding with the Interahamwe and the FDD, there have been efforts to encourage other Mai-Mai groups to return to civilian life. The presence of international observers would certainly support community leaders committed to peaceful cohabitation and encourage their efforts to distance themselves from armed groups.

  4. The Region Sets the Terms of International Involvement

    The Lusaka document creates a precedent by setting the terms for the involvement of the international community in the Congo peace plan. The region asks the Security Council to approve an "appropriate"9 chapter 7 force and clearly spells out a calendar for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. Until the UN Peacekeeping force is deployed, the JMC, composed of representatives of the belligerents, is supposed to carry out peacekeeping operations. Even the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping force is defined by the region. From the outset, the region has taken a leadership role on the operations and claims ownership of the agreement "both on content and form"10. The essence of the request is for the UN to give the regional powers a mandate of peace-enforcement, and to let them carry it out without interference.

    The UN faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it is very unlikely that the Security Council will approve a chapter 7 force, which requires the UN to find and send troops, and to take the political risk that those troops will be shot at. On the other hand, the demand highlights the failure of the international community to disarm and arrest the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide while they were in refugee camps, and creates a moral obligation on the UN to act. It remains to be seen whether the UN will agree to subcontract and legitimise the belligerents to act as peacekeepers.

Contents

Who Wins What?

All the parties had initial objectives when they entered the war but also developed new ones once fighting on DRC territory. The war economy that has developed in the Democratic Republic of Congo has created a set of powerful individuals and networks that transcend state actors. More and more people have an interest in the continuation of the war. There is no guarantee that an agreement among the major belligerents will affect those sets of interests.

  1. Kabila and his Allies - a Weakening Coalition

    The envisaged cease-fire agreement would leave Kabila's hold on power much diminished. With rebels in control of nearly all the mineral fields in the east and Zimbabwe's hold on the diamond centre of Mbuji-Mayi hotly contested by Rwanda, Kabila lacks the capacity to wage war without external support. However, although it is clear that Kabila will be weakened by the cease-fire agreement, he may well manipulate it and the National Dialogue process to his advantage. If the progress of the peace process is stalled after it is signed and before the National Dialogue begins, he will have time to employ the tactics he has used so successfully in the past. In 1996, as he began his push for power, Kabila dismissed all calls for a national conference to comprehensively involve the forces opposed to Mobutu, and instead declared himself president.

    1. Kabila - Negotiating for his own political survival

      The Congolese rebellion supported by Uganda and Rwanda that broke out last year has been both a blessing and a curse to President Kabila's career as a politician. Immediately, Kabila successfully mobilised the Congolese population in his favour by branding the war as a product of foreign aggression. He played upon national fears, isolated the ethnic element of the conflict, and called on the population to pick up spears, machetes and guns to fight the Tutsi invaders. With this combination of offensive and defensive measures, he gained significant domestic support for his actions.

      Kabila has also performed well on a regional and international level. Almost immediately, Kabila called on Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for support, and their response effectively blocked the rebels from taking over Kinshasa. He has built on this military alliance to attain diplomatic recognition and support from the Southern Africa region. On the international level, Kabila has been able to attract attention to his situation by getting audiences with prominent personalities such as the Pope, President Chirac of France and the King of Belgium.

      Having successfully stopped the rebels from taking over Kinshasa, President Kabila can now claim to have forced the rebels and their backers to the negotiation table in Lusaka. The Lusaka agreement recognises the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and recognises Kabila as head of state.

      The main reason why Kabila has been forced to negotiate is because of the weakening commitment of his allies to continue the war, and the growing military pressure on his regime. Despite claims of victories, he has not recovered any of the territory taken by the rebels and their allies since the beginning of the war. The option of a comprehensive military victory over the rebels has become elusive. The rebels continue to advance, taking strategically important locations such as Gbadolite and Zongo. Kabila's hold over the north east of the country continues to deteriorate, despite the signing of the agreement. The rebel forces are operating around Mbandaka on the Congo river only about 500 km from Kinshasa, and near Bandundu about 300 km to the east. The two thrusts make a future rebel offensive on Kinshasa possible. By signing the agreement, Kabila sought to ensure that at least he would not be removed from power as a result of a crushing military defeat at the hands of the rebels. On 26 July he went to South Africa to ask President Mbeki to put pressure on Rwanda and Uganda in the hope of forcing the rebels to sign the cease-fire deal.11 This represented a major shift in his approach; since the beginning of the war he had accused South Africa of supporting the rebels.

      The divisions within rebel ranks were another motivation for Kabila to enter negotiations. If he was to organise elections, as he claimed was his intention in Lusaka, the rebels and their backers exposed as a bunch of opportunists without a genuine program for the Congolese people would certainly lose. In Lusaka, Kabila had the opportunity to play statesman and sign the agreement, leaving the rebels to bicker over internal leadership dynamics.

      The suspension of international aid to DRC since the start of the war might also play a role in Kabila's calculation. Major donors have conditioned the resumption of aid-related talks with Kinshasa on a negotiated settlement to the conflict. By working for a negotiated settlement he signals his willingness to comply with the donors, and increases the chance of jumpstarting the stalled aid process. On a macro-economic level, Kabila wants to use the cease-fire agreement as a confidence building measure for investors. This is particularly relevant in the mining sector, where investors have been refusing to sign mining concessions with such an uncertain outcome to the war pending.

    2. Zimbabwe - The cease-fire agreement as an exit strategy

      Zimbabwe needs to get out of the DRC for many different reasons and its withdrawal will change the balance of forces dramatically. However, a SADC Allied Task Force Commander told journalists on 10 August, that the departure of the troops by the end of the year was now doubtful because of the failure of the rebels to sign the cease-fire agreement. "The cease-fire is putting itself into effect but the problem is that it is one-sided. The rebels and their allies are taking advantage of the cease-fire to gain ground."12 The commander said the cease-fire had been violated 70 times in the last month.

      Zimbabwe's interest is to prevent the rebels and their backers from taking over Kinshasa and maintaining control over the territory that they have already secured in the DRC, especially diamond-rich Mbuji-Mayi. Mineral concessions currently held by Zimbabwe are secure under the terms of the cease-fire deal, which also allows for a small contingent of Zimbabwean troops to remain behind and participate in peacekeeping operations.

      There has been mounting domestic opposition to Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC, and as a result, Zimbabwe has been looking for ways to pull out of a distant and increasingly unprofitable war. Zimbabwe needs to secure financial compensation against their investment in the war, which runs to an estimated US $3 million monthly.13 The IMF has also put conditions for the release of funds and balance of payment support for the country. Among other things, IMF requested that the cabinet makes the undertakings and expenditures public. A workable peace pact gives President Mugabe of Zimbabwe the opportunity to pull his 10,000 troops out of an unpopular war that his cash-strapped country can ill afford. "I think he has been desperate for a way to bring his troops home for sometime now because of the costs involved" 14. In the course of the war Zimbabwe has lost two war planes and several tanks. The official fatality figure stands at 20 soldiers but independent sources put the figure closer to 120.

      Zimbabwe defence industries are supplying the DRC army and need to be assured that any future government in the DRC will continue to work with them. They want to avoid the Mozambique scenario where, after supporting Frelimo with troops and equipment, they were outcompeted by South African capital.

      Zimbabwe has also realised that a military victory over the rebels and their allies is impossible in the short run. Zimbabwe's only successful military involvement in the DRC has been to stop the rebels from taking Kinshasa, and only then with the combined force of the Angolan, Namibian and Kabila government forces, and to manage to keep Mbuji-Mayi. Mugabe's announcement of an operation intended to push the rebels from their eastern bases has not materialised.

      Rwanda's allegations that Zimbabwe has been training and re-arming the Interahamwe militia have also been very damaging. During the 1996-97 war that brought Kabila to power, Zimbabwe supported Rwanda's effort to dismantle camps housing Hutu militias. Mugabe's criticism of those who planned and executed the 1994 genocide does not sit well with his policy of supporting them now, particularly given the international community's guilt over their failure to act to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Mugabe, who is regarded in the region as a statesman, cannot afford to be seen as an ally of those accused of crimes against humanity under international law. A commitment to a cease-fire agreement which isolates, disarms and destroys the power of the Hutu militias is the only way Mugabe can distance himself from these charges and rebuild the international credibility he needs to secure economic aid.

      Finally, Zimbabwe is rebuilding its links with Uganda and needs a platform from which to carry this out. In order to achieve this objective, Zimbabwe has to recognise the Congolese element to the rebellion, supported by Uganda. As a confidence building measure to Mugabe,15 Museveni sent Wamba dia Wamba to Harare (on 28 June 1999 during the Lusaka talks) to convince him that the rebellion was brought about not by the Rwandan/Ugandan ambition of building a Hima-Tutsi empire, but by real security concerns and by the need for political solutions to the DRC crisis. Given Zimbabwe's weakening military situation, this is an argument that Mugabe might be willing to accept in return for a share of leadership in the region.

    3. Angola - A cease-fire agreement in the DRC allows concentration on UNITA activities at home

      Angola's involvement in the war, like that of Rwanda and Uganda, has not been motivated by any real support for the Kabila regime. The Angolans knew that Kabila had links with UNITA, but feared that the collapse of his regime would lead to the withdrawal of his Katangese-dominated army back to Katanga. This move would make it possible for Kabila's troops to link up with UNITA, which controls the Angolan side of the border.

      Angola came in to protect domestic security interests threatened by rebel activity on Congolese territory. Angola's critical concerns were to ensure that UNITA did not manipulate the Congolese internal confusion to re-establish and expand its supply routes throughout the country. In particular, Angola was concerned that UNITA's alliance with the Congolese rebels might result in the installation of a UNITA-friendly leader in Kinshasa. Angola needs to be convinced that the Kinshasa leadership which emerges from the cease-fire agreement and National Dialogue process will commit to closing down UNITA access through the DRC.

      The Angola government has seen short-term gains from its intervention into the DRC, but may pay the price in the long run. Initially Angola derived some benefits from the intervention by denying UNITA free access to DRC ports and territory, diverting UNITA troops and resources from Angolan territory to the DRC. The strategy certainly made the war more costly for UNITA, but did not prevent them from gaining control over nearly 2/3 of Angolan territory.

      Angolan intervention in the DRC last year saved the capital Kinshasa from falling to an audacious rebel attack from the east, but in the process the Angolan army has stretched itself too thin on the ground and compromised itself at home. Angola had up to 7,000 troops in DRC when it repelled the rebel assault on Kinshasa and had since had around 1600 in the country at any given time. UNITA meanwhile has taken, secured and held strategic locations such as Malange and Huambo, and even captured territory within 60 km of the capital Luanda. Analysts in the region have warned that Angolan government forces are seriously overwhelmed by UNITA's advances, and that there is a genuine potential that UNITA could launch an attack to take the capital and gain access to the government controlled oil fields from there. Angolan support for the cease-fire agreement comes from a desperate need to concentrate on the war at home, and from a belief that an alternative to Kabila will be more able and willing to control UNITA activity on DRC territory without the need for Angolan troop intervention.

    4. Namibia - The break up of the Kaprivi crisis

      There are few reasons for the continued military involvement of Namibia into the DRC. The Namibian involvement can only be explained in terms of the warm relationship between Namibian President Sam Nujoma, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Kabila. The friendship between Nujoma and Mugabe started in their early days as freedom fighters against white minority rule in their countries. Nujoma and Kabila used to belong to informal marxist discussion groups in Dar Es Salaam, where they were exiled in 1960's. After Kabila took over, he formed a diamond company with Nujoma.

      The war costs to Namibia have not been high and its contribution in troops and equipment has been modest, so the engagement is more a symbolic show of solidarity amongst a group of former liberation movement leaders than the expression of any real interest in the outcome of the war. With the break up of the secessionist crisis in Kaprivi on the border with Botswana, Namibia needs her troops home to battle the rebels who claim independence.

  2. The Rebels and their Allies - Unhappy Winners

    The Lusaka agreement gives the rebels and allies exactly what they have asked for. As a group, the Congolese rebels and their external partners have largely achieved their objectives. Although there have been machinations around the signing of the agreement by all the rebel factions, it should be made clear that none of them disputes the content of the agreement. Unhappy with Kabila's government, they have successfully drawn international attention to their concerns, while using the war against the government to pursue their individual agendas. The cease-fire agreement contains mechanisms to address all their demands, and whatever the outcome of the National Dialogue and the domestic power struggle ahead, they have ensured that Kabila is significantly weakened militarily, politically and in terms of regional alliances. The road forward may not be clearly defined, but at the least they have, through the terms of the agreement, secured national, regional and international support for their involvement in the solution to the DRC conflict.

    However, there is serious fragmentation within the alliance, and a positioning crisis that could jeopardise the successes attained. There is the leadership quarrel between the RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani factions, uncertainty about the potential leadership role of Wamba dia Wamba given his strong Tanzanian and Ugandan support, and Uganda's power over Bemba. Although Rwanda has signed the agreement, its proxy RCD-Goma has not, which opens them to serious pressure from all sides while also allowing Rwanda to pursue its objectives of wiping out the Interahamwe. Significantly, the Banyamulenge issue is not catered for by the agreement and this could also be viewed as an exit strategy for the Rwandans.

    One of the reasons that could explain why the RCD-Goma has not signed is to keep the door open for the capture of Mbuji-Mayi by RPA-backed Congolese rebels. This capture is essential to prevent Kabila from having access to resources that he could use to manipulate the National Dialogue and finance his political programs.

    1. Congolese Rebels - Factions, positions and interests

      The division of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)

      From the beginning, the RCD has been divided. It originated as a compromise movement composed of politicians from different backgrounds and with differing agendas. It was a pragmatic solution, quickly organised after the failure to overthrow Kabila in August 1998. The idea was to have a consensus-based movement, in order to avoid the hijacking of the movement by any one individual, as occurred with Kabila and the AFDL. The internal dynamic soon led to a deterioration in relationships within the RCD. It was no surprise, therefore, that the fragmentation of the RCD led to the paralysis of the signing of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement on 10 July 1999.

      At the end of December 1998, it was obvious that there were major splits emerging. The news from Goma was that Lunda Bululu, Mobutu's former Prime Minister, and other Mobutists in the RCD were against Wamba dia Wamba. The split became public in a New Year's eve speech, broadcast on Radio Goma by Wamba which criticised the RCD for succumbing to Mobutists forces, and warned the rebellion against installing another Mobutu in Kinshasa. The real split came in early March when Wamba, by then the RCD President, moved to Kisangani ostensibly to bring Bemba into the RCD and attempt to regain control over the movement. Though Bemba is also associated with the Mobutists,16 both RCD factions want him on their side due to the strong support he commands in his home province Equateur, and because of his strong financial basis, ensured by those members of Mobutu's government who managed to make billions during the regime. The most likely explanation for the split is that Wamba at that time had called for direct negotiations with Kabila, which could not be accepted by the military/political wing of the RCD.

      On the first day of his arrival in Kisangani, Wamba replaced his Rwandan body guards with Ugandan body guards. Since then a plot to oust him has been pursued in earnest.17 In May 1999, key RCD officials including Emile Ilunga, Bizima Karaha, Moise Nyarugabo, Lunda Bululu and Alexis Tambwe announced that the college of founding members that had elected Wamba as Chairman of RCD, had removed him. Wamba disputed his ousters and claimed that the move was a coup d'État. Since then there have been two factions, each claiming to be the legitimate RCD.

      Without resolving these divisions, the RCD will face political demise when the DRC enters the post negotiations phase, when it will have to compete politically. Kabila knows that the RCD is in a precarious position and is confident that it will not survive the "peace era"18. In Lusaka, the RCD took a very defensive position on the political front by not signing the agreement. It can't be ruled out that the RCD will undertake a military action to reaffirm itself as the main player.

      Investigations by the South African Foreign Minister and Zambian Minister of State concerning RCD leadership claims are still going on. These will determine whether Wamba should sign the agreement and under what terms. It is quite clear however, that a leadership dispute within the movement cannot justify their refusal to sign or their decision to continue fighting.

      Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) - An emerging political and military force?

      This movement, led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, has risen from relative obscurity to a central position in the DRC, and constitutes a real competitor to the RCD. When the war broke out last year, Bemba, eager to engage in the anti-Kabila movement, was isolated by the RCD - the only existing rebel movement. "I had differences with the RCD on political and military strategy. That was my only problem with them. When Wamba dia Wamba was the President of the RCD, I wrote two letters to him requesting to join the war against Kabila, but I never got any reply that was why I started the MLC", Bemba claims.19

      Bemba has established himself as a recognised rebel leader. He is popular in areas he controls, especially in Equateur where he comes from; he is supported financially by former Mobutists, married to Mobutu's daughter and backed militarily by the UDPF. When Congolese parties to the conflict enter the National Debate, Bemba will be treated as an equal partner. For a man who was not known in Congolese political circles before the war, this is a major motivation for him to enter into negotiations and benefit from his swiftly elevated status. It also explains why he signed so quickly, and before other rebel groups. As the factions within the RCD bicker among themselves, Bemba offers himself as the only credible and rational rebel leader now, and potential alternative to Kabila in the future.

      However, Bemba's commitment to stop fighting seems very ambivalent. Although Bemba signed the ceasefire agreement, he put a condition on his signing. He pledged to resume fighting if RCD-Goma did not sign by the end of the week. Before that week finished, he came up with allegations that Kabila had used a Sudanese Antonov to bomb Makanza and Bogbongo, but did not allow any journalists to go there to find evidence of the bombing. In fact it seems he exaggerated the incident to buy time and carry on fighting. Immediately the Ugandan Minister Amama Mbabazi warned that this was a 'serious violation of the cease-fire and could shatter the fragile pact'20

      It is clear that even as the agreement was signed, Bemba's troops were advancing militarily. They captured Gbadolite and Gemena during the Lusaka negotiations, and also took control of Zongo, a major strategic town on the border with Central African Republic, after the agreement was signed. They are now moving towards Mbandaka, directly threatening Kinshasa.

    2. Uganda - Peace process as war strategy

      The MLC's ambiguous strategy raises many questions about Uganda's objectives. After the signing of the Lusaka agreement, Uganda deployed more troops in the North. While on the one hand Uganda is key in the efforts for peace, it is also the backer of the most aggressive rebel military force in the post-Lusaka context.

      A favourable military situation and secured interests

      Uganda has justified its intervention by claiming that it is concerned about the security threats emanating from Sudanese supported rebels, the Lords Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces. Uganda 's support for rebels in the north of the DRC is aimed at blocking their regional rivals, the Sudanese, from using the area, a potential direct threat to Ugandan sovereignty, access to resources and political stability. Kabila is closely allied to the Khartoum leadership, and has worked with them to define and implement a joint military strategy against Uganda.

      Ugandan troops deployed in the northern sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo faced few challenges. The only confrontation was with Chadian troops sent to reinforce Kabila's forces last year. After some weeks, the Chadians withdrew from the frontline, due to unfamiliar terrain and mounting causalities. Since then, Uganda has successfully occupied and controlled this northern sector. The capture of Gbadolite during the Lusaka negotiations was extremely significant; both symbolically as late President Mobutu's birthplace, as a political bargaining chip and strategically due to its airfield and military supply base. The tactic demonstrates the power of Uganda's military and the wider strategic framework being pursued. With Gbadolite in their hands, Uganda can confidently allow inter-Congolese negotiations to go forward, as the agreement stipulates that respective rebel groups and their allies will retain control of areas currently occupied until there is a new political dispensation in the DRC. This will enable Uganda to continue its campaign to neutralise rebel groups trained by Sudan. It will also send a message to neighbouring countries that Uganda has a military force that could have gone all the way to Kinshasa.

      However, that strategy has not improved the security of Uganda in the north. The guerrilla movements are fighting inside Ugandan territory, and still causing serious fatalities.

      In fact, Uganda's interests in the DRC war are more diverse than just security. The objective is to ensure the country's political and commercial influence in the north east of the DRC. Bemba is an ideal ally in that game plan; he has the support of Mobutists, who have also invested a lot of money in Uganda since 1996. Conversely, Bemba's popularity and military strength in Equateur allows the Ugandans to have access to the gold mines, such as the Kilomoto mines. Since the beginning of the war in the DRC, a large amount of the gold on the international market has been sold through Kampala.

      Bemba has recruited and, with the help of Ugandan instructors, trained thousands of troops since last September 21 . Apart from fighting alongside Ugandan troops Bemba is carrying out political mobilisation of the population by setting up local administration units similar to the local councils in Uganda, which are heavily encouraged by Uganda. By setting up this form of territorial administration, establishing links with Congolese businessmen and supporting their efforts to trade in Kampala, the Ugandans have managed to make their occupation strategy look less Ugandan and more Congolese, and thus ensure a sustainable connection with this region. These allegiances will mean that Uganda's interests and control will be protected after they withdraw their troops.

      Uganda's support for Wamba in the RCD leadership crisis can also be interpreted as a strategic alliance that will further the country's interests in a future Congolese government. Although he is considered as being from the Diaspora, Wamba could be a candidate for presidency. He has the support of Tanzania, where he lived and taught, and would give Bas Congo an opportunity to have a president (Mobutu was from Equateur).

      Mounting international and domestic pressure on Museveni to negotiate and withdraw

      International donors who have been supportive of President Museveni's economic reforms are questioning the wisdom of the continued presence of Ugandan troops in the DRC. Donors have been questioning raised defence expenditures, especially since the deployment of troops in August 1998. Museveni is in danger of losing his reputation as a regional broker, and the donor support that this credibility has assured him. The World Bank in particular is criticising military expenditures as Uganda is a beneficiary of the debt relief facility under the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPIC) scheme.

      The United States is concerned that Uganda's involvement in the DRC is also weakening the ability of the Ugandan government to deal with the Sudan situation and support the SPLA effectively.

      The involvement of Ugandan troops in the DRC also compromises Museveni's domestic agenda as Ugandan public opinion is firmly against troops abroad. With a referendum that will determine the future of his system of government due next year, President Museveni is being pressured to withdraw. 22 Ugandan troops deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo have also been hit by massive desertions due to poor logistical management in delivering salaries, medicine and in some instances, food.

      Museveni using the cease-fire agreement as a diplomatic strategy

      President Yoweri Museveni is known for using both war and diplomacy to achieve his objectives. He is famous for his slogan "talk as you fight and fight as you talk". On his way to power through armed struggle he signed a peace agreement brokered by President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya in 1985, but went ahead and captured power a few months later.

      The irony of this war is that Presidents Mugabe and Museveni are close friends, with the same ideological orientation, they were both in exile in Dar-Es-Salaam Tanzania, where former President Nyerere23 had an influence on their political thinking. Both Presidents support the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), fighting the Arab dominated regime in Khartoum. The cease-fire agreement is the only way Museveni and Mugabe can re-establish their comradeship. "Uganda does not consider Zimbabwe as an enemy. We just found ourselves on different sides"24 , according to the Ugandan Minister for regional cooperation Amama Mbabazi.

      Another reason behind Museveni's eagerness to support the Lusaka agreement is to end the suspicions that he has ambitions of building a Hima-Tutsi empire over Africa.25 This agreement ensures the security of Uganda and gives Museveni the opportunity to reclaim his pan-African credentials. Museveni's vision for Africa is of an integrated continent both economically and politically: "The greatest single factor why economic integration cannot take place in a context of political fragmentation is the lack of a political superstructure necessary for the integration process. Given the present economically weak states, there is no African state that can impose discipline on the others by economic or other forms of pressure" he explained in a presentation last year26 . The success of the cease-fire agreement restores the regional solidarity needed for the fulfilment of the objective of an integrated region.

    3. Rwanda - Hesitating about giving up a military solution?

      Rwanda risks being isolated by the region

      Rwanda's demands, especially the promise to disarm the Interahamwe militias, have been included in the cease-fire agreement. Rwanda is no longer referred to as an aggressor, but as a party to the conflict. In signing the agreement, they signalled their compliance with the regional consensus among African heads of state that the Congo conflict must be resolved through political means. However, RCD-Goma has refused to sign the cease-fire agreement, ostensibly because the former President Wamba dia Wamba wants to sign. In order to continue their mission to destroy the Interahamwe, Rwanda needs RCD-Goma to remain outside the agreement. By not urging the rebels to sign, and manipulating their position as signatories who have not stopped fighting, Rwanda is seen as the major obstacle in the way of implementation of the agreement despite the fact that all the parties have stated that it is an acceptable framework.

      Regional goodwill is being tested by Rwanda's hesitation to work with the region on the DRC peace process.27 South Africa and Tanzania, Rwanda's allies in the past, are now putting pressure on Rwanda to bring in RCD-Goma. If Rwanda does not comply, it risks being isolated by all its regional allies. In the Lusaka agreement, the recognition of the problem, the pledge to solve it, and the designation of Rwanda as a party and not an aggressor gives Rwanda more legitimacy than ever before to carry out the fight against her enemies on foreign territory. This is an opportunity that they should not miss. Whether Kabila and his allies are able and willing to deliver the Interahamwe could prove a decisive factor in the conflict and the cease-fire agreement. If the Hutu militias are not delivered, Rwanda will not cease fighting on Congolese territory.

      No end to the fighting until the Interahamwe/Ex-FAR issue is resolved, Kagame says

      Among the countries involved in the DRC, Rwanda has been consistent on why it has deployed troops there. Since 1994, Rwandan government officials have said that their only interest in the DRC is the presence of militias and ex- government forces (Ex- FAR) blamed for the 1994 genocide. Both forces have been fighting to return home by force, so Rwanda's position on the Interahamwe problem is to defeat them militarily: "We don't envisage any point at which we shall compromise with genocidaires. If these were people with a cause, then we could find some kind of agreement. You cannot have a bunch of criminals holding a country at ransom. We shall fight them, that is the solution."28 The number of Hutu militias stand at between 20,000 and 40,000, according to Rwandan official figures. Over 10,000 are said to be fighting alongside Kabila and his allies.

      The Rwandans have clearly stated their intention to fight regardless of a cease-fire. Kagame stated: "I can't stop the Zimbabweans doing whatever they want. They can decide to take the whole of their army to Congo even after signing the peace agreement. I can't stop them. But for Rwanda to defend itself, that is a different matter. We have the capacity to defend our country and continue fighting in Congo for a long time with all these problems that you have mentioned. And I think Zimbabweans know that well. Let them get the message very clear. They came in with hot air, saying they were going to march to the border. You ask them what happened."29

      Rwanda has been pressured to sign, and it is using the cease-fire to gain the moral high ground as a victim of Kabila's machinations. Rwanda also wants to use Lusaka to humiliate the United Nations as a lame duck, a strategy employed in the past: "I know how to fight the insurgents, does the UN also know?"30 Kagame has remarked.

      The Rwandans also have considerable intelligence about the location of the Interahamwe outside the DRC; in CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi and Tanzania and as sheltered by UNITA and other forces. They believe the only solution is a military one and feel that they are the only ones who can be trusted to achieve this and end the problem once and for all. After the failure of the international community to deal with the issue in the past, and the unwillingness of the international community to deal with it now, Rwanda has no option but to continue to wage war against the militias. Only when the situation has been cleaned up to their satisfaction will they devolve their territorial and military control to the Congolese.

      They are also still strategising about capturing Mbuji Mayi, which would be a major turning point in the war and change the balance of force radically. However, such an offensive would result in heavy casualties as the Zimbabweans are still in Mbuji Mayi, and the political price to pay for taking the city after signing the cease-fire would be very high.

Contents

Part 2 of 2

[Central Africa Menu]- [ICG Home]- [TOP]