A Peace, or Just A Cease-Fire?

The Military Equation In Post-Dayton Bosnia

December 15, 1997 (Part 2 of 2)

Shortly after the start of the military reduction process described in the previous section, a US-directed effort to build the military capabilities of the Federation commenced. This assistance programme, christened "Train and Equip" by its US-backers, is an important element in the military equation in post-war Bosnia, although it has several different aspects and a rationale and identity that has shifted with the passage of time, leaving its ultimate significance unclear.

This section will outline the Train and Equip programme as it has developed since its inception, examine the main arguments for and against, and attempt to distinguish its practical impact in both military and political terms from the hopes and fears of advocates and detractors. A systematic look at the programme is overdue since public discussion of Train and Equip has been sporadic, consisting mainly of intermittent coverage in the national and international media when arms shipments arrive.

As its name suggests, the assistance provided under Train and Equip consists of several forms of military training as well as deliveries of military equipment. The training is provided by Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), a US private sector company based near Washington. MPRI is licensed to provide military assistance to foreign governments and it employs a staff of about 180 former US military personnel in Bosnia. MPRI's initial 13-month, $50 million contract with the Federation went into effect on 6 August 1996 and was recently extended for an additional year, through 5 September 1998.

Although MPRI is a commercial operation, its contract with the Federation is paid for with donor funds and is co-ordinated by the Department of State's Task Force for Military Stabilisation in the Balkans (OMSB). The director and chief spokesman for the effort is Ambassador James Pardew, US Special Representative for Military Stabilisation in the Balkans. Like the senior MPRI staff, Pardew is a retired US Army officer.

The arrangement for subsidising training that is provided by a civilian contractor was initially devised after the formation of the Federation in March 1994. One of the purposes was to side-step the international arms embargo then in effect without risking an open conflict between the US and the European governments which, then as now, opposed introducing more arms into the region.

MPRI's first appearance in the region had been a 1994 contract with the Croatian government to advise on the management of the Croatian defence ministry. MPRI spokesmen say they had nothing to do with the successful Croatian military campaigns in the spring and summer of 1995 since their training programmes had barely started when those campaigns took place.

The US has defended Train and Equip, arguing that at the start of the war in Bosnia, the correlation of military forces overwhelmingly favoured the Serb beneficiaries of the JNA. That imbalance was locked into place by the 1991 UN Security Council embargo on arms imports to all parts of the Former Yugoslavia, which the US supported when it was imposed, but later regretted. The absence of an organised Bosnian military force not only made it impossible to deter or suppress the Serb and Croat secessionist drives, but left Bosnian cities such as Sarajevo and Bihac defenceless and unable to break sieges until the final months of the war.

The European governments that have committed troops to IFOR/SFOR have persistently questioned the wisdom of any military build-up so soon after the war on the grounds that it is "destabilising". European officials have muted their disagreement with the US policy by not criticising Train and Equip openly, but they have opposed the military assistance indirectly and have turned a deaf ear to repeated US requests to contribute to the programme. Some US political and military analysts share European doubts about Train and Equip. Thus a low intensity debate about the programme has smouldered.

The Training Component

According to OMSB news releases, the training component of Train and Equip is designed to assist the Federation Army become "a self-sufficient and fully operable force capable of providing security for the Federation and stability for the region by attaining minimum levels of combat effectiveness and readiness." The emphasis in OMSB literature and in nearly all statements by Pardew is on the defensive nature of the project. For example, the programme is said to aim to provide the Federation Army "with sufficient military capabilities to deter against ground attack by the Bosnian Serb Army and defend Federation territory should deterrence fail."

However, it is worth examining several assumptions implicit in this formulation: that the Federation Army is indeed a viable and unified military organisation, as opposed to the sum of two separate and antagonistic Bosniac and Croat components; that a renewed Serb attack is still the primary threat scenario and is more plausible than, for example, a renewed Croat secession drive or a Bosniac misadventure; and that acquiring a defensive capability does not entail acquiring an offensive capability as well.

The MPRI trainers provide a comprehensive bundle of military advice to the Federation Army. These consist of unit training for elements of platoons, companies, battalions and brigades; staff training for ranking officers; and a variety of individual training programmes: professional development courses for non-commissioned officers, company-grade officer training, and staff officer and leader training, including courses for about a dozen officers in the US.

Combat training takes the form of small unit tactics; battle management training through war games conducted with a sophisticated computer system at a combat simulation centre near Sarajevo; and live-fire tank and artillery training at ranges in western Bosnia and in Turkey. An additional component is flight training for the pilots of 15 utility (Huey) helicopters which is scheduled to take place this winter at a German military flight school. This appears to be the first direct European participation in the programme, although the German government maintains that the flight training is separate and distinct from Train and Equip.

Based on journalistic portrayals of the programme, which are often spiced with bellicose quotes from trainees about what they will do to the Serbs when the opportunity presents, one could get the impression that MPRI is turning out tens of thousands of warriors. But in interviews, MPRI officials insist the programme is actually far more complex, focused primarily on one of the essentials of "state-building", which is to create a coherent military establishment that has a monopoly on, and effective civilian control over, the use of military force.

MPRI stresses that its aim is to build a "NATO-type" military. This means not only the use of NATO standard weapons, but tactics and doctrines that are standard in advanced western countries: for example, indoctrination in the principle that in a democracy the military is subordinate to civilian command, and that soldiers must not meddle in politics; that military leadership is a staff-work process in which subordinates respond to a "guidance" and generate proposals which are then evaluated by higher-ups and eventually confirmed as orders; that the troops of a professional army adhere to rules the US Army calls the Law of Land Warfare and consequently do not shoot prisoners, torch villages and shell civilian targets; and in general, that war-fighting is a complex management process the essence of which is planning, team-work, co-ordination, logistics and re-supply rather than issuing commands.

The degree to which this is novel in Bosnia may not be clear to those unfamiliar with the recent war. There was no Bosnian Army at all at the start and the initial desperate defence of Sarajevo was mounted mainly by self-defence units cobbled together by mafia organisations and made up largely of youths whose ideas of battle stemmed as much from action films as from the year of military service that most had spent in the JNA. They were bold, disorganised and inventive, a law unto themselves, and also sometimes responsible for atrocities. And when opportunities for theft and personal enrichment presented themselves, they were corrupt.

As the government began to organise the rudiments of the Bosnian Army, the mafia leaders were driven out and "regular" units were established, but these were by no means conventional either. The officer corps was small at the start. The Serbs had traditionally dominated the JNA officer corps, and relatively few Bosniacs had sought careers in the military. The initial Bosnian Army officer corps consisted of a few trained Bosniac officers and a handful of Serb and Croat officers who defected from the JNA, plus others who were promoted unsystematically, sometimes based on battlefield bravery and sometimes because they were well connected. One aspect of the war known to Bosnians but not to many internationals was the incompetence of some of the leaders. There are tales of poorly trained conscripts sent out on impossible missions. Corps commanders tended to operate independently in their areas of the country and sometimes, in the mould of "war lords", to get rich through smuggling, often in partnership with enemy commanders. Bosnian Army units rarely helped each other in combined operations, and almost never took and held ground. Most of the front-lines were static until the last weeks of the war.

This dismal picture of the effectiveness of the wartime Bosnian Army should not cast a shadow over the bravery and commitment of thousands of officers and fighters. To the contrary, it indicates the grave obstacles they had to overcome. However, it also suggests the scope of the task inherent in Train and Equip.

The Equipment Component

Press accounts of Train and Equip have generally emphasised the provision of modern weapons and equipment which began to arrive in air shipments to Sarajevo in late August 1996, and by sea to the Croatian port of Ploce that November. The core equipment was provided from used but refurbished US surplus stocks paid for under a $100 million "draw-down" which had been authorised by the US Congress several months before the Dayton Peace Conference.

The light equipment consisted of 45,100 M-16 rifles with ammunition; 1,000 M-60 machine guns; an assortment of field radios and telephones; and other key gear such as binoculars, generators and computers with software. The heavy equipment included 45 upgraded Vietnam-era M60A3 main battle tanks; 80 M113A2 armoured personnel carriers; 840 AT-4 light anti-tank weapons; and 15 UH-1H (Huey) utility helicopters.

In December 1996, the first non-US donation to Train and Equip arrived at Ploce: 36 105mm howitzers, with ammunition and spare parts, from the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and 12 130mm field guns, 12 122mm howitzers, and 18 23mm anti-aircraft guns, with spare parts, from Egypt. Later the UAE delivered 44 ML90 armoured personnel carriers and 42 French-built AMX30 tanks. And in October 1997, the US delivered an additional 116 refurbished 155mm field howitzers. Drawing on financial donations from countries including Brunei and Malaysia, the Federation has also purchased an assortment of several hundred refurbished trucks from a company in Holland.

According to MPRI, the total value of the equipment and training furnished to date is about $400 million. The scale of this build-up is modest as can be gauged by comparison with the agreed ceiling on Federation heavy weaponry under Article IV of the Florence arms reduction agreement described above.

In sum, the equipment, is well below the arms control ceilings established at Florence, although it is far better than the equipment held by the Federation at the end of the war and is superior in quality and condition to most of the Bosnian Serb arsenal. In only one category, artillery, was the Federation obliged to destroy stock to stay under the Florence limits, whereas Republika Srpska had substantial "destruction liabilities" in tanks, armoured personnel carriers and aircraft. This suggests that Republika Srpska will maintain numerical superiority in most categories of weaponry unless international deliveries continue indefinitely, which Pardew says is unlikely.

The Practical Impact

It is evident from Pardew's statements that much of the effort has gone into the creation of the bureaucratic structure of a unified Federation army. The key event, which had to take place before Train and Equip could begin, was the passage of the Federation Defence Law. That took place on 9 July 1996 and the MPRI contract was signed on 16 July. Thereafter, although some training began and most of the weapons were shipped, the release of weapons was held back, pending other key organisational steps such as approval of the joint Federation force structure in January 1997, agreement on the location of major unit headquarters in May, and adoption of a joint Federation military strategy.

Initially, neither Bosniacs nor Bosnian Croats seemed to have much enthusiasm for unification. They simply wanted to receive the weapons, divide them up and learn to use them. Much of Pardew's labour has gone into persuading the reluctant partners that there is a quid pro quo for the military aid: they at least have to demonstrate a good-faith effort to become a unified force.

MPRI officials say that, at the start, the Bosniacs and Croats would barely talk to each other. But they add that, with some key personnel changes, an atmosphere of civility and co-operation has begun to emerge and that, during the past year, there has been great progress. Whether this co-operation will prove permanent remains to be seen.

MPRI needs to emphasise different aspects of the programme to different audiences. The Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats need to be prodded with hold-backs of equipment as well as encouraged with positive reinforcement. On the one hand, most in the US want to hear the programme is doing well and is helping to prepare the way for an "exit strategy", meaning the withdrawal of US forces from Bosnia. On the other hand, some in the US and European officials need to be persuaded that the programme is not doing so well that it will cause an eventual resumption of the war.

Building an integrated NATO-type military in Bosnia is still an uphill task. SFOR officials agree with MPRI estimates that, despite progress made to date, the Federation Army is by no means capable of mounting "combined operations" (using forces in an integrated, synchronised manner) at the battalion level, and will not be capable of doing so for several years. Meanwhile, as a measure to encourage Bosniac-Croat co-operation, the heavy weapons are stored on Bosniac territory and the ammunition on Croat turf.

The most fundamental question concerning the effect of Train and Equip is raised by Europeans and sceptical analysts in the US: can the programme be considered truly "defensive", or does it have a destabilising offensive potential as well?

In answering that question, neither the numerical count of weapons nor the implementation of bureaucratic steps such as adoption of joint defensive doctrines are as meaningful as a judgement of qualitative factors such as the attitudes, morale, economic base, strategic vulnerabilities and military skills of the parties, all in the context of the political environment in Bosnia and the Balkans, as noted above in section III.

Pardew says that the Train and Equip programme, although improving Federation planning, logistics and command and control capabilities, will not radically change its capabilities. He notes that, even with Train and Equip, the Federation Army will have no air force, very little air defence, limited mobility, and insufficient logistical capability to sustain an operation beyond two or three days, which is the key to offensive action.

Pardew insists that Train and Equip is purely defensive in nature and that, moreover, the Bosniacs are well aware of their complicated situation and would not attempt a rash act. But he acknowledges with some frustration the difficulty of countering sceptical analysts who emphasise the destabilising potential of even an ostensibly defensive build-up. Such analysts assume that more weapons would be likely to restart an arms race and fuel an "endgame" attack by the Bosniacs, or entangle the US into an endless preventive commitment. "The Bosnian people have the right of self defence," Pardew counters. "The problem is you can't prove a negative, and you can't prove intentions," he adds.

The Shifting Logic and Packaging

An important element in the controversy over Train and Equip stems from the complexity of the goals that the programme is intended to achieve, which have shifted in emphasis over time as the situation in Bosnia has changed.

Most advocates of Train and Equip, on the one hand, argue from a moralistic position that has its antecedents in the US debate over the war in Bosnia dating back almost three years before the Dayton Peace Conference. Advocates of what was then called the "Lift and Strike" option -- that is, bombing the Bosnian Serb forces and lifting the arms embargo as to be able to deliver weapons to the Bosniacs -- argued that it was immoral not to right the obvious imbalance in military capabilities.

In the prevailing European view, on the other hand, the emphasis is not on righting past wrongs but rather on assuring regional stability in the future. In this view, the tragedy in 1992 was not entirely the fault of European governments which could not agree on a common foreign and security policy. It was also caused by the inherent political divisions in Bosnia, and by US unwillingness to risk troops on the ground alongside the Europeans in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). This weakened the UNPROFOR peace-keeping effort and reduced the chances of enforcing the long succession of UN Security Council resolutions for which the US voted, but for the implementation of which it declined to assume any risk. Thus, opponents of Train and Equip argue that if the main objective is preventing the war next time, maintaining the post-war military stalemate is more useful than giving the Bosniacs military means to accompany the motive they may have to launch an "endgame strategy".

These sharply conflicting views of Train and Equip and of each other's wisdom in supporting or opposing it are to some degree caricatures, and they have impeded a serious discussion of the programme. Moreover, among diplomats and military officers in Bosnia, it is generally taboo to discuss the pros and cons of Train and Equip on the record.

If and when such a discussion does take place, the shifting rationales for military assistance offered at different junctures should be examined:

As noted above, the initial US aim was to "level the battlefield" and oppose Bosnian Serb aggression without risking American lives.
By the time of the March 1994 Washington cease-fire between Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats, military assistance was seen as a carrot to persuade the two sides to coexist within the Federation and make common cause against the Bosnian Serbs.
Simultaneously, military assistance was promoted as a way to replace the "foreign" (extremist) influence which was by then quite evident in Central Bosnia and in a few branches of the Sarajevo government.
During the year before the Dayton Peace Conference, pressure was building in the US Congress to force the Clinton Administration to unilaterally break the arms embargo. The Administration refused to do this overtly because of the damage that step would have done to relations within NATO, but it evidently approved, or at least turned a blind eye to, some covert arms shipments from the Middle East. Promising to provide assistance through Train and Equip was seen by the Clinton Administration as a way to win Congressional support for the peace settlement whose implementation would clearly require American ground forces.
At Dayton, Train and Equip was offered to the Bosniac delegation as a sweetener to win acceptance of a territorial division that left Sarajevo in effective control of far less than half the country despite the huge numbers of displaced Bosniacs trying to return to their homes.
In selling the DPA to Congress, Train and Equip was pitched as a way to strengthen the Federation so that it would become a free-standing entity capable of defending itself and enabling the NATO force, especially the US component thereof, to withdraw within 12 months. Thus, it become closely linked in the minds of many in Congress to the Administration's "exit strategy".

Train and Equip and Republika Srpska

In the period since Dayton, Train and Equip has served an interesting two-sided function with respect to Republika Srpska. The prospect of increasing Federation strength through Train and Equip has been portrayed, at least tacitly, as a sword of Damocles that might lever the Bosnian Serbs into complying with the key civilian provisions of the DPA, such as permitting freedom of movement and the return of displaced Bosniacs and Croats to their homes in Republika Srpska.

In recent months, however, as the West has courted Bosnian Serb President Biljana Plavsic and supported her moves against the hard-line leadership in Pale, Train and Equip has begun to assume a surprising reverse image. Pardew and others have begun to hold out "membership" in Train and Equip to Republika Srpska as an ambiguous form of carrot. The form this membership might take is far from clear, but it seems the programme could evolve into an inducement to reward Republika Srpska for co-operation, analogous to its post-1994 function in the formation of the Federation.

Bosnian Serb officials have shown some interest in this latest incarnation of Train and Equip. However, they have focused on the prospect of getting new equipment, while minimising the training. A 1 November commentary in the Belgrade newspaper Vecernje Novosti, for example, indicated that Bosnian Serb politicians see the offer of training as a stalking horse for the creation of a joint executive command which "the international community seems to be longing for, and by which the framework of Dayton would be exceeded, since the entities have full independence regarding the military and defence."

On the theme of NATO expansion, the commentary continued: "The establishment of a joint command would facilitate NATO's goal to come closer to the East by another step, and to stay permanently in the [Bosnia] area.... It is becoming more obvious that this programme has much wider and deeper interests than mere help for the 'unarmed' Muslim army...."

The next day, Vecernje Novosti carried a statement by Bosnian Serb Chief of General Staff Gen. Pero Colic that the Republika Srpska army "is interested in entering the NATO project regarding equipment, but it will need only a basic training for new weapons. A programme of possible participation by our army is being made. We don't need training as much as the Federation army does."

In a 4 November interview in Demokratija, a Belgrade newspaper, President Plavsic also welcomed the idea of receiving new equipment. "Regarding preservation of peace and stability, I think that equal treatment of the Republika Srpska and Federation armies may only contribute to that," she said. "Of course, without conditioning, since the Federation is not presented with any conditions either.... We accepted Dayton as it is, and we can neither reduce it nor add anything."

The general thrust of these comments suggests, unsurprisingly, that the Bosnian Serbs remain allergic to the idea of trading "membership" in Train and Equip for incorporation into a unitary state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, they seem cautiously open to the idea of being "westernised" to the extent of accepting some assistance, although Colic said subsequently that this could not be done without FRY and Russian approval.

Presumably, the extension of Train and Equip to cover the Bosnian Serbs would be a drawn out process that would have benefits in terms of lowering tensions and increasing transparency. It is far too early to predict whether that process could lead to the creation of a single army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, given the bitterness of the recent war and the sharply clashing goals of the Federation and Republika Srpska.

In any case, it should be clear that with such a complex and chameleon-like identity, Train and Equip merits straightforward and serious discussion rather than the oblique criticism it has received to date. Conclusions listed in the final section of this report could serve as a point of departure for a new look at Train and Equip.

"Exit Strategy": Squaring The Circle

The Double-Bind

As the pre-announced end-date of the SFOR mandate approaches, civilian and military planners are coming to grips with the realisation that a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia is not yet in sight.

Achieving the ambitious DPA goals -- forging a unified state of Bosnia and Herzegovina out of the shaky Federation and resistant and unstable Republika Srpska -- is a complex social engineering project. And it is not made easier by the quest for a so-called "exit strategy".

On the one hand, the US Administration is feeling domestic political pressure to arrive at an "end-state" in which US combat troops, which make up the backbone of the NATO force, are withdrawn from Bosnia. On the other hand, the international community, led by the US, is seeking full implementation of aspects of the DPA which experience has demonstrated can only occur if the NATO force intervenes more actively than it has done to date, and if it continues to intervene for an extended period.

The key DPA undertakings that national authorities have proven generally unwilling to fulfil are: guaranteeing the security and the rights of displaced national minorities trying to return to their homes; installing the winners of municipal elections in areas where they belong to the minority group; and especially in the Republika Srpska, arresting accused war criminals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former-Yugoslavia (ICTY) and surrendering them to The Hague for trial.

Establishing additional conditions central to any democratic state -- rule of law, professional police forces, independent judiciaries and fully open media -- appears beyond the present capacity or will of the authorities in all three national groupings, although Bosniac authorities have made greater progress than the others in some areas.

Thus two years after Dayton, it is generally recognised that the conditions for a lasting and stable peace will not have been achieved by June 1998, not even if SFOR were to take a more interventionist posture in the meantime. In these circumstances, a withdrawal of the NATO force would lead to an intensification of the political conflict driven by nationalist parties in all three groups and renewed fighting would be almost inevitable.

The NATO Force In Bosnia

The NATO force which stabilised the cease-fire after the DPA was signed began life as the "Implementation Force" (IFOR) and a year later was halved in size and renamed the "Stabilisation Force" (SFOR). Planning papers make clear that if the mandate of the NATO force is extended past June 1998, it will be called something else, probably the "Deterrence Force", not only because the mission may change, but also because whenever a new name is adopted, the prior mission can be declared "accomplished", which is a domestic political consideration in troop contributing countries such as the US.

Beneath the nomenclature, the reality is that NATO countries dispatched a multilateral intervention force to attempt to enforce a treaty that imposes a new code of conduct on a deeply divided society. Euphemistic renamings do not hide the fact that the intervention is a complex undertaking that will not be completed soon.

The original NATO force was authorised by the UN Security Council on 15 December 1995 and approved by the North Atlantic Council the next day. It numbered close to 60,000 troops, some of them European units already in Bosnia as part of the prior UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and about 19,000 of them American. IFOR was created on 20 December 1995 when UNPROFOR transferred its authority in Bosnia, and it lasted until 20 December 1996, when it metamorphosed into the SFOR. SFOR today is about 32,000 strong, of which about 8,000 are American.

IFOR's primary tasks, listed in its mission statement, were to ensure its self defence ("force protection") and freedom of movement, to establish and mark the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Zones of Separation, to ensure a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of "foreign forces" from Bosnia, to monitor and enforce the redeployment of entity forces agreed in the DPA, to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, to control Bosnian airspace; and to establish a Joint Military commission to resolve all military issues.

IFOR's secondary tasks, to be undertaken "within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources", were to help create conditions for civilian agencies to carry out non-military provisions of the DPA, including: to assist the UN High commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organisations in the accomplishment of their humanitarian missions and other tasks associated with the peace settlement; to assist in prevention of interference with the freedom of movement of civilians, refugees and displaced persons; responding appropriately to deliberate violence; and to assist in demining.

The primary tasks were prerequisites to establishing even a short-term peace, and IFOR, which was weighted heavily to armoured units, accomplished them in a matter of weeks. During the winter and spring of 1996, NATO officials prided themselves on that accomplishment, implicitly calling attention to the relative disorganisation and slow pace of progress of the civilian effort. This chiding began to subside, however, as civilian officials pointed out that the military task was infinitely simpler than the unprecedented social engineering called for in the civilian side of the DPA, and as civilian agencies began to call on IFOR for a greater emphasis on its "secondary tasks".

Among the secondary tasks, the ones that involved engineering, logistics and simple forms of police work were the easiest. As soon as its own bases were established, IFOR began repairing bridges and roads, and it responded with enthusiasm to requests to assist in the holding of elections, especially since elections were being advertised as a major step toward IFOR's withdrawal.

Other tasks which involved potential risk to IFOR personnel or involvement in politically ambiguous and open-ended commitments were rejected. These included participation in civilian demining, which entailed exposure to the risk of mine strikes; escorting minority group returnees to their homes in hostile communities, which would raise the issue of safeguarding them once they were there; and above all seeking out and arresting persons who had been indicted by ICTY, which was seen as politically entangling as well as risky.

As it became clear that nationalist political parties in Croat and Serb areas of Bosnia were closely identified with, indeed run by, some of the indicted war criminals, international civilian officials endorsed the view of human rights activists and independent observers that this was the absolute top priority in efforts to change the political culture in the secessionist parts of Bosnia. Thus, IFOR began to face steadily rising expectations and criticism in the media for declining to arrest indicted war criminals, above all Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic who was the most notorious.

IFOR began to decline in size in the summer of 1996. But as it began to shrink, the demands it was facing were becoming more complex. After a policy review in April 1997, the US Administration concluded that only a more aggressive effort could lead to successful implementation of the DPA Eventually, on 10 July, that conclusion -- coupled with a change of government in Britain, led to the arrest of one indicted Serb and the killing of another in a shoot-out during a "snatch" operation conducted by British Special Air Service (SAS) troops in Prijedor.

At the 30 May meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Sintra, Portugal, the High Representative was given added powers to force the restructuring of entity police forces and to force an opening in the media. Then, when an open split occurred between Karadzic loyalists in Pale and Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic, based in Banja Luka, international officials began to intervene increasingly openly on the side of Plavsic.

By this time, SFOR was a main player in what had become a relatively activist team effort. By late summer, it had assumed a key back-up role, covering attempts by Plavsic to take control of police stations that were still held by Karadzic loyalists in northern Bosnia, as well as to secure television transmission towers in an attempt to silence a bellicose media in Pale that had repeatedly incited the population to violence.

Thus, despite some evident misgivings about being drawn into a process that may take a long time to complete, SFOR is far more deeply engaged in implementing its secondary tasks than it was six months ago.

The US Political Context

Just as understanding the complications of implementing the DPA requires an appreciation of recent Balkan history, making sense of the exit strategy debate requires an awareness of the domestic political context in troop-contributing states.

The term "exit strategy" entered US political usage about a decade ago, meaning a plan developed by a US Administration to terminate an overseas military involvement which commits US ground forces in a potentially hostile or entangling environment. The issue has been a factor in Congressional debates over all recent military engagements in places such as Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia where overwhelming economic or strategic national interests were not perceived to be at stake.

An Administration contemplating such a deployment is invariably asked to present a plausible exit strategy before Congress will authorise funding for the operation to begin. The Administration would have difficulty winning congressional approval if it states that its strategy may well have to be revised or extended as events require. One short cut to approval is to simply announce a date certain for completion of the mission. That, however, is a double-edged tactic.

In presenting the DPA to the US public, President Clinton justified US participation by arguing that it was necessary to stop suffering, bring stability to Europe and maintain US leadership in NATO, and because all three parties in the war insisted that US ground troops be part of the NATO force. He also stated that the deployment would last "about one year".

A year later, President Clinton announced that IFOR would metamorphose into SFOR and remain in Bosnia for another 18 months. Military planning for the transition had been underway for many months. However, there were immediate and predictable congressional accusations that the Administration had kept its policy deliberations secret and never had been serious about withdrawing US troops in "about one year".

Throughout 1997, the exit strategy was debated intensely in the US. By the end of the year, it appeared to have been resolved in favour of continuing US participation in an extended NATO operation. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said on 4 November that "a consensus is developing that there will or should be some form of US military presence post-SFOR". Speaking at a news conference alongside German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, Albright added, "We need to do what is necessary to make [the DPA] work." Then on 28 November, US Gen. Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, told NATO ambassadors at a meeting in Brussels that NATO should remain at about its current strength and that a withdrawal in June 1998 would leave a dangerous "vacuum".

Also, there is said to be agreement in the US that it would not be wise or credible to set yet another arbitrary deadline for the withdrawal of the SFOR follow-on force, but policy makers are wrestling with the size of the force, possible changes in its mission and the size of the US component, all of which are related. They are said to believe that, if the force is to intervene more aggressively to enforce civilian aspects of the DPA, such as freedom of movement, it cannot be reduced in size. Nor, for reasons explained below, can the US component probably drop below its current one-quarter share.

European and US Perspectives on Involvement in Bosnia

Bosnia fell apart rapidly at the start of the war because the Bosnian Serbs, armed by the JNA, were fully prepared for a secessionist campaign, and because the government in Sarajevo had no means to block the rebellion or control its territory.

Facing this reality, European diplomats tried to head off the war in March 1992 by persuading Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic to accept the division of Bosnia into ethnically-based cantons. Leaving aside the relative merits of this so-called Lisbon Agreement, which was brokered by the then Portuguese Foreign Minister Jose Cutilheiro, some European diplomats feel that it was fatally undermined by US interference. Having signed the cantonisation agreement in principle, Izetbegovic backed out after, among others, consulting with Warren Zimmerman, the then US Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

When the war started soon thereafter, mainly British, Canadian and French troops were quickly committed to the UN Protection Force which opened the besieged Sarajevo airport in June and then tried for the next three years to open the way for humanitarian aid deliveries and to serve, by its presence, as a shield for the civilian population.

The US voted consistently for Security Council resolutions that expanded the UNPROFOR mandate -- for example declaring "safe havens" around cities and enclaves such as Srebrenica -- but it did not contribute troops whose presence would have inevitably stiffened the NATO peace-keeping operation. President Clinton promised more assertive US leadership in Bosnia during the 1992 presidential campaign, but facing complicated domestic relations, Clinton distanced himself from the issue soon after his election.

By spring 1993, it had become clear that the US would under no circumstances commit ground troops to the peace-keeping effort. Thereafter, Americans who favoured active intervention to stop the war in Bosnia coalesced around low-risk policy options such as "Lift and Strike" -- aerial bombardment of the Bosnian Serbs and delivering arms to the Bosniac side -- which would allow the US to influence the situation by technical means. Almost no US political figures were willing to defend a view that is widely taken as a given today: that the European effort needed to be made tougher, and could not be made tougher without US involvement, alongside the others, on the ground.

The remote control policy options favoured by US officials, such as air strikes, were unacceptable to European leaders because their ground troops were already deployed across Bosnia in small, highly vulnerable detachments of the UN peace-keeping force. Europeans saw the Lift and Strike approach as likely to intensify the war rather than to end it, in which case their troops would be caught in a cross-fire and pay the price. If fact, as the US pressed for Lift and Strike, arguing that the arms embargo was unfair, the Europeans threatened to withdraw from UNPROFOR.

Such a withdrawal would have been extremely difficult as well as risky because peace-keepers were likely to be taken hostage by all sides to serve as shields. Thus, the US was pressed to begin planning a tough NATO extraction force to cover the UNPROFOR withdrawal which Lift and Strike would provoke. This would have required US ground troops, however. Faced with the European threat to withdraw UNPROFOR, the Clinton Administration delayed its plans for air strikes and dropped the idea of overt arms shipments.

In a May 1995 episode, NATO tried some bombing to chasten the Bosnian Serbs for violating a weapons exclusion zone. This led within hours to the taking of hundreds of UNPROFOR soldiers hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, proving the European case. The bombing ended after one day and the hostages were released.

A renewed NATO bombing campaign at the end of the war came after the massacre at Srebrenica and was triggered by a shell which landed outside the closed market building in Sarajevo on 28 August, killing 43. In that campaign, US and other NATO planes flew numerous sorties against Bosnian Serb targets such as communications facilities and bridges, which crippled the Bosnian Serb forces at the same time they were coming under attack from the massive Croat-Bosniac offensive in western Bosnia. This devastated Serb morale and led quickly to the cease-fire immediately preceding Dayton.

US and European Perspectives at Present

The foregoing history of US and European involvement in Bosnia during the war is a necessary part of the context for understanding the current NATO debate on the composition of a successor force to SFOR.

In recent months, the basic conflict of interest between those who have troops at risk and those who do not has surfaced again as US politicians have called for an early pull out of US troops, even though the future of Bosnia remains in doubt. Most European leaders have said that if the US quits Bosnia, they will withdraw too.

US politicians point out with irritation that European countries clearly have a much more direct interest in preserving peace in Bosnia than do Americans, since economic dislocation and refugee flows would affect them first. Moreover, in theory this powerful group of states should be able to manage troubles in its own "back yard". Accordingly, the US has tried until recently to consider nothing more than an arms-length support role, providing logistics, intelligence, communications, and air cover for an all-European post-SFOR ground force.

But European leaders are determined not to be caught again in something resembling the wartime situation when the US decided what kind of peace settlement was acceptable, pressed for expansions of the UNPROFOR mandate, and pressed continually for Lift and Strike, without willing to share the risk on the ground.

Although it may be argued that peace in the Balkans is above all a European concern, if a premature US withdrawal led the Dayton peace to collapse, US interests would be affected in several ways. Since US diplomats negotiated and took credit for Dayton, its collapse would be a significant US diplomatic setback. In the ensuing recriminations, NATO unity would be threatened and, in fact, the reason for NATO's existence would be in doubt, just at the moment the US is pressing to expand NATO eastward to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Finally, if an SFOR withdrawal led to a Bosniac attack on the Bosnian Serbs, there could be grave implications for western relations with Russia. Russian involvement, first in UNPROFOR and then in IFOR/SFOR, has been important in winning Serb acceptance. It has been even more important, however, by engaging Russia and drawing it into the western world. This East-West co-operation has been a precedent-setting experiment in bridging East-West military suspicions which have subsided but not entirely vanished after the Cold War. The chance of seriously undermining relations with Russia at a time when the West is trying to expand NATO, and seeking Russian acquiescence as well as active co-operation in dealing with other crises, is not a risk western strategists want to run.

The Muted Debate

Quietly, planning has been underway in Washington for options after SFOR. One reflection of this is a recent political-military exercise that was developed at the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) and run at the US Army Concepts Analysis Centre to provide policy options for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This exercise explored a range of theoretical "transition options" for SFOR post-June 1998:

The first was "Out Together", meaning a total NATO withdrawal in June;
The second was "Zero Force" (ZFOR), meaning removing all NATO combat forces and leaving military observers only;
The third was a "European-Only Force" (EFOR), which is not an option for reasons explained above;
The fourth was an "Over-the-Horizon" Force (OHFOR) composed of a European NATO force stationed nearby, but outside Bosnia, with US combat support and material pre-positioned in Bosnia;
The fifth was a "Transition Force" (TFOR) in which a European combat force would remain in Bosnia, with US support units, and with a US combat force stationed nearby, probably in Hungary, but returning often to conduct exercises in Bosnia to maintain the impression of continuing US deployment, at least initially.

Each option was analysed for its probable impact on several key issues: the likelihood of deterring an endgame attack; ability to control escalation of local ethnic clashes; ability to back up the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), which is regarded as playing a crucial role under any scenario ; likelihood of an early exit; impact on NATO-US relations; NATO credibility at a time of expansion; impact on US-Russian relations; engendering NATO self-reliance; impact on US relations with the Islamic World; and impact on displaced persons returns.

The exercise reached the following conclusions:

"Out Together" and ZFOR were seen as likely to trigger a resumption of genocidal warfare, tarnishing of US credibility, grave damage to US leadership in NATO, a NATO fall into disrepute, magnified Russian mistrust of US motives, and other worst case results;
"EFOR" was seen as good in that it would force NATO to adapt, but as disastrous for US leadership;
"OHFOR" was seen as good for NATO adaptation, Russian relations and NATO expansion, but dubious for NATO credibility, US leadership and relations with Islamic states, and bad for displaced persons;
"TFOR" was seen as somewhat workable in all regards, but dubious for displaced persons return;
The one alternative which scored highest in the exercise, receiving positive scores in NATO credibility, US leadership, NATO expansion, and relations with Islamic states, was continuing SFOR much as it is, but calling it perhaps "DFOR" for "Deterrence Force". DFOR, however, received negative scores in the exit strategy column and on domestic implications, both for failing to meet the June 1998 deadline and for costs.

In sum, military planners have been looking hard at the whole range of options. They think that getting the Europeans to carry on if the US leaves is wishful thinking. They see the most politically acceptable compromise inside Washington to be a transition force with Americans commuting regularly from Hungary. But they seem to think the only safe choice -- however unsavoury politically -- is to soldier on, much as at present, but with a name change. "Over the horizon forces are fine until things go wrong... and then they usually don't come," says a ranking European SFOR officer. "I don't feel that you have a credible military commitment in Bosnia unless you are prepared to take casualties."

Although there now seems to be a consensus that SFOR will be followed with a force that includes US troops, it remains to be seen how ambitious the mandate of the follow-on force will be. If it is intended to provide security for minority returns, enable freedom of movement and install municipal administrations, much less arrest indicted war criminals, it is unlikely to be reduced much below its present strength.

Curing the gravely-wounded political culture of Bosnia is an intensely complicated undertaking. While a more aggressive NATO presence, which includes arresting indicted war criminals, will no doubt push the peace process forward, the political situation is likely to remain delicate.

Perhaps in a few years, much of the US component can be reduced and based over-the-horizon, and one can expect US planners to push steadily in this direction. It is unlikely, however, that this could be achieved in the short run without risking a rapid reoccurrence of instability in Bosnia as local parties challenge the remaining force, which will inevitably be seen as less capable.

Conclusions

On the Military Balance

It must be assumed that there are weapons as yet undeclared on all sides, although over time these will deteriorate if they are not maintained and will diminish as a threatening factor. However, assuming continued mutual monitoring and mutual transparency under OSCE auspices, quantitative uncertainties will become less pressing. Qualitative factors such as economic conditions, morale, strategic liabilities and political dynamics will remain of decisive importance.
It will be important to note whether the OSCE and SFOR remain in agreement that "reduction liabilities" have been met and that confidence-building measures are on course. The issue will require continued monitoring, since there was a huge reservoir of JNA armaments available at the beginning of the war, and since there is no way of making an accurate baseline count.
It should be remembered that evenly matched sides often get into wars. A level battle-field does not guarantee a stable peace. The weapons count remains a factor but not, by itself, a decisive one.

On Train and Equip

Train and Equip should cease to be a taboo subject. At present, the programme is supported vigorously by the US and is deprecated obliquely by others in the international community. It is an important part of the international effort in Bosnia and it deserves a closer examination than it has had to date.
Proponents of Train and Equip who argue the "moral case" for righting a wrong that existed egregiously four years ago, but which has much less relevance today, make a fundamental mistake: their arguments look to the past rather than to the future and are less-than convincing to those whose main concern is future stability in the region.
The belief among some in the US that Train and Equip will build up the Federation and permit an early exit by US forces is a grave error. Pressure for an early US exit strategy is almost certain to be highly destabilising. If NATO departs prematurely, Train and Equip could easily serve as trigger for a new war which might begin well but end badly for the Federation, as well as generate a new wave of refugees that will destabilise a broader region.
Detractors of Train and Equip who see it as purely destabilising and ignore its potential as one path toward the gradual westernisation of Bosnia are taking too narrow a view. There are indications the programme has brought some stability to the Federation Ministry of Defence; indeed, by some accounts the level of co-operation is more promising there than in other Federation ministries.
Those suspicious of Train and Equip should acknowledge that it provides an important window into the workings of the Federation Defence Ministry and a substantial influence over Federation military thinking. It has been one factor in the reduction of extremist influence in the Federation army. To the extent that Europeans participate in the programme, it could serve as a mechanism to pull Bosnia closer to Europe. It would be foolish to scrap this asset.
A simple path to easing European misgivings about Train and Equip would be to make MPRI an equal opportunity employer, building a portion of its staff by hiring retired military officers from European NATO states, rather than solely from the US. The transparency principle is relevant here, since the Europeans are properly concerned about stability.
A defensive capability inevitably has offensive implications, and because of terrain, short distances and configuration of the IEBL, there are inherent instabilities in Bosnia. Thus far, there is no reason to think the scope and quantity of the assistance offered through Train and Equip has crossed the line. But substantial numbers of tanks and other weapons with clear offensive potential would be problematic.
If Train and Equip is extended to the Bosnian Serbs, it might lower tensions, increase transparency and over time build a military bridge between the Federation and Republika Srpska, as it seems to have been doing between Bosniacs and Croats. It would be naive to expect a sudden convergence of interests and lapse of animosities, however. Progress on this front will depend on the form of membership offered to Republika Srpska, whether it involves equipment or training or both. A transformation will also require dropping the implicit threat that after a NATO exit, the new-and-improved Federation army might take matters into its own hands.
Train and Equip should not be seen or advertised for US domestic political purposes as a quick and easy "exit strategy", an alternative to US involvement in Bosnia. If the US makes clear it is engaged in Bosnia alongside its allies for the long haul, it is much more likely the Europeans will see the merits of Train and Equip as a step toward gradually Europeanising Bosnia. European objections could be expected to diminish, and European support for Train and Equip would be more likely.
In sum, Train and Equip provides a useful window into the Federation military, and an obvious means to compete successfully with extremist influence. It should be seen as one element in an extended and complex process of westernising post-war Bosnia. The advantages of a judiciously managed and monitored Train and Equip programme outweigh its drawbacks.

On Exit Strategy

NATO preoccupation with exit strategies sends a confusing and destabilising message to Bosnians, perpetuating uncertainties about investment, refugee returns and normalisation. Moreover, the prospect of a premature NATO departure encourages hard-liners to sit tight and wait NATO out.
The treatment of NATO follow-on planning as a taboo subject is damaging to public understanding of events and prospects in Bosnia, and can undermine domestic political support. Since it is widely understood that a continued international military presence will be required for years in Bosnia, this should be acknowledged. Recent moves in this direction are encouraging.
However, the sensitivities of politicians are part of the political context in which Bosnia policy is made. It may be politically necessary for the extension of the NATO presence past June 1998 to appear different in form from SFOR. Whatever the new force is called, however, it will still require the presence of a significant fraction of US ground troops who share duties and risks alongside troops from other NATO countries. Early withdrawal of US ground forces would render the NATO follow-on force far less effective, even if European contingents remained, and a US pull-out would severely undermine the US claim to leadership within NATO.
Since troubles in the Balkan countries have a more direct impact on their European neighbours than on the US, it is reasonable to expect the European states to assume more of the burden over time. There must be no abrupt transition, however. Tentative US plans to withdraw to an "over-the-horizon" role -- offering logistics, intelligence and air support, and promising a "rapid reaction force" if circumstances require -- are not realistic in the near term.
The option of partitioning Bosnia, decreeing it, managing population exchanges, and then withdrawing the NATO troops -- is offered by some. However seductive the idea may be as a means of bringing current US exposure to a close, such a partition would be disastrous. Given the resistance of displaced persons to being moved again, nothing short of a new round of warfare may be required to force the sought-after population movements. The policy will be a disaster for a large number of Bosnians who are of mixed families, and a harbinger of more instability in the international system if it became a precedent justifying other changes of borders. Moreover, none of the entities makes economic sense standing alone. The Croatian areas are likely to gravitate toward Croatia, and the Serb areas -- at least eastern Bosnia -- to gravitate toward Serbia. This would leave the Bosniac area with a huge, embittered displaced population, which would be a breeding ground for trouble and a magnet for extremists who would pull rump Bosnia away from the current westernising influence of NATO involvement, producing the outcome that European governments fear most. Conceivably, if the Republika Srpska divides and the north-western areas are linked to the Federation, a partition might be more feasible, but there should be no illusions about the difficulties and the drawbacks, including further forced movements of populations with repercussions in neighbouring states. The situation would remain turbulent and managing such a partition would also require an open-ended NATO presence, including a US presence for years into the future. Whatever else it does, partition does not offer an exit strategy.
Instead of formulating another "exit strategy" for the SFOR follow-on force, it may be more constructive to develop "transition strategies" that alter the role and composition of the NATO force over time. For example, perhaps over time Europe can develop a common foreign policy and the Western European Union (NATO minus the US and Canada) could assume full responsibility for peace maintenance in the Balkans. In the meantime, however, the entire region -- not only Bosnia but FRY and Croatia, as well as Macedonia and Albania -- will need continuing attention. For the foreseeable future, that will involve a sizeable NATO force in Bosnia, US troops among them.
It should be acknowledged in retrospect that one way to have avoided a costly and long-term involvement in the post-war recovery of Bosnia would have been to pay more attention five years ago, when the eventual catastrophe was still only a crisis.

Sarajevo, 15 December 1997

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