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Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina:How International Support Can be More EffectiveMarch 18, 1997 (Part 1 of 2)
Contents
Given the critical role that the media played in the destruction of both Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the on-going role they play in fanning the flames of ethnic hatred, the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has devoted much time, energy and money to this field. Despite frenetic activity, however, there have been few breakthroughs. Nearly 15 months after the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) came into force, the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain divided into three separate and mutually antagonistic components in Republika Srpska, Bosniac-controlled Federation territory and Croat-controlled Federation territory. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has a mandate to support the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Annex 3 of the DPA by way of creating conditions for free and fair elections. Otherwise, the international community is also able to influence the Bosnian media via subsidies, training programmes, and its own media presentation. The work of the OSCEs Media Development Unit (MDU) and in particular its Media Experts commission was extremely disappointing in the run-up to the 1996 national elections. As a result, nationalist media were able to flout minimum standards with impunity. The postponement of the municipal elections, however, has given the media development unit a second chance. Critically, the MDU has new leadership and personnel who appear determined to play a more pro-active role and to respond rapidly to abuses. Foreign donors, in particular George Soross Open Society Fund, the US Agency for International Development and the European commission ploughed money into media projects in 1996. However, only the Open Society Fund, which unlike the other principal donors has already been working in Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years and is largely staffed by Bosnian nationals with media expertise, appears to have a long-term strategy. Donor rivalry and overlap in both training and subsidies are rife and a cost-benefit analysis of media investment indicates a poor return. Moreover, the very number of media projects, which is out of all proportion to the size of Bosnias population and, critically, the limited number of able journalists, dilutes their potential impact. The highest profile and most expensive project, TV-IN, which is otherwise known as the Open Broadcast Network and cost $10.5 million in 1996, has been a failure. The fundamental problem was the desire for quick results. The station went on the air one week before elections to give the impression of media pluralism. It was not technically ready and lacked the journalists to make it a success. Worse still, it was built on a network of small Bosniac stations and this has compromised the project in the eyes of both Croats and Serbs. The other high-profile international media project, the Swiss-financed Free Elections Radio Network (FERN) which cost 2 million DM, also had negligible impact on the Bosnian media scene during the election campaign, despite going on air two months before polling day. Although originally scheduled to close after the elections, postponement of the municipal poll gave the station a new lease on life and time to develop a quality product and to build up an audience. It has therefore been able to evolve into an influential medium, albeit concentrated in Bosniac-controlled Federation territory, the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina where media are generally the most open. The media approach of international organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is unimaginative at best. The principal point of contact with journalists is a daily press conference which is held in English without translation. While the foreign press corps is well catered for, Bosnian journalists feel that they are ignored and consider the international communitys approach imperialistic. ICG proposes a series of measures for the international community which, if implemented, could help change the role of the Bosnian media from one which is exacerbating tension to one which could contribute to restoring trust between the countrys peoples. They include:
Given the critical role that the media played in the destruction of both Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the on-going role they play in fanning the flames of ethnic hatred, the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has attempted to influence their output during the first 14 months of peace. The record to date is mixed, though not for want of trying. This report is the fruit of extensive monitoring of the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of international attempts to influence them, interviews with foreign donors, and in particular Bosnian journalists throughout the country. It consists of a brief history of the Bosnian media and their disintegration in war; a survey of the current media scene and of existing international attempts to influence them, and concludes with suggestions for a co-ordinated strategy to boost the non-nationalist media, reduce the influence of the nationalist media and thus contribute to the reintegration of the country. Appendices at the end contain media directories for Republika Srpska, Bosniac-controlled Federation territory and Croat-controlled Federation territory, including a brief description of each medium, as well as a break-down of the media investment of many of the major donors in 1996.
Until the very last years of the communist era the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina were dull, conservative and firmly controlled by the republican authorities. Nevertheless, in the best Titoist traditions they aimed to satisfy, if not necessarily please, all three of the republics constituent peoples. Key newspapers were published in a mix of Latin and Cyrillic with the script of the front-page alternating. Likewise, television subtitles were in Cyrillic one day and Latin the next. The Bosnian media acquired a lease on life as Yugoslavias League of Communists disintegrated. RTV Sarajevo, RTV B&Hs predecessor, was freed from direct government control by act of parliament and Oslobodjenje, the dominant publishing house, began the privatisation process. In October 1990 Sarajevo became home to Yutel, a would-be pan-Yugoslav television network launched by Yugoslavias last prime minister, Ante Markovic, in an attempt to neutralise the media war then being waged between Belgrade and Zagreb. Yutel leased RTV Sarajevos second channel and was remarkably popular among Bosnians throughout the war in neighbouring Croatia. It went off the air five weeks after the outbreak of fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the Yugoslav ideal it represented disintegrated. In the course of 43 months of war, the integrated Bosnian media fell apart and split into three completely separate and mutually antagonistic components. The structure of the media also changed. During the war, most of the trade publications folded and the circulation of newspapers and magazines collapsed. By contrast, broadcast media, which was viewed as critical to the war effort, mushroomed. Whereas 377 publications, 54 radio stations, four television stations and one news agency were officially registered before the war, there are now 145 print media, 92 radio stations, 29 TV stations and six news agencies. 2
The Bosnian media remain divided into three almost totally separate markets in Republika Srpska, Bosniac-controlled Federation territory and Croat-controlled Federation territory. Broadcast signals cross the former front lines and enable Bosnians to watch television or listen to radio originating from territory controlled by another people. However, few journalists dare to travel to regions outside the control of their nations armed forces because they fear for their personal security. Moreover, telephone links, which are poor between Croat and Bosniac-controlled territory, hardly exist between the Federation and Republika Srpska. 3 One feature common to all three media markets is the overwhelming influence of state television. An opinion poll in the Sarajevo monthly magazine Dani indicated that 46.6 per cent of people in Bosniac-controlled Federation territory declared television to be their principal source of information - far ahead of the second most influential medium, the daily newspaper Dnevni avaz, which, according to the same poll, was the principal source of information for 7.54 per cent. 4 In Republika Srpska and Croat-controlled Federation territory the influence of state television was even more pervasive, since virtually no alternative medium exists in those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the lack of contact between the three media markets, each must be considered in turn. (See appendix for a directory of the Bosnian media.)
In Republika Srpska the most important media are directed by the most powerful politician in the ruling Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS). Momcilo Krajisnik, the Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency and close colleague of indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, chairs the management board of RTV Srpska and carefully controls the content of state radio and television. The consequences are predictable. Indeed, the output of the official Bosnian Serb media is frequently so offensive that High Representative Carl Bildt accused them of putting out propaganda that "even Stalin would be ashamed of". 5 TV Srpskas news output and especially the flagship early evening Novosti u 7.30 is less than subtle. According to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, "Novosti provides unreserved support to Republika Srpska authorities. It fully upholds the policies, ideology and national euphoria propagated by the ruling SDS. Its relentlessly negative stance towards the Federationand especially towards Bosniacsaims to rule out any possibility of coexistence and reintegration." 6 Bosniacs are still frequently referred to in derogatory terms, and reports from the Federation are regularly placed in the section Iz sveta (From Abroad), thereby suggesting that Republika Srpska is not part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Republika Srpska is home to 25 newspapers and other periodicals, 36 radio stations (seven of which are privately-owned), seven television stations (i.e. production units or studios) and one official state news agency, SRNA. 7 Of the broadcast media none apart from RTV Srpska has an independent news-gathering capacity and even the handful of privately-owned stations rely almost exclusively on the SRNA wire. In addition to TV Srpska, Sarajevo-based radio and television B&H, as well as Croatian and Serbian radio and television, can be watched in much of Republika Srpska. Of these, Serbian television is naturally the most influential, though its image has recently taken a severe beating because of its coverage, that is lack of coverage, of the mass demonstrations in Belgrade which could be watched on TV Srpska. Otherwise, the Belgrade press is also generally available and read far more than anything published in Republika Srpska.
Alternative MediaAfter several years of darkness, alternative media began cautiously to emerge around the time that the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. The first medium to make an impact, however, was hardly independent. Radio Krajina, an army-run station in Banja Luka which was headed by indicted war criminal Ratko Mladics spokesman Colonel Milovan Milutinovic, became an unlikely yet influential forum for alternative points of view. Indeed, according to IWPR, it was the "lone broadcaster to act as something other than a government transmission belt" 8 and in the run-up to the elections it consistently produced lively political phone-in debates featuring every party which wished to take part. The elections were a great spur to the alternative media since the ruling party had to give the impression, at least temporarily, that it would tolerate other points of view. In this way, a handful of newspapers, Nezavisne novine and Novi prelom in Banja Luka, Alternativa in Doboj and Panorama in Bijeljina, all of which had been launched or relaunched since the signing of the DPA, became mouthpieces of the opposition. Of these, Nezavisne novine was by far the most influential, evolving, with financial assistance from the UKs Overseas Development Agency, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and George Soros Open Society Fund, from a fortnightly newspaper into a weekly in June and a daily in August. Moreover, the daily boasted a circulation of 4,000 and the weekly of 9,000, which though objectively low was, nevertheless, far greater than any other publication in Republika Srpska. The backlash came as soon as the elections were over and the SDS was confirmed in power. In October journalists with Alternativa were put on trial for libel, Radio Krajina was closed and Glas Srpski, the state-owned and only printing press suitable for newspapers told Nezavisne novine that "for technical reasons" it could no longer be printed. If the intention of the SDS was to silence all dissenting voices, it had the opposite effect. Reporters from throughout Republika Srpska who had been working for alternative media came together in December to form a union of independent journalists. Meanwhile, Nezavisne novine switched printing to Belgrade and continued to come out as a weekly, continuously pushing back the boundaries of the possible with, for example, interviews with the chairman of the Bosnian Presidency Alija Izetbegovic and a joint-venture of sorts with the Sarajevo-based bi-weekly Slobodna Bosna. In January, as it became clear that the clamp-down was counter-productive, Glas Srpski relented and agreed to print Nezavisne novine again.
The most closed media market is in Croat-controlled Federation territory. Of 10 papers and magazines, 15 radio stations, five television studios and one news agency, Habena, 9 no media organs, not even those which are privately owned, deviate from the line of the ruling Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ). Not even during the election campaign did any of the media give any space to alternative points of view. The most important local medium, HTV Mostar (which is a privately-owned television station) is, according to IWPR, "one party television for a would-be one-party state". 10 Newspapers from Croatia dominate the news-stands and the Split daily Slobodna Dalmacija devotes a page every day to events in so-called Herceg-Bosna. Dissident Croatian publications, however, such as the satirical Split weekly Feral Tribune, are difficult to find. Otherwise, Hrvatska Radio-Televizija, that is television from Croatia proper whose signal covers much of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the principal information source. On 1 February an outpost of Hrvatska Radio-Televizija called TV Herceg-Bosna began broadcasting to Croat-controlled Federation territory from Siroki Brijeg. In December a weekly newspaper called Horizont was launched in west Mostar. While too early for a definitive analysis, the newspaper is nevertheless already the most positive media development in Croat-controlled territory since the end of hostilities.
The most open of the state-run media in Bosnia and Herzegovina is by far that in Bosniac-controlled Federation territory. They, nevertheless, leave much to be desired, and while relatively open to the Bosniac opposition, have little positive to say about either Republika Srpska or, more worrying, their Croat partners in the Federation. Though TV B&H, the most influential medium, attempts to portray itself as a public service broadcaster for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its news output is generally slavishly obedient to the ruling Bosniac nationalist party Stranka za demokratsku akciju (SDA) and amounts at best to a version of events from the perspective of a broad-minded Bosniac. The situation is considerably bleaker in the local, municipality-owned media outside Sarajevo, especially in Cazinska Krajina, the area of northern Bosnia around Bihac, which are firmly under SDA control. Since the state-run media are so much more reasonable and tolerant in Bosniac-controlled territory than elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniac nationalist media with close links to the ruling SDA also exist. These include Dnevni avaz, the best-selling daily newspaper, Ljiljan, the weekly with especially high sales abroad, and Hayat Radio. Moreover, a Bosniac nationalist television linked to the newspaper Ljiljan is scheduled to come on air in the near future.
Alternative MediaAt first glance the alternative media scene appears to be thriving, diverse and dynamic. News-stands are packed with a plethora of publications and the air waves are clogged by the frequencies of the many radio stations. In addition, privately-owned, local television stations are everywhere. Indeed, there are 110 print media, 41 radio stations, 17 television stations and four news agencies on Bosniac-controlled Federation territory. 11 The reason is donations from abroad. An estimated $7 million were ploughed into the media in Bosniac-controlled territory between October 1992 and the end of 1995. 12 Since there has been no shortage of deep-pocketed donors, the scale of the alternative media and the number of journalists is out of all proportion to the size of the population. Moreover, as foreign donors appear prepared to continue subsidising the Bosnian media, the number of media ventures and radio projects in particular, appears to grow by the day. Despite a handful of quality publications, however, circulations are generally small and most of the industry would collapse if the donations dried up.
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