OVERVIEW
Maumere, a town of
some 40,000 people on the island of Flores in eastern Indonesia, is to all
appearances the model of tranquillity, noted primarily for its poverty and
Catholicism. But since July 2002, three incidents that are symptomatic of many
problems facing Indonesia more generally have shaken the town. On 14 July, a
riot erupted after a crew member of a visiting ship committed what locals
considered sacrilege during a Catholic mass. The perpetrator happened to be a
Protestant, but the mob marched on the local mosque, and serious violence was
only narrowly averted. At the end of the month, a well-known public official
with ties to the local government and army went on trial for smuggling wood. On
18 August 2002, a fight broke out between the police and military that revealed
the hostility between the two agencies, the depth of local animosity towards
the police; and the ongoing impact of the East Timor conflict on Flores. The
July and August eruptions have left the business community, mostly ethnic
Chinese, frightened and uncertain of its future, although no Chinese was
targeted.
The unrest on Flores raises questions that every corner of
Indonesia is facing:
Flores must additionally manage the unaddressed problem of
demobilisation of troops who served in East Timor.
The incidents
described in this briefing have taken place against the backdrop of a
decentralisation policy that is transforming the political landscape of
Indonesia. That policy, which devolves substantial economic and political
authority from the central government down to the district level, has raised
the stakes of local political contests, particularly for the position of bupati or district head. Maumere is the
seat of Sikka district, whose bupati,
Paulus Moa, has strong links to the military. His term ends in 2003, and
manoeuvring to extend or replace him is already well underway. This could well
exacerbate existing military-police rivalry, lead to new promises to the
military of economic returns from projects licensed by the central government,
or give different parties an incentive to play on existing frictions.
Decentralisation has
also resulted in a process of administrative fragmentation known as pemekaran, literally “blossoming”, by
which new and smaller provinces and districts are carved out of larger ones,
supposedly based on criteria set by the Ministry of Home Affairs but often
based on how much those in favour of the new units are able to pay in bribes.
A campaign is
underway to make the island of Flores, together with the nearby island of
Lembata, a separate province that would be carved out of the province of Nusa
Tenggara Timur (NTT). There are strong arguments for and against.
Administrative services would be within easier reach. The provincial capital of
NTT is Kupang, in West Timor; if Flores became a province in its own right, the
town of Maumere would be a strong contender to become the capital. This would
facilitate local recruitment of police, for example, since at present, anyone
wishing to take the recruitment exam has to travel to Kupang. (Until recently,
the exam was only held in Denpasar, Bali, with the result that many of the
police in Flores are Balinese.)
Land values in
Maumere would likely skyrocket, benefiting the local elite but also perhaps
generating more land speculation and disputes. More trade would be directed to
Makassar, in South Sulawesi, instead of Kupang. The Maumere-Makassar route
makes far more geographic and economic sense, but it could result in an
increase in migration to Flores by ethnic Bugis traders and a heightening of
communal tensions. Establishing the province of Flores could also lead to an
increased military presence, for reasons discussed below.
The problems that
produced the July and August outbreaks in Maumere are unlikely to be solved at
a local level alone, in part because most of the parties are tainted. Members
of the Catholic clergy in Flores are growing weary of being called on to
prevent conflict and are in any case concerned that their ability to do so is
waning. The communal tensions on Flores, and in particular the suspicions of
the Catholic majority about the intentions of the tiny Muslim minority, have
less to do with reality on the ground and much more with national developments
as played out in the print and broadcast media. “If Laskar Jihad [a militant
Muslim militia now operating in several conflict areas] comes to Flores, we’re
ready for them”, one parishioner told a local priest grimly.
All this underscores
the fact that the problem of managing conflict in Indonesia is not simply one
of crafting better policies for Aceh, Maluku, Poso, Papua and other hotspots.
The potential for violence exists throughout much of the country. The solutions
go back in many cases to police and military reform. An analysis of the three
incidents in Flores is followed by a concluding section drawing together some
of the wider lessons to be learned from them.
Jakarta/Brussels, 10 October 2002
